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INVITATION AU VOYAGE
Invitation au voyage: is there better title to our Volume 8,
Number 2? Our journey starts in Louisiana, to take us to
Switzerland and Turkey. In One into Three, Three into One, Esin
Örücü creates a magic triangulation between the Louisiana, Swiss,
and Turkish civil codes, translation making the first spread to new
horizons, and one of three linguistic versions of the second
supporting the creation of the third and generating a new civil law
system in Turkey. Translated into French and Spanish, the Civil
Code of Louisiana could regain its historical influence in Latin
America and be more accessible in other parts of the world. There
is no migration of legal ideas without translation, and translation is
in itself a linguistic and cultural voyage. This was the 38th John H.
Tucker, jr. Lecture in Civil Law on March 17, 2015.
We then leave Glasgow-based Professor Esin Örücü in Istanbul
to meet Professor Kjell Å Modéer in Lund, wherefrom he invites
us to explore unchartered legal links between Sweden and
Louisiana. At an annual meeting of the American Society for Legal
History in Austin, Louis de la Vergne introduced himself to
Professor Modéer as a descendant of Gustavus Schmidt, who was a
famous attorney in 19th century New Orleans. Gustavus’s brother
Carl Schmidt was a prominent judge in Sweden, the Schmidt
brothers’ home country. The two brothers founded law reviews in
Sweden and Louisiana, and established a rich comparative law
conversation between both jurisdictions. Loads of books and legal
ideas crisscrossed the Atlantic, including Gustavus Schmidt’s Civil
Law of Spain and Mexico, published in 1851, which was well
received by the King of Sweden. Navigating private
correspondence, novels, and poetry, the reader will discover a rich
and unexpected transatlantic intercultural communication between
Sweden and Louisiana. The journey ends in the basement of the
Lund law library where the author rediscovers one of the six copies
of The Civil Law of Spain and Mexico once sent to Sweden by
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Gustavus Schmidt, a lost treasure now available in reprint (Hein
2008).
The Australia-based Italian comparatist Luca Siliquini-Cinelli
has us embark on a worldwide trip, showing that a global
destination means nowhere. He shows how the traditional jurist,
the homo juridicus, loses his way on the soft-networked channels
of the new liberal global order, as a consequence of a shift from the
individual’s active will to the sterile behavioral schemes prompted
by the universalization of liberalism and economic analysis of
social interactions. Inviting Susan Sontag and Josef Esser’s
accounts against and for the interpretative task, he urges us to
rediscover the anthropological and ontological function of the
jurist to be based on the re-affirmation of the will as constitutive of
human uniqueness. This philosophical reflection focuses on the
centrality of interpretation, which happens to be the cornerstone of
the civil law tradition: all roads lead to Rome!
In Rome we are escorted by an enthusiastic Louisiana student,
who fell in love with the civil law at first sight in his first year of
law school. Secundum Civilis is a second-to-none guide where
Derek Warden connects the Eternal City to Washington via
Prussia, the Habsburg Empire and revolutionary France, to depict
the United States Constitution as an Enlightenment Code. This
could not be done without a voyage initiatique, taking us from
Rome to the seminal civil codes, visiting Justinian in
Constantinople and Napoléon in the Ville Lumière. This grand tour
ends up as a tour de force, making sense of the Ninth Amendment
as an invitation to interpret the whole Constitution as a code so that
its spirit may transcend its letter.
Civil Law of the World then transports us to South Africa,
where François du Toit discusses trusts and the patrimonial
consequences of divorce in a mixed jurisdiction, navigating the
reception of trust in a legal system that does not differentiate law
and equity. The discussion is technical and moves the reader from
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port to port or case to case, and is very informative for all civil law
jurisdictions having received the trust technique.
Back to Louisiana, the reader is offered the full French
translation of Book II of the Louisiana Civil Code, which can be
read side by side in English and in French. Book II features the law
of property (Things and the Different Modifications of
Ownership), entirely revised under the leadership of Professor
Yiannopoulos of Tulane University. This will no doubt interest
English-speaking and French-speaking civilians around the globe.
From Montreal, Lyon-educated Yaëll Emerich reviews Louisiana
Property Law—The Civil Code, Cases and Commentary (John A.
Lovett, Markus G. Puder & Evelyn L. Wilson eds., Carolina
Academic Press 2014), which serves as a guide for navigating
Book II of the Louisiana Civil Code.
Last but not least, another traveler from Quebec reviews the
Dictionary of the Civil Code (Alain Levasseur & Marie-Eugénie
Laporte Legeais eds., LexisNexis 2014), which is no less than the
translation of the Vocabulaire juridique of Gérard Cornu. The
French jurilinguist Jean-Claude Gémar shows how this gigantic
project, conducted by French and Louisiana teams, is faithful to the
spirit of its author and to the style of the civil law, offering
guidance to navigate the civil law in English not only in Louisiana,
but everywhere in the world.
For, to pastiche Baudelaire,
Là, tout n'est qu'ordre et beauté,
Luxe, calme et civilité.
Olivier Moréteau

ONE INTO THREE: SPREADING THE WORD
THREE INTO ONE: CREATING A CIVIL LAW SYSTEM
Esin Örücü
I. Introduction ............................................................................. 381
II. General Concerns Related to Code Translations.................... 384
III. Three into One: The Turkish Case ........................................ 388
IV. One into Three: The Louisiana Code.................................... 397
V. Rounding Up .......................................................................... 403

I. INTRODUCTION
being many, seemingly one
Shakespeare, Sonnet 8
It is a great honour and privilege for me to have been invited to
deliver the 38th Tucker Lecture here in the elegant surroundings of
the Paul Hebert Law Center. It is also a great pleasure. The
pleasure is enhanced by the fact that the Lecture falls on St.
Patrick’s Day, and more importantly, that it marks the fiftieth
anniversary of the Center of Civil Law Studies, now directed by
my dear friend Professor Olivier Moréteau, whose hospitality I am
enjoying. Thus I hope you will find it appropriate that my talk is on
spreading the word and also creating a civil law system.
 Professor Emerita of Comparative Law and Honorary Senior Research
Fellow University of Glasgow and Professor Emerita of Comparative Law
Erasmus University, Rotterdam, Dr.h.c. (Uppsala), esin.orucu@glasgow.ac.uk.
This lecture was delivered at the 38th John H. Tucker, jr. Lecture in Civil Law
(2015) at the LSU Law Center. The part of this lecture on Turkey can be found,
though in a different version, in 6 J. CIV. L. STUD. 445-73 (2013): A Legal
System Based on Translation: The Turkish Experience.
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Let me first clarify the title of this lecture: the first part of the
title refers to the Louisiana experience, which I will consider later
in this talk. I call this “one into three”, since the now-monolingual
Louisiana Civil Code is being translated into French and Spanish,
which I define as “spreading the word.” The Louisiana Civil Code
Translation Project Conference in 2014 called this expansion
“enhancing visibility.” Louisiana is not alone in this, however. A
well-known instance of this kind of enhancement, though for a
different purpose, is the monolingual Dutch Civil Code being
converted, by translation, into a trilingual Code (Dutch, French and
English)—that is, another “one into three.”1 There is also the
instance of the translation of the bilingual Quebec Civil Code
(originally in French and English) into Spanish, thus creating yet
another trilingual Code, rivalling the Louisiana one, however, this
time “two into three.”2 Then, though not recent, there is Fisher’s
translation of the Civil Code of Philippines from Spanish into
English, “one into two.”3 Other instances might come to mind.
The second part of the title refers to the Turkish experience.
Before considering the Louisiana case, I will deal with the
translation into Turkish from the already trilingual Swiss Civil
Code (in French, German and Italian), seemingly a “three into one”
case. I define this as “creating a civil law system.” If all the three
versions of the Swiss Code were looked into by the Turkish
translators—as should have been the case—it could truly have
been “three into one.” Unfortunately, the Turkish translators used
only the French version of the Swiss Civil Code. Furthermore, had
the Swiss themselves been involved in translating their Civil Code
into Turkish, then the title of this lecture would have been “One
1. For this see Ejan Mackaay, La traduction du nouveau Code civil
néerlandais en anglais et en français in JURILINGUISTIQUE : ENTRE LANGUES ET
DROITS—JURILINGUISTICS: BETWEEN LAW AND LANGUAGE 537 (Jean-Claude
Gémar & Nicholas Kasirer eds., 2005).
2. See Jimena Andina Dorato, A Jurilinguistic Study of the Trilingual Civil
Code of Quebec, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 591-630 (2011).
3. For this see Francisco Capistrano, Mistakes and Inaccuracies in
Fisher’s Translation of the Spanish Civil Code, 9 PHILIPPINE L.J. 89-141 (1929).
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into Three – Three into Four!” In fact, the Swiss did produce an
official English version of their Code (three into four—a
quatrolingual Code), though English is not regarded as the fourth
official language. Its use is mainly in commercial law and
international arbitration cases.
The crucial role of translation in multilingual law-making
should alert us to problems to be encountered in developing not a
single but a multilingual legal language through the example of
European Union harmonization. This is also worth noting for more
lessons to be learnt, although I will not be dealing with these issues
in this lecture.4 For me as a comparatist, however, the connection
to comparative law becomes more than evident in all the works
above.
Also, what I will not be doing here is looking at deeper and
contentious questions such as, “if law lives in and through
language, what happens to it when it is transferred into another
language?”5 If the structure of a language influences, or even
determines, the mode and content of thought, might it not be that
any language can only express certain thoughts, and that these
thoughts differ from culture to culture? There are also other
questions to be studied by jurilinguists, such as “how strong is the
link between the law or a legal system and the language of its
statutes?” And “is a ‘neutral legal language’ possible or even
necessary?”6 I leave the discussion of these questions to others:
linguists, sociologist and anthropologists, who would be in a better
position than I am to tackle these issues.
Now, I would like to start this lecture by looking briefly at
some general concerns related to code translations, such as
language, culture, transpositions, neologisms, equivalence and
mistranslations.
4. THE ROLE OF LEGAL TRANSLATION IN LEGAL HARMONIZATION (C.J.W.
Baaij ed., 2012).
5. BERNHARD GROSSFELD, THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 101 (Tony Weir trans., 1990).
6. Dorato, supra note 2, at 618.
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II. GENERAL CONCERNS RELATED TO CODE TRANSLATIONS
Intra-linguistic translations deal with two languages: a source
language and a target language, although, legal language may be
regarded as having a system-specific nature. However, when
culture-specific institutions, procedures or official bodies are
involved one would obviously expect problems. Because no two
languages are sufficiently similar as to be considered to represent
precisely the same social reality, the untranslatable can be
transcribed or explained in such cases. In legal systems that portray
socio-cultural and legal-cultural affinity, the legal register may
have become naturalized as a result of sufficient similarity.7 When
it is a case of impossibility of translation, translator’s notes may be
required. This method however, could not be considered with ease
when translating codes, where there are mostly instances of wordfor-word translation and, occasionally, of neologism. Code
translations are particularly difficult, are full of hazards and create
specific problems, and resorting to the original text might become
necessary for accurate results. Different to the translation of the
Quebec Civil Code into Spanish, the Turkish translators, for
instance, did not indicate “with a dagger symbol and notes
‘infelicities in language’ with an asterisk,”8 thus outlining difficult
or controversial choices in translation. In fact, in the Turkish case,
there are no translators’ notes as is the case in the Quebec Code
translation into Spanish; but following each article in the Turkish
Civil Code the number of the corresponding Swiss article appears,
with the aim that scholars and judges may like to consult the
original text, if they so wish.
7. To translate technical words used by lawyers in France, Germany or
elsewhere on the European continent into Turkish, which I will address later in
this article, would have been in many cases a nearly impossible task. The best
approach may have been to keep the original word and provide an explanation
as suggested by Martin Weston—though in the context of a code translation this
may not be appropriate. See Martin Weston, Technical and Practical
Approaches to Translation in AN ENGLISH READER’S GUIDE TO THE FRENCH
LEGAL SYSTEM 9-42 (Berg, Oxford 1991).
8. See Dorato, supra note 2, at 595.
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“An alternative way of dealing with culture-specific terms,
when translation in the narrower sense is not possible,”9 is
transcription or borrowing, which is not translation. It may be
assumed that between European languages, such as English,
French and Spanish, the difficulties may be less pronounced than
between European languages and a non-European language, such
as Turkish, which I will deal with below. This is related to the
presence or absence of common cultural denominators.10
It is true that the word is an essential vehicle of cultural
influence and the language of a particular society is an integral part
of its culture, yet cultures are not necessarily coterminous with
languages. Because the lexical distinctions drawn by each
language reflect the culturally important institutions and activities
of that society, in the process of legal translation what is generally
sought is functional equivalents. It can also be assumed that there
is much cultural overlap. A greater or lesser degree of equivalence
can be found in the application of the word, though there may be
no synonymy between words of different languages. The general
assumption is that exact equivalence cannot be obtained and that
validity can be achieved only through control of factors that affect
equivalence. Martin Weston—a onetime translator in the
Secretariat of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg and Senior
Translator in the Registry of the European Court of Human
Rights—suggests five possible options open to translators facing
culture-bound source language: use of a target language expression
denoting the nearest equivalent concept (functional equivalence);
word-for-word translation, making adjustments of syntax and
function words if necessary; borrowing of the foreign expression,
9. Weston, supra note 7, at 30.
10. For the problem of seemingly similar words with different connotations
between French and English, see Vivian Grosswald Curran, Comparative Law
and Language in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 675-707, at
678 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006) and UGO MATTEI,
TEEMU RUSKOLA, & ANTONIO GIDI, SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW:
CASES-TEXTS-MATERIALS 154-62 (7th ed., 2009). The same problem exists
between Dutch and German, and even Austrian and German.
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adding a target language explanation if the concept is unlikely to
be familiar to the target language readership; creation of a
neologism in the form of a literal translation, a naturalization or a
wholly non-formal translation; or lastly, use of an existing
naturalization.11
Creating neologisms is a subsidiary solution and a last resort in
any translation activity in law. Necessity must be the mandatory
test. As Weston says, “it is no business of the translator’s to create
a new word or expression if the source language expression can be
adequately and conveniently translated by one of the methods
already described.”12 It is possible to combine old words to form
new compounds or phrases. It must also be kept in mind that all
neologisms created must satisfy the requirements of conformity
with regular target language grammatical, morphological and
phonological patterns. What is needed is naturalness, as well as
economy and succinctness.
Loanwords, recognizable from the language of origin,
borrowed from other languages, may be regarded in the receiving
system as indications of cultural transformation and therefore less
desirable. Preserving the source term can be an option when
languages are related. Yet, as underlined by Rene de Groot, “using
an untranslated term from the source language in the target
language must be avoided in particular where there is little or no
etymological correspondence between the two languages.”13
In his work, de Groot gives the example of mortgage,
illustrating the translation of the Spanish word hipoteca into
English as hypothec, rather than mortgage. He asks the question:
“Would this term not look very odd to an English reader of the
target text if no explanation is provided?”14 Obviously, the word
hypothec would work well with Scottish or Louisiana audiences!
11. Weston, supra note 7, at 19-21, 31.
12. Id. at 28.
13. Gerard-René de Groot, Legal Translation in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 538-54, at 541 (2nd ed., Jan Smits ed., 2012).
14. Id. at 544.
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Reading is related to conceptual content, and it is often
impossible to give the meaning of a word without putting it in
context. A word-for-word translation, that is literal translation
(formal lexical equivalence), can be criticized in this regard. If
there are source language expressions that defy translation in the
narrow sense, then literal translation makes no sense. In such a
case, transcribing or paraphrasing (glossing) can be recommended.
The source language term will be given in italics or between
inverted commas and followed in brackets by the target language
gloss. Although this may be a workable method in general, one
cannot clarify the original term in a code by adding a literal
translation in parentheses. Although, Jimena Andino Dorato
suggests that “where translation is found to be impossible, a note is
evidently necessary” and in fact, there are seventy-eight
translator’s notes in the Spanish version of the Quebec Civil
Code.15
Because “sentences are unlimited in their variety of the
arrangement of words,”16 and because language is connected to
context, and because in the context of statutory interpretation, the
instrument is considered “an always speaking statute”17 and the
words are given their “natural and ordinary meanings” that reflect
the “common sense” proposition, it seems difficult “to accept
easily that people have made linguistic mistakes in formal
documents.”18 This, however, may not always be true, as, for
example, seen in the Turkish translations.
Roman law terms may also be attractive as neologisms, since
one can assume that lawyers have knowledge of Latin. Latin
15. See Dorato, supra note 2, 613.
16. Johan Steyn, Interpretation: Legal Texts and their Landscape in THE
CLIFFORD CHANCE MILLENNIUM LECTURES; THE COMING TOGETHER OF THE
COMMON LAW AND THE CIVIL LAW 79-90, at 81 (Basil S. Markesinis ed., 2000);
Esin Örücü, Interpretation of Multilingual Texts in the UK, vol. 10.3
ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. (December 2006), http://www.ejcl.org/103/art1039.pdf.
17. Steyn, supra note 16, at 90.
18. Id.
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phrases such as lis alibi pendens, forum non conveniens, ejusdem
generis, negotiorum gestio, status de manerio, sine die, sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas can be retained in Latin. However, the
target audience is not necessarily only lawyers, so care has to be
taken.
As to ambiguity, that is the double meaning with doubt and
uncertainty: patent ambiguity is obvious on the face of the
instrument; latent ambiguity becomes apparent only when the
surrounding circumstances are known. To resolve ambiguity,
extrinsic evidence is admissible to enable the court to ascertain the
meaning. Ambiguities in the meaning of the translated codes or
other legislation are resolved by recourse to rules of construction
and interpretation and, more important, resort to the original texts.
Finally, although inadequate for dealing with linguistic
comparability, using back translation, a simple technique, may
help in writing multilingual texts. Rather than offering solutions,
however, it would serve as a detector of problems. A comparison
of the two or more texts can show the sources of difficulty and
inconsistency. Yet, an item in the source language may give rise to
more than one version in a target language and re-translation may
create multiple source language versions.
III. THREE INTO ONE: THE TURKISH CASE
I would now like to move onto illustrating some of the above
issues through the experience of Turkey with her process of total
and global modernization, westernization, secularization,
democratization and constitutionalism.
Let me tell you about the Turkish experience of creating a civil
law system, and thereby a new identity for the populace.19
19. The birth of this identity was also supported by the social reforms
introduced by the eight reform laws (İnkilap Kanunları), establishing secular
education and civil marriage, adopting the Latin alphabet and the international
numerals, introducing the hat, closing the dervish convents, abolishing certain
titles, and prohibiting the wearing of certain garments. These reform laws are
still protected by Art. 174 of the 1982 Constitution.
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The Turkish Republic was founded in 1923, following the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman state already had a
mixed legal system from 1839 onwards, with Islamic law and
French law constituting the legal framework. Personal laws applied
on the basis of religions of the various communities, forming a
kind of legal pluralism. However, the Republic’s vision of total
modernization, westernization and secularization led to reform
efforts that rested solely on import from major continental
jurisdictions, both as to form and content. French administrative
law was already put in place during the time of the Ottoman
Empire. The borrowed codes now were the 1926 Civil Code and
Code of Obligations from Switzerland, the 1926 Commercial Code
from Germany, the 1926 Criminal Code from Italy, the 1927 Code
of Civil Procedure from Switzerland and the 1929 Code of
Criminal Procedure from Germany. Thus, from 1926 to 1930,
within a span of five years, a civilian legal system was created.
This meant that the legal framework was synthetically constructed
through voluntary and imposed receptions, imitations, adaptations
and adjustments. As a result, an eclectic and synthetic legal system
was born, directly borrowed and translated from, and significantly
replicating, foreign civilian models.20 Such large-scale borrowings
transformed the mixed legal system into a civilian system, thus
promoting the civil law in Turkish. However, law was being
infused from societies and laws that were socio- and legalculturally diverse from her own.
At times the choice of system to borrow from was driven by
the perceived prestige of the model, and at other times by
efficiency. Sometimes chance or historical accident played a role.
The fact that a number of different models were chosen, except on

20. Esin Örücü, A Synthetic and Hyphenated Legal System: The Turkish
Experience, 1 J. COMP. L. 261-81 (2006).
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the whole the civilian tradition might have given the borrowings
cultural legitimacy.21
For my purposes here, I will only deal with the Civil Code. To
achieve the aim of the vision and for the modernization of the civil
law, the Swiss Civil Code was chosen. This Code was preferred
over the French or the German ones because it was regarded as
adapted to the multitude of cantonal customs; it did not use a
technical language and therefore would be more easily translatable;
it was set out as briefly as possible; it avoided judicial
conceptualism; it favoured democratic equality by allowing
freedom of contract, freedom of testation, equal rights in intestacy
and equality of the sexes. Added to these reasons was also the fact
that certain leading personalities in the Turkish legal world, such
as the then Minister of Justice, were educated in Switzerland.22
The task of translating the trilingual Swiss Civil Code from its
French version was given to a commission of twenty-six members.
A number of special commissions later translated most of the
important commentaries on various branches of law into Turkish.
In fact, within the year of 1926, Turkish legal experts translated
and produced three entirely new codes (Civil, Criminal and
Commercial), and more were to follow.23
As a result of such far reaching translations, there were a
number of problems created, the least being that the Turkish
translators were not all professional translators but relied upon
their knowledge of the specific foreign language necessary for
translating a Code: in the case of the Swiss Civil Code, for
instance, this was French. One feature these translators had in
common was skill in French, though their knowledge of legal
21. Gianmaria Ajani, The Role of Comparative Law in the Adoption of New
Codifications in ITALIAN NATIONAL REPORTS TO THE XVTH INTERNATIONAL
CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 65-82, at 68-69, 80 (1998).
22. See ERHAN ADAL, FUNDAMENTALS OF TURKISH PRIVATE LAW 44, 48
(rev. 5th ed., 1998).
23. Code of Civil Procedure (1927), Code of Criminal Procedure (1929),
Bankruptcy Code (1929) and Maritime Code (1930).
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French differed. Possibly none had any training in legal translation,
though they were trained in law. There was a comparable problem
in the case of the Quebec Code translation into Spanish. Dorato
tells us that “one feature they [translators] all had in common was
skill in Spanish, though their knowledge of Latin Spanish differed:
only a few of them had studied or practiced law in Spanish
speaking countries.” The “translators did not have much
experience with respect to Quebec law and its context” either.24
We know that the three authentic versions of the trilingual
Swiss Civil Code—German, French and Italian texts, prepared
with great care—are all equally authoritative. And yet, there are
various discrepancies between the three texts. The French, German
and Italian versions of the Swiss Civil Code do not always agree.
Since in Switzerland all the versions have equal value, in case of
doubt, the judges have to resort to all versions and may have to
make a choice between versions while interpreting the law, but not
in Turkey. It is not difficult to expect that there were and still are
problems created as a result of translations and building a system
based on translation. If a faithful translation of the Swiss Civil
Code were to be provided, the translators of such a multilingual
text should not have ignored the legal authority of each of the
languages. Translating a trilingual Code into a fourth language as
such creates a serious problem in itself, let alone when only one
version is used. As Dorato points out, it is a requirement to get to
all the texts (three in our case) and to take them all into account.25
However, she tells us that in the Quebec translation of the code
into Spanish, “even if the English version had an important role,
the French version seems to have been considered the source text
and the English version mostly as a translation of it,” though the
translators knew that this was an officially bilingual code.26

24. See Dorato, supra note 2, at 606, 609.
25. Id. at 602.
26. Id. at 611.
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Neither did the Turkish translators have a basic knowledge of
the legal system of the language they were translating from, which
is a prerequisite “to properly translate at a scholarly level.” 27 A
number of Turkish academics thereafter had most of their training
in universities in the countries from whence the receptions came.
They then undertook the fitting of the models to the Turkish
situation and the tuning of them. In the early years of the Republic,
language training and translations were extensive. Fortunately for
the Turkish legal system, again in the early years of the Republic,
as a consequence of a historical accident, Swiss, Austrian and
German immigrant academics also contributed to the new legal
system. This greatly helped the imported system to take root.28
Professors such as Schwartz, König, Neumark and Hirsch were
given sanctuary in Turkey before the Second World War, and held
posts in the Turkish universities of İstanbul and Ankara. The
presence of such Professors in Turkey at the time of reception
fuelled the spread of civilian legal ideas. Many of their Turkish
assistant lecturers later themselves became professors and so
helped the internal diffusion and subsequent infusion of the law.29
A Turkish Civil law, a Turkish Commercial law, a Turkish
Criminal law, a Turkish Criminal Procedure, a Turkish Civil
Procedure and other laws have developed over the years, slowly
diverging from the source laws. Nonetheless, even today, the
higher courts, as the interpreters of the law, at times make use of
the models when reaching decisions. They never base a decision
27. Mattei et al., supra note 10, at 159. In fact, again Dorato points out that
in the Quebec experience, the translators did not know of “the Quebecer’s
perspective”, not having had contact with “the Quebec reality.” See Dorato,
supra note 2, at 605. They “did not have much experience with respect to
Québec law and its context” either. Id. at 609.
28. On an extensive history and the importance of this event, see HORST
WIDMANN, EXIL UND BILDUNGSHILFE: DIE DEUTSCHSPRACHIGE AKADEMISCHE
EMIGRATION IN DIE TURKEI NACH 1933 MIT EINER BIO-BIBLIOGRAPHIE DER
EMIGRIERTEN HOCHSCHULLEHRER IN ANHANG (1973).
29. See Esin Örücü, The Infusion of the Diffused: Four Circles of Diffusion
Infusing the Turkish Legal System in DIFFUSION OF LAW: THE MOVEMENT OF
LAW AND NORMS AROUND THE WORLD (Sue Farran et al. eds., Juris Diversitas
Series, Ashgate Pubs. 2015).
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solely on the source law, but the foreign models are still seen as
aids to further modernization, as stimulus and corrector, aiding
interpretation of the translated texts.
I must now mention three specific factors to illustrate the
vastness of the task. The first factor is the peculiarity of the
Turkish language and its total difference to the source languages:
Turkish is a member of the south-western or Oghuz group of the
Turkic languages. Other members of the group are the Turkic
dialects of the Balkans; Azeri or Azerbaijani, spoken in north-west
Iran and Azerbaijan; the Qashqai of south Iran; and the Turkmen
or Turcoman of Turkmenistan.30
Turks were converted to Islam from the tenth century onwards
and adopted the Arabic alphabet. A vast number of Arabic terms
related to theology, thought and civilization entered the language.
When the Seljuk dynasty was overrun by Persia in the eleventh
century, Persian became the language of Turkish administration
and literary culture. As a result, the “educated Turk’s vocabulary”
was formed by “thousands of Persian words [which] joined the
thousands of Arabic words.”31 By the end of the thirteenth century,
this hybrid language became the official language of the Ottoman
dynasty. The speech of the majority of ordinary Turks, however,
was always Turkish.

30. See GEOFFREY LEWIS, TURKISH GRAMMAR at ix (1967). For those
unfamiliar with the Turkish alphabet: it contains the letters ç, ş, ğ, ö, ü and ı
(undotted i) both in the lower case and the upper case, in addition to twentythree letters from the Latin alphabet (i.e., not q, w or x). Most Turkish
consonants are pronounced as in English, most of the vowels as in Italian, but
there are some variations. The Turkish ö and ü are like the German, or like the
vowels in French peu and tu, dotted Turkish i like i in “it”, and the undotted i (ı)
is something between i as in “will” and u as in “radium”. Among the consonants
ç and ş are like sh and ch, as they are pronounced. C is pronounced like the j in
“jet”. The ğ, after e and i–roughly as y in “saying”, after o, ö, u, ö–roughly as
“sowing”, after a and ı, hardly sounded, but has the effect of lengthening the
vowel. On the new alphabet, see GEOFFREY LEWIS, THE TURKISH LANGUAGE
REFORM: A CATASTROPHIC SUCCESS at 27-39 (1999) [hereinafter TURKISH
LANGUAGE REFORM].
31. LEWIS, TURKISH GRAMMAR, supra note 30, at xx.
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In 1928, the Arabo-Persian alphabet was replaced by the Latin
one, but as a result of the nationalist element in the change, the
new letters were not called Latin, but “Turkish”, in contrast to the
old Arabic script. Because the Codes had been translated into
Ottoman Turkish and promulgated in 1926, and published in the
old script, after the change to the new alphabet, they had to be rewritten—that is, transcribed from the Arabic alphabet to the Latin
one. The new versions appeared in 1934.32 Thereafter a substantial
language reform movement began. Ottoman Turkish was
eliminated and Turkish words replaced Persian and Arabic words.
Where none were to be found, they searched for words from other
Turkic languages, and even sometimes invented new ones. New
words were coined from Turkish roots, or from western words.
Inevitably, this movement also impacted the Codes. Although the
script was changed and an effort was made to keep the language
simple, for a long time, the terminology remained mostly
unchanged.
It must be remembered that the existing Ottoman legal
language was totally different to the new source languages. French,
German and Italian had no connection with Arabic, Persian and the
legal target language Turkish—be it Ottoman Turkish or modern
Turkish.
The second factor is that this difference was not only due to the
fact that the languages were not related in any way, but also that
“most” of the existing legal institutions and mentality from the
Ottoman times hailed from Islamic law: a different culture. I say
“most” here advisedly, since following the Reformation movement
(Tanzimat) in 1839, the Ottoman Empire moved, as noted, from
being an Islamic State to becoming a mixed legal system, by
borrowing a number of Codes from France in order to appease the
32. The texts became in time virtually incomprehensible. However, there
was later an edition of the Civil Code where the 1934 text was on the left hand
page and a translation into the Turkish of the 1970s on the right. The new 2002
Code is more accessible to lawyers, though not necessarily to laymen.
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western powers: the Commercial Code in 1850, the Commercial
Court Procedure in 1861, the Maritime Code in 1863 (also
influenced by the Belgian and the Prussian Codes), and the Code
of Criminal Procedure in 1879. These were also translations.
Furthermore, the potential users of the translations, judges and
lawyers, were not familiar with the source languages, source
culture or the source laws. Martin Weston observes that, “the
fundamental difficulty in translation of any kind is how to
overcome conceptual difference.”33 A concept or institution
peculiar to the source-language-culture is said to be “more or less
untranslatable,” all else being “more or less translatable.”34 Then
the translator can opt for equivalence, looking for equivalents in
the target language for terms of the source language legal
systems.35 As certain terms of art in the source legal traditions did
not exist in the Turkish one, this was not possible in all cases in the
Turkish situation.
Because legal terminology has system-specificity, equivalents
work well when the legal systems concerned are nearly the same or
very similar. There are also “vast networks of associations of a
word in one language that cannot all be transposed into the other,
such that there must be a loss of connotative significance in the
process.”36 If one were to go for functional equivalence, then,
similarly, in the Turkish case, one would also come across
problems arising from the above differences while looking for “the
nearest situationally equivalent concept.”37 So, “how should
translations be elaborated when a legal phenomenon has no exact
equivalent in two languages?”38 This has been a significant
problem in Turkey.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Weston, supra note 7, at 9. Also see de Groot, supra note 13, at 538.
Weston, id.
de Groot, supra note 13, at 539-40.
Curran, supra note 10, at 679.
Weston, supra note 7, at 21.
Curran, supra note 10, at 678.
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The third factor to be noted is that the Turkish language is
phonetic in the sense that in the system of writing and
pronunciation there is a direct correspondence between symbols
and sounds. If foreign words are borrowed either in terms of loanborrowing or calque, they must be converted into Turkish symbols
to be pronounced correctly. Previously, the spellings were changed
when words were generally borrowed from French, German,
Italian and English to fit the phonetic Turkish language. For
example, French “station” became “istasyon”, Italian “scala”,
“iskele”, German “schlep”, “şilep”, English “steam”, “istim” and
so on.39 Today, this does not seem to happen. Not only that, but
English seems to have entered the Turkish language at an
enormous speed. Geoffrey Lewis calls this “the new yoke.”40
In spite of the fact that Roman law was taught in Law Faculties
in Turkey, jurists in Turkey know no Latin. Therefore, Roman law
terms and Latin phrases, which may be attractive as neologisms,
could not have been retained in Latin, as the basis of the Turkish
language is not Latin.
While reminiscing of his years of teaching commercial law in
Turkey, Professor Ernest Hirsch, one of the foreign professors
working in Turkey during the formative years of Turkish law,41
writes that he was not using the Turkish Commercial Code since
he knew no Turkish. Rather, he used two unofficial French
translations of it, which were not identical. He points out that in the
preparation of the Commercial Code (1926-1929) a number of
translators used different foreign Codes, not just the German one.
The Code was therefore eclectic and in its translation a variety of
terminology was used, depending on the translator. He reports that
39. For more examples, see LEWIS, TURKISH GRAMMAR, supra note 30, at
9.
40. LEWIS, TURKISH LANGUAGE REFORM, supra note 30, at 133-39.
41. Ernest Hirsch, Yasama ile Öğreti ve Yargı Arasındaki Karşılıklı
Bağlılık’ (Reciprocal Ties between Legislation, Education and the Judiciary) in
50. YIL ARMAĞANI: CUMHURİYET DÖNEMİNDE HUKUK 173, İstanbul
Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi No: 1888/421, 173-89 (1973).
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his Turkish colleagues told him jokingly, that, “the Code is a
Russian salad in need of mayonnaise to be put on top by you.”42 He
further admits that since he studied the Code from those inadequate
French translations and lectured in German, the lectures then being
translated into Turkish, all the lectures were partially ambiguous
and partially incomprehensible!
Most of the codes have been updated in our day: the Civil Code
in 2002, the Criminal Code in 2005 and the Commercial Code in
2011, but the bases have not changed and they still carry the
stamps of the translated laws of the 1920s, though these new codes
are not direct translations any more.
IV. ONE INTO THREE: THE LOUISIANA CODE
I am aware that I will be partially “taking coal to Newcastle” or
more colloquially here, “sand to the beach,” when I talk of the
Louisiana experience at Louisiana State University. Be that as it
may, let us now turn our gaze to the Louisiana experience. When
we look into the history of codification in Louisiana, if the 1769
O’Reilly’s Code,43 based on Spanish law transforming Louisiana
into a Spanish ultramarine province, is left to one side, we see as
the first important enactment the 1808 Digest: “A Digest of the
Civil Laws now in Force in the Territory of Orleans, with
Alterations and Amendments Adapted to its Present Form of
Government.” This Digest, known as the Louisiana Civil Code of
1808,44 was bilingual, published both in French and English, the
English version being a translation from the French original. This
is the Code which was revised in 1825, again as a bilingual code,
and finally in 1870. As revised and amended, the 1870 Code, now
42. Id. at 176.
43. There are lively discussions on whether the O’Reilly Code repealed the
French law that prevailed in Louisiana then, as French law was still in force at
the time of the Purchase (especially between Tucker, Batiza and Pascal).
However, there is no published project acknowledging the debt to either of the
sources.
44. Here, too, we must say that the discussion as to whether the Code was a
Code or a Digest, even for the present code, never went away.
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monolingual and only in English, but bilingual in spirit, remained
the foundation of Louisiana private law until very recently. Even
today, parts of the 1870 Code are deemed applicable.
The 1808 Civil Code or Digest was based on a variety of
sources, its model being the preparatory works and the final text of
the French Civil Code of 1804, together with Roman law, Spanish
law and Common law. One might say that Spanish law remained in
the blood, though the French model dominated: when there was an
obvious difference between Spanish and French laws, the redactors
were careful to adopt Spanish solutions.45
The 1808 and the 1825 Civil Codes were mainly a blend of two
specific sources (French and Spanish) and both Codes appeared in
French and English, first drawn up in French and then translated
into English. Although both versions had equal status officially,
there were a number of errors in the English text. In the event of
obscurity, ambiguity, fault or omission, both texts were to be
consulted and mutually serve the interpretation of one or the other.
This was the case for the 1808 enactment. For the 1825 one, the
two texts were printed on facing pages and there were no
provisions for the resolution of conflicts between the two texts.
Because of the poor quality of the translation, the courts came to
the conclusion that the French text was to be controlling. This
strengthened the place of French culture in the Louisiana civilian
tradition since the legal profession had to be familiar with French
legislation, jurisprudence and doctrine.
Although the 1825 Code followed the French Civil Code
closely and the redactors relied heavily on French doctrine and
45. See Vicenç Felliu, Dennis Kim-Prieto & Teresa M. Miguel, A Closer
Look: A Symposium Among Legal Historian and Law Librarians to Uncover the
Spanish Roots of the Louisiana Civil Law, Librarian Scholarship Series Paper 23
(2010), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylss/23. The authors consider the
debate regarding whether the origin of Louisiana civil law is based in the
Spanish or in the French legal tradition, which has been ongoing since its
incorporation into the United States. They propose and demonstrate that the
Spanish, not French, civil law had an enormous influence on the creation and
evolution of Louisiana civil law and that this legacy resonates today.
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jurisprudence, the Roman and Spanish sources were still there,
their basic assumptions and character being retained unless better
rules could be found or devised. The redactors also identified their
sources for the amendments, deletions and additions. The stillbilingual 1825 Code, as an all-inclusive piece of legislation,
intended to break with the past. It was not just an amendment of
the 1808 Digest. Its article 3521 stated that:
The Spanish, Roman and French laws, which were in force
in this State, when Louisiana was ceded to the United
States, and the acts of the Legislative Council, of the
legislature of the territory of Orleans and of the Legislature
of the State of Louisiana, are hereby repealed in every case,
for which it has especially provided in this code, and that
they shall not be invoked as laws, even under the pretence
that their provisions are not contrary or repugnant to those
of this Code.
Not seeing this to be sufficient in view of the attitude of the
Louisiana Supreme Court, in 1828 the Great Repealing Act was
passed.
We see that this blend survived in the 1870 Code, though now
only in English. This Code was published under the title “The
Revised Civil Code of the State of Louisiana.” Actually, it was
substantially the Code of 1825. The revision related to the
elimination of certain provisions such as those concerning slavery
and incorporation of amendments made with integration of acts
passed since 1825. The articles were thus re-numbered. The
question then became whether the French text was still to be
regarded as the controlling text as and when a conflict occurred
between the English and the French versions in the untouched
articles of the 1825 Code, now in the 1870 Code. Because the
French and Spanish speakers in Louisiana had vastly dwindled,
this approach became untenable, however. Nevertheless, the 1870
Louisiana Civil Code was both functional and durable.
In the last decades of the twentieth century, countries such as
Quebec, the Netherlands, Belgium and France all felt the need to
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update their codes, as these codes did not reflect or respond
anymore to the social needs of the populace. The Louisiana
legislature also decided to produce a new code and, similar to the
Dutch, chose the method of selective revision of individual titles
and chapters. The revision started in 1987 and within ten years
most of the Code was completely revised. The present Code (or as
some have it, the new Digest46) has other sources than the classical
French and Spanish, though all in the civilian legal tradition. There
are, for instance, references to German, Greek, Italian, Quebec,
Swiss and even Ethiopian Codes, as pointed out in the comments
following the articles of the Code. Thus it does indeed enhance the
visibility of the civil law tradition and as such it can be expected to
contribute further to the American common law culture in the other
American states and the federal law. This can be assessed as
promoting the civil law in English.47
By translating the Code into French and Spanish, the visibility
will be further enhanced.48 We already know that the 1825
Louisiana Code has had its impact on a number of Latin American
civil codes, such as the Chilean (1855), which influenced later
Latin American codifications, such as the Ecuador of 1857,
Colombia of 1873-1887, El Salvador of 1859, the Brazilian of
1864, and the Puerto Rican and Argentinean ones of 1871. 49 The
Argentinean Code then became a model for others and also
46. See Vernon Palmer, The Death of a Code—The Birth of a Digest, 63
TUL. L. REV. 221-64 (1988); Vernon Palmer, Revision of the Code or
Regression to a Digest? A Rejoinder to Professor Cueto-Rua, 64 TUL. L. REV.
177-86 (1989), among others.
47. However, see, Alain Levasseur & Vincenç Feliu, The English Fox in the
Louisiana Civil law Chausse-Trappe: Civil Law Concepts in the English
Language; Comparativists Beware, 69 LA. L. REV 715 (2009).
48. The French translation is well under way. We must remember here that
while, obviously, the translation is into standard French, the position of Cajun
French, spoken by some in Louisiana, is neglected. See the emphasis in the 1968
CODOFIL (Council for the Development of French in Louisiana) report, as
discussed in 2014 by James Etienne Viator, Kreyol-Ye, Kadjen-Ye, E Lalwa a
Langaj Dan Lalwizyann (Creoles, Cajuns, and Language Law in Louisiana), 60
LOY. L. REV. 273 (2014).
49. See Rolf Knutel, Influence of the Louisiana Civil Code in Latin
America, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1445-77 (1996).
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influenced the revisions in 1984 of the 1870 Louisiana Code in the
area of conventional obligations. The 1825 Louisiana Civil Code
served as a natural model for the drafting, style and substance of
these Codes in Latin America. According to Knutel, the Louisiana
Civil Code, animated by the spirit of Roman Law and of civil law,
has been “the means of transportation through which, the fruits and
results of this legal thinking arrived in the then–modern and young
South American states.”50 In addition, in the Caribbean Basin, the
Civil Code of St Lucia was also impacted by the Louisiana Civil
Code.
Even the Spanish Civil Code was influenced by the
Preliminary Title of the revised edition of the 1870 Louisiana
Code, in the changes introduced into the text of the Spanish Code,
which is younger than the 1870 Louisiana one. Thus Louisiana
Civil Code provisions were exported into Latin America, and back
to Spain and Europe in the “Old World.”51 As Knutel notes:
The Roman legal institutions, maxims, and solutions to
legal problems travel around the world, from Rome to
France and Spain; from there to Louisiana; from Louisiana
to Latin America; and from Latin America back to
Louisiana and back again to Europe. They may change
their appearance, but in their substance, they remain
Roman.52
Hopefully, the Louisiana Civil Code will again be a model for
Latin American code revision projects, competing with the Quebec
Code. In this context, the Spanish version rather than the French
should prove to be the more valuable of the two.

50. Id. at 1467-68. Knutel also asks the question (1451-52), why would the
lawmakers of a Code think it would be helpful or appropriate to borrow a
foreign code (the LA. CIV. CODE) for their work? He gives as reasons: it was
relatively easy to gain knowledge; the 1825 LA. CIV. CODE was the first civil
code of the New World and therefore became a model; and the community
played a role in legal development.
51. Id. at 1451, and Shael Herman, Louisiana’s Contribution to the 1852
Projet of the Spanish Civil Code, 42 LA. L. REV 1509, 1512 (1982).
52. Knutel, supra note 50, at 1474.
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In sum, viewed from a historical point of view, today’s
translation of the present Louisiana Civil Code into French and
Spanish does not come as a surprise. The affinity to both French
and Spanish laws has been there from the start. We also have to
remember that although the 1808 and 1825 Codes were bilingual,
the French text was the controlling text, as it was claimed that the
English translation was done in a hurry and was not very accurate.
Even after the 1870 Code this discussion did not die away. Again
from a historical perspective, today’s translation project signifies
Louisiana’s legal and cultural heritage and a return to an original
identity that is based on French and Spanish cultures. Though not
its overt aim, this “one into three” can therefore also be regarded as
a rekindling of the past, a nostalgic move towards a past heritage
that might be in the process of being lost.53 Because common law
influence expanded, and the 1870 Code faced the danger of
becoming just another statute, the new Code and this translation
project is also making a statement. Re-asserting the civilian past
may be seen as a stamp of identity in a common law surrounding
in the twenty-first century, a century that is today regarded as the
century of the common law and of the American kind.54
Viewed from a comparatist’s point of view, the comparators
for Louisiana are the Quebec and the Dutch experiences. For
instance, when the trilingual edition of the Civil Code of Quebec
came out in 2008, the Spanish version was added to the French and
English versions as the third column on the left. The format of
three columns side by side was preferred and “the metamorphosis
from translation to trilingual Code is also emphasized by the title:
‘Código Civil de Quebec–Code Civil du Québec–Civil Code of

53. For elements in mixed legal systems that are endangered, see
contributions in A STUDY OF MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS: ENDANGERED,
ENTRENCHED OR BLENDED (Sue Farran, Esin Örürü & Seán Patrick Donlan eds.,
Juris Diversitas Series, Ashgate Pubs 2014).
54. See, for example, Pacifico Agabin, Philippines: The Twentieth Century
as the Common Law’s Century in id. at 61-87.
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Québec’.”55 This is a Code presented in three languages. Neither is
there an indication that the Spanish version lacks authority.
Different to the Louisiana and the Dutch Codes which are “one
into three” cases, the Quebec Code was a bilingual text being
translated into a third language: “two into three.” Last but not least,
an important question is, “which Spanish or whose Spanish?”
When there are regional variants of the language into which a code
has to be translated, should one search for or create a neutralized
language? In the Quebec experience, although mainly the
Argentine version of Spanish was used, Dorato says that “the
Spanish ‘neutralization’ that appeared in the second stage, seems to
have been more a search for a neutral Latin-American Spanish than
an international Spanish.”56 Would looking at the Spanish as used
in the EU legislative translations have helped?
V. ROUNDING UP
According to Eva Hoffman, unless “the entire language”
around the word or its audience is transported, distortions occur in
translation of even a single word in “transporting human meaning
from one culture to another.”57 Pierre Legrand claims that
“legislation cannot make mores.”58 As seen earlier, the entire
Turkish legal system, which is fully functioning, is built on such
institutional transfers and translations, with a different and brand
new audience and has been keeping lawyers, judges and academics
active since 1926.
A great believer in receptions, and therefore—we can infer—
translations, as a way forward for legal systems, Alan Watson is of
the view that even when misunderstood or even mistranslated, a
borrowed institution or concept may solve the problems for the
55. Dorato, supra note 2, at 609.
56. Id. at 617.
57. EVA HOFFMAN, LOST IN TRANSLATION: A LIFE IN A NEW LANGUAGE
272-73 (1991, 2008).
58. Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of Legal Transplants, 4 MAASTRICHT
J. EUR. & COMP. L. 111, at 119 (1997).
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solution of which it was borrowed. He says, “a total mistake as to
the meaning of the rules which it is thought are being borrowed
need not stop the creation of a new doctrine nor prevent it
becoming authoritative and important.”59 Furthermore, “foreign
law can be influential when it is totally misunderstood.”60 When
one looks at the Turkish experience again, it can be said that
Watson’s views can be endorsed.
One thing is certain and that is that the Turkish experience
defies the romantic view that there is an indissoluble bond between
law, language and culture.61 This experience therefore, can also be
studied as a useful empirical work on the relations between
language, culture, translation and comparison, and the value of a
Code in more than one language. Is this relationship indeed as
profound as is purported?
One crucial question to pose related to all translated codes must
be: why translate a code? Aims and reasons vary.
By creating completely new laws, the aim of the Turkish
experience was to demolish the foundations of the old legal
system. Not only that, but the intention was to regulate, by means
of legislation, the relationships of the people, not according to
existing customs, usages, and religious mores, but according to
what it was thought these relationships ought to be. In fact, to
achieve this aim, the received Codes were accompanied by eight
radical social reform laws (İnkilap Kanunları), establishing secular
education and civil marriage, adopting the Latin alphabet and
international numerals, introducing the hat, closing the dervish
convents, abolishing certain titles and prohibiting the wearing of
certain garments. The constitutionality of these laws cannot be
59. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE LAW 52 (1974).
60. Id at 99.
61. Discussed by Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of
Transplants and Receptions in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW
441, 469 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds. 2006). See also
Grossfeld, supra note 5, at 101; and Dorato, supra note 2, at 618.
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challenged even today (Art. 174 of the 1982 Constitution), nor can
their amendment be proposed.62 The radical reforms in Turkey
aimed at the basics: language reform, a new western system of law,
a new sense of national identity based on a newly created culture,
excluding the unwanted Islamic and Arabic elements of the
Ottoman heritage, which created a civil law tradition.
Can it be suggested here that the Turkish Codes, originally all
translations from civilian codes, might be vehicles to “spread the
word further a-field” as models for the newly emerging Middle
East, Turkic and North African countries?
The aims of other experiences are quite different and not as
revolutionary or even radical as the Turkish one. The present aim
of the Louisiana experience, for instance, is not that radical:
enhance visibility and promote the Louisiana civil law, which is in
English, mostly to countries in Latin America. Since this new code
has its sources in a number of civilian codes, it is a fine example of
a synthetic amalgam worth exporting. Time will show its destiny
as a trilingual code. The wider impact of the more recent
codification effort has already been felt, for instance in Estonia,
through the help of Professor Yiannopoulos in the production of
the Estonian Civil Code, although the direct influence of the
Louisiana Civil Code was limited.63
The main aim of the Quebec experience can be compared to
the Louisiana one. The Quebec Code is also the main competitor to
the Louisiana Civil Code. Already in English and French, its
Spanish version may prove useful if the aim is to spread the word
and act as a model in Latin America. It is a vehicle for exporting

62. However, change is in the air as a new Constitution is being prepared.
63. See Paul Varul & Heiki Pisuke, Louisiana’s Contribution to the
Estonian Civil Code 73 TUL. L. REV. 1027-31 (1998-1999). Since parts of the
LA. CIV. CODE, specifically on Property law (arts 1994-1999), impacted the
Estonian Civil Code, can we then say that the LA. CIV. CODE was partly
translated into Estonian?
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Quebec legal ideas into Spanish-speaking countries.64 In the
Preface of the Code, a number of aims are stated. The trilingual
Code is presented as a tool for legal practice in Quebec as well as
having a theoretical use as an asset in comparative law. Another
aim, again stated there and more important for our purposes here,
is to serve as an inspiration to a number of foreign legislatures.65
The aim of the Dutch translations, especially into English, is to
enhance its position as a prospective model in the emerging
democracies in Eastern Europe and also have an impact on the
scholars and politicians in multilingual European Union lawmaking. Dutch not being an international language shared by a
large number of nations, and English seemingly becoming the new
lingua franca, this prospect has definitely been strengthened by
this translation process. It is a true expansion of visibility of a
civilian system into the English language and into the common law
world, mainly within the context of the European Union
The aim of the Philippines translation was the preservation of
the Spanish civilian heritage in a country where Spanish as an
official language has been lost and the impact of American
common law has grown exponentially
Obviously, the Turkish experience is not similar to the others
such as Louisiana, Quebec or the Dutch also in another way, in that
here it is the recipient that translated someone else’s codes and not

64.
Dorato says, for this “the timing was excellent since this was a
decade of re-codification efforts in Latin American countries.” Previous
successful efforts include Paraguay (1985), Peru (1984) and Brazil (2009).
Dorato, supra note 2, at 604. When Argentina wanted to reform its Civil Code,
the bill that was passed was to “a significant extent inspired by the Civil Code of
Québec,” “recently enacted, clearly written and [considered] an excellent
infusion between civil law and common law.”: Id at 603-604. Argentina
eventually adopted a new project presented in 2012, and passed into law on
October 1, 2014, to take effect on January 1, 2016: Julieta Marotta & Agustín
Parise, Argentina - On Codes, Marriage, and Access to Justice: Recent
Developments in the Law of Argentina, 7 J. Civ. L. Stud. (2014).
65. See id. at 594.
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the Swiss, Germans and Italians that translated their own codes
into Turkish
The final words must be that the most important factor in all
these projects is the human factor. Through creative interpretation,
mistakes and inaccuracies in translation (unless they are there on
purpose) can be either eliminated over time with minor corrections
or give a different direction to the law compared to the source
laws. For this, an active judiciary and creative academics are
needed. Louisiana definitely has them in abundance. The hope is
that they will continue to inspire those in other jurisdictions and
also help in training multilingual jurists.
May the word be spread and visibility enhanced to the glory of
the Louisiana mixed legal system.
As to the civil law, a quote from Shakespeare’s Sonnet 8 sums
it up: “being many, seemingly one.”
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I. PROLOGUE. A LETTER TO THE GERMAN COMPARATIST OF LAW
K.J.A. MITTERMAIER
In the huge collection of letters to and from the famous
German law professor and law-journal editor, Karl Joseph Anton
Mittermaier (1787–1867),1 there is one letter dated from
Stockholm, the 7th of April, 1852. The letter is brief and written in
French. It is a missive, un billet, in which the Swedish Supreme
Court Justice, le Conseiller de Justice, Carl Schmidt includes a
book, upon the request of his brother, Gustavus Schmidt, who was
an attorney in New Orleans, Louisiana, in the United States. The
book, The Civil Law of Spain and Mexico, was written and
published by Gustavus in Louisiana. Respectfully, Carl Schmidt
asked Mittermaier for his opinion about his brother’s book, and
further asked Mittermaier if a review of the book could appear in
one of Mittermaier’s law journals or, perhaps, in a letter.
Among the numerous letters in Mittermaier’s correspondence,
this one is by no means unique.2 However, behind this letter hides
a fascinating context and this article serves to further develop that
context. An important part of the contextual research, which relates
to courts and judiciaries, is about judicial networks, bricolage, and
jurist families. In the early-modern period there existed many
examples of such important family relations. They were not only
essential for the understanding of the structure of the contemporary
legal profession; they were also significant for the view of the legal
profession in a wider diachronic perspective.

1. Mittermaier’s archive in Heidelberg University Library.
2. Barbara Dölemeyer, Wissenschaftliche Kommunikation im 19.
Jahrhundert: Karl Josef Anton Mittermaiers juristisch-politische Korrespondenz
in 24 IUS COMMUNE 285-98 (1997) [hereinafter Wissenschaftliche
Kommunikation im 19. Jahrhundert]; Dölemeyer, Transfer juristischen Wissens
- Wissenschaft und Rechtspolitik in K. J. A. Mittermaiers Werk und
Korrespondenz
in
WISSENSKULTUREN.
BEITRÄGE
ZU
EINEM
FORSCHUNGSSTRATEGISCHEN
KONZEPT
(WISSENSKULTUR
UND
GESELLSCHAFTLICHER WANDEL, BD.1) 73-85 (Johannes Fried & Thomas Kailer
eds., Berlin 2003).
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This paper is about members of a Swedish jurist family named
Schmidt, whose roots were in Scania, in the south of Sweden. The
patriarch of the family, Hans Christian Schmidt (1756–1822),3
finished his judicial career as an appellate court justice at Göta
Court of Appeals (Göta havrätt). He had four sons, three of whom
became lawyers. Hans Isak Schmidt (1786–1826) ended up as a
fiscal, which is an assistant to the judiciary in the Göta Court of
Appeals.4 The other two brothers in the legal profession became
well-reputed jurists, Carl Christian Schmidt (1792–1872) ended his
career as a Swedish Supreme Court Justice,5 and Gustaf Adolph
Schmidt (1795–1877) became a well-known lawyer in New
Orleans, Louisiana. Hans Christian, the father, as well as two of his
sons, Hans and Carl, received their legal education and degrees at
the Lund University Faculty of Law. Further, Carl and Gustavus
played a pivotal role in the increasingly boundless intercultural
communication and transatlantic legal transfers of the 19th century.
In 19th century European legal culture, first France and later
Imperial Germany played a dominant role and served as models for
legal reforms. Swedish legal culture from 1870 to 1939 was to a
great extent dominated by influences from Germany in legal
scholarship, as well as in legislative matters. In this case, the
interactive legal communication took place between two Schmidt
brothers and jurists, Carl, a judge from Sweden, and Gustavus, a
lawyer from the United States.

3. Carl Sjöström, BLEKINGSKA NATIONEN 1697-1900: BIOGRAFISKA OCH
GENEALOGISKA ANTECKNINGAR JEMTE HISTORIK [Blekinge Nation 1697-1900.
Biographical and genealogical notes with a history] 191 (Lund University
1901).
4. Carl Sjöström, SMÅLANDS NATION, i LUND 1668–1921: BIOGRAFISKA
OCH GENEALOGISKA ANTECKNINGAR [Smålands nation in LUND 1668-1921:
BIOGRAPHICAL AND GENEALOGICAL NOTES] 237 (Lund University 1922).
5. Id. at 260.
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II. THE END OF A LIFE-LONG RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TWO
BROTHERS
On July 31, 1872, another Swedish Supreme Court Justice in
Stockholm, Christian Naumann (1810–1888), wrote a letter to an
American lawyer, Gustavus Adolphus Schmidt, located at 26
Camp Street, New Orleans, Louisiana. Naumann wrote:
This morning I was told that God late yesterday had
decided to call your dear brother, the Supreme Court justice
Carl Christian Schmidt etc. to his final rest. With heartfelt
sympathy I (being his friend and by him appointed executor
of his house and will) am hurriedly giving you and those
closest to you this sad information. Where you will find the
right comfort it is not for me to say. May peace be with the
remembrance of this departed honest man! - - -The passing
occurred [on] the above-mentioned day of the 30th of July,
at 9:30 p.m. The memorial service will be held on the 5th
of August followed by the burial at the Church of St. Clara
at 5 pm. Before long, I will have more to tell. These lines
are written in great haste.
Humbly,
Chr. Naumann
Supreme Court Justice, Doctor of Law, Professor Emeritus
of Law at Lund University.6
The passing of Carl Schmidt marked an end to the career of
one of the 19th century’s most significant Swedish jurists. It also
ended a very interesting correspondence between two jurist
brothers, one in Sweden and one in the Francophone state of
Louisiana in the United States. Through correspondence, for over
forty years, they had informed each other of mutual family
relationships, as well as passed on information about their
respective countries’ customs of law.

6. Letter from Christian Naumann to Gustavus Schmidt (July 31, 1872)
(on file with Tulane University Special Collections).
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III. BIOGRAPHIES OF THE BRETHREN
Carl Schmidt enjoyed a successful career as a judge. He began
his career as a judge in a clerk position in the newly founded Court
of Appeals for the two southern provinces in Sweden, Hovrätten
över Skåne och Blekinge. He ended his judicial career as a
Supreme Court justice, justitieråd, in the Swedish Supreme Court,
having been appointed in 1845. His younger brother Gustav, who
later named himself Gustavus, became a successful and prominent
lawyer in New Orleans. Both of them were pioneers as editors of
law journals. Carl Schmidt was the founder of Juridiskt Arkiv
(Legal Archives), the first modern law journal in Sweden.7 He was
the journal’s editor from 1830–1862. Carl was also active in
Juridiska Föreningen (The Swedish Law Society), founded in
1850, and was the founder and publisher of Juridiska Föreningens
Tidskrift (The Journal of the Swedish Law Society) from 1850–
1862.8 His colleague and executor of his estate, Christian
Naumann, became his successor in this field. Between 1864–1888,
Naumann published another important law journal, Tidskrift för
lagstiftning, lagskipning och förvaltning, (Periodical of
Legislation, Practice and Administering of Laws) popularly known
as “Naumanns tidskrift” or “Naumann’s Journal.”
Gustavus Schmidt was three years younger than his brother
Carl. He enlisted in the Swedish navy as a teenager, and around the
age of 25 (in the 1820s) he caught the “Wanderlust” and
immigrated to America. He arrived in New York, but traveled
south along the east coast and stopped in Richmond, the capital of
Virginia. There he took up an apprenticeship with a judge of the
Virginia Court of Appeals, William Brokenbrough (1778–1838).
Gustavus was subsequently admitted to the bar and worked for
several years as a lawyer in Richmond.
7. Among Swedish jurists the journal was called “Schmidt’s Archive.”
8. In addition, he was the co-editor of Skånska Posten and was the chief
editor at Christianstads läns hushållstidning (1838–43).
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While Schmidt lived and practiced in Richmond, one of the
most famous U.S. Supreme Court Justices of the 19th century,
Chief Justice John Marshall (1755–1835), frequently visited the
home of Judge Brokenbrough. Chief Justice Marshall took notice
of Gustavus, which later landed Gustavus a clerkship with Chief
Justice Marshall. Gustavus Schmidt later made the following
statement about his employer: “Mr. Marshall can hardly be
regarded as a learned lawyer. His acquaintance with the Roman
jurisprudence as well as with the laws of foreign countries was not
very extensive. He was what is called a common lawyer in the best
and noblest acceptation of that term.”9 In 1827, John Marshall also
appointed Schmidt, together with the esteemed lawyer Benjamin
Watkins Leigh (1781–1849), to represent three Spaniards charged
with piracy and murder onboard the ship Crawford en route
between Matanzas, Cuba, and New York. The Spaniards were
convicted and executed. Gustavus Schmidt wrote a 51-page
publication about the criminal case, which became welldisseminated throughout the country.10
Chief Justice John Marshall, along with other esteemed
lawyers, wrote Gustavus’ letters of recommendation when he left
Virginia for New Orleans, Louisiana in 1829. His move to New
Orleans was well-chosen. The Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 was
heavily influenced by French civil law and its customary law was
distinctly Francophone. In Louisiana, French as well as Spanish
were spoken, and contacts with Mexico and the West Indies were
9. Gustavus Schmidt, Reminiscences: Of the Late Chief Justice Marshall,
1 LA. L.J. 81–82 (May 1841). See also ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN
MARSHALL VOLUME II: POLITICIAN, DIPLOMAT, STATESMAN 1789–1801, at 178
(Houghton Mifflin Co. 1919) (1916).
10. BY A MEMBER OF THE BAR, A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE OCCURRENCES ON
BOARD THE BRIG CRAWFORD ON HER VOYAGE FROM MATANZAS TO NEW
YORK: TOGETHER WITH AN ACCOUNT OF THE TRIAL OF THE THREE SPANIARDS,
JOSE HILARIO CASARES, FELIX BARBEITO, AND JOSE MORANDO, IN THE CIRCUIT
COURT OF RICHMOND BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL, FOR PIRACY AND
MURDER COMMITTED ON BOARD SAID BRIG: WITH OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES
CALCULATED TO ILLUSTRATE THOSE TRANSACTIONS (Samuel Shepherd & Co
1827).
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conducted in New Orleans. The city offered antebellum America
unparalleled legal opportunities in the frontier West. “New
Orleans, with its port, its banks, its railroads, its steamboats, and its
commerce . . . became a magnet for a disproportionate share of
bright legal talents.”11 Gustavus Schmidt was one of them. In
December 1829, he opened a law firm and was established as a
lawyer,12 and he soon became a successful one. Another famous
lawyer of the same generation in early-1830s New Orleans was
Judah Benjamin. Benjamin was an ambitious New Orleans
attorney who specialized in civil and commercial law. 13 Gustavus
Schmidt was also nominated as a candidate for the Louisiana
Supreme Court.14
Gustavus Schmidt also became a leading member of the “little
colony of Swedes,” who settled in New Orleans around 1830.
Additionally, Gustavus hosted more established Swedes, like Olof
Wijk from Gothenburg in 1830 and André Oscar Wallenberg from
Stockholm in 1833, who later became famous merchants and
bankers.15
Gustavus Schmidt married Melanie Seghers in 1831. His wife
was the daughter of one of the most well-reputed lawyers in New
Orleans, Dominique Seghers (1767–1848). They had four children.
When she died in September of 1836, Gustavus Schmidt was left
with the young children and the youngest, an infant, also
subsequently passed away. In his second marriage, this one to
Estelle Marie Mascey, he had four sons. Gustavus Schmidt also
11. Warren M. Billings, A Course of Legal Studies: Books That Shaped
Louisiana Law in A LAW UNTO ITSELF?: ESSAYS IN THE NEW LOUISIANA LEGAL
History 25, 39 (Warren M. Billings & Mark F. Fernandez eds., 2001)
[hereinafter A LAW UNTO ITSELF?].
12. Minutes from the Supreme Court of Louisiana Minute Books, vol. 4, 58
(Dec. 23, 1829) (on file with Law Library of Lousiana Special Collections).
13. Michael B. Chesson, Benjamin, Judah Philip in 2 AMERICAN NATIONAL
BIOGRAPHY 568 (John A. Garraty & Michael C. Carnes eds., 1999).
14. Vox Populi, TIMES-PICAYUNE, February 9, 1853, at 3.
15. ALLAN KASTRUP, THE SWEDISH HERITAGE IN AMERICA: THE SWEDISH
ELEMENT IN AMERICA AND AMERICAN-SWEDISH RELATIONS IN THEIR
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 211 (Swedish Council of America 1975).
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worked as a law teacher, and he founded the Louisiana Law School
in 1844—often referred to as “Schmidt’s Law School”—which
later merged into the law department of the University of
Louisiana, which eventually became Tulane University of
Louisiana.16 Gustavus Schmidt is therefore considered as one of
the founders of the contemporary law department at Tulane
University School of Law.17
Moreover, he published the first law journal in Louisiana, the
Louisiana Law Review, which was praised by authorities, such as
Judge Joseph Story (1779–1845) and Chancellor James Kent
(1763–1847). Because the publishing house closed down in 1842,
only one volume with four numbers was ever published. However,
he published several articles in judicial magazines, the last one—
about the federal courts—when he was more than 80 years old.18
When he died in 1877, he was one of the most prestigious and
respected lawyers in Louisiana.19 He was the last link:
which connected the present with the Augustan era of the
New Orleans bar. Without, perhaps, possessing the
brilliancy of Mazureau,20 Preston,21 or Grymes,22 or the
16. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM
THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 5, 33 (Univ. of N. Carolina Press 1983).
17. Mark W. Lambert, The Trinity University School of Law 1873–1878,
and the Jurisprudence of Texas, THE HOUSTON LAWYER, Nov./Dec. 2003, at 34,
available at http://www.thehoustonlawyer.com/aa_nov03/page34.htm.
18. Gustavus Schmidt, The Federal Courts, 2 SOUTHERN L. REV. 140
(1876); see also Gustavus Schmidt, Presumption of Survivorship When Several
Persons Perish by a Common Calamity, 2 SOUTHERN L. REV. 594 (1876).
19. Handwritten biography, Schmidt Collection, Tulane University [55–59].
20. Étienne Mazureau (1777–1849), a distinguished French and later
Louisiana lawyer, serving three times as Attorney General of Louisiana and as a
Secretary of State of Louisiana. He was a law partner with Edward Livingston
and practiced law in New Orleans.
21. Isaac T. Preston (1793–1852) graduated from Yale College in 1812. He
worked as a judge of the First District Court of New Orleans, and then as the
state’s Attorney General from 1823–29 and again from 1842–45. He was a
member of the constitutional convention of 1844 and served as a Supreme Court
Justice from 1850–52. Sheridan E. Young, Louisiana’s Court of Errors and
Appeals, 1843–1846 in A LAW UNTO ITSELF?, supra note 11, at 107.
22. John R Grymes (1786–1854), a Virginian lawyer who had moved to
New Orleans in 1808:
[W]as an eminent practitioner of the law, engaged in almost every case
of importance in the courts of New Orleans and the surrounding
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eloquence of Soulé,23 he was equal, if not superior to, any
of these great men in learning. Gustavus’ place in the
esteem of the world was at an all-time high in a career at
the Bar, which extended a period of over half a century.24
Another obituary noted: “For a thorough knowledge of legal
lore he had no peer in Louisiana, and scarcely in America. His
books were his companions in season and out of season, though he
served his clients with unflattering perseverance.”25
The Schmidt brothers were both pioneers as publishers of law
journals, in the old world, as well as in the new. Their law journals
carried significant importance due to their international and
comparative approach.
The brothers are important examples of the intercultural
communication process during the 19th century. German legal
scholars and professors of law, K.J.A. Mittermaier and K.S.
Zachariae, influenced the Schmidt brothers’ ideals on comparative
counties, acted in the capacity of counsel for Gen. Jackson in the
United States bank case, and opposed Daniel Webster in the city of
New Orleans against Mrs. Myra Clark Gaines; he held at different
periods the offices of United States district attorney and attorney
general of Louisiana, served in the legislature several terms, and was a
member of the state constitutional convention;
Lyon Gardiner Tyler, LL. D, [Art.] John R. Grymes, Jr., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
VIRGINIA BIOGRAPHY: VOLUME II (Lewis Historical Pub. Co. 1915). See also
Elizabeth Urban Alexander, NOTORIOUS WOMAN: THE CELEBRATED CASE OF
MYRA CLARK GAINES 60 (La. State Univ. Press 2004).
23. Pierre Soulé (1801–1870), French-born American politician, lawyer,
and diplomat, active in Louisiana politics and pre-Civil War diplomacy. He
finally settled in New Orleans.
Soulé became an active criminal lawyer, orator, financier, and
Democratic politician. In 1846 he was elected to the Louisiana
Legislature; at the end of the year he went to the U.S. Senate to fill an
unexpired term. Elected to a full term in 1848, Soulé became the leader
of the Southern faction of the Democratic party. . . . Between 1854 and
1861 Soulé practiced law. He advocated a canal project across the
Isthmus of Tehuantepec in Mexico and was a leader of the Democratic
party in Louisiana. A unionist during the secession crisis of 1861,
Soulé supported Louisiana during the Civil War.
Pierre Soulé, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD BIOGRAPHY 2004, Encyclopedia.com
(May 15, 2015), http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3404706067.html. See
also CATHERINE CHANCEREL, L’HOMME DU GRAND FLEUVE (CNRS ed. 2014).
24. Gustavus Schmidt, NEW ORLEANS TIMES, September 27, 1877, at 3.
25. One by One, NEW ORLEANS ITEM, September 26, 1877, at 2.
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law. The concepts and the ideas in the German legal periodicals
were used by the brothers and were adapted to the Swedish and
American legal cultures.
IV. COMPARATIVE LEGAL CULTURES OF THE TIME
One important context to the period is how the law was
received and distributed over the international border during the
period of 1830–1870. Three examples of such transcontinental
legal discourses can be observed in this section.
A. The Vision of a National Codification
In the early 19th century, there was a classic Schul-Streit, or
school rivalry, between the Heidelberg Law Professor Anton
Friedrich Justus Thibaut (1772–1840) and the law professor at the
Reform University in Berlin, Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779–
1861). This dispute was in regards to the role of codification in a
modern nation. In Germany, one discussed whether to identify its
own national customs and laws, or to use foreign models (like the
French Code civil), and introduce a legal transplant into German
legal culture.
In 1811, in Sweden, a law commission was appointed
following the constitutional reform in 1809. The task for the
commission was to produce a draft of a civil code and a criminal
code. Carl Schmidt was engaged in this work in his capacity as a
liberal judge in the Court of Appeals in southern Sweden. When
the draft of the civil code was presented in 1826, and that of the
criminal code in 1832, the drafts were sent to various legal
authorities for comments, including the Court of Appeals where
Carl Schmidt served as a judge. Most of the comments were
reluctant and critical to such a reform, but Carl Schmidt’s liberalorientated court advocated for the codification reform.
Gustavus Schmidt moved to Louisiana after the French
inspired Civil Code had been introduced in 1825. Louisiana was
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the only state in the United States that chose this continental
European legal tradition. The struggle for a modern codification
occurred as an important scholarly and practical debate, not only in
Germany, but also in Sweden and the United States. Gustavus
Schmidt believed that in the USA science is of no value unless it
can bring in money. “As a result they study law as a profession, as
an art, and you only need a certain mechanical knowledge and little
or no scientific insight.”26
B. Concept of Constitutions
The United States Constitution became an important model in
19 century Europe. The Norwegian Constitution of 1814 is one
example of a constitution influenced by the United States
Constitution.27 Later, the French political scientist Alexis de
Tocqueville’s work De la démocratie en Amérique, published in
the 1830s, played an important role in German, as well as Swedish,
constitutional discourses. Several Swedish intellectual liberals
traveled to America in the early 1850s. The law professor Pehr
Erik Bergfalk (1798–1890) from Uppsala was one of them. He
made the trip together with author Fredrika Bremer (1801–1865).28
th

C. Comparative Legal Science
The third legal discourse of this period was about comparative
law. In Germany and France, professorships and institutes for
comparative law were introduced. The first chair in comparative
law was established at the Collège de France in 1832 for Eugène

26. Letter from Gustavus Schmidt to Christian Naumann, (June 30, 1873)
(on file with Tulane University Special Collections).
27. KONGERIGET NORGES GRUNDLOV [CONSTITUTION] May 17, 1814
(Nor.). WRITING DEMOCRACY: THE NORWEGIAN CONSTITUTION 1814–2014
(Karen Gammelgaard & Eirik Holmøyvik eds., Berghahn, New York 2014).
28. FREDRIKA BREMER, THE HOMES OF THE NEW WORLD: IMPRESSIONS OF
AMERICA (Mary Howitt trans., Harper & Brothers Pubs 1853).
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Lerminier.29 Additionally, Gustavus Schmidt’s works can be found
in the library of the Paris Institut de Droit Comparé, founded in
1931. In Germany, Professor Mittermaier was one of the most
important catalysts of comparative law development. He collected
legal materials from all over the world and published them in the
law journals he edited.30
V. A DEEPER VIEW INTO THE BIOGRAPHIES OF THE SCHMIDT
BROTHERS
This section returns to the biographies of the Schmidt brothers,
so that their lives may be explored in depth. Their parents were
from the province of Scania, in southern Sweden. Their father
grew up in Sövestad, received his law degree in Lund, and
defended his thesis on “house arrest” (De arresto civil) in 1772.
His career as an appeals court judge started at Göta Court of
Appeals in Jönköping.31 Later, he came to Mariestad for a high
position within the regional government administration. His son
Carl was born in 1792 and Gustav[us] was born in 1795. They had
only two sisters who survived into adulthood, Sofia Ulrika (1787–
1854) and Sigrid Fredrika (born 1798).32 Mariestad, by Lake
Vänern, was a more important regional and strategic place in the
early 1800s than it is today. When the liberal Swedish author, Carl
Jonas Love Almquist (1793–1866), wrote his novel “It can be
done!” (Det går an) in 1838, he placed the plot in the surroundings
of Mariestad. Almquist, who spent time with his generation’s
liberal jurists, pointed out the importance of focusing on legal

29. Mireille Delmas-Marty, Comparative Law and the Internationalization
of Law in Europe in EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE
LAW 247 (Mark van Hoecke ed., Hart 2004).
30. Dölemeyer, Wissenschaftliche Kommunikation im 19. Jahrhundert,
supra note 2, at 285–98.
31. Enrolled as an auscultator in the court on March 23.1773. Barbro
Edlund, Göta hovrätts auskultanter. Matriklar 1635–1804, Acta Societatis
Juridicae Lundensis, Nr 69, Lund 1984, 147.
32. Letter from Carl Schmidt to Gustavus Schmidt (March, 28 1830) (on
file with Tulane University Special Collections).
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problems. “The [pen] is the sword of today and the law [from the
basic law down to the smallest ordinance] represents the shield. . . .
Justice must be included in the world of poetry. . . .”33
Almquist’s novel “It can be done!” is about an emancipated
young woman, Sara Widebeck, who makes a trip with her friend
Sergeant Albert on the Göta Canal from Stockholm to Mariestad.
They are in love, but Sara does not want to get married. It is a
modern reform novel, with the liberated woman as its theme. The
novel was violently criticized due to the narrative of the unmarried
couple. Almquist was even prosecuted in Uppsala because of this
blasphemous work.34
In the novel, when Sara Widebeck and Albert arrive in
Mariestad they walk to Lidköping, where Sara was born, and she
shows Albert the sandy road leading up to the mansion of
Trufverö, where she used to walk “every morning in the
summertime.” Almquist used her morning walk at sunrise as a
metaphor for a modern reform toward a visionary future. At that
time a famous Swedish jurist, Johan Gabriel Richert lived in the
mansion Trufve. He trained at Lund University, was a pioneer of
Swedish liberalism, and was also a friend from his youth to the
Schmidt brothers.35
Carl Schmidt remembered in a letter to Gustavus the memory
from their childhood of “the nice mansion of Trufve on the road
between Lidköping and the hill of Kinnekulle, filled with natural
beauty, whose peak we often regarded from the windows in the

33. C.J.L. Almquist, Letter from C. J. L. Almquist to O. P. Sturzen-Becker,
1840 in 1 DET GAR AN: UN TAVLA UR LIVET 47 (P.A.Norstedt & Söner Förlag,
Stockholm 1911).
34. KJELL Å. MODÉER, Carl Jonas Love Almquist och juristerna. En första
skis, in JUSTITIA OCH CLIO. ÅRETS SKÄRVOR FRÅN SKRIVBORD OCH KATEDRAR
151 ff. (Corpus Iuris Förlag, Lund 1990).
35. C. J. L. Almquist, Det går an. En tavla ur livet [Can It Really Be Done:
A Picture Out of Life] in SAMLADE VERK 21 43 f. (Svenska Vitterhetssamfundet,
Stockholm 1993). In English: SARA VIDEBECK AND THE CHAPEL (Aldolph
Bernett Benson trans., American-Scandinavian Foundation 1919).
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nursery in the stonehouse at the Mariestad’s bridge.”36 Thus, law,
literature and the Schmidts’ biographical reality are weaved
together.
In 1802, the Schmidt family moved to Jönköping, where the
father Hans Christian was appointed Appeals Court Assessor in the
Göta Court of Appeals.37 In 1818, Hans Christian became an
Appeals Court Justice, and died in 1822. The sisters always lived
nearby and played an important part in the correspondence
between the brothers.
VI. LIBERAL LAWYERS IN EARLY 19TH CENTURY SWEDEN
Carl Schmidt had an interesting law career in 19th century
Sweden, similar to that of his famous countryman Johan Gabriel
Richert (1784–1864). Richert studied at Lund around the turn of
the century, and Carl Schmidt went to Lund in 1811—the same
year the law professor Johan Holmbergson (1764–1842) was
appointed professor at the Lund law faculty. One of his famous
students, the professor of a history of laws, Carl Johan Schlyter
(1795–1888), wrote in Holmbergson’s obituary that when
Holmbergson left Uppsala for Lund, the lantern of legal science
was extinguished in Uppsala and was lit in Lund.38 From the Lund
perspective it is a nice metaphor. Johan Holmbergson was an
extraordinary law professor who had high standards for legal
education, while also insisting it be for practical use.39 The result
of his work can be observed in the development of the law faculty.
When he came to Lund he was the only law professor on the
36. Letter from Carl Schmidt to Gustavus Schmidt (July 23, 1852) (on file
with Tulane University Special Collections).
37. The assessor Schmidt was one of the examiners at S.A. Leijonhufvud’s
examination to become a clerk in the Göta Court of Appeal 1803. PRESIDENTEN
S.A. LEIJONHUFVUDS MINNESANTECKNINGAR 44 f. (H.L.von Dardel ed.,
P.A.Norstedt & Söners Förlag, Stockholm 1919).
38. Kjell Å Modéer, Schartau och juristerna in HENRIC SCHARTAU 1757–
1825, at 58 (Anders Jarlert ed., Lund 2005).
39. Jan Eric Almquist, Examen juridicum i Lund 1749–1812 in SVENSK
JURIDISK LITTERATURHISTORIA 232 (P.A.Norstedt & Söners Förlag 1946).
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faculty; when he passed away in 1842, there were four professors
of law, among them Carl Johan Schlyter for legal history and
Christian Naumann for constitutional and criminal law. Carl
Schmidt belonged to the first class to be examined by
Holmbergson, and the two men kept in close contact over the
years.40
Carl Schmidt followed his fathers and older brothers’ law
career footsteps to the Göta Court of Appeals. He got a position at
the new Court of Appeals for Southern Sweden when it was
inaugurated in 1821 and moved to Kristianstad. At that time,
Kristianstad was a colorful town with counts, barons, and artillery
officers living in the surrounding mansions.41 The new Frenchborn King Charles XIV Bernadotte wanted to “hold the flag for the
liberal ideas,”42 and the liberal Johan Gabriel Richert was
appointed the teacher of Crown Prince Oscar.43 Part of the future
legislative reform plans followed the French model of introducing
the oral process and efficient principles of action. Carl started his
career at the new Court of Appeals, in 1821, as a prosecutor; he
advanced to an assessor in 1823, and to an appellate judge in
1843.44 As an appellate judge, he appeared in another of Carl Jonas
Love Almquist’s novels, Amalia Hillner (1840). Almquist used
real, as well as fictional characters, in his novel to tell a story about
life among the judges in the Court of Appeals in Kristianstad. Carl
Schmidt, as well as his friend and colleague at the bench, Peter
Quiding, appeared in this novel.45 In the novel the following
40. Holmbergson published several articles in Carl Schmidt’s Juridiskt
Arkif in the 1830s; see infra note 51.
41. Kjell Å Modéer, Från Helgeå til Öresund. Om Skånska hovrätten kring
sekelskiftet, 67 SVENSK JURISTTIDNING 273 ff. (1982).
42. TORVALD T:SON HÖJER, CARL XIV JOHAN, KONUNGATIDEN 127 (PA
Norstedt & Söners Förlag, Stockholm 1960).
43. JOHAN GABRIEL RICHERT, HANS LEFNAD OCH UTTALANDEN 86, 88 (P.
A. Norstedt & Söners Förlag 1905).
44. KJELL Å. MODÉER, HOVRÄTTEN ÖVER SKÅNE OCH BLEKINGE. EN
ÖVERRÄTTS TILLKOMSTHISTORIA 95 (P.A. Norstedt och Söner Stockholm 1971).
45. C. J. L. ALMQUIST, AMALIA HILLNER [SAMLADE SKRIFTER, Del. 23] 102
(Fredrik Böök ed., Albert Bonniers Förlag, Stockholm 1932).
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statement was made regarding his abilities as a judge: “Ask Judge
Schmidt in this case! Everybody tells me, he is the most excellent
and clever judge in this country.”46
Carl Schmidt was regarded as a liberal jurist in his time. The
law committee’s bills were remitted to the three courts of appeals
for their opinion. Most of the upper courts were critical of the
reform bills, but in Kristianstad, judges gave a very positive
response to these bills.47 Several of the comparative legal
references made by his court of appeals demonstrate that Carl
Schmidt made use of the books and magazines his brother
Gustavus had sent him over the years.48
Carl Schmidt became an important figure in the aristocratic and
social life in Kristianstad: his colleague at the court, Peter Quiding,
Peter’s wife Charlotte (Fredrika Bremer’s sister), and his principal
Per Johan Böklin, was Fredrika Bremer’s friend and mentor. 49 In
1830, Carl Schmidt, along with some friends, became the cofounder of a printer’s office in Kristianstad, C. Schmidt & Co.
They published educational novels in Swedish and in other
languages. Fredrika Bremer showed her loyalty to them by
publishing a novel at: “Misters Smith & Co—at the good printer’s
office in Kristianstad.”50

46. Id. at 32.
47. Hofrättens öfver Skåne och Blekinge underdåniga utlåtande jemte
anmärkningar i anledning af Lagkommitténs Förslag till Kriminallag,
JURISDISKT ARKIF, Bd. 9 (1838–39), 1 ff.
48. “Livingstons Förslag til Brottmåls-Lag för Louisiana Staten i Norra
Amerika” quoted in several cases. E.g. JURIDISKT ARKIF, Bd. 9 (1838–39), 20,
64, 110. One translated article from The American Jurist and Law Magazine was
published in Juridiskt Arkif, Vol. 3, pp. 358–398. Författaren ogillar på flera,
som det synes, antagliga skäl bestämmandet af rentefoten, JURIDISKT ARKIF,
Vol. 9 (1838–39), 179.
49. CARINA BURMAN, BREMER: EN BIOGRAFI 84 (Albert Bonniers Förlag
2001) [hereinafer BREMER].
50. FREDRIKA BREMER, Letter from Fredrika Bremer to Per Johan Böklin,
April 1834 in FREDRIKA BREMER. BREV. NY FOLJD I–II TIDIGARE EJ SAMLADE
OCH TRYCKTA BREV UTGIVNA AV CARINA BURMAN 48 (Gidlunds Förlag 1996)
[hereinafter BREV].
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VII. THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE TWO SCHMIDT
BROTHERS
The existing correspondence between Carl and Gustavus
Schmidt begins in 1830. In his family, Gustavus had been regarded
as the lost son. In his first letter to Gustavus, on March 28, 1830,
Carl wrote that he had read Gustavus’ letter with great happiness
the night before. “You cannot imagine how happy I was last night
when I received your letter . . . We haven’t heard from you for
over ten years and I understand from your letter that you never
received our previous letters.” Carl informed his brother about the
tragic events in the family during the past years, that their father
had passed away in 1822, and that two of their other brothers had
died. The older brother Hans became an alcoholic and was fired
from Göta hovrätt. He died a few years later. Additionally, his
brother Adolf had died early in his life. “You are now my only
brother,” he wrote to Gustavus.51 Both Carl and his sister kept
asking Gustavus to return to Sweden. “If you can, please return to
your homeland. With your knowledge you will find good work
here if you want to.”52 However, by that time Gustavus was
already well-established in New Orleans, so he remained there
through two marriages and had a big family—whose descendants
are still living in Louisiana.53
Already in his first letter, Carl spoke about his new printing
house, saying “that it would probably be ready in May.” The
printers were all well-acquainted with the English language, and
four of them “read Shakespeare, Byron, Moor, and Walter Scott in
English.”
If you decide, as is our wish, to return home, please bring
me the newest, most liberal North American literature and
if you could bring some law books, I would be most
51. Letter from Carl Schmidt to Gustavus Schmidt (March 28, 1830) (on
file with Tulane University Special Collections).
52. Id.
53. For example, Louis de la Vergne’s grandmother’s grandfather was
Gustavus Schmidt.
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thankful. In an English journal I have found that Louisiana
has already adopted the Civil Code in 1824. [sic: should be
1825]—Furthermore, I intend to start a law journal next
summer, with the best and the newest in legal literature,
and that which comes from the native land of liberty must
be of interest to each enlightened friend. If we can’t have
the pleasure of seeing you soon, at least send us a dear
book of yours, and tell me how much you want for it.54
This was an invitation to fraternal intercultural collaboration.
For more than forty years the brothers exchanged books, and their
book parcels crossed the Atlantic Ocean, in times of peace and in
times of war. Far from all of their book packets reached their
addressees, but the correspondence between them tells us that the
Schmidt brothers were following what was happening in the
different legal cultures, with interest, on both sides of the ocean.
VIII. THE LAW JOURNALS AS COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNALS
This interest in North American democracy, and the
construction of the growing federal North American Union, was an
important theme of discussion among the liberal European
intellectuals, especially in Sweden around 1830. The publishing of
Alexis de Tocqueville’s previously mentioned work, De la
démocratie en Amérique (1835-1840), translated into several
languages, compelled legal political discourse among Swedish
liberals on topics such as prisons, capital punishment, and the jury
system.55 Carl published several articles on these problems in the
1830s. Additionally, in Johan Gabriel Richert, Professor Bergfalk,
and Fredrika Bremer we find further influence from the work of
Tocqueville.56 Bremer’s interest in the United States grew because
of Tocqueville’s description of American prisons. “The prisons
54. Letter from Carl Schmidt to Gustavus Schmidt (March 28, 1830) (on
file with Tulane University Special Collections).
55. SHELDON S. WOLIN, TOCQUEVILLE BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: THE
MAKING OF A POLITICAL AND THEORETICAL LIFE 383 (Princeton Univ. Press
2001).
56. Bremer read Tocqueville’s work in the winter of 1836–37. See CARINA
BURMAN, BREMER, supra note 49, at 147.
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make me especially happy. It is nice to think about the silence and
hard work of the prisoner, who after a day of quiet can open up to a
priest that can give him solace—how nice, how lovely!”57
This liberal and progressive view, around the 1830s was,
however, not the majority view in Sweden. In the first volume of
Kritische Zeitschrift fur Rechwissenschaft und Gesetzgebung des
Auslandes (1829) (Critical Journal for Legal Science and . . .
Abroad), published by Mittermaier and Zachariae, two Swedish
legal scholars, Carl Johan Schlyter and Hans Samuel Collin, wrote
a very critical article about the current situation regarding
jurisprudence and legislature in Sweden.58 Swedish legal education
was “in a terrible condition,” according to Schlyter and Collin.59
Johan Holmbergson had indeed introduced a qualitative
jurisprudence, but what about the future? Possibly their arrogant
statements provoked Carl Schmidt, and when he founded Juridiskt
Arkif in 1830, he wanted to demonstrate that there were jurists with
ambitions to raise the standards of the Swedish legal tradition. He
used a vignette that he had probably found in the German law
journal, Juristische Zeitung für das Königreich Hannover. It
showed the eye of the law, with its symbols of justice, the scale
and the sword, laid crosswise on top of the law book and the olive
branch.60

57. BREMER, Letter from Fredrika Bremer to Böklin, Tomb, May 21, 1837
in BREV, supra note 50, at 281, 361, 447.
58. H. S. Collin & C. J. Schlyter, Kurze Uebersicht über den gegenwärtigen
Zustand der Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft in Schweden [Aus dem
Schwedischen einer brieflichen Mittheilung übersetzt und mit einigen
Anmerkungen begleitet von Herr Professor Schildener in Greifswalde] i: 1
KRITISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT UND GESETZGEBUNG DES
AUSLANDES 423 ff. (Mittermaier & Zachariae ed., Heidelberg 1829).
59. Id. at 429.
60. MICHAEL STOLLEIS, DAS AUGE DES GESETZES. GESCHICHTE EINER
METAPHER 10 (Verlag C.H. Beck, München 2004). Juristische Zeitung für das
Königreich Hannover was mentioned in the index of German law journals
published by C. Schmidt in JURIDISKT ARKIF, Vol. 1 (1830–31), 473.
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Carl Schmidt had high ambitions for his journal. An extensive
article by Mittermaier, about English criminal law,61 was followed
by a Scottish law report from the High Court Justitiary in
Edinburgh.62 Collaboration between Norwegian and Swedish law
committees was reported,63 and Professor Holmbergson
contributed with several articles on jurisprudence in the first two
volumes of Juridiskt Arkif.64 The American legal scholar, Edward
Livingston, wrote the most important legal political article
published in the journal. It was about capital punishment and was
an excerpt from the introduction to the proposed penal code in
Louisiana. Even though Livingston’s penal code never was
adopted, it brought him widespread fame when it was published in
1824.65 The reform-oriented law committee decided to keep capital
punishment but also presented an alternative suggestion to abolish
it. Carl Schmidt was against capital punishment. In September
1831, he enclosed in a letter to Gustavus two copies of the first
issue of the second volume of Juridiskt Arkif—one issue for
Gustavus’ father-in-law and one for “the great lawmaker
Livingston, who had an article about capital punishment in it. It
might seem bold, but I would like you to persuade him to write an

61. Mittermaier, Engelska Criminalrätten i dess utbildning, hufvudsakligen
genom nyare Parlamentsacter, JURIDISKT ARKIF, Vol. 1 (1830–31), 1 ff., 161 ff.
62. Ransakning angående Burke och M’Dougal [Hearing about Burke and
M’Dougal], JURIDISKT ARKIF, Bd. 1 (1830–31), 41 ff., 184 ff.
63. Svenska och Norrska förenade Lagkommiteernas protokoller, hållne i
Stockholm år 1830 [Swedish and Norwegian united law committees’ protocol,
Stockholm 1830], JURIDISKT ARKIF, Vol. 1 (1830–31), 65 ff.
64. Minderårighet såsom lagligt hinder mot Äktenskap, JURIDISKT ARKIF,
Bd. 1 (1830–31), 151 ff.; Hvad förstås med hustruns hus och jord i staden i 11
kap. 1 § Giftermåls Balken?, JURIDISKT ARKIF, Bd. 2 (1831–32) 72 ff.;
Utredning av 2 § 11 Kap. GB, JURDISKT ARKIF, Bd. 2 (1831–32), 80 ff.; Om och
hvilken inskränkning i bevisningen af ett skriftligt testamentes verklighet medför
den omständighet, att ena testamentsvittnet dött fore Testator och innan
detsamma edeligen vitsordat der förhållande, dess underskrift å testamentet
omfattar, JURIDISKT ARKIF, Bd. 2 (1831–32), 85 ff.; Om incestuösa giftermål m.
m. i anledning af en i Lund år 1813 utgifven academisk afhandling: de connubiis
inter cognatos & affines prohibitis, JURIDISKT ARKIF, Bd. 2 (1831–32), 329 ff.
65. Alexander DeConde, Livingston, Edward, 13 AMERICAN NATIONAL
BIOGRAPHY 764 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999).
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article about criminal legislation in Louisiana, or if you could send
me the latest criminal case codex.”66
From Carl Schmidt’s letter to Gustavus, it is evident that their
exchange of letters had become more extensive by the end of 1832.
Carl also sent dozens of books that he considered to be remarkable,
such as the Swedish poet Erik Johan Stagnelius’ collected works.
Stagnelius died in 1823, at the age of 29. Carl also sent to
Gustavus poems by Elias Tegner (“the most beloved poet of the
time in Sweden”). All the books were “nicely bound and well
written. They are from my own library; I don’t have time to
procure other copies right now, but I can buy them over time later
on.” He also asked to be sent the American Quarterly Review, the
North American Review, the Southern Review, and the United
States Law Intelligencer Review from Providence, Rhode Island.
He received James Kent’s classic work, Commentaries on
American Law (1826), in four volumes from Gustavus and sent
them to Johan Gabriel Richert. “A letter from him tells me that he
likes it so much that he would like to keep it, and I therefore ask
you to send me another copy.”67
Carl Schmidt was appointed Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court in 1845 and moved to Stockholm. He sold his printing office
in Kristianstad, and in Stockholm, he was nominated by Richert to
be a member on the legislative committee, which was to prepare
the Swedish codification. He had been appointed to this task
already in 1840 because of his positive statements on the original
law committee’s propositions. Almost all nominated experts
declined for political reasons,68 but after King Oscar I had been
inaugurated in 1844, he appointed a new law committee (Gamla
Lagberedningen) the following year; and, Richert, Per Staaf, Carl
Johan Schlyter, Pehr Erik Bergfalk, and Carl Schmidt accepted.69
66. Letter from Carl Schmidt to Gustavus Schmidt (December 29, 1831) (on
file with Tulane University Special Collections).
67. Id.
68. See RICHERT, supra note 43, at Part II, 83.
69. See RICHERT, supra note 43, at Part II, 227.
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Pehr Erik Bergfalk, who was considered to be Uppsala’s most
liberal man of power, and Fredrika Bremer traveled to the United
States around 1849 to 1851. Carl Schmidt informed Fredrika
Bremer about his brother in New Orleans. During the Christmas
and New Year’s holidays of 1850 into 1851, Bremer visited
Gustavus Schmidt in New Orleans while on her way to Cuba.
Bremer had spent the first months of her trip to America on the
east coast. In February of 1850, Gustavus wrote to her during her
visit to Boston and invited her to come down to New Orleans. On
her way down the Mississippi River on a paddle steamer (which
she called Noah’s Ark because of its colorful crowds of people:
women smoking pipes and blowing their noses in their hands), she
made a stop in St. Louis in November 1850, and from there she
wrote to Gustavus—“My dear countryman!” She traveled from
Minneapolis, Minnesota and estimated that she would be in New
Orleans by the beginning of December.70 She had written a letter to
her friend Andrew Jackson Downing when she was in Cincinnati,
writing, “From New Orleans you will hear from me. My address
there will be in care of Mr. Gustavus Schmidt of Sweden.”71
In her published accounts of her journey, also translated into
English, The Homes in the New World: Impressions of America
[Hemmen i den Nya verlden], published in three volumes from
1853-1854, she recounts her visit to the Schmidt family in New
Orleans. She arrived on Christmas Eve in the harbor of “the
Crescent City.” Her “friendly countryman,” who also provided her
with someplace nice to stay during her visit, welcomed her.
I went to church on Christmas Day [she wrote,] in a church
nearby, whose gloomy windows didn’t let any light in, I
listened to a dry, soulless sermon; thought New Orleans
was a dry and boring city.
70. BREMER, Letter from Fredrika Bremer to Gustavus Schmidt & Letter
from Fredrika Bremer to Andrew Jackson Downing, in BREV, supra note 50, at
190.
71. BREMER, Letter from Fredrika Bremer to Andrew Jackson Downing in
BREV, supra note 50, at 373.
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—In New Orleans, Christmas is not Christmas. I seem to be
in heathen country.72
Fredrika Bremer was able to observe slavery in New Orleans.
She visited both a slave market and a slave auction. “I saw nothing
too offensive there, except—the whole thing; and I feel a sense of
amazement that such things are possible in a Christian society.”73
I had dinner today, December 30, in my countryman Gustavus
Schmidt’s home. He wanted to treat me to a real New Orleans
dinner and especially to my favorite soup in Louisiana, gumbo,
made of some fairytale grain. Mr. Schmidt is a small, lively man,
with a Creole charm in his being, very talkative and friendly. He is
married (second marriage) to a French Creole woman from New
Orleans and they have several little, dear, beautiful boys with dark
eyes and curls, like little Frenchmen. The wife, too, was a
beautiful, nice, simple woman, who had never seen a woman
writer, and seemed surprised that a woman writer was just like any
other. She seemed to believe that a person who writes books must
talk like a book. The dinner was delicious, and gumbo is the
tastiest of all soups in the world, a real life elixir in a substantial
way. If you have eaten gumbo you can frown upon the most
authentic turtle soup. After dinner the hostess, her sister, and I
talked by the fireplace. I had the pleasure of speaking to this native
woman, to hear her speak French, and to speak French myself, too.
It is refreshing for the tongue and ear after speaking the unmelodic
and troublesome English language.74
When the third volume of The Homes in the New World came
out in 1854, gumbo soup became one of the topics of the day in
Sweden.75 In a post script to a letter written in May of 1855, Carl

72. FREDRIKA BREMER, 2 HEMMEN I DEN NYA VERLDEN. EN DAGBOK I
BREF, SKRIFNA UNDER TVENNE ÅRS RESOR I NORRA AMERIKA OCH PÅ CUBA
[THREE VOLUMES] 507, 510 (P.A. Norstedt & Söner 1853).
73. Id.
74. Id. Vol. 3, at 7.
75. Gumbo is still a culinary specialty of the Creole kitchen in New
Orleans. The recipe can be found at: EXPERIENCE NEW ORLEANS! “GUMBO! BY
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sent Gustavus regards from Fredrika Bremer, “who now is the
chairperson of a women’s association.” Her brother-in-law, the
Associate Justice Peter Quiding, who had also been moved from
the Scanian Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court,76 had become
very curious about the delicious soup called gumbo. Carl Schmidt
continued to give information regarding the gumbo,
Which Ms. Bremer ate for dinner in New Orleans that he
[Quiding] has asked to know what is in it and how to make
it, so that even he can try the “real life elixir.” This is
something I would like to trouble your wife with and ask
for the eagerly awaited recipe with your next letter, which I
am sure will cause a revolution in Stockholm’s most finest
kitchens, after having been so highly spoken of by Fredrika
Bremerm, and be a dish eaten in a Swedish man’s house in
the happy city. I hope that all the ingredients can be found
here, or a surrogate at least, or else our hope will vanish in
thin air.77
Two months later there was a reply from New Orleans:
Gustavus’ second son, Albert, was on a boat to Sweden. On the
ship there was a box of 55 books, forty-eight bound and seven
unbound—12 of which are by Sp. & M. Lagen.78 “There is also a
box of 12 bottles of Gumbo, alias Gombo, and you will in due time
get a ‘gastronomical description.’ The best ways to cook and eat
this fine dish ‘it needs to be prepared by a distinguished artist from
that town.’”79 If these bottles ever made it across the Atlantic to
Stockholm, we cannot tell from this correspondence.

MOM,” http://www.experienceneworleans.com/recipe2.html (last visited Sept. 8,
2015).
76. A Borgström, Kongl. Hofrätten öfver Skåne och Blekinge 1821–1900.
Biografiska anteckningar, Kristianstad 1901, 7.
77. Letter from Carl Schmidt to Gustavus Schmidt, (May 7, 1877) (on file
with Tulane University Special Collections).
78. GUSTAVUS SCHMIDT, THE CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND MEXICO (Thomas
Rea 1851).
79. Letter from Gustavus Schmidt to Carl Schmidt (July 15, 1855) (on file
with Tulane University Special Collections).
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IX. DISTRIBUTION TO EUROPE OF THE CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND
MEXICO
Gustavus Schmidt’s knowledge of foreign languages included
Spanish—and the Spanish law was commonly known in Louisiana.
He was considered an expert on civil law systems both in Europe
and Louisiana80 and already in 1835, some successful businessmen
in New Orleans had told him they would pay for his trip to Mexico
if he would go. In connection with this trip, he also went to Cuba
where he helped to create a treaty between Havana and the Spanish
authorities. Schmidt was also engaged in the political situation in
Texas. On October 13, 1835, he gave a speech in New Orleans, in
support of the rebellion in Texas against the Mexican dictator
Santa Anna.81 After California and New Mexico were annexed by
the U.S.A., Gustavus used this as a justification for going back to
Louisiana’s legal historical roots, where the Spanish laws had
traditionally been used. He wanted to write a legal historical work
about the laws in Mexico and Spain. This work, The Civil Law of
Spain and Mexico, was published in New Orleans in 1851, and
dedicated to his colleague, Professor Christian Roselius, a civil law
professor at the University of Louisiana.
In the preface of this work, Gustavus Schmidt argues for the
importance of the field of legal history, stating, “It is hardly an
exaggeration to say that the history of the laws of a country is, in
many respects, a complete history of the country itself, as a French
writer [Granier de Cassagnac] maintains.”82 He also quotes
Montesquieu in his preface to support the necessity of legal
80. Rowena D. Richards, Schmidt, Gustavus, in A DICTIONARY OF
LOUISIANA BIOGRAPHY 722 (Glenn R. Conrad ed., 1988). See also 2
LOUISIANA: COMPRISING SKETCHES OF PARISHES, TOWNS, EVENTS,
INSTITUTIONS, AND PERSONS, ARRANGED IN CYCLOPEDIC FORM 125–26 (Alcée
Fortier ed., 1914).
81. Eugene C. Barker, The Tampico Expedition, 3 Q. TEX. ST. HIST. ASS’N
169, 171, 169–86 (1903).
82. GUSTAVUS SCHMIDT, THE CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND MEXICO, at v–vi
(Thomas Rea 1851) (citing GRANIER DE CASSAGNAC, HISTOIRE DU DROIT
FRANḈAIS (Librarie de Firmin Didot Frères, Fils et Cie 1872)).
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history: “The maxim of Montesquieu: One has to clarify history by
the laws and the laws by the history cannot be too carefully
adhered to by the lawyer, since, if he has failed to follow it, he will
never deserve the title of jurist.” Schmidt was disappointed that
legal history had not been observed as important enough.
“Jurisprudence hardly deserves the rank of science until such a
history has been written.” This project demands a model and
knowledge, such that of Montesquieu and Savigny; “but the very
existence of such men, and the nature of their juridical labors,
prove the possibility of such a performance, which, in our age, has
been greatly facilitated by the immense materials everywhere
collected in aid of the reform of the law.”83 Gustavus Schmidt was,
thus, one of the early missionaries for the German Historical
School on American soil—even though not observed in recent
research.84 His legal historical work was long considered the
standard work in this area, and is still quoted—however, with some
reservations.85
Gustavus Schmidt sent six copies of his work to Carl Schmidt.
They arrived in Stockholm in July of 1852, and were distributed to
several representative persons. Carl Schmidt delivered the first one
personally to the Swedish King, Oscar I, at the royal castle. The
king knew of Gustavus because he had previously received books
from him,86 and Carl Schmidt could later tell his brother that the
King “had asked him to convey how grateful he was for the gift.”

83. Id. at vii.
84. DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW’S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND
THE TRANSATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY 15 (Cambridge University Press 2013).
85. Hans W. Baade, The Formalities of Private Real Estate Transactions in
Spanish North America, 38 La. L. Rev. 665, 729 (1977–1978).
86. År 1844 översände han ett arbete av M’Kenney och James Hall författat
arbete, [In 1844, Gustavus Schmidt sent a work authored by Thomas McKenney
and James Hall] titled, The History of the American Tribes of North America.
See THOMAS MCKENNEY & JAMES HALL, THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
TRIBES OF NORTH AMERICA (Philadelphia 1838–1844). See also Letter from
King Oscar I to Gustavus Schmidt (October 2, 1844) (on file with Tulane
University Special Collections).
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The second copy was given to Johan Gabriel Richert at Trufve.
Richert had been working on the codification work for over 40
years, but had now retired from that task and was serving as a
lower court judge (häradshövding). Carl Schmidt had worked with
him for 10 years. He was able to tell his brother that Richert had
reviewed his book in an article that appeared in a liberal newspaper
in Stockholm.87 The third copy was sent to the Norwegian
councilor of State, H.J. Vogt, a member of the Norwegian
legislature, who had drawn up the proposal for a new criminal law
of Norway, in which Carl Schmidt had taken part on the Swedish
side. The fourth copy was sent to Professor juris civilis et romani
Knut Olivecrona, in Uppsala, one of Mittermaier’s most frequent
correspondents. Olivecrona had promised to publish a review of
the work in Juridiska Föreningens Tidskrift.88 At Gustavus’
suggestion, Carl sent the fifth copy to Professor Friedrich Carl von
Savigny in Berlin, and the last copy was sent to Professor C.J.A.
Mittermaier in Heidelberg. Richert suggested they should send a
copy to Mittermaier, “if you can get a German review of the book,
Mittermaier is the safest and most valuable bet,” Carl wrote to
Gustavus.89 Six copies written and published by an author in
Louisiana were supplied by Carl Schmidt to six prominent national
and international recipients, all of whom were interested in legal
affairs in the New World.

87. AFTONBLADET (Swedish daily paper), March 23, 1852.
88. Knut Olivecrona, Book Review of The Civil Law of Spain and Mexico,
by Gustavus Schmidt, counsellor at law, New Orleans 1851, 6 JURIDISKA
FÖRENINGENS TIDSKRIFT 181 (1853). [6 Law Society Magazine 181 (1853)]
“Ref. slutar denna anmälan med önskan att författerens arbete måtte finna läsare
äfven i hans gamla fosterbygd. Åt de jurister, hvilka intressera sig för känndom
af främmande länders lagar och rättstillstånd, tror sig Ref. med skäl kunna
recommendera Hr Schmidts The Civil Law of Spain and Mexico.” [“The
reviewer wishes that this work may find readers in the countryside of Sweden
where Gustavus grew up. To any jurists who want knowledge of foreign
countries’ law and legal states, the reviewer recommends Mr. Schmidt’s The
Civil Law of Spain and Mexico.”]
89. Letter from Carl Schmidt to Gustavus Schmidt, (July 23, 1852) (on file
with Tulane University Special Collections).

436

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 8

X. THE END OF THEIR LIFE-STORIES
During the last years of his life, Carl concluded his life work.
In 1858, he left the Supreme Court and moved to a small apartment
“to spend my last days somewhere nice and quiet within Clara
Parish.” He donated most of his library to the University Library at
Lund and to the library of the Swedish Supreme Court “to be used
in my memory.” Another part of the library was sold at an auction:
I still have a few hundred volumes of books, the ones you
gave me, and the ones in Swedish, and others to be read in
later days. I have also put aside books to be put in boxes
and sent to you when the communications after the Civil
War are safe and open again.90
As a bachelor, Carl Schmidt had long seen it as his
responsibility to, “with the help of God—help his sisters be able to
live among tomes and books, his life element.”91 In November
1870, he wrote his will, having consulted Christian Naumann, who
he also asked to be the executor of his will. Carl Schmidt went for
daily walks, “between 12:30-2:00 p.m.—to get fresh air and eat
dinner,” at Hotel de Suede.92 It may not have been a surprise to
Gustavus, in New Orleans, to hear of his brother’s passing and his
will.
Christian Naumann reported in a letter that the burial on
August 5th had passed according to the wishes of the deceased:
“No invitations other than in the newspapers, no commemorative
party afterwards, no it was formal, and well suited the deceased’s
position in society. The decedent’s former brothers of office,
higher and lower public officers, and civil servants attended the

90. Letter from Carl Schmidt to Gustavus Schmidt, (March 24, 1862) (on
file with Tulane University Special Collections).
91. Letter from Carl Schmidt to Gustavus Schmidt, (April 1, 1847) (on file
with Tulane University Special Collections).
92. Letter from Carl Schmidt to Christian Naumann, (October 30, 1870) (on
file in Christian Naumann’s Collection, Letters L–Z, at Riksarkivet [The
Swedish National Archives]). See also Letter from Carl Schmidt to Gustavus
Schmidt, (March 4, 1870) (on file with Tulane University Special Collections).
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funeral” in St. Clara Church.93 The vicar in Clara Parish, Frithiof
Grafström (1827-1883), spoke of psalm 15 of David from the
Book of Psalms, and of Johan Olof Wallin’s hymn 277, in 1819’s
Swedish Hymnal.94 The theme was well-chosen when the poetic
and idealistic vicar Grafström spoke in memory of a liberal and
idealistic judge.95 In the language of Romanticism, Wallin spoke of
the idealistic virtues of public officers as they had been adapted to
the ideology of society that characterized the era of Carl Schmidt:
who is the person, tired from fighting life’s war, which receives
peace with the Lord? Wallin’s hymn was suitable for a politically
engaged jurist who had served the liberal constitutional state.
“Children sang carols and a cantata of grief. The departed was
accompanied to the churchyard and put in a new grave,” which
Christian Naumann, being his colleague and executor, had
purchased.96 In Ny Illustrerad Tidning, an illustrated weekly paper,
nice words were written about Carl Schmidt. It is true that Carl
Schmidt had not been a discernible figure in the political fights:
But seldom had a mind been more awake, a view more
sharp, a pen used more than his; for over thirty years,
during which he, with conscientious zeal and enlightened
judgment, managed our biggest law journal. His name has
been well known for a long time and his work
acknowledged by the larger public. Lawmen have honored
him as an advocate of their own development of
knowledge, in legislature and justice, both in our own

93. Letter from Christian Naumann to Gustavus Schmidt, (August 10, 1872)
(on file with Tulane University Special Collections).
94. Letter from Carl Schmidt to Christian Naumann, (October 30, 1870 and
November 11, 1870) (on file in Christian Naumann’s Collection, Letters L–Z at
Riksarkivet [The Swedish National Archives]). See also Letter from Carl
Schmidt to Gustavus Schmidt, (March 4, 1870) (on file with Tulane University
Special Collections).
95. Grafström, Thor(e) Frithiof, SVENSKT BIOGRAFISKT LEXIKON, Bd. 17,
1967–69, 206 f. (1967–1969) [Grafström, Thor(e) Frithiof, 17 SWEDISH
BIOGRAPHICAL LEXICON 206], available at: http://sok.riksarkivet.se/SBL/
Presentation.aspx?id=13130.
96. Located at Norra Begravningsplatsen, Stockholm. Quarter 02, tomb
101.
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country and in foreign countries.97
Gustavus Schmidt survived his brother by five years, but his
ties to his homeland were weakened after Naumann finished
dividing Carl’s estate. His sister Sigrid, in Jönköping, no longer
responded to his letters. In July of 1875—a couple of weeks after
his 80th birthday—Gustavus wrote a third letter to his dear sister:
As I haven’t heard from you, I know nothing of your
health, etc. and I have assumed that the former unruly boy
Gustaf, is no longer considered to belong to his old country,
but has to be viewed a stranger, which, I assure you brings
me discomfort and is also unjustifiable, “because coelom
non animum mutant qui trans mare currunt,”98 that is, “if
you cross the sea you see a new sky but your heart stays the
same.”99
Gustavus was of good health until a few months before he
passed away. He moved to his son’s home in Old Sweet Springs,
Monroe County, West Virginia, where he passed away at the age
of 82 on September 20, 1877. Gustavus Schmidt was laid to rest in
the New Orleans’ St. Louis No. 2 cemetery.100 In his obituary, it
was noted that he was the most respected of the body of lawyers in
the state, he had been a lawyer for 46 years, and had appeared
before the State Supreme Court since the time it started. In another
obituary, it was stated that: “He was more than a mere lawyer, and
in his speeches, as well as private conversation, he expressed
himself with a terseness and eloquence that indicated the sincerity
and truth of his conviction on ethics and morals.”101 Thus, the two
brothers from Mariestad became high ranked jurists of their
generation in Sweden and in Louisiana. Their names are now to be
remembered in the legal history books.
97. Carl Christian Schmidt, Ny Illustrerad Tidning, Vol. 8 Nr 35
(31.8.1872).
98. Gustavus Schmidt to Sigrid Schmidt, New Orleans, July 3, 1875 (68–9).
99. HORACE, EPISTLES, 1, 11, 17.
100. Via Flickr Sabreur 76 User, Gustavus Schmidt Tomb, St. Louis No. 2,
New Orleans, available at http://flickrhivemind.net/blackmagic.cgi?id=
6872595490&url= (last visited Sept. 9, 2015).
101. Obituaries in New Orleans newspapers 1877. Clippings.
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XI. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
Finally, a brief explanation of the background of this essay is
needed. Toward the end of October 2004, at the annual meeting of
the American Society for Legal History in Austin, I met a senior
researcher, Louis de la Vergne, from New Orleans. He informed
me that he had come to Austin to make contact with Swedish legal
historians, who, according to the program, were participating. He
is the great-great grandson of Gustavus Schmidt, and was
participating in the publication of the Book Auction Catalogue
concerning his ancestor’s library.102 Gustavus Schmidt’s library
was one of the 19th century’s biggest, and most distinguished,
private law libraries in the United States. He told me that Gustavus
Schmidt’s private archives were kept in the law school’s archive at
Tulane University in New Orleans,103 and with the assistance of
the co-workers at Tarlton Law Library at the legal faculty at the
University of Texas (Austin), a few weeks later I received copies
of Carl Schmidt’s letters to his brother, Gustavus Schmidt, in New
Orleans. The correspondence had been unknown to Swedish
researchers for almost 130 years. Today we only have a smattering
of Carl Schmidt’s biography. Svenskt biografiskt lexicon (Swedish
Biographical Lexicon) overlooked this well-merited 19th century
jurist, when they passed the letter combination “Sch” a few years
ago. This essay can be seen as a kind of acknowledgment, an
Ehrenrettung, to the brothers.
At last, a comment about some of the research that this
discovery has caused.104 Of the six copies of The Civil Law of
102. MICHAEL H. HOEFLICH, LOUIS V. DE LA VERGNE & KJELL Å. MODÉER,
CATALOGUES OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW LIBRARIES: THE 1877 SALE
CATALOGUE OF GUSTAVUS SCHMIDT'S LIBRARY (Michael Widener ed., Jamail
Center for Legal Research 2005).
103. TU Law School is Given Briefs: La Vergne Family Makes Gift to
University, TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 18, 1967, at 2.
104. The following citations are articles regarding the Schmidt Brothers that
have already been published by Kjell Å Modéer: Mittermaier och bröderna
Schmidt—ett bidrag till 1800-talets interkulturella juristkommunikation in
FESTSKRIFT TILL HANS RAGNEMALM 233–256 (Göran Regner, Marianne Eliason
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Spain and Mexico that Carl Schmidt distributed to famous jurists,
one was for Richert. I assumed that later on he had given it to the
library of Law Commission. The older parts of the extensive
library that the Permanent Legislature of 1901 (Lagberedningen,
Swedish Law Commission) created, consist of books from later
Law Commissions’ book collections. When the permanent
Swedish Law Commission finished its work around 1980, these
books were kept in the basement of Rosenbad (Swedish
Government’s headquarter in Stockholm). In the beginning of the
1990s, Anders Eriksson, the then-legal director of the Ministry of
Justice, made an inquiry as to whether the law faculty in Lund
would like to take over this library. Having consulted Professor
Hans-Heinrich Vogel, the faculty’s permanent library consultant,
they decided to accept this treasure of books. The library is today
kept on compact shelves in the basement of the Law School. When
I was browsing through these shelves my hypothesis was
confirmed. There, under the cellar vaults, I found the book in
faded, yellow leather binding from Louisiana. The Schmidt
brothers would have smiled down from heaven if they could have
seen this happy Swedish legal historian, who with childish glee
shouted, “Bingo!” then kissed the book, and lifted it up towards the
ceiling, as if he had found, the never-found medieval law book,

& Hans-Heinrich Vogel eds., 2005) (Swed.); See Gustavus Schmidt’s Library:
The Swedish Connection in THE 1877 SALE CATALOGUE OF GUSTAVUS
SCHMIDT’S LIBRARY 95–107 (Michael Hoeflich, Louis de la Vergne, & Kjell Å
Modéer
eds.,
2005);
See
Carl
und
Gustavus
Schmidt
als
Zeitschriftenherausgeber: Zwei schwedische Juristenbrüder als Pioniere
juristischen Zeitschriften im 19. Jahrhundert in JURISTISCHE ZEITSCHRIFTEN IN
EUROPA 55–66 (Michael Stolleis & Thomas Simon eds., 2006) (Ger.); See Carl
Schmidt und die ersten juristischen Fachzeitschriften in Schweden: Juridiskt
Arkif und Juridiska Föreningens Tidskrift—Foren für die schwedischen
rechtswissenschaftliche Diskurse des 19. Jahrhundets, 17 JURIDICA INT’L UNIV.
OF TARTU 40 (2010) (Est.); See The Law Journal Editors Carl and Gustavus
Schmidt: Two Swedish Lawyers and Brothers as Law Journal Pioneers in the
19th Century in CIVIL LAW COMMENTARIES 1, Summer 2011, available at
http://www.law.tulane.edu/uploadedFiles/Institutes_and_Centers/Eason_Weinm
ann/clc3modeer11.pdf.
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always sought for, by my supervisor, Professor for legal history
Gerhard Hafström, the copy of Tiohäradslagen (on the old
Swedish county laws).
This is an example of what can happen, when the
Holmbergson’s lantern of legal science, in all its modesty still, tries
to illuminate the fall darkness at Lund University in Southern
Sweden.

“AGAINST INTERPRETATION”?
ON GLOBAL (NON-)LAW, THE BREAKING-UP OF HOMO
JURIDICUS, AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE JURIST
Luca Siliquini-Cinelli
Abstract ....................................................................................... 443
I. Introduction ............................................................................. 445
II. The Liberal Global-Order Project: From Action to Behaviour
................................................................................................ 459
III. Against Interpretation?.......................................................... 470
A. The Arrogance of Interpretation ........................................ 471
B. The Value of Interpretation ................................................ 477
IV. Conclusion ............................................................................ 483

ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the nullification of homo juridicus and the
vanishing of the jurist in relation to the liberal global-order
project and the emergence and spread of soft-networked channels
of post-national governance. By inquiring into the shift from the
individual’s active will to the sterile behavioural schemes
prompted by the universalisation of liberalism and economic
analysis of social interactions, it will be argued that the jurist and
the (rule of) law are no longer needed in a post-national system of
rational and mechanic causations. Through an analysis of Susan
Sontag’s and Josef Esser’s accounts for and against the
interpretative task, it will be contended that the re-discovery of the
 Dr. Luca Siliquini-Cinelli is Lecturer at Deakin Law School, Deakin
University, Australia. All rights reserved. No part of this contribution may be
used, reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by
any means without prior explicit permission in writing from the author.
Enquiries concerning any use, reproduction, and storage should be sent to
l.siliquinicinelli@deakin.edu.au.
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anthropological and onto-sociopolitical function of the jurist
depends upon the re-affirmation of: (1) the will’s oscillation
between velle and nolle as constitutive of human uniqueness; (2)
the need to interpret homo juridicus’s will power normativistically,
and what this power leads to.
“ . . . in willing and, correspondingly, in not willing, we bring ourselves to
light;
it is a light kindled only by willing.
Willing always brings the self to itself”
Martin Heidegger
Nietzsche, [1961] 1991, 51
“ . . . the culture of inwardness, the intensification of personal conflicts in
human life,
and the pent-up expressive power of its artistic representation is gradually
becoming alien to us”
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Philosophical Foundations of the Twentieth Century, [1962] 2008, 111
“Freedom becomes a problem, and the Will as an independent autonomous
faculty is discovered,
only when men begin to doubt the coincidence of the Thou-shalt and I-can”
Hannah Arendt
The Life of the Mind, [1971] 1978, Vol II, 63
“Reason is not self-defining”
Paul W. Kahn
Out of Eden, [2006] 2010, 175
“. . . according to Christian theology there is only one legal institution
which knows neither interruption nor end: hell.
The model of contemporary politics–which pretends to an infinite economy
of the world–is thus truly infernal
Giorgio Agamben
The Church and the Kingdom, [2010] 2012, 41
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I. INTRODUCTION1
I have been criticising the liberal global-order project for some
time now.2 While investigating the structural relationship between
the Law & Finance doctrine used by the World Trade Organisation
(WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank,
and the sterile administrative and economic-oriented aspatial
ufficium of global governance as opposed to that of political
government, my efforts have been particularly focused on what I
perceive as the two main features of this universalist (non-)
dimension: (1) despite what may be argued regarding the
accommodating essence of global pluralism,3 which is ultimately
1. This paper stems from my participation in the Conference “DeJuridification: Appearance and Disappearance of Law at a Time of Crisis,” IVR
International Association of Legal and Social Philosophy, UK Branch, held at
the Law Department, London School of Economics and Political Science on
October 25, 2014, and in the Graduate Legal Research Conference “Divergence
and Dissent in Legal Globalization,” held by Católica Global Law School,
Lisbon, on September 19, 2014. At both conferences I presented the paper
entitled The Age of “Depoliticization” and “Dejuridification” and its “Logic of
Assembling”: An Essay against the Instrumentalist Use of Comparative Law’s
Geopolitics”, 37 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 215 (2015) [hereinafter The
Age of “Depoliticization”].
In addition to the two anonymous reviewers, I would like to thank a number of
friends and colleagues for their valuable comments and criticism on an earlier
draft. In particular, I am indebted to Maksymilian Del Mar, William E Conklin,
Christoph Antons, John Morss, and Michael Stokes. The usual disclaimer
applies.
2. Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, The Age of “Depoliticization”, supra note 1;
Siliquini-Cinelli, Hayek the Schmittian: Contextualising Cristi’s Account of
Hayek’s Decisionism in the Age of Global Wealth Inequality, 24(4) GRIFFITH L.
REV. (2015) forthcoming;
3. For an introduction, see GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3–28 (Gunther
Teubner ed., Dartmouth 1997); More recently, see PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICS
(Emilios Christodoulidis & Stephen Tierney eds., Ashgate 2008); CONCEPTS OF
LAW (Seán Patrick Donlan & Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler eds., Ashgate 2014)
[hereinafter CONCEPTS OF LAW]; LAW, SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY (Richard
Nobles & David Schiff eds., Ashgate 2014).
Global pluralism’s alleged attitude is double-rooted in liberalism’s misleading
belief in the perpetual inclusive capacity of endless negotiations and in the
pluralist branch of the sociological study of democracy, which erupted in the
early post-war period and which was aimed at linking realist theories of society
with normative models of regulative democracy. Habermas defines it in terms of
“sociological enlightenment,” in JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND
NORMS, 329–87 (Polity Press 2014) (1992) [hereinafter BETWEEN FACTS AND
NORMS].

446

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 8

rooted in the misleading belief that “[g]lobalisation does not imply
homogenisation,”4 the totalising Oikoumene is characterised by the
uniformity of (non-)politics, (non-) culture, and (non-)legislation in
the Western (and in particular, Anglo-American) standardisation of
local and particular forms of cultural sensibility5—which means
that we should rather speak of global (non-)law;6 (2) the global
4. WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY 89
(Cambridge University Press 2000). See contra SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE
CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF THE WORLD ORDER (Simon &
Schuster 1996); See also what was pointed out by Bowden and Seabrooke,
namely that “global standards of market civilization are based on a global
normalization of liberal positivism,” in GLOBAL STANDARDS OF MARKET
CIVILIZATION 10 (Brett Bowden & Leonard Seabrooke eds., Routledge 2006)
[hereinafter GLOBAL STANDARDS]. For a recent point of view on global order
issues, see HENRY KISSINGER, WORLD ORDER (Penguin 2014).
5. Dyzenhaus’ claim that Rawls’ homogenous society “involves, by and
large, getting rid of pluralism [in politics],” should be investigated within this
perspective. See DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY 231
(Clarendon 1991). This passage was reprinted, in part, in “Putting the State Back
in Credit,” in THE CHALLENGE OF CARL SCHMITT 75–91 (Chantal Mouffe ed.,
Verso 1999) [hereinafter CHALLENGE OF CARL SCHMITT], where Dyzenhaus
adds that the discipline of public reason wanted by Rawls “is supposed not so
much to displace politics as to suppress it altogether,” at 84; See also Žižek’s
notion of “post-politics” in Carl Schmitt in the Age of Post-Politics in
CHALLENGE OF CARL SCHMITT, id. at 30. François Ost is of the same view, as it
emerges when he argues that “globalised law . . . results from a much more
radical perspective of transnational penetration, the result of more-or-less
spontaneous convergence of national laws seeking to align themselves with
standards and models that are dominant or seductive,” in Law as Translation in
THE CULTURE AND METHOD OF COMPARATIVE LAW 69–86, at 77 (Maurice
Adams & Dirk Heirbaut eds., Hart Publ’g, 2014). For an introduction, see PAUL
W. KAHN, PUTTING LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE (Princeton Univ. Press 2008)
[hereinafter LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE]. For a historically contextualised
perspective, see CARL SCHMITT, THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE JUS PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM 214–94 (Gary J.
Ulmen trans., Telos 2006) (1950) [hereinafter NOMOS OF THE EARTH]; Gary J.
Ulmen, Pluralism Contra Universalism, 31:5 SOCIETY 32 (1994).
6. The term ‘global (non-)law’ has also been used by Marc Amstutz in
Global (Non-)Law: The Perspective of Evolutionary Jurisprudence 9 GERMAN
LAW JOURNAL 465 (2008).
In this regard, at first glance it might seem that we already live in the
“community” for whose coming Agamben argued more than twenty years ago
after the fall of the “bipolar system” and in which neither commonality nor
identity is a condition of belonging because “[t]he coming being is whatever
being.” Yet upon closer look, it emerges that such a community is yet to come
as the formation of such a community requires an absolute—that is, exceptional
and sovereign—act of simultaneous ‘potentiality’ and ‘actuality’ (a destituent
potential, as Agamben defines it). The limit of this solution, however, is that its
key features are purely metaphysical – and Agamben is aware of that. See
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order scheme may not be considered a territory in spatioontological terms and, consequently, there is no need in it for a
nomos in terms of “division”, “allocation”, and “appropriation”
(Nahme) of rights, interests, obligations, and duties; that is to say,
by being made up of (non-)boundaries, global (non-)law rejects
law’s anthropological and ontological need for a tangible
signature.7 The unification of these two components leads, I
maintain, to the nullification of the Schmittian sovereign,
exception, and concept of the political.
Within the same perspective, the present contribution argues
that in our dehumanised global age, legal interpretation will be
less-frequently required because the jurist’s anthropological and
onto-sociopolitical function will increasingly no longer be needed.
This is so, I will contend, because in the post-national setting8—in

GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE USE OF BODIES 269–73 (Adam Kotso trans. Stanford
University Press 2016); See also GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE COMING COMMUNITY
1, 67 (Michael Hardt trans., Univ. Minn. Press 2013) (1990) [hereinafter THE
COMING COMMUNITY]. See also AGAMBEN, MEANS WITHOUT END (Vincenzo
Binetti & Cesare Cesariano trans., Univ. Minn. Press 2000) (1992); Agambem,
Special Being in PROFANATIONS 55–60 (Jeff Fort trans., Zone Books 2007);
AGAMBEN, THE SACRAMENT OF LANGUAGE 69–72 (Adam Kotso trans.,
Stanford Univ. Press 2010). For a theological inquiry into the managerial and
administrative paradigm of the oikonomia, see AGAMBEN, THE KINGDOM AND
THE GLORY (Lorenzo Chiesa & Matteo Mandarin trans., Stanford Univ. Press,
2011). The reasons why this paradigm found a decisive ally in the imperialist
age were queried by HANNAH ARENDT in THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM
123–302 (Harvest Books 1973) [hereinafter ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM].
Not surprisingly, in trying to shape the political task of our generation, Kahn
correctly urges us to “think critically about our own claims for universal norms”,
a necessity due to the fact that “Western aspirations for a single global order are
not universally accepted.” KAHN, supra note 5, at 2. For a more juridical
account, see WILLIAM E CONKLIN, STATELESSNESS (Hart Publ’g 2014). See also
FLEUR JOHNS, NON-LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge Univ. Press
2013).
7. Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, Imago Veritas Falsa: For a (Post-)Schmittian
Decisionist Theory of Law, Legal Reasoning, and Judging, 39 AUSTRALIAN J.
LEGAL PHIL. 118 (2014) [hereinafter Imago Veritas Falsa]; Siliquini-Cinelli, The
Age of “Depoliticization”, supra note 1.
8. Scholarship on post-national issues is seemingly endless. Any
investigation on this topic should at least consider GOVERNANCE WITHOUT
GOVERNMENT (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2009); NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM (Oxford Univ.
Press 2012); BEYOND TERRITORIALITY (Peer Zumbansen, Günther Handl &
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which (non-)humans neutrally behave rather than willingly act and
in which cultures are no longer “mapped” through the (legal)
traditions that express them via definition of identities—the
political relationship between the law and those it tries to protect
by imposing respect for itself and/or stimulating that respect is
neutralised. What we are witnessing is, then, the breaking up of
homo juridicus as a type of homo whose performative volitions
need the law’s normative placet.
According to Alain Supiot,9 homo juridicus is a type of homo
characterised by “reason”10 and who acquires and protects his/her

Joachim Zekoll eds., Brill 2012); George Pagoulatos & Loukas Tsoukalis,
Multilevel Governance in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
62–75 (Erik Jones, Anand Menon & Stephen Weatherill eds., Oxford Univ.
Press 2012) [hereinafter OXFORD HANDBOOK]; Vivien A. Schmidt, Democracy
and Legitimacy in the European Union in OXFORD HANDBOOK, id. at 661–75;
Adrienne Héritier, Policy Effectiveness and Transparency in European Policy
Making in OXFORD HANDBOOK, id. at 676–89; ADRIENNE HÉRITIER, POLICYMAKING AND DIVERSITY IN EUROPE (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999); Héritier,
New Modes of Governance in Europe: Increasing Political Capacity and Policy
Effectiveness? in THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 105–26 (Tanja A. Börzel
& Rachel A. Cichowski eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2003); Héritier, New Modes of
Governance in Europe: Policy-Making Without Legislating? in COMMON
GOODS 185–207 (Adrienne Héritier ed., Rowman & Littlefield Pubs 2002);
Adrienne Héritier & Dirk Lehmkuhl, The Shadow of Hierarchy and New Modes
of Governance 28 J. PUB. POLICY 1 (2008); Gráinne de Búrca, Robert O.
Keohane & Charles F. Sabel, Global Experimentalist Governance, New York
University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, #485 (2014);
DEMOCRACY AND CRISIS (Benjamin Isakhan & Steven Slaughter eds., Palgrave
MacMillan 2014); TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE (Michael Head, Scott Mann
& Simon Kozlina eds., Ashgate 2012); EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION (Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin eds., Oxford Univ.
2010) [hereinafter EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE IN THE EU]; RULING THE
WORLD (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Tratchman eds., Cambridge Univ. Press
2009); GLOBAL STANDARDS, supra note 4; CRITICIZING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
(Markus Lederer & Philipp Müller eds., Palgrave Macmillan 2005);
GLOBALIZATION AND LAW FROM BELOW (Boaventura de Sousa Santo & César
Augusto Rodriguez-Garavito eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005); ANNE-MARIE
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (Princeton Univ. Press 2000);
GLOBALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE (Aseem Prakash & Jeffrey A. Hart eds.,
Routledge 2000).
9. ALAIN SUPIOT, HOMO JURIDICUS (Saskia Brown trans., Verso, 2007).
See also Maksymilian Del Mar, Book Review: Homo Juridicus: On the
Anthropological Function of Law, 5 LAW, CULTURE AND THE HUMANITIES 325–
29 (2009); Robert Knox, Homo Juridicus: On the Anthropological Function of
Law, 17:2 HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 286–99 (2009); See also Peter Goodrich,
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own humanised identity by performing within his/her own
biological and symbolic dimensions. The law plays a pivotal
anthropological role in this process because, Supiot claims, it helps
homo juridicus to differentiate him/herself from what s/he is “not”
and “should not be.” Supiot seems to realise that Kojéve’s HegeloMarxist post-historical (that is, animal) condition, with its
apolitical and legally neutral essence and unstable non-substance,
is what would remain should the anthropological function of the
law not meet this challenge. In addition to several aspects of labour
law, of which Supiot is a leading scholar, the so-called “civilising
mission” of the contract is also investigated throughout his book in
support of his claim.
Supiot’s account, while fascinating, is affected by a primary
conceptual paradox that, unfortunately, weakens it. Indeed, while
warning us against the dehumanising trend of the mechanical
global-order project, Supiot expends much effort in criticising the
model of the individual promoted by the schemes of standard
economic analysis, according to which people do not act, but
behave. Yet, as he admits while quoting Dumont, “in reality actual
men do not behave; they act with an idea in their heads . . . .”11
Although Supiot correctly warns us against the “humanitarian”
façade of globalisation,12 he seems to underestimate this existential
feature of mankind, and, by arguing for the possibility of a homo

Interstitium and Non-Law in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 213, 213 (Pier
Giuseppe Monateri ed., Edward Elgar 2012) [hereinafter METHODS OF
COMPARATIVE LAW]; Goodrich, Law’s Labour’s Lost 72 MODERN L. REV. 296
(2009).
10. SUPIOT, supra note 9, at ix.
11. Id. at 99. David Nelken is of the same idea, as it emerges when he notes
that “social life consists of action rather than mere behaviour,” in Puzzling Out
Legal Culture: A Comment on Blankenburg in COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES
69–92, at 75 (David Nelken ed., Darthmout 1997) [hereinafter COMPARING
LEGAL CULTURES].
12. On this, see also KAHN, supra note 5, at 135–36. The fact that Kahn
himself, who is director of a worldwide centre for human rights, claims that “the
human rights movement [is] a new form of global politics—the liberal politics
of reason—[that] has virtually nothing to say” is truly astounding. Id. at 136.
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juridicus who reasons, he actually offers a neo-Kantian notion of
“persons”13 that supports both economic models of rational
behaviour and the dehumanised essence of liberalism.14 The
contemporary post-national globalising trend, and the “irresistible
progress of technology”15 that underpins it, may therefore
paradoxically find a valuable ally in Supiot’s account.
The definition that best addresses homo juridicus’s nature is, I
contend, quite different. As I shall explain in Section II, homo
juridicus is, to me, a type of homo who acts instead of behaving
and does so because of the performative instances of his/her
willing ego rather than because of some interest- or reasonoriented scheme of social interaction. I argue this because our
existential power to (per-)form our volitions is rooted in the
essence of the conflict that takes place within our sovereign powerto-will while we are deciding both “for” and “against” a future
project (as Plotinus and Hegel would agree). Hence, the act of
(per-)forming our choices is what defines both the essence of
willpower and the existential uniqueness of mankind. This was
clear to Augustine who, in On the Free Choice of the Will,
13. As we shall see in due course, according to Kant, beings who act under
the maxim of the “categorical imperative” are “rational beings . . . called
persons.” See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS 55 (Lewis White Beck trans, Library of Liberal Arts 1997) (1785).
14. The relationship “reason-law” has been understood since philosophy
began to be constitutively involved with the law—that is, since Socrates’ trial
and Plato’s meeting with Dionysius in Sicily. The rationalisation of society
brought about by modernity gave it new life. Any investigation on its modern
essence should at least deal with HANS BLUMEMBERG, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
MODERN AGE (Robert M. Wallace trans., MIT Press 1983) (1966); JÜRGEN
HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, Vols I and II (Polity
Press 2004, 2006) (1981)[hereinafter THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION];
HABERMAS, ON THE LOGIC OF SOCIAL SCIENCES (Shierry Weber Nicholsen &
Jerry A. Stark trans., MIT Press 1994) (1988) [hereinafter LOGIC OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES]; HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 3; ANTHONY
W. PRICE, CONTEXTUALITY IN PRACTICAL REASON (Oxford Univ. Press 2008);
NEIL MACCORMICK, LAW, STATE AND PRACTICAL REASON (series) (Oxford
Univ. Press 1999–2011); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND
REASONING (Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison eds., Oxford Univ. Press
2012); LUC J. WINTGENS, LEGISPRUDENCE: PRACTICAL REASON IN LEGISLATION
(Ashgate 2012); see also infra note 51.
15. SUPIOT, supra note 9, at 39.
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explained how in his youth he turned from reason to will to form
his character and who, as Arendt has correctly pointed out,
believed that “the freedom of the Will draws exclusively on an
inner power of affirmation or negation that has nothing to do with
any actual posse or potestas.”16 Framed in these terms, homo
juridicus is a type of homo characterised not by the unspontaneous
potentiality of reason (or desire), but by the immanence and
freedom of the volo me velle, which makes him/her decide “for”
and “against” something or someone according to the power of
affirmation or negation of the self. If the above is correct, the
authority of the jurist’s activity of jus-dicere (or rule-telling) is
then rooted in the sociopolitical need to, first, normativistically
interpret the individual’s active will and then, through the
formulation of (and answer to) a quaestio juris, hold “that”
individual (and, thus, as we shall see, man qua man as opposed to
“Man”) accountable for the consequences of his/her sovereign
choice.
This type of willing homo, and thus the existential need for
having a legal expert who actively interprets and encapsulates the
meaning of his/her doing within law’s regulative instances,17 are
disappearing. Put bluntly, this means that the jurist is disappearing.
This was also true, at least in part, in the civil law tradition during
the modern era, when, with the exception of Germany, the
constructivist, political dicta of the Leviathan as absorbing
magnum-artificium (or magnus homo) determined the victory of
the ratione Imperii over that of the imperio rationis and displaced

16. HANNAH ARENDT, 2 THE LIFE OF THE MIND 88 (Harcourt 1978) (1971)
[hereinafter 2 LIFE OF THE MIND]. Elaine Pagels carefully investigates the role
that Augustine played in changing the Christian perspective on freedom and
willpower in ELAINE PAGELS, ADAM, EVE, AND THE SERPENT 78–150 (Vintage
Books 1989) (1988).
17. See the notion of “interpretation” in the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
according to which “interpretation is the action of explaining the meaning of
something.” Emphasis added; see also STEFANO BERTEA, THE NORMATIVE
CLAIM OF LAW (Hart Publ’g 2009).
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the jurist from the picture (auctoritas non veritas facit legem).18 On
the contrary, in our (post-post-modern or neorealist?19) globalised
age, both the willing homo juridicus and the jurist make no
appearance because of the working scheme of the global “civil
society,” which is an apolitical and legally neutral soft-networked
worldwide web of more-or-less autonomous associations that
openly binds (non-)humans20 together in matters of “common”
concern. This intangible and illimitable web works according to
the destructuralised mechanisms of what is known as post-national
governance (PNG).
What I claim in this paper cannot be evaluated without a
knowledge of how soft-networked and intangible schemes of PNG
work. Unfortunately, a full description of them is beyond the
parameters of this contribution. It will have to suffice to highlight
that the PNG model is that of a neutral administration of
(non-)human affairs that is ultimately aimed at transcending the
forms of politics and law through which the modernisation of the
world was achieved (and unsuccessfully protected) over the last
two centuries. The term “soft-networked interaction” basically
signifies that every level of governance “spontaneously”
collaborates with each other by operating on an equal basis of
“output” legitimation and accountability (the so-called Roman
strategy21).
I will return to PNG’s features in Section II. What should be
noted now is that, law being a phenomenon that precedes the state,
“legal hybridity” is a fascinating term that the (globalised) jurist
has used to, or at the very least tries to, overcome the limits that
affect the recursive thinking of the neo-Kantian debate on the
18. I discussed this in Siliquini-Cinelli, Imago Veritas Falsa, supra note 7.
See also TIMOTHY MURPHY, THE OLDEST SOCIAL SCIENCE? (Oxford Univ. Press
1997); JAMES GORDLEY, THE JURISTS (Oxford Univ. Press 2013).
19. See FRANCA D’AGOSTINI, REALISMO? (Bollati Boringhieri 2014).
20. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE OPEN (Kevin Attell trans., Stanford Univ.
Press 2004) (2002).
21. LUUK VAN MIDDELAAR, THE PASSAGE TO EUROPE 223, 229, 252–73
(Liz Waters trans., Yale Univ. Press 2013) (2009).
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nature of the law (see Austin, Kelsen, Hart, Raz, and, in part,
Dworkin) and thus makes sense of his/her essence in this liquid
scenario.22 Unfortunately, while trying to face this wave of
juridical nihilism (in which s/he became “an unwitting tool, a link
in a chain of events that [s/he does] not see as a whole”23) by
accommodating his/her functionalist anthropological and
sociopolitical existential needs, the jurist has made (at least) two
terrible mistakes. First, the jurist did not pay enough attention to
the recursive motion of the strategy followed by the liberal globalorder project, whose “occult” essence cannot be revealed without a
comparative inquiry between, on the one hand, liberal
individualism and its belief in the never ending potentiality of
reason and, on the other hand, the aesthetic, subjected
occasionalism and metaphysics of absolute individualism24 that
characterised the romantic attitude and that were aimed at opening
the “self” to a world of illimitable and interchangeable
(non-)realities.25 Second, in trying to take back the role of which

22. For an introduction, see KEITH C. CULVER AND MICHAEL GIUDICE,
LEGALITY’S BORDERS (Oxford Univ. Press 2010). The discussion undertaken at
the conference “Stateless Law: The Future of the Discipline,” which was held at
McGill University in September 2012, has provided useful insights on this: see
STATELESS LAW, EVOLVING BOUNDARIES OF A DISCIPLINE (Helge Dedek &
Shauna Van Praagh eds., Ashgate 2015). On the notion of “liquid society,” see,
in addition to Zygmunt Bauman’s works, LIQUID SOCIETY AND ITS LAW (Jirí
Pribán ed., Ashgate 2007).
23. FRIEDRICH HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 63 (Routledge
2013) (1973, 1976, 1979). See also NATALINO IRTI, NICHILISMO GIURIDICO
(Laterza 2005). I share Roger Cotterrell’s belief that “the juristic issue is how
the idea of law can survive in the socio-historic conditions it faces,” in The
Jurist’s Conscience: Reflections Around Radbruch, THE ANXIETY OF THE JURIST
13–26, at 24 (Maksymilian Del Mar & Claudio Michelon eds., Ashgate 2013).
24. Think, for example, of Fichte’s absolute ego and philosophy of science,
and Schelling’s philosophy of nature and notion of external reality.
25. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL ROMANTICISM (Guy Oakes trans., MIT Press
1986) (1919); SCHMITT, ROMAN CATHOLICISM AND POLITICAL FORM (Gary L.
Ulmen trans., Greenwood Press 1996) (1923); SCHMITT, HAMLET OR HECUBA
(David Pan & Jennifer Rust trans., Telos 2009) (1956); PAUL DE MAN, THE
RHETORIC OF ROMANTICISM (Columbia Univ. Press 1984); DE MAN,
ALLEGORIES OF READING 135–301 (Yale Univ. Press 1979). See also HANNAH
ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 38–49 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1998) (1958)
[hereinafter HUMAN CONDITION]; finally, see LAW AS POLITICS (David
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the nation-state, with the aforementioned exception of Germany,
has deprived him/her, the jurist has instrumentally supported the
global-order plan by using the same Legendrian “logic of
assembling”26 through which the Leviathan has neutralised the
authority of legal reasoning and that inevitably implies an a priori
deconstruction.
The dissolution of the nation-state and of its sovereignty as a
principle of political and juridical unity has provoked several
reactions. Two of them are of particular interest here because they
have led to two completely opposite scenarios—the justification
and the total displacement of the jurist’s function. The first
scenario, aimed at protecting the state by making sense of its legal
authority in the globalised network, makes a claim for the
empirical impossibility of fully achieving the form of the nationstate. What should be achieved, it posits, is rather what should be
called the “cosmopolitan” state. Given that globalisation, in
Glenn’s words, “represents the inevitable challenge to the
instruments of closure of the contemporary state,”27 the only form
of state that may accommodate civil society’s pluralistic instances
is that of a cosmopolitan (non-)Leviathan. This is so because the

Dyzenhaus ed., Duke Univ. Press 1998); JOHN P. MCCORMICK, CARL
SCHMITT’S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM 46–57 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999).
26. PIERRE LEGENDRE, L’OCCIDENTE INVISIBILE (CE QUE L’OCCIDENT NE
VOIT PAS DE L’OCCIDENT) 41 (Paolo Heritier trans, Edizioni Medusa 2009)
(2004). My translation. See Siliquini-Cinelli, The Age of “Depoliticization”,
supra note 1.
On the relevance of Legendrian thought to legal discourse, see LAW AND THE
UNCONSCIOUS (Peter Goodrich trans. & ed., Palgrave MacMillian 1997); LAW
AND THE POSTMODERN MIND (Peter Goodrich & David G. Carlson eds., Univ. of
Mich. Press 1998); LAW, TEXT, TERROR (Peter Goodrich et al. eds., Routledge
2006).
27. H. PATRICK GLENN, THE COSMOPOLITAN STATE 165 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2013). Glenn goes further and clarifies that “[f]actual globalization not
only surpasses the institutional capacities of state hierarchies, it also transcends
the physical boundaries of states,” id. at 170. See also id. at 172–80 for a
compelling summary of the various approaches to cosmopolitism. In particular,
see Held’s argument for a “cosmopolitan citizenship” in DAVID HELD,
DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER (Stanford Univ. Press 1996).
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so-called “internal aspect” of socio-legal rules,28 and thus their
rational acceptance by the participants in the soft-networked realm,
would benefit from this shift. More precisely, although Glenn
admits that “the cosmopolitan theory has not produced easily
identifiable results,”29 he nevertheless suggests that, in light of how
the “cosmopolitan character of the contemporary state also
explains much of its present operation,”30 “[o]ur thinking of the
contemporary state can . . . be facilitated by awareness of its
cosmopolitan character”.31 A similar claim is made by William
Twining, who argued for the urgent necessity of a “cosmopolitan
discipline of law,”32 and by Paul Berman, who, in describing the
limits of sovereigntist territorialism and universalism, opted for a
tertium comparationis, namely “cosmopolitan pluralism.”33 All
these views share some elements with those aimed at uniting the
benefits of inter-connected channels of PNG with the ante-factum
legitimation and post-factum accountability working logic of those
forms of progressive constitutionalism34 in which the state is not a
mere “bystander” that observes what other private, public, and
28. It was Hart who coined the notion of the positivistic and state-oriented
“internal aspect of law,” by which he meant that law’s social recognition (also)
depends on its appeal to reasonable acceptance. See H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 203 (Oxford Univ. Press 2012) (1961). See also Adam Perry,
The Internal Aspect of Social Rules, 35 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (2015).
29. GLENN, supra note 27, at 172.
30. Id. at 291. It is noteworthy that, despite what may be contrarily thought,
a similar point was made decades ago by Schmitt in Ethic of State and
Pluralistic State in CHALLENGE OF CARL SCHMITT, supra note 5, at 195–208.
See also ELLEN KENNEDY, CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE 140–44 (Duke Univ.
Press 2004); DYZENHAUS, supra note 5.
31. GLENN, supra note 27, at 291.
32. WILLIAM TWINING, GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE 3 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2009).
33. PAUL BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM 10–1 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2012). See also id. at 12–3. For a recent account of Berman’s inquiry, see
Michael Giudice, Global Legal Pluralism: What’s Law Got to Do With It?, 34:3
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 586 (2014).
34. Luca
Siliquini-Cinelli,
Legal
Pluralism
and
Progressive
Constitutionalism: An Introduction to the South African Challenge for PostNational Governance, 2 J. COMP. L. IN AFRICA 1 (2015). See also Laurence R.
Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997).
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hybrid actors achieve and/or fail to achieve; rather, the state is seen
as a political “ally”, or an entrepreneur35—as a co-protagonist risktaker.
The second reaction has instead led to the complete rejection of
any forms of legal authority as expressed by the social contract
theory (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant). This is done with the aim
of establishing, through the adoption of a post-structuralist theory
of unconventional legitimation, the beginning of a new ontological
anarchism that “contends that the law has no binding claim on our
obedience”36 by refusing “the founding of the law [and] invok[ing]
. . . the ethical and political disruption of all legal authority.”37 Yet,
notwithstanding this fascinating claim that anarchy “is the very
condition for doing politics in an ethical way,”38 the proposed
model of society can never be achieved. This is so because, once
the absolute foundations of normative power are neutralised
through the “deconstruction or displacement of . . . essential
identities,”39 the new order would depend entirely upon the belief
in “the autonomous, voluntary and cooperative relationships that
are found in everyday social relations”40 which, to serve the
anarchic cause, would be extended to utopic limits.
35. MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE (Anthem Press
2013).
36. Saul Newman, Anarchism and Law: Towards a Post-Anarchist Ethics of
Disobedience, 21 GRIFFITH L. REV. 307, 315 (2012). See also the whole Volume
21, No. 2 of the GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW entirely dedicated to Law and Anarchy:
Legal Order and the Idea of a Stateless Society.
37. Id. at 321.
38. Id. at 327.
39. Id. at 323.
40. Id. at 321. This becomes even more evident when anarchists themselves
admit that “[i]f an anarchist ends up in front of a judge, presumably [s/he] will
want a good lawyer,” id. at 327. In this sense, a true form of real anarchism is
that which took place in Italy in the 1970s, when the terrorists of the so-called
Brigate Rosse refused any form of legal assistance during the several trials in
which they were condemned. This led to a very delicate situation in which the
rule of Article 24 of the Italian Constitution (according to which legal defence is
an inviolable right) could not be complied with. The existential crisis of the
judicial system and the rule of law culminated in the threatening (and sometimes
killing, such as in the case of Advocate Fulvio Croce, in Turin) of the lawyers
who were “forced” to provide legal assistance to the “red” activists. The more
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Delving into this debate, this paper proposes an alternative
strategy through which one can (try to) challenge the threat posed
to the sociopolitical need for and authority of the jurist in the
current soft-networked globalised scenario. My claim, which
stands in evident opposition to both liberalism’s mechanic
rationalisation of human conduct41 and Tamanaha’s belief that law
“has no essence,”42 is that for the jurist to defeat the current
nihilism which affects his/her role, a metaphysico-ontological turn
must be made: from the (non-)human who rationally behaves
according to scientific schemes of social interactions to the human
who willingly (and politically) acts and whose decisions must be
normativistically interpreted. Only through the individual’s reappropriation of his/her willpower—that is, the power to decide
both “for” and “against” different possible scenarios—will the
jurist’s jus-dicere come back to act as a medium between society’s
anthropological need for sociopolitical order and coordination, and
law’s performative instances.
To put it differently, the decisive anthropological and ontosociopolitical relationship between jus-dicere and the individual’s
active will is what jurists should look for while trying to visualise
and make sense of both (the rule of) law’s organising ideal and its
claim to regulative power in a globalised era characterised by

accurate and accessible description of what happened in those years is to be
found in GIORGIO GALLI, PIOMBO ROSSO (Baldini Castoldi Dalai 2007). On the
unavoidable intrinsic “evilness” of mankind, see, in addition to Baudelaire’s and
Dostoyevsky’s works, PAUL W. KAHN, OUT OF EDEN (Princeton Univ. Press
2010) (2006) [hereinafter OUT OF EDEN]; SUSAN NEIMAN, EVIL IN MODERN
THOUGHT (Princeton Univ. Press 2002); MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND
CIVILIZATION (Vintage Books 1988) (1961). For a different notion of evil in
terms of a dehumanised and “banal” consequence of the rise of bureaucratic
schemes of administration, see HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM
(Penguin Books 2006) (1963).
41. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY 63 (George Schwab trans., Univ.
of Chicago Press 2005) (1922, 1934); KAHN, LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE, supra
note 5 and OUT OF EDEN, supra note 40, at 53–60; KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY
175 (Columbia Univ. Press 2012) [hereinafter POLITICAL THEOLOGY].
42. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND
SOCIETY 193 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2001).
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multiple and conflicting non-exclusive and non-supreme claims of
authority43 (and in which, as a consequence, the very essence of a
primordial and supreme constitutive power is nothing but
obsolete).44 I believe that the only way through which the jurist
may effectively take back the leading role of which the
universalisation of liberalism (and in particular the idea that
governments should build or reform their institutions to regulate
economic activities according to rational global standards
determined by outsiders) has deprived him/her is the re-affirmation
of the immanence of the decisive and active function of people’s
willing faculty and of the corresponding need to make sense of it in
normative terms. Strictly speaking, this means that we, as lawyers,
should effect a “conceptual shift” and opt for a Heideggerian
backward method of comprehension that will lead us to understand
the essential authority of (the) law by inquiring into and exploring
the existential authority of the jurist, and not vice versa.
This is what this paper tries to do by addressing the essence of
legal interpretation (and, thus, at least in part, legal hermeneutics)
through the analysis of two opposite accounts: Susan Sontag’s
essay “Against Interpretation” and Josef Esser’s defence of the
interpretative task in his Vorverständnis und Methodenwahl in der
Rechtsfindung.45 In particular, Section II investigates the
relationship between the individual’s sovereign will and the role of
43. Bas van der Vossen, Legitimacy and Multi-Level Governance in NEW
WAVES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 233–53 (Maksymilian Del Mar ed., Palgrave
Macmillan 2011); Nicole Roughan, The Relative Authority of Law: A
Contribution to “Pluralist Jurisprudence”, id. at 254–74; EMMANUEL
MELISSARIS, UBIQUITOUS LAW: LEGAL THEORY AND THE SPACE FOR LEGAL
PLURALISM (Ashgate 2009).
44. A comparison between the aforementioned scheme of “Roman
strategy,” which characterises PNG’s system of post-factum legitimation and
accountability, and Robespierre’s “Immortal Legislator” as a perpetual source of
authority still needs to be done. See HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 176–77
(Penguin Books 2006) (1963).
45. Respectively, SUSAN SONTAG, AGAINST INTERPRETATION AND OTHER
ESSAYS (Picador 2001) (1966), and JOSEF ESSER, PRECOMPRENSIONE E SCELTA
DEL METODO NEL PROCESSO DI INDIVIDUAZIONE DEL D IRITTO 112–37 (Salvatore
Patti & Giuseppe Zaccaria trans., ESI 1983) (1972).
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the jurist in providing it with a legal meaning along with the
current displacement of both, caused by the universalisation of
liberalism; in Section III Sontag’s and Esser’s inquiries will be
compared; concluding remarks will appear in Section IV.
II. THE LIBERAL GLOBAL-ORDER PROJECT: FROM ACTION TO
BEHAVIOUR
What this paper claims could be summarised as: that law’s
essence should be inferred from its existential force—that is, from
the jurist’s function. As a comparatist, I fully agree with Geoffrey
Samuel when he says that the considerable body of work produced
by jurists on the definition and nature of law is “less helpful” to the
comparatist “than might first appear.”46 Nonetheless, it is precisely
my comparative experience that tells me that the law can keep its
regulative promises only if the jurist can count on it to interpret
decisively the active power-to-will of homo juridicus whilst
inferring the rule from the norm, as Paul suggested.47 This is why,
as I will argue in Section III, legal interpretation is the canon of
jus-dicere, that is, “to tell what is the law.”48 Importantly, this is
why, as Schmitt, Derrida, and, more recently, Agamben and Kahn
have persuasively argued while inquiring into the political sin of
legal positivism and liberalism, the law is the product of both the
norm and the decision.
The nullification of the individual’s will brought about by (the
universalisation of) liberalism49 and the ideal of a self-regulating
46. Geoffrey Samuel, Epistemology and Comparative Law: Contributions
from the Sciences and Social Sciences in EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY
OF COMPARATIVE LAW 34–77, at 36 (Mark Van Hoecke ed., Hart Publ’g 2004)
[hereinafter EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY].
47. Cf. Digest, 50, 17, I: Regula est quae est breviter enarrat. Non ex regula
ius sumatur, sed ex iure quod est regula fiat. This reciprocal need leads to the
(unanswerable) question of whether it is humans who control (and need) law, or
law that controls (and needs) humans (non sub homine sed sub [Deo et] lege).
See also infra note 58.
48. Siliquini-Cinelli, Imago Veritas Falsa, supra note 7.
49. Kolakowski correctly spoke of the “self-destructive potential of
liberalism” while describing “the process by which the extension and consistent
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(global) society in which (non-)humans behave according to
“mathematical symbols of economic equations, which require
persons to be grasped simply as contracting units,”50 renders the
activity of jus-dicere obsolete. To understand this dissolving
phenomenon completely entails that we first understand that to
assess human action in terms of rationality is misleading because
to speak of “rational choice”51 or “purposive-rational action [in
which] behaviour is guided by technical rules”52 is nothing but an
oxymoron. If reason, in Kahn’s words, “is not self-defining,” it is
application of liberal principles transforms them into their antithesis.” See,
respectively, The Self-Poisoning of the Open Society and Irrationality in Politics
in LESZEK KOLAKOWSKI, MODERNITY ON ENDLESS TRIAL 162–75, at 162–163
and 192–203 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1990).
50. SUPIOT, supra note 9, at 96. The behavioral model of social interaction
recalls Nietzsche’s “mathematical faith” in a world “reduced to a mere exercise
for a calculator.” See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 335 (Walter
Kaufmann trans., Vintage Books 1974) (1882). The fact that the global
governance framework is administrated through “indicators” is a powerful
testament to this. See GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS (Kevin Davis, Angelina
Fisher, Benedict Kingsbury & Sally Engle Merry eds., Oxford Univ. Press
2012).
On how the law and economics approach examines (non-)legal rules as a
working system, see Francesco Parisi & Barbara Luppi, Quantitative Methods in
Comparative Law in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 9, 306–16;
Parisi & Luppi, Comparative Law and Economics: Accounting for Social Norms
in COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIETY 92–104 (David S. Clark ed., Edward Elgar
2012); Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Litigation and the Evolution of Legal
Remedies: A Dynamic Model, 116 PUBLIC CHOICE 419–33 (2003). See also
FRANSCECO PARISI & VINCY FON, THE ECONOMICS OF LAW MAKING (Oxford
Univ. Press 2009).
51. See, among others, MARTIN HOLLIS, REASON IN ACTION (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1996). For a broad introduction on the “will-reason” dichotomy, see
KAARLO TUORI, RATIO AND VOLUNTAS: THE TENSION BETWEEN REASON AND
WILL IN LAW (Ashgate, 2010).
The fact that John Finnis uses the antithesis between “commensurability” and
“incommensurability” (which are two technical terms used in mathematics and
physics—that is, two sciences in which the individual makes no appearance) to
make a claim for the possibility of rational choice is the maximum expression of
the fallacy that affects the notion that reason can act. See Practical Reasoning in
Law: Some Clarifications, now in JOHN FINNIS, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 353–73, at
358 (Oxford Univ. Press 2011); See also supra note 14. The same fallacy affects
Habermas, according to whom “[t]he law presents itself as a system of rights
only as long as we consider it in terms of its specific function of stabilizing
behavioural expectation.” HABERMAS, supra note 3, at 133. Emphasis added.
52. HABERMAS, LOGIC OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 14, at 46. See also
infra note 154.
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simply because rationality informs our behaviour, not our actions.
We do not decide when we behave because our will, and thus the
conflict between velle and nolle, does not appear in behavioural
procedures. This conflict only arises when we are free to both
make a decision and act accordingly. The fact that the decision is
(and cannot be anything but) the outcome of such a conflict makes
it clear that only the power-to-will, that is the power to (per-)form
our uniqueness by making choices, is self-defining. This is why
will’s autonomy can transcend the power of reason. Heidegger’s
discussion of Scheler’s account against the “objectification of acts”
and Greek and Christian components of traditional anthropology,
along with his explanation of Dasein’s resoluteness, is what we
should look at to fully understand this phenomenon. It will then
become evident that, despite what is commonly argued, to say that
Oedipus is not evil because he makes “rational choices” would be
misleading. On the contrary—in opposition to the Old Testament’s
Cain, who decides according to his power-to-will and then acts,
Oedipus is not evil because he does not choose at all but merely
behaves.
The constitutive force of human uniqueness lies within the
anthro-sociopolitical essence of the self’s power of affirmation or
negation through willing action. The homogenisation of
sociopolitical practices through the neutralisation of local
sensibilities and ways of expression brought about by the
Westernisation of behavioural standards is aimed at dissolving the
internal conflict that generates this unique force. Avowedly, the
connections among our power of affirmation or negation, human
plurality, and action was clear to Arendt. While explaining why
“distinctness” and “otherness” should not be considered the same
thing and why in humans they get fused together to become
“uniqueness”, Arendt remarkably claimed that “[i]f men were not
distinct, each human being distinguished from any other who is,
was, or will ever be, they would neither need speech nor action to
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make themselves understood.”53 This then led her to claim that
“human plurality is the paradoxical plurality of unique beings.”54
Not surprisingly, the shift from “input” to “output” forms of
(non-)legitimation and (non-)accountability in which the
experimentalist architecture of inter-connected channels of PNG is
rooted is one of the main components of the current dissolution of
what makes us human.55 If to act, as the etymological essence of
the Greek word archein reveals, is “to set something into motion,”
from the anthropological point of view, this constitutive beginning,
as Arendt has persuasively claimed,56 is the beginning of
“somebody” in his/her “uniqueness”. Hence, if action is the
manifestation of the sovereign decision that creates, as God did,
something ex nihilo—from nothingness—as Schmitt (and Bergson)
correctly understood,57 and in so doing determines who we are, it
is quite evident that in the uniformed and dehumanised post53. ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 25, at 175–76. See also id. at
41.
54. Id. at 176.
55. See supra note 8. I do not agree with Sabel and Zeitlin’s suggestion that
experimentalist forms of (European) PNG are the product of human action and
therefore arose from Adam Ferguson’s third class of social phenomena.
EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE IN THE EU, supra note 8, at 9.
56. ARENDT, supra note 25, at 177. See also HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN
PAST AND FUTURE 155–63 (Penguin Books 2006) (1961). Arendt quotes twice,
in both THE HUMAN CONDITION and THE LIFE OF THE MIND, Augustine’s insight
that “[i]nitium ut esset homo creatus est,” id. and supra note 16, at 158. See also
Michael A. Wilkinson, Between Freedom and Law; Emilios Christodoulidis &
Andrew Schaap, Arendt’s Constitutional Question; and Jan Klabbers, Hannah
Arendt and the Languages of Global Governance in HANNAH ARENDT AND THE
LAW 35–61, 101–14, 229–47 (Marco Goldoni & Christopher McCorkindale
eds., Hart Publ’g 2013).
57. In Schmitt’s words, the “constitutive, specific element of a decision is,
from the perspective of the content of the underlying norm, new and alien.
Looked at normatively, the decision emanates from nothingness.” See SCHMITT,
supra note 41, at 31–2. In CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, Schmitt further maintains
that “[a] constitution is not based on a norm [but] on a political decision
concerning the type and form of its own being, which stems from its political
being.” See CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 125 (Jeffrey Seitzer
trans., Duke Univ. Press 2008) (1928). See also Hannah Arendt, Lying in
Politics in HANNAH ARENDT, CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 5 (Harcourt 1972)
[hereinafter CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC], when it is claimed that “[i]n order to
make room for one’s own action, something that was there before must be
removed or destroyed, and things as they were before are changed.” See also
infra note 74 and note 161.
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political framework of “civilised economy” in which the spatiality
of local identities, sensibilities, and cultures is dissolved and the
constitutive force of man’s uniqueness is nullified, there is no need
for “input” forms of sociopolitical regulation. Being the postnational “constellation” the (non-)dimension in which the
sovereign, active will as the source of political (self-)creation is
neutralised, revolutions and constitutional process of “input”
political legitimation are no longer needed in it. In other words,
(universalised) liberalism displaces the irreducibility of foundation.
As a result, the authority of the jurist to give a normative
meaning to our choices and to hold us accountable for what we
decide to do or not to do plays no role in a uniformed
(non-)dimension, such as that of the liberal global order, in which
social rules are distortedly confused with legal norms,58 and in
which its participants never actively decide “for” or “against”
something or someone because they all behave according to
reason- or interest-oriented schemes of interaction. This is why the
sterile structures through which the post-national framework is
administered neutralise the anthropological and onto-sociopolitical

58. I agree with Alan Watson that “[t]he core of law is authority,” in Legal
Culture v. Legal Tradition, EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY, supra note 46,
1–6, at 2. In this sense, amongst all possible differences, what matters here is
that, whilst conducting a theological inquiry into how the concept of “will”
evolved alongside the operative understanding of the concept of “being” in
terms of form-of-life, Agamben has demonstrated that the norm does not
necessarily need two or more parties perform its claims. See GIORGIO
AGAMBEN, THE HIGHEST POVERTY (Adam Kotso trans., Stanford Univ. Press
2013) [hereinafter HIGHEST POVERTY]; AGAMBEN, OPUS DEI (Adam Kotso
trans., Stanford Univ. Press 2013) [hereinafter OPUS DEI]. See also AGAMBEN,
THE COMING COMMUNITY, supra note 6, at 3–12. Blankenburg has correctly
noted that the incredible confusion between the legal norm and social rules has
led to believe in the exact opposite myth, namely that “legal rules are rooted in
social norms.” See Civil Litigation Rates as Indicators for Legal Cultures in
COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES, supra note 11, 41–68, at 64. See also SOCIAL
AND LEGAL NORMS (Matthias Baier ed., Ashgate 2013). See also supra note 47.
Gordon Woodaman denies that law is a specific field of social reality: see
Gordon Woodman, Ideological Combat and Social Observation: Recent Debate
About Legal Pluralism, 42 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 21 (1998). Contra, see M.
Croce, Is Law a Special Domain? On the Boundary Between the Legal and the
Social in CONCEPTS OF LAW, supra note 3, 153–68.
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function of jus-dicere: the jurist, the (rule of) law,59 legal
interpretation, and analysis broadly understood, are no longer
needed in a soft-networked system of rational and mechanical
causations characterised by the never-ending apolitical
performance of collective platforms of “regulatory” peer-review
dialogue that lack any form of supervision (and in particular that
offered by the “principal-agent” model).60
That said, a question comes to mind: if the activity of the jurist
only makes sense in a sociopolitical scenario in which the
individual’s sovereign will manifests itself by actively making
choices, why (and how) did liberalism and its globalisation
displace willpower in favour of reason? The answer is that
liberalism needed to carry out this shift in order to make its
strategy succeed. Once the inner power of affirmation or negation
of the self, which, according to Augustine, constitutes the freedom
of the will, is completely annihilated, the empty space left by this
revolutionary operation can be easily filled by behavioural
schemes of rational, social interaction. This is not surprising.
Augustine is, as Arendt has correctly noted,61 “the first
philosopher” of the will. His task was to uncover the cause of evil
through the transformation of Paul’s “two laws” (the Old Law
which says “thou shalt do” and the New Law which says “thou
shalt will”62) into the two wills (I-will and I-nill) which lies at the
59. For an introduction to the dichotomy of “post-national governance-rule
of law,” see KRISCH, supra note 8, at 276–96. For a brilliant account of the
“social deficit” in the rule of law, see Timothy A. O. Endicott, The Impossibility
of the Rule of Law, 19 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 1 (1999).
60. My claim that soft-networked channels of PNG are rooted in
liberalism’s infinite rationalistic openness cannot be understood, and eventually
criticised, without bearing in mind that “[t]he centrality of reason means that
liberal practice and liberal theory are continuous activities.” KAHN, supra note 8,
at 14. Emphasis added.
61. ARENDT, 2 LIFE OF THE MIND, supra note 16, at 84–110.
62. Id. at 84. As we shall see below, Paul’s revolutionary introduction of the
spiritual willing ego was meant to provide humankind with the freedom to
choose whether or not to fulfill the Messianic message while neutralising the
social divisions and conditions imposed under Hebrew and Roman law (cf., for
instance, Romans 3:11, 3:19-20, 7:7, 8:11, and 10:4; Corinthians 7:20-23 and
29-32), and in so doing, defeat man’s finitude and death (cf. Acts 24:21). To
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bottom of men’s internal conflict from which the choice between
velle and nolle arises.63 With the aim to eliminate the individual’s
volo me velle and unpredictability of its presentifications (which is
precisely what our uniqueness is rooted in), liberalism has
displaced what determines what is good and bad and then acts
accordingly. This is why, as Kahn has persuasively claimed,
“[l]iberalism fails to understand evil for just the same reason that it
fails to understand love.”64 This is so because liberalism’s “horizon
of explanation is framed by reason, on the one hand, and personal
well-being, on the other. Between reason and interest, it can find
no third term.”65 As a result, liberalism has simultaneously
neutralised the performative instances of the self’s political
unconscious66 and critical attitude toward the legitimacy of legal
rules (or what Duns Scotus would call experentia interna). No
understand why Paul’s universalism is different from what is currently taking
place, see GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE TIME THAT REMAINS 44–58 and 88–112
(Patricia Delay trans., Stanford Univ. Press 2005) [hereinafter TIME THAT
REMAINS]; Agamben, The Messiah and the Sovereign: The Problem of Law in
Walter Benjamin in POTENTIALITIES 160–74 (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans. & ed.,
Stanford Univ. Press 1999).
63. ARENDT, 2 LIFE OF THE MIND, supra note 16, at 89.
64. KAHN, OUT OF EDEN, supra note 40, at 53. In providing a theological
critique of liberalism’s “narrative of political progress” through an inquiry into
the “problem of evil,” Kahn compellingly suggests that the liberal doctrine may
be linked to the return to “Genesis one”, that is, to the condition of pure (and
sterile, I would add) contemplation in which man and woman found themselves
before the Fall (from which begins “Genesis two”). Only by exercising their
willpower, and thus choosing to act for the benefit of their own knowledge (and
in particular the knowledge of their finitude and death) and against the rational
law imposed from above, Adam and Eve broke with the Greek tradition and
became “human.” This means that, from a theological point of view, will (and
our active use of it) is what makes us human. If we unite this perspective to what
was mentioned in note 62, it becomes clear why, according to Kahn, “Rawls’
idea of reaching a knowledge of justice behind the veil of ignorance is the
symbolism of leaving this fallen world of particular concerns and returning to a
purer space of undifferentiated, equal individuals.” Id. at 98. For an introduction
on how the myth(s) of Genesis informed Western culture in terms of freedomto-will, see PAGELS, supra note 16; EVE AND ADAM (Kristen E. Kvam, Linda S.
Schearin & Valarie H. Ziegler eds., Indiana Univ. Press 1999); GARY A.
ANDERSON, THE GENESIS OF PERFECTION (Westminster John Knox Press 2001).
65. KAHN, OUT OF EDEN. supra note 40, at 98.
66. See, in particular, FREDERIC JAMESON, THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS
(Routledge 2002) (1981).
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wonder, then, why the term “post-national” was taken up by
Habermas,67 and why pluralist forms of PNG transcend state-based
patterns of legislation and political regulation or administration.
It seems to me to follow from these considerations that what
liberalism and its globalisation have thus targeted is humans’
political essence as expressed on the one hand by the will’s power
of assertion and denial, and on the other hand by the fact that no
one can act alone. The promoters of the uniformed Oikoumene, as
a (non-)dimension in which cultures and identities are innocent and
indifferent because they have been annihilated by the levelling and
conformist demands of the global (open) society, are fully aware
that the “fact that man is capable of action means that the
unexpected can be expected from him, that he is able to perform
what is infinitely improbable [and that this] is possible only
because each man is unique . . . .”68 The shift from those who
willingly and politically act to “Human” who rationally and
interestingly behaves should be seen as a component of the broader
strategy to neutralise the boundlessness of action and the
unpredictability of the outcomes which have always characterised
human conduct. In this sense, if the public realm, as distinguished
from the private sphere, is the space of human appearance, and if
political power “is what keeps the public realm . . . between action
and speaking men, in existence,”69 it is anything but surprising that
the global-order project, with its soft-networked and post-national
web of social connectivity, is aimed at the nullification of modern
stated-based schemes of political and legal order.
In this sense, if we bear in mind that Ancient Greece believed
that the aforementioned idea of creation out of nothing was simply
67. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION (MIT Press
2002) (1998).
68. ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 25, at 178.
69. Id. at 200. Arendt further clarifies that this type of power “preserves the
public realm and the space of appearance, and as such it is also the lifeblood of
the human artifice, which, unless it is the scene of action and speech, of the web
of human affairs and relationships and the stores engendered by them, lacks its
ultimate raison d’être.” Id. at 204.
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unconceivable,70 it becomes clear why liberalism and the
intangible (non-)dimension and illimitable potentialities prompted
by its universalization recall Aristotle’s behavioural “I-can”,71
rather than Schmitt’s active “I-will”.72 Notably, Aristotle, whose
definition of man as the living being who has λόγος has become
canonical in Western belief in man as animal rationale, challenged
the Platonic view that reason is incapable of “moving” things. This
was done through the promotion, in Agamben’s words, of “a
theory of potential and habit [that] is in truth a way for Aristotle to
introduce movement into being.”73 Kinēsis is indeed the
fundamental concept in Aristotelian metaphysics, while, not
surprisingly, stasis, as a state of exception in which the sovereign
suspends the validity of the norm with the aim of saving the legal
order unconventionally from its own death with a pure political act
(necessitas non habet legem), is that of Schmitt.74 Hence, it makes
70. Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and, more importantly, Zeno all believed
that nothing is absolutely new.
71. Audi has defined this faculty as the actor’s performative reasoning that
originates and evolves according to innumerable explicative propositions that
work as “object language formulations” of “the rules constitutive of the game in
which ‘want’ functions.” See ROBERT AUDI, ACTION, INTENTION AND REASON
36–37 (Cornell Univ. Press 1993). On why Aristotle’s notion of deliberative
choice, as a tertium comparationis between reason and desire, cannot be defined
as “will,” see ARENDT, 2 LIFE OF THE MIND, supra note 16, 55–63. See also
GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE MAN WITHOUT CONTENT 59–93 (Georgia Albert
trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1999) (1994) [hereinafter MAN WITHOUT
CONTENT].
72. Agamben, who in trying to define a faculty claims that every time
“something is or is not ‘in one’s power’ . . . we are already in the domain of
potentiality,” would probably not agree with this distinction. See AGAMBEN,
TIME THAT REMAINS, supra note 62, at 178. On Schmitt’s decisionism, see
Siliquini-Cinelli, Imago Veritas Falsa, supra note 7.
73. AGAMBEN, TIME THAT REMAINS, supra note 62, at 95. Yet if we unite
this claim with what Agamben himself argues while further inquiring into
Aristotle’s concept of potentiality, which says that what is essential therein is the
“existence of non-Being,” it becomes clear that what the Aristotelian “I-can”
leads to is nothing but a zone of indistinction between “to be” and “not to be.”
See ON POTENTIALITY, supra note 62, 177–84, at 179. See also AGAMBEN,
HOMO SACER 46 (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1998)
(1993) [hereinafter HOMO SACER]; AGAMBEN, THE COMING COMMUNITY, supra
note 6, at 35–7.
74. The “divine conflict” between God and the crucified Jesus as described
in Moltmann’s The Crucified God may be considered the first Schmittian state
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perfect sense that, as Arendt carefully explains, Plato believed that
“human affairs . . . the outcome of action . . . should not be treated
with great seriousness.”75 In this sense, both Plato and Aristotle,
who “did not count legislating among the political activities,”76
may be seen as the forerunners of (liberal and economic) interest
theory.
While marking a totally new reappraisal of the matter through
the implementation of the pre-Christian view and negation of
willpower, Spinoza developed further what was claimed by Greek
philosophy. Spinozism may be viewed as the pre-modern
forerunner of the current essence of the globalising trend against
the constitutive force of the willing ego and the anthropological
and sociopolitical need for an authority that posits the law.77 This
seems to be further confirmed by the use of Spinoza in Deleuze’s
contemplative empiricism, which, as is well-known, is
characterised by the total disappearance of the subject and any idea

of exception in political theology from which Christianity, and hence the West
as we know it today, originated; see JÜRGEN MOLTMANN, THE CRUCIFIED GOD:
THE CROSS OF CHRIST AS THE FOUNDATION AND CRITICISM OF CHRISTIAN
THEOLOGY 146, 154–55, and 162–63 (SCM Press 2002) (1973). See also supra
note 57. For present purposes it is extremely relevant to note that, while
introducing the faculty of will, Paul’s aforementioned revolution paradoxically
caused what Agamben has persuasively defined as the “messianic inversion of
the potential-act relation.” Paul was perfectly aware of the Greek opposition
between act and potentiality and effected this inversion by restoring the law’s
“dividing” principle to a state of pure potentiality in which the “non-normative
figure of the law” could emerge as “nomos no-longer-at-work.” In overcoming
the flaws of Löwith and Blumemberg’s notion of messianic time, Agamben
correctly clarifies that the effect of the Pauline katargēsis (the exceptional
condition law’s inoperativeness which Paul calls nomos pisteōs) should not be
confused with the eschaton, but should rather be compared with Schmitt’s state
of exception. See AGAMBEN, TIME THAT REMAINS, supra note 62, at 63, and 88–
112. See also AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, supra note 73; AGAMBEN, STATE OF
EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2003, 2005).
75. ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 25, at 185. Emphasis added.
See also id. at 195.
76. Id. at 194.
77. After having heard Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi reading Goethe’s
Prometheus, Lessing shouted the totalising “Hen kai pan!” and proudly claimed
to have turned into a Spinozist. See JAN ASSMANN, MOSES THE EGYPTIAN 139–
43 (Harvard Univ. Press 1998); ASSMAN, RELIGIO DUPLEX 2–3 (Polity Press
2014).
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of self-consciousness.78 Yet the turn to the universal capacity of
reason officially began, as Arendt and Kahn have pointed out, with
Kant. It is true that it was Duns Scotus who, in arguing for the
primacy of the will over that of the intellect, first distinguished
between the “natural” will, which, in Arendt’s words, “follows
natural inclinations, and may be inspired by reason as well as
desire,”79 and “free” autonomous will which, as the Will through
which God created the world ex nihilo, performs in total freedom
from external causations.
Kant utopistically dreamed of a perpetual (that is, totalising)
peace in which “[t]he subject is now to give to himself the
principle of his own being: reason.”80 The (liberal) function of the
“categorical imperative” (you must “act according to that maxim
whose universality as law you can at the same time will”81) is
therefore very clear: it is aimed at neutralising the performative
conflict that takes place within the will between velle and nolle and
whose essence has kept theologians and philosophers busy since
Paul’s Messianic revolution. Indeed, according to Kant, “will is
absolutely good [when] it is a will whose maxim, when made
universal law, can never conflict with itself.”82 This belief is not
only one of the main components of current economic theory and
the information it provides,83 but eventually led to all neo-Kantian
78. Life, according to Deleuze, “is pure contemplation without knowledge.”
See GILLES DELEUZE & FÉLIX GUATTARI, WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? 213 (Hugh
Tomlinson & Graham Burchell trans., Columbia Univ. Press 1994) (1991). See
also id. at 43. Not surprisingly, this inactive idea of life brings us back to both
the aforementioned pre-Adam-and-Eve condition of “Genesis one” and the
notion of “potentiality” in Aristotelian metaphysics. On the similarities between
Deleuze and Aristotle, see Giorgio Agamben, Absolute Immanence in
POTENTIALITIES, supra note 62, at 220–239.
79. ARENDT, 2 LIFE OF THE MIND, supra note 16, at 132.
80. KAHN, OUT OF EDEN, supra note 40, at 59; see also KENNEDY, supra
note 30, at 58.
81. KANT, supra note 13, at 54.
82. Id.
83. Which, in Habermas’s words, “cannot be ‘true’ or ‘false’ [but has
rather] the status of conditional imperatives which may be deductively ‘valid’ or
‘invalid.’” See HABERMAS, LOGIC OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 14, at 52.
Emphasis added.
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forms of social analysis, such as that of von Kempski, according to
whom all social sciences, including jurisprudence, can be
explained through the dehumanized behavioural schemes offered
by mathematical economics.
If only in such an imperial system of uniformed behaviour,
basic equal rights and individual liberty (such as property and
contract rights) could be guaranteed, then it should not surprise
anyone that Kantian aesthetics is about the rise of a particular type
of “genius” who is paradoxically capable of creating his/her own
works “unconsciously.”84 Schmitt spotted this while arguing (not
without inconsistencies85) against the emergence of aesthetics as a
sign of the rationalisation of politics. Similarly, but with a different
aim, Arendt understood full well the essence of Kant’s fictio when
claiming that “[t]he Will in Kant is in fact ‘practical reason’ much
in the sense of Aristotle’s nous praktikos; it borrows its obligatory
power from the compulsion entered on the mind by self-evident
truth or logical reasoning.”86 Yet it is precisely the willing ego’s
essential conflict between its own affirmation and negation that
constitutes the “spark” of the active unique existence of humans in
anthropological and sociopolitical terms.
III. AGAINST INTERPRETATION?
Susan Sontag’s and Josef Esser’s accounts could not be more
opposed to each other. While the former tries to explain why the
84. Gadamer, who along with Paul Ricoeur was the leading postHeideggerian hermeneutical philosopher, rightly claimed that “Kant makes the
concept of genius serve his transcendental inquiry completely and does not slip
into empirical psychology” in the sense that his “transcendental reflection . . .
does not permit a philosophical aesthetics.” See HANS-GEORG GADAMER,
TRUTH AND METHOD 49, 51 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans.,
Bloomsbury 2004) (1975) [hereinafter TRUTH AND METHOD].
85. One of the most compelling critiques of Schmitt’s battle against the
aesthetics of liberalism and its shift from action to acting can be found in
Victoria Kahn, Hamlet or Hecuba: Carl Schmitt’s Decision, 83
REPRESENTATIONS 67–96 (2003).
86. ARENDT, 2 LIFE OF THE MIND, supra note 16, at 63. For a recent
rehabilitation of Arendt’s “political action,” see Lucy Cane Hannah Arendt on
the Principles of Political Action, 14 EUR. J. POLITICAL THEORY 55 (2015).
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interpretative task is a misleading fictio through which the
interpreter replaces the original author (or artist, as Sontag writes),
the latter aims to demonstrate that it is only through a particular
type of (normative) interpretation that the “true” meaning of the
(legal) text may appear and perform. Both claims should be
investigated carefully.
A. The Arrogance of Interpretation
To try to interpret Sontag’s essay “Against Interpretation”, her
most famous work, first published in its entirety in 1966, is, per se,
already a mistake, considering that she specifically asks us to
abandon any interpretative desire when approaching the text. How
can we even try to interpret something that stands against any
interpretative attempt? If we follow Sontag’s indications strictly,
we should not even read what she wrote. Yet the mythical essence
and concrete existence of the act of interpretation have kept
humanists busy since the thinking faculty was discovered. This is
so because, as Arendt noted,87 what makes us think is what Kant
defined as “reason’s need.” To delve into this need seems,
however, impossible. Philosophers have tried to get a better
understanding of it since Anaxagoras, who around 440 B.C.
claimed that the mind has power over all things that have life and
is the source of all motion. Hence the explosive energy of Sontag’s
essay is that, in just under fifteen printed pages, it renders centuries
of anthropological, philosophical, metaphysical, ontological,
artistic, and legal inquiry absolutely obsolete and ridiculous. In this
sense, what is truly impressive is that Sontag was not an
anthropologist, a philosopher, or a lawyer, but a Jewish-American
intellectual and writer who had a long academic apprenticeship at
Berkley, Chicago, and Harvard. Her fight against modern nihilism

87. ARENDT, 2 LIFE OF THE MIND, supra note 16, at 69. But see the whole
first volume as well.
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must therefore be understood as a fight from the outside, not from
within.
Sontag develops a powerful statement against what she
describes as “a conscious act of the mind which illustrates a certain
code, certain ‘rules’ of interpretation.”88 From this perspective,
“interpretation means plucking a set of elements . . . from the
whole work.”89 This is why, in her view, every interpretation
requires a translation.90 The question is, then, what is to be
translated, and into what do we translate it? This is a key question
if we are to understand the operability of the (non-)subject, that is
the dissolution of the author into the interpreter which occurs
between original presentation and re-presentation. In trying to
provide an answer, Sontag first claims that the “modern style” of
interpretation is structurally different from that of late classical
antiquity. Indeed, while, for instance, the Stoic desire for
interpretation was evinced “to reconcile the ancient texts to
‘modern’ demands,” the interpretative task of our own time does
nothing but “destroys.”91 That is to say, the modern style of
interpretation brings the “discrepancy between the clear meaning
of the text and the demands of (later) readers”92 to levels which
were unknown at the time of Philo of Alexandria and which
annihilate the constitutive force that led to the creation of what is
interpreted. In a sort of Derridean disruptive motion, the “modern
style of interpretation excavates, and as it excavates, destroys; it
‘digs’ behind the text, to find a sub-text which is the true one.”93
From the perspective of legal theory, Sontag’s claim sounds
like a defence of positivism and its belief that the presence of what

88. SONTAG, supra note 45, at 5.
89. Id.
90. Id. On this, see also GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at
401–23.
91. SONTAG, supra note 45, at 6.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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is non-legal is not necessary to make law properly legal.94 What
matters, then, is that, in doing so, the interpreter replaces the
original author by pushing aside what Sontag labels the “manifest”
content for the sake of the “latent” one which, through a clever
move, is given “true” meaning. Hence, according to Sontag,
interpretation can never claim to be innocent and pure: it always
implies a contingent fictio, which must be evaluated “within a
historical view of human consciousness.”95
From this perspective, interpretation is nothing but a
manipulative process of new production of content that aims to
overcome the limits of what one might call “historical distance.”
Indeed, Gadamer argued in 1964 that “[o]ur experience and
interpretation is obviously in no sense limited by the mens
auctoris.”96 Even more importantly, eleven years later he
maintained that “every translator is an interpreter,” and that despite
what happens between two people in conversation, any text
“speaks only through the other partner, the interpreter.”97 This is so
because “the interpreting word [is] the word of the interpreter
[because] assimilation is no mere reproduction or repetition of the

94. Hegel believed that there is in language always a superior, concealed
“un-said” or “never said” as the ultimate true meaning that may be explained
only in terms of language’s universality and that has to be ultimately linked to
the temporal process of self-negation. He would thus not agree with this view.
As Agamben noted while inquiring into the mystery and strength of the
Hegelian “unspeakable”, “[t]hat which is thus unspeakable, for language, is
none other than the very meaning, the Meinung, which, as such, remains
necessarily unsaid in every saying.” See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, LANGUAGE AND
DEATH 13 (Karen E. Pinkus & Michael Hardt trans., Minn. Univ. of Minn. Press
1991) (1982) [hereinafter LANGUAGE AND DEATH]; AGAMBEN, INFANCY AND
HISTORY (Liz Heron trans., Verso 2007) (1978). See also AGAMBEN, HOMO
SACER, supra note 73, at 21; AGAMBEN, TIME THAT REMAINS, supra note 62, at
27–87. See also infra note 155. I have discussed both (legal) positivism’s and
pragmatism’s political sin in Siliquini-Cinelli, Imago Veritas Falsa, supra note
7.
95. SONTAG, supra note 45, at 7.
96. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Martin Heidegger and Marburg Theology in
PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 198–211, at 209 (David E. Linge trans. & ed.;
Univ. of Cal. Press 2008) (1976) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS].
97. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at 405. See also id. at
303, 307, and infra note 161.
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traditionary text; it is a new creation of understanding.”98 It seems,
then, that Sontag brought to its logical conclusion Gadamer’s claim
ten years before it was made, because, in her view, from being the
object, the content becomes, through the interpreter, the new
subject. When we embark on the interpretative task, we replace the
subject who created the object on which we are focussing our
efforts with the object itself, and to this object we then attribute the
specific meaning that we want: interpretation is therefore the way
through which we replace the original creator with ourselves
(subject X → object → subject Y). This can also be expressed by
saying that, in pursuing such a roadmap, which in legal theory
could not be more opposed to historical and systematic forms of
interpretation, the self-consciousness of the artist who created what
is interpreted is nullified and displaced from view. Any
interpretation displaces the sovereign will of the artist, or original
creator.
So the question arises: What should we do to stop this process
of dissolution? According to Sontag, whose only hope is that
“interpretation [will] not . . . always prevail,”99 we should all pay
more attention to the form rather than to the content of the object
of our interest.100 This is not surprising. Given that “excessive
stress on the content provokes the arrogance of interpretation,”101
the only activity by which the spectator (or interpreter) may respect
the presentification of the author’s self-consciousness is silent
investigation strictly into the form of what s/he created. This
means that, according to Sontag, we need to displace the content
from our view if we, as spectators, really want to find it.102 Yet it
98. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at 489.
99. SONTAG, supra note 45, 10.
100. Id. at 12–13.
101. Id. at 12.
102. Even though he does not quote Sontag, Agamben turns her strategy
upside down and argues that it is instead the artist who should stop hoping to
find his/her certainty in the content of what s/he created. More precisely, in
inquiring into why “art leaves behind the neutral horizon of the aesthetic and
recognises itself in the ‘golden ball’ of the will to power,” Agamben argues that
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seems to me that this also means that we must turn into some sort
of Aristotelian non-interpreters;103 in pleading for a shift from the
analysis of the content to that of the form of what is interpreted,
Sontag is in truth asking us to deal only with a superficial and
secondary component of the author’s self-consciousness. Form
without content can never lead us to the discovery of the self. This
can only happen when the form actually becomes the content. And
as Agamben has persuasively argued while inquiring into the
theological moralisation of Western habits,104 this only happened
through the monastic development of the evangelicus canon as a
“form-of-living” (or forma vivendi)—in other words, when the
monastic rules of the patristic texts of the early centuries
prescribed a form-of-life that was the combination of a totalising
way of being and acting. Hence, even if we agree with Sontag
when she claims that “interpretation takes the sensory experience
of the work of art for granted,”105 and that this is the reason why
we should opt for a methodology of inquiry that preserves
transparency as “the highest, most liberating value in art,”106 we
cannot agree with her radical strategy on how to reach the

while the spectator “confronts absolute otherness in the work of art,” the artist
experiences “artistic subjectivity”—that is, a zone of indistinction between
“absolute essence” and “absolute abstract inessence.” In particular, this abstract
inessence is, in truth, the “pure creative-formal principle” which, “split from any
content,” “annihilates and dissolves every content in its continuous effort to
transcend and actualize itself.” This process, Agamben maintains, puts the artist
“in the paradoxical condition of having to find his own essence precisely in the
inessential, his content in what is mere form.” See AGAMBEN, MAN WITHOUT
CONTENT, supra note 71, at 2 and 54. Emphasis added. See also infra note 159.
103. Agamben has demonstrated, I think successfully, that in De
Interpretatione, “the letter, as interpreter of the voice, does not itself need any
other interpreter. It is the final interpreter . . . the limit of all interpretation.” See
The Thing Itself in AGAMBEN, TIME THAT REMAINS, supra note 62, 27–38, at 37.
104. AGAMBEN, THE HIGHEST POVERTY and OPUS DEI, supra note 58, and
AGAMBEN, TIME THAT REMAINS, supra note 62, at 27.
105. SONTAG, supra note 45, at 13.
106. Id.
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“luminousness of the thing in itself, of things being what they
are.”107
Sontag’s passionate account cannot be understood completely
without addressing another compelling essay of hers, “The
Anthropologist as Hero,”108 which unfortunately has not received
the same attention as “Against Interpretation.” Through an
(interpretative?) analysis of Claude Lévi-Strauss’s formalism and
intellectual agnosticism, this second essay was written with the aim
of demonstrating how “[t]he unreliability of human experience
brought about by the inhuman acceleration of historical chance has
led every sensitive modern mind to the recording of some kind of
nausea, of intellectual vertigo.”109 The result of this trauma is
terrible: “[t]he other is experienced as a harsh purification of the
self.”110 Put bluntly, this means that in trying to bring together the
self-consciousness of the interpreter and the original creator, we
actually dissolve both. This is so because, in Sontag’s words,
“[m]odern sensibility moves between two seemingly contradictory
but actually related impulses: surrender to the exotic, the strange,
the other; and the domestication of the exotic, chiefly through
science.”111 In this sense, the most powerful statement made by
Sontag in “Against Interpretation” is probably the last one, in
which she claims that “[i]n place of a hermeneutics, we need an
erotics of art,”112 that is, an erotic of pure passion that acts as a
spark of life. There may be no doubt that, as we shall see, Esser
fully internalized the difference between interpretation and
hermeneutic, and that such difference was clarified by Gadamer at
the very beginning of his magnum opus.113 It seems, however, that
Sontag was not sufficiently aware of it.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 69–81.
109. Id. at 69.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 70.
112. Id. at 14.
113. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at xxvii–xxxv, 306,
and 403. Hermeneutics, with its comprehensive perspective, is not a “method”,
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B. The Value of Interpretation
I have introduced the significance of Esser’s account of the
interpretative task elsewhere.114 On that occasion, I claimed that
Esser has demonstrated that our comprehension, individualisation,
and further conviction of what the idea of law is, passes through
the decisive combination of the interpretation and judgment of
value of the positivistic content of the norm. I now wish to further
clarify what I meant, and contextualise it in light of this paper’s
claims.
Esser believes that the law is always the combination of two
types of jus: scriptum and non scriptum. As the (tangible) nature of
the former is well-known, Esser delves into the essence of the
latter to demonstrate that legal interpretation always acts as an
unwritten source of law. More than thirty years later, Supiot
similarly argued that the interpretation of the law is “not enclosed
within the letter of its texts but open to the spirit that informs it.”115
The energy that emanates from this notion of legal interpretation
requires us to investigate cautiously how this special unwritten
source influences the activity of jus-dicere—that is to say, how
legal interpretation leads us first to find the norm that fits our needs

but the study of the universalist linguistic process of signification. From an
ontological point of view, hermeneutics has therefore more in common with
semiotics, which can be defined as the science of signs, than with interpretation.
Yet hermeneutics and interpretation overlap significantly, as when Gadamer
claims that “[t]he genuine reality of the hermeneutical process seems . . . to
encompass the self-understanding of the interpreter as well as what is
interpreted.” See GADAMER, On the Problem of Self-Understanding in
PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS, supra note 96, 44–58, at 58. See also BERNARD
JACKSON, SEMIOTICS AND LEGAL THEORY (Deborah Charles Pubs 1997) (1985);
JACKSON, LAW, FACT AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE (Deborah Charles Pubs
1988); COSTAS DOUZINAS, RONNIE WARRINGTON & SHAUN MCVEIGH,
POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE 92–110 (Routledge 1993); Maksymilian Del Mar,
System Values and Understanding Legal Language, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 29
(2008).
114. Siliquini-Cinelli, Imago Veritas Falsa, supra note 7.
115. SUPIOT, supra note 9, at 115.
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and then makes that norm capable of performing its regulative
instances through an act-ualising decision.
Esser accepts the challenge, and, as the central point of his
inquiry into the pre-comprehension of the method(s) of juridical
comprehension,116 describes several types of legal interpretation
(i.e., dogmatic, grammatical, systemic, historical, normative) with
the clear intent of uncovering the real essence of what is usually
defined as the ratio juris, the juridical reasoning that lies behind
the norm and that, if correctly interpreted, makes it suitable for
application. In this regard, Esser believes that the fact that a legal
disposition has a ratio means nothing more than that the
interpreter, standing at a privileged point such as that of Friedrich’s
Wander über dem Nebelmeer, is required to deal with its possible
sociopolitical applicative “horizons”117 (or “expectations”118). In
arguing so, Esser, who, unsurprisingly, quotes Habermas at the end
of the chapter, overcomes both liberalism’s and positivism’s
neutral automatism.
The starting point of Esser’s analysis is indeed that no one
would allow the creation and/or application of a norm seen as
“unjust” by society. What the interpreter has the duty to achieve is,
then, not “a” general comprehension of the norm, but the very best

116. The chapter on legal interpretation is, not accidently, the fifth in a series
of nine, cutting the whole opus into two equal parts, four chapters preceding it
and four following. See ESSER, supra note 45, at 112–37.
117. Id. at 136. The use of the term “horizon” is not accidental. Esser’s
research was profoundly influenced by that of Perelman, Heck, and, more
importantly, Gadamer, to whom in particular understanding is always a
(universal) process of mediation between the past horizon (composed of
prejudices and tradition) of the text and the present one of the interpreter. See
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at 302–22, 334–50, and 455–
506; GADAMER, Man and Language in PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS, supra
note 96, 59–68, at 67 [hereinafter Man and Language]. For present purposes it is
quite relevant that Habermas, too, has inquired into Gadamer’s use of the
concept of the horizon to explain the hermeneutical task, in HABERMAS, LOGIC
OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 14, 151–70.
118. ESSER, supra note 45, at 136. In describing Radbruch’s view, Cotterrell
explains why “[t]he jurist has to look beyond law’s technical efficiency to its
existence as an idea embodying cultural expectations,” Cotterrell, supra note 23,
at 21.
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comprehension of it according to the essence of a (delicate and yet
powerful) point of intersection between the jus scriptum of the
norm and the horizons upon which the sociopolitical acceptance of
its application inevitably depends. According to Esser, who is
obviously well-aware of the structural laws that inform humans’
capacity for understanding,119 the comprehension of the legal text
is therefore guided by an anticipation of the sense that informs the
court’s duty to judge. This is why, in his words, the precomprehension and choice of method to be followed in the process
of “juridical individualisation” is “the premise of an understanding
which may be used as a foundation for the [legal] decision.”120
This is how the interpreter is capable of checking the actual
fairness of the norm. Yet this means that the reasoning of the
interpreter, who deals with real people and real problems, must be
equal to that of the historical (that is, no longer present) legislator
because “the ratio legis can be ‘better understood’ by who applies
the norm.”121 To formulate the issue in this way means that the
interpreter undertakes a “critico-objective” revision of the norm
targeted with the aim of ascertaining whether or not “that” norm
can, and should, be used.
The last point warrants further comment. Esser makes it
incredibly clear that (legal) interpretation would be deprived of its
very sociopolitical meaning without the a priori recognition and
the a posteriori protection of the interpreter’s active power-to-will,
upon which the “freedom to valuate”122 the possible outcome(s) of
the application of the norm ultimately depends. In this sense, the
law-applying procedure, rooted in the decision-making one,
becomes nothing more than the fulfilment of “the duty to
regulate”123 which is fulfilled through what Esser labels the
119. On this, see in particular Gadamer, Man and Language, supra note 117,
at 59–68.
120. ESSER, supra note 45, at 135. My translation.
121. Id. at 114. My translation.
122. Id. at 115. My translation.
123. Id. at 117. My translation.

480

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 8

“interpretative praxis,”124 that is, the original signification and
further administration of its existential counterpart (the law). Such
a duty, it is worth noting, makes the interpreter the canon of the
“hermeneutical circle of the historical comprehension”125 of the
law: if law’s performance depends upon what the interpreter
understands of its given positivistic content—in other words, if the
law is the combination of both the norm and the decision as
previously mentioned—it is quite evident that the interpreter acts
as trait d'union between the political will that drafted the norm and
society at large. The interpreter is asked, therefore, to valuate the
facts (freely) in order to encapsulate them efficiently within a
normative framework, and then (freely) valuate and choose the
interpretive method that will render the law able to keep its
sociopolitical regulative promises. It is, then, the legal interpreter’s
double-faced decisive and active valuation that guides the law’s
performance. This is what Esser defines as the “normative purpose
of interpretation,”126 which, as he notes, is precisely what the
Enlightenment’s raison d’État, with its utopian belief in the
“objectification of interpretative rules and dogmatisation of the
[interpretative] method,”127 has tried to neutralise.
Thus, if we want the jurist to understand why s/he is the
protagonist in the process of “juridical individual-isation,” we
should free him/her from the influence of legal positivism’s claims
on the automatic self-applicability of the norm. No wonder, then,
that Esser, who rejects the fictio prompted by historico-legal
interpretation, opts for what could be defined as a decisive
“contextualised-normative” interpretation, or a type of
interpretation which “is necessarily guided by judgements of

124. Id. at 115. My translation.
125. Id. at 119. My translation.
126. Id. at 120. My translation.
127. Id. My translation. Esser’s critique of the dogmatic method of
interpretation is evidently rooted in that of Gadamer. See GADAMER, TRUTH
AND METHOD, supra note 84, at 339–41.
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value”128 over all possible applicative expectations. Indeed, it is
only through these performative judgments that the
“actualisation”129 of every sociopolitical and legal institution can
keep happening. What is relevant here is that this act-ualising
process cannot take place if we do not first recognise that the
decision in which the judgment is rooted is not mechanistically
“offered” by the norm itself: this is so because the norm cannot,
per se, “anticipate all estimative parameters [that are] necessary for
the application of the law.”130 On the contrary, such a decision can
only arise as the result of the problematic (that is, essential)
conflict that takes place within the sovereign power-to-will while
evaluating and deciding both “for” and “against” the
aforementioned horizons/expectations and concrete usability of the
norm.131 What matters for present purposes is thus that while
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics was specifically aimed at
overcoming the limits of Schleiermacher’s and Dilthey’s pure
individualism by (partly) displacing subjectivity132 from the
process of understanding and conferring authoritative value to our
prejudices,133 Esser’s theory of legal interpretation represents a
zone of intersection between them.
128. ESSER, supra note 45, at 127. My translation.
129. Id. at 128. My translation.
130. Id. My translation. See also id. at 135, where Esser argues that the jurist
“comprehends the given text . . . in terms of a directing model which has a
meaning according to his ‘satisfying’ decision”. My translation. Emphasis
added.
131. Which is why Esser maintains that “the path along the individualisation
of the law through interpretation is never linear . . . but is a path of alternatives
and hypotheses which . . . must be justified in the light of their possible
plausibility.” Any tentative attempt to achieve a mechanical (that is, positivistic,
systemic, etc.) interpretation of the norm is therefore deemed to be unsuccessful.
Id. at 131.
132. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at 307–8, and 338;
GADAMER, Martin Heidegger, supra note 96, at 58. See, in comparison, infra
note 160. See also David E Linge’s Introduction to GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL
HERMENEUTICS, supra note 96, at xii–xxvii.
133. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at 278–318. See also
GADAMER, The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem in PHILOSOPHICAL
HERMENEUTICS, supra note 96, 3–17, at 12. See also George Duke, Gadamer
and Political Authority, 13 EUR. J. LEGAL THEORY 25 (2014).
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This is why Esser claims that the correspondence between the
norm and the decision will inevitably lead us to delve into the
“hermeneutical circle,” which “consists in the relationship between
formulations of problems and answers, to be intended as the
comprehension of the norm” which itself is rooted in the “prejudice over the necessity of discipline and possibility to solve
[conflicts].”134 If we turn the picture upside down and keep in mind
what was mentioned about the distinction between social rules and
legal norms, this means that the jurist cannot norm-alise our
choices and offer norm-ative guidance to human conduct (or, as
Paul would say, the jurist cannot act as a medium between the law
and the rule, or regula vitae135), and the law cannot solve social
conflicts, unless we first let the internal conflict between velle and
nolle manifest itself within us. Thus, the a priori essence of the
anthropological conflict that makes us human informs the a
posteriori sociopolitical existence of the law, which conversely
makes sense only in light of the former.136 Both conflicts
ultimately lead the legal interpreter to formulate a decision that is
seen as “objectively just”137 because of the subjective
contextualised-normative evaluation.
The value of (the correct method of) legal interpretation is,
therefore, very clear: given that, like any provisions, legal
provisions only make sense as part of a delicate (yet powerful)
performative/dispositive
narrative,
legal
interpretation’s
performative capacity decisively act-ualises the regulative
instances of our sociopolitical institutions. It makes them relevant
by linking their performance to what renders us unique. What is
increasingly lacking in our neorealist globalised constellation is
exactly this act-ualisation which, I contend, cannot re-take place if
what makes us human, namely the internal conflict between the
134.
135.
136.
137.

ESSER, supra note 45, at 133.
See supra note 47.
Id.
ESSER, supra note 45, at 136.
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will power of affirmation or negation, is not re-affirmed. The more
we cover the manifestation of this anthropological conflict, the
more all mechanical forms of post-national governance will
succeed in their dehumanising enterprise and displacing the jurist
from view.
IV. CONCLUSION
The contention, so well demonstrated by Whorf,138 that the
structures of language determine those of thought is testament to
the fact that language is the medium for human self-understanding
or, as Heidegger would say, and Gadamer, Esser, and Agamben
would all in their own ways confirm, that understanding is being(in-there).139 Consequently, as an act of meaning production,
interpretation plays a pivotal role in the present-ification of our
uniqueness, that is the volo me velle. It is in this sense that, in legal
theory, legal interpretation is the canon of the process through
which what makes us human (per-)forms its instances. Importantly,
law being an ideal object in constant need of a “corpus” to show
and prove its historical existence,140 legal interpretation is the point
of intersection between the active will of the jurist and law’s
normative presentification in ontological terms. This is why in the
courtroom, as in the liturgical tradition, interpretative
understanding leads to what Gadamer called the “third element in
the hermeneutical problem,”141 namely application, which is itself
presentification.

138. BRIAN LEE WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALITY (The MIT
Press 2012) (1956).
139. Consider, in particular, Gadamer’s argument that an “essential feature of
the being in language [is] its I-lessness. Whoever speaks a language that no one
understands does not speak,” in Gadamer, Man and Language, supra note 117,
at 65.
140. Siliquini-Cinelli, The Age of “Depoliticization”, supra note 1, and
Imago Veritas Falsa, supra note 7.
141. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at 318 and 338–50. See
also AGAMBEN, TIME THAT REMAINS, supra note 62 at 79–85.
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In light of the above discussion, I believe that the jurist may
defeat the nihilism that currently affects him/her and return to the
authority of which liberalism and its universalisation have deprived
him/her only if we, as lawyers, re-affirm the neglected sovereignty
of the will to (per-)form the self-understanding of our uniqueness
through the affirmation or negation of a future project. The ontosociopolitical need for the jurist’s function to give a normative
meaning to the signification of the power-to-will through legal
interpretation can be re-discovered and successfully protected only
if we first re-uncover the anthropological essence of homo
juridicus’s self-consciousness and sovereign activity in
existentially (per-)forming his/her decisions.
Arendt claimed that “the freedom of the will is relevant only to
people who live outside political communities.”142 On the contrary,
I believe that the very notion of our sociopolitical liberty is
meaningless without recognition of the anthropological function of
the sovereign power-to-will. This belief leads me to a subsequent
suggestion. That recent public and private (household and
corporate) financial crises have revealed an a priori and more
profound political crisis is not a mystery. What is less clear,
however, is that the politico-ideological gridlock that currently
affects the decision-making processes of Western democracies143
(consider, for instance, what has happened over the last few years
in Greece, Portugal, Italy, and the U.S.) and that, not
coincidentally, experimentalist forms of PNG aim to overcome, is
rooted in the crisis of what makes us human: our will and power to
decide both “for” and “against” a future project (and, thus,
142. ARENDT, 2 LIFE OF THE MIND, supra note 16, at 199. See also ARENDT,
LIFE OF THE MIND, supra note 56, at 145, when it is claimed that political
freedom “is the very opposite of ‘inner freedom’”. Not surprisingly, Arendt was
of the opinion that Eichmann’s evilness was “banal.” See ARENDT, EICHMANN
IN JERUSALEM, supra note 40.
143. Which was “forecasted” by Schmitt in THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY
DEMOCRACY (Ellen Kennedy trans., MIT Press 1988) (1923, 1926). See also
CARL SCHMITT, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY (Jeffrey Seitzer trans. & ed., Duke
Univ. Press 2004) (1932, 1958).
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something and/or someone) and then actively perform our volitions
accordingly. Importantly, as I have argued here, such an existential
crisis cannot be understood completely without a critique of the
economic theory of democracy on the one hand and of liberalism’s
limits on the other (and in particular its utopian belief in the
perpetual inclusive capacity of endless negotiations and in the
possibility of freeing law from the metaphysic of the will). In
particular, along with Rawls’s dehumanised veil of ignorance,
which should inform the contractual paradigm of reasonable
political discourse, Habermas’s belief that the “rational character
of parliamentary deliberations is to be sought primarily . . . in the
fair balancing of interests, the clarification of ethical selfunderstanding, and the moral justification of regulations” is one of
the maximum expressions of liberalism’s challenge to our
uniqueness. This is so because it leads to the possibility of
“subjectless forms” of communicative (non-)action that “regulate
the flow of discursive opinion- and will-formation in such a way
that their fallible results enjoy the presumption of being
reasonable.”144
In the liquid and unstable post-national framework, the law is
incapable of keeping its sociopolitical regulative promises. What is
important is that we do not need it to keep these promises.145 This
is what, as mentioned in the introduction of this study, global
(non-)law is about. The fact that, over the last ten years, softnetworked channels of PNG have branched out in new directions,
sparking novel business models of rational behaviour that
challenge the forms through which the politicisation and
juridification of modernity have taken place, is anything but a
coincidence. Gustav Radbruch’s authoritarian claim that “[i]f
nobody can ascertain what is just, somebody must determine what

144. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 3, at 180 and 301
respectively. Emphasis added.
145. See supra note 47.
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shall be legal”146 makes no sense in the post-national
“constellation.” This is so because the anthropological function of
positing the law, which, in Arendt’s words, is aimed at erecting
“boundaries and establish[ing] channels of communication
between men whose community is continually enlarged by the new
men born into it,”147 is deprived of its meaning. The promoters of
soft-networked forms of PNG are used to claim that they may
better overcome the political gridlocks and ideological clefts that
characterise classic modes of regulation, and more importantly,
prevent democratic systems of accountability from achieving the
structural reforms they need. Although this claim sounds
fascinating, I believe that the strategy by which liquid mechanisms
of PNG operate and transcend state-based patterns of government
can only be fully understood if we address why law’s sociopolitical
instances become completely obsolete within the global-order
(non-)dimension. This can be done only if, in light of the
aforementioned distinction between law and rule, we first
comprehend that the dehumanised scenario is characterised by
rules, not laws, that inform behavioural schemes of motion.
It is in this sense that the liberal global-order project threatens
what makes us human—the agent-revealing constitutive force as
expressed by the will’s oscillation between velle and nolle, and,
balancing that, the anthropological and sociopolitical role that this
force has in the formation and protection of our self-consciousness.
By imposing on us standardised apolitical schemes of interconnected mechanical behaviour, the global Oikoumene targets the
individual’s power of assertion and denial as expressed by the
will’s power of affirmation and negation; this is (per-)formed
through the boundlessness and unpredictability of (political)
action. Arendt suggests that the “impossibility of foretelling” the
consequences of human conduct finds its maximum expression in
146. GUSTAV RADBRUCH, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 163 (Müller Jur.Vlg.C.F.
2011) (1969). Also quoted by HAYEK, supra note 23, at 212 and 323.
147. ARENDT, ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM, supra note 6, at 465.
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the act of making promises as “the only alternative to a mastery
which relies on domination of one’s self and rule over others;”148 if
she is right in that assertion, then the preference for the common
law tradition expressed in the WTO’s Doing Business reports149—
that is, for a tradition in which promises are usually not legally
binding150—becomes even clearer.
Unfortunately, given that “[t]he liberal will is fundamentally
without content” and that “the end of liberalism is to create a form
of public discourse in which [the differences in cultural norms]
would have no significance,”151 the totalising strategy of the liberal
global-order project leads us to a sort of Deleuzian contemplative
form of “immanent life” without knowledge. This is a pre-Adamand-Eve contemplative condition in which the original λόγος
mentioned by John 1:1 (which means both reason and speech) has
no limit, or a Kantian dehumanised universe of harmonic reason
and perfect (because mechanical) social coordination that
transcends the imperfections and contradictions of our empirical
world(s). This is what Agamben meant in claiming that “the
planetary petty bourgeoisie is probably the form in which
humanity is moving toward its own destruction.”152 Despite its aim
of achieving a perfect rule-of-law-order away from the chaos and
anarchy that affect the homo homini lupus condition of the state of
nature, universalised liberalism produces instead a sort of “global
Eden,” or “intangible open” in which we do not have a sense of our
living experience because we neither come to birth nor die as
148. ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 25, at 244.
149. I have investigated this preference further in Siliquini-Cinelli, supra
note 1.
150. This general doctrine, along with its exceptions, are compellingly
investigated by Martin Hogg in PROMISES AND CONTRACT LAW 428–50
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2011).
151. KAHN, LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE, supra note 5, respectively at 16 and
33.
152. AGAMBEN, THE COMING COMMUNITY, supra note 6, at 65. Agamben,
who as quoted compares the imperial trend of the global economy to that which
characterises the Hell, further maintains that current “politics assume[s] . . . the
form of an iokonomia, that is, of a governance of empty speech over bare life.”
See AGAMBEN, id. at 72.
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“someone”;153 this is a sort of Kojèvean post-historical (that is,
animal) condition in which not only miracles are exceptions, but
even time and space, as well love and evil, happiness and
suffering, violence and sacrifice, friend and enemy no longer exist,
and in which everyone can be (and in fact, is) everyone else
because its (non-)human participants are moved merely by
incentives154 according to quantitative (rather than qualitative)
models of interest, and then evaluated and divided according to
their behavioural virtues rather the decisions they make.
In such a (non-)dimension of objective regularities rather than
of subjective irregularities, of language rather than languages,155 of
novels rather than tragedies, (non-)humans are completely
interchangeable and replaceable (as is the case, not surprisingly,
for the channels through which soft-networked forms of PNG
operate) because their lives will no longer be sacer, and even the
153. The rationalistic and aspatial ius soli is already producing this result.
154. Habermas speaks of “stimulus-response behavior” in On the Logic of
Social Sciences and of “impulses” throughout Between Facts and Norms. There
are two reasons for this. First, Habermas believes that humans can define their
own identities by rationally following their interests. Second, even if he tries to
draw a fine line between “political public sphere” and “civil society” through a
conception in which the latter “institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on
questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public spheres”
and which “can acquire influence in the public sphere,” his notion of the public
sphere underestimates, on the one hand, the (anthropological more than
sociopolitical) distinction among private, public, and social realms so welldescribed by Arendt, and on the other hand, Hayek’s warning against the
instrumentalisation of the term “social.” See HABERMAS, LOGIC OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES, supra note 14, at 44, and BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 3,
329–87, at 367 and 373; ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 25, 22–78;
HAYEK, supra note 23, at 241–43. See also JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE FUTURE
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 262 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014). See also Thomas
Piketty’s critique of the scientific methods used by modern economists in
CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 574–75 (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
Belknap Press 2013) (2014). Finally, see supra note 50-52.
155. I refer here to when Habermas, borrowing from theologicophilosophical inquiry, claims that “[o]nly by destroying the particularities of
languages . . . does reason live in language.” HABERMAS, LOGIC OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES, supra note 14, at 144.
It seems, then, that liberalism’s linguistic sin is that it has never understood that
“a word [is not] an instrument, like the language of mathematics, that can
construct an objectified universe of beings that can be out at our disposal by
calculation.” See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at 473. See
also supra note 94.
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act of killing will lose its political and normative meaning and
become a sterile and neutral behavioural outcome (as it already is,
not coincidentally, in criminal law every time the mens rea is
displaced from view).156 This is why, from claiming to be the only
feasible solution to the sociopolitical challenge posed by cultural
pluralism, universalised liberalism has imposed a form-of(non-)living in Agambenian terms which in fact annihilates our
uniqueness through the imposition of procedural rather than
substantial truths which, paraphrasing Nietzsche, we may say
forces humans to place “[their] behaviour under the control of
abstractions.”157 Thus the liberal global-order project requires us to
master the problem of law in its original structure, in the
connubium between its essential uncanny presence and existential
performative instances. This cannot be done without asking why,
building on Benjamin, Agamben argues that in an age such as ours,
in which the exception has become the rule, instead of claiming
that “there is nothing outside the law” we should rather understand
that “there is nothing inside the law.”158
The lesson to be learnt then is that, if we agree with Agamben
when he observes that “[i]t is, in every being that exists, the
possibility of not-being that silently calls for our help,”159 then we
156. This is so because the co-essential possibility of being killed would be
seen as an existentially tolerable condition. Heidegger would say that the
“merely-living,” as opposed to Dasein as “Being-in-the-world” or “Being-thethere” or “Being-in-motion,” does not die, but just ceases to live. On this, see
Agamben, Language and Death, supra note 94.
157. Friedrich Nietzsche, On Truth and Lies in the Nonmoral Sense in
PHILOSOPHY AND TRUTH 84 (Daniel Breazeale trans., Humanities Press 1990)
(1873). David Dyzenhaus suggests that “political liberalism . . . seeks to ban
truth from politics,” in supra note 5, at 231.
158. AGAMBEN, TIME THAT REMAINS, supra note 62, at 170. “The entire
planet,” Agamben further maintains, “has now become the exception that law
must contain in its ban,” id. See also AGAMBEN, THE COMING COMMUNITY,
supra note 6, at 113.
159. AGAMBEN, THE COMING COMMUNITY, supra note 6, at 31. In light of
what was discussed in Section II, it is of pivotal interest that Agamben believes
that this need for help finds its maximum expression in the artist, that is in the
creator par excellence. The artist, Agamben claims, is he who “remains on [the]
side of himself [because] condemned forever to dwell, so to speak, beside his
reality.” Hence, the artist is the real “man without content, who has no identity
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should say that, as lawyers, we have the precise duty to do our part
not only in understanding why this help is required, but also in
providing it. The central question is, of course, how. In my
opinion, the best way to meet this challenge is by uncovering the
connection between the existential component of jus-dicere and,
paraphrasing Thomas Aquinas, the anthropological and
sociopolitical essence of the voluntas vult se velle et nolle, that is,
of the “will which wills itself to will and nill.” The combination of
the two creates a powerful zone of indistinction within legal
theory, namely the unity of consciousness.
This can be achieved only through the promotion of a call for
action, which implies a “narrative of the subject, an account of the
deliberative process by which the subject chose and thus of the
values and principles which he affirmed in that process.”160 Yet, as
Arendt taught us, action cannot be built on contemplation. Hence,
if legal texts are central to the operativity of the (rule of) law, and
if we agree with Gadamer that “[a] person who is trying to
understand a text is always projecting”161 and with Esser’s account
of the role of the act-ualising decision in the interpretative task,
then we should admit that the performative character of legal
interpretation as described in this paper depends upon the restitutio
in integrum of the will as principium individuationis. As this paper
has shown, this ‘will’ ought not be confused with the liberal
prototype, which as Kahn as set out, is “fundamentally without

[other] than a perpetual emerging out of the nothingness of expression and no
other ground than this incomprehensible station on this side of himself.”
AGAMBEN, MAN WITHOUT CONTENT, supra note 71, at 55. See also AGAMBEN,
The Author as Gesture in THE COMING COMMUNITY, supra note 6, at 61–72.
160. KAHN, OUT OF EDEN, supra note 40, at 46. See also KAHN, POLITICAL
THEORY, supra note 41, at 125–52. Kahn has introduced the need for a
normative inquiry into the process of self-exploration in THE CULTURAL STUDY
OF LAW (Univ. of Chicago Press 1999).
161. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 84, at 279. See also
ARENDT, CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 57, in which it is explained why
the ability to act requires imagination.
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content”;162 rather the will we should put back on stage is the
faculty through which we actively choose the determination(s) of a
future project while setting into motion the constitutive process of
our uniqueness.

162. KAHN, PUTTING LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE, supra note 5, at 16.

LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
CODE CIVIL DE LOUISIANE
The Journal of Civil Law Studies continues the publication of the
Louisiana Civil Code in English and in French, with the full text of
Book Two, Things and the Different Modifications of Ownership.
Volume 5 (2012) included the Preliminary Title and the general law
of obligations, namely three titles of Book Three: Obligations in
General (Title 3), Conventional Obligations or Contracts (Title 4),
and Obligations Arising without Agreement (Title 5). Representation
and Mandate (Title 15) and Suretyship (Title 16) were published in
Volume 6 (2013). Sale (Title 7) and Exchange (Title 8) were
published in Volume 7 (2014). Volume 8 Number 1 featured
Matrimonial Regimes (Title 6).
The translation is made at the Louisiana State University Center
of Civil Law Studies, with the support of the Partner University Fund
supporting transatlantic partnership around research and higher
education, within the ‘Training Multilingual Jurists’ Project, in
cooperation with the University of Nantes, France.1
Le Journal of Civil Law Studies poursuit la publication du Code
civil louisianais en anglais et en français avec la publication
intégrale du Livre II, Des choses et des différentes modifications de la
propriété. Le Titre préliminaire et les trois titres du Livre III couvrant
la partie générale du droit des obligations : Titre III (Des obligations
en général), Titre IV (Des obligations conventionnelles ou des
contrats) et Titre V (Des engagements qui se forment sans
convention) furent publiés au volume 5 (2012). Les Titres XV (De la
représentation et du mandat) et XVI (Du cautionnement) furent
publiés au Volume 6 (2013). Les Titres VII (De la vente) et VIII (De
l’échange) furent publiés au Volume 7 (2014) et le Titre VI (Des
régimes matrimoniaux) au premier numéro du Volume 8 (2015).
La traduction est faite au Centre de droit civil, avec le soutien du
Partner University Fund, supporting transatlantic partnership around
research and higher education, dans le cadre du projet ‘Training
Multilingual Jurists’ en coopération avec l’Université de Nantes,
France.1
1

For a general presentation of the translation project, see Olivier Moréteau, The
Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project: An Introduction, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD.
97-104 (2012); Le Code civil de Louisiane, traduction et retraduction, 28
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE SEMIOTICS OF LAW 155-175 (2015).
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BOOK II. THINGS AND THE
DIFFERENT
MODIFICATIONS OF
OWNERSHIP
(…)

LIVRE II. DES CHOSES ET DES
DIFFÉRENTES
MODIFICATIONS DE LA
PROPRIÉTÉ
(…)

TITLE I. THINGS
[Acts 1978, No. 728, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1979]

TITRE 1. DES CHOSES
[Loi de 1978, n˚ 728, §1, en
vigueur le 1er janvier 1979]

CHAPTER 1 - DIVISION OF
THINGS

CHAPITRE 1 - DE LA
DIVISION DES CHOSES

SECTION 1 - GENERAL
PRINCIPLES

SECTION 1 - PRINCIPES
GÉNÉRAUX

Art. 448. Things are divided
into common, public, and
private; corporeals and
incorporeals; and movables and
immovables.

Art. 448. Les choses sont
communes, publiques ou
privées ; corporelles ou
incorporelles ; meubles ou
immeubles.

Art. 449. Common things
may not be owned by anyone.
They are such as the air and the
high seas that may be freely used
by everyone conformably with
the use for which nature has
intended them.

Art. 449. Les choses
communes sont celles dont la
propriété n’appartient à
personne, tels l’air et la haute
mer dont chacun peut se servir
librement, conformément à
l’usage pour lequel la nature les
a destinées.

Art. 450. Public things are
owned by the state or its political
subdivisions in their capacity as
public persons.
Public things that belong to
the state are such as running
waters, the waters and bottoms of
natural navigable water bodies,
the territorial sea, and the
seashore.
Public things that may belong
to political subdivisions of the
state are such as streets and
public squares.

Art. 450. Les choses
publiques sont celles qui
appartiennent à l’état ou à ses
subdivisions politiques en tant
que personnes publiques.
Les choses publiques
appartenant à l’état comprennent
les eaux courantes, les eaux et
les fonds des étendues d’eau
naturelles navigables, les eaux
territoriales et le rivage de la
mer.
Les rues et les places
publiques sont parmi les choses
publiques qui peuvent appartenir
aux subdivisions politiques de
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Art. 451. Seashore is the
space of land over which the
waters of the sea spread in the
highest tide during the winter
season.
Art. 452. Public things and
common things are subject to
public use in accordance with
applicable laws and regulations.
Everyone has the right to fish in
the rivers, ports, roadsteads, and
harbors, and the right to land on
the seashore, to fish, to shelter
himself, to moor ships, to dry
nets, and the like, provided that
he does not cause injury to the
property of adjoining owners.
The seashore within the limits
of a municipality is subject to its
police power, and the public use
is governed by municipal
ordinances and regulations.

l’état.
Art. 451. Le rivage de la mer
est l’estran d’hiver.
Art. 452. Les choses
publiques et les choses
communes sont soumises à
l’usage public conformément aux
lois et règlements applicables. Il
est permis à chacun de pêcher
dans les rivières, ports, rades et
havres, et d’aborder sur le
rivage maritime, d’y pêcher, de
s’y abriter, d’y amarrer ses
vaisseaux, et d’y faire sécher ses
filets et autres usages
semblables, pourvu qu’on ne
cause aucun dommage aux biens
des riverains.
Le rivage maritime au sein
des limites de la municipalité
relève de son pouvoir de police,
et son usage public est régi par
les ordonnances et règlements
municipaux.

Art. 453. Private things are
owned by individuals, other
private persons, and by the state
or its political subdivisions in
their capacity as private persons.

Art. 453. Les choses privées
sont celles qui appartiennent aux
individus et autres personnes
privées, à l’état ou à ses
subdivisions politiques en tant
que personnes privées.

Art. 454. Owners of private
things may freely dispose of
them under modifications
established by law.

Art. 454. Les propriétaires
de choses privées peuvent en
disposer librement sous réserve
des modifications établies par la
loi.

Art. 455. Private things may
be subject to public use in
accordance with law or by
dedication.

Art. 455. Les choses privées
peuvent être soumises à l’usage
public par l’effet de la loi ou du
fait de leur affectation.

Art. 456. The banks of
navigable rivers or streams are
private things that are subject to
public use.

Art. 456. Les rives des
fleuves et des rivières navigables
sont des choses privées affectées
à l’usage public.
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The bank of a navigable river
or stream is the land lying
between the ordinary low and the
ordinary high stage of the water.
Nevertheless, when there is a
levee in proximity to the water,
established according to law, the
levee shall form the bank.

La rive d’un fleuve ou d’une
rivière navigable est l’espace de
terre situé entre les niveaux
ordinaires des eaux les plus
basses et les plus hautes.
Néanmoins, lorsqu’il y existe une
levée légalement établie à
proximité de l’eau, cette levée en
forme la rive.

Art. 457. A road may be
either public or private.
A public road is one that is
subject to public use. The public
may own the land on which the
road is built or merely have the
right to use it.
A private road is one that is
not subject to public use.

Art. 457. Une voie peut être
publique ou privée.
La voie publique est celle
affectée à l’usage public. Le
public peut être propriétaire du
terrain sur lequel la route est
construite ou simplement avoir le
droit d’en faire usage.
La voie privée est celle qui
n’est pas affectée à l’usage
public.

Art. 458. Works built without
lawful permit on public things,
including the sea, the seashore,
and the bottom of natural
navigable waters, or on the banks
of navigable rivers, that obstruct
the public use may be removed at
the expense of the persons who
built or own them at the instance
of the public authorities, or of
any person residing in the state.
The owner of the works may
not prevent their removal by
alleging prescription or
possession.

Art. 458. Les ouvrages
construits sans permis valide sur
des choses publiques, y compris
la mer, son rivage, et les fonds
des eaux naturelles navigables,
ou sur les rives des cours d’eaux
navigables, qui font obstacle à
l’usage public, peuvent être
enlevés aux dépens des
personnes qui les ont construits
ou auxquelles ils appartiennent à
la demande des autorités
publiques, ou de toute personne
résidant dans l’état.
Le propriétaire des ouvrages
ne peut en empêcher
l’enlèvement en alléguant la
prescription ou la possession.

Art. 459. A building that
merely encroaches on a public
way without preventing its use,
and which cannot be removed
without causing substantial
damage to its owner, shall be
permitted to remain. If it is
demolished from any cause, the
owner shall be bound to restore

Art. 459. Le bâtiment qui
empiète simplement sur la voie
publique sans en empêcher
l’usage, et qui ne peut être enlevé
sans causer d’importants
dommages à son propriétaire,
doit être maintenu en l’état. S’il
est démoli pour quelque raison
que ce soit, le propriétaire est
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to the public the part of the way
upon which the building stood.

tenu de restituer au public la
part de la voie sur laquelle était
le bâtiment.

Art. 460. Port commissions of
the state, or in the absence of
port commissions having
jurisdiction, municipalities may,
within the limits of their
respective jurisdictions, construct
and maintain on public places, in
beds of natural navigable water
bodies, and on their banks or
shores, works necessary for
public utility, including
buildings, wharves, and other
facilities for the mooring of
vessels and the loading or
discharging of cargo and
passengers.

Art. 460. Les commissions
portuaires de l’état ou, en
l’absence de commissions
portuaires compétentes, les
municipalités, dans les limites de
leurs compétences respectives,
peuvent construire et maintenir
sur les places publiques, dans les
lits des étendues d’eau naturelles
navigables, et sur leurs rives ou
rivages, des ouvrages justifiés
par l’utilité publique, tels que
des bâtiments, des quais et autres
installations pour l’amarrage des
vaisseaux et le chargement ou
déchargement des cargaisons et
passagers.

Art. 461. Corporeals are
things that have a body, whether
animate or inanimate, and can be
felt or touched.
Incorporeals are things that
have no body, but are
comprehended by the
understanding, such as the rights
of inheritance, servitudes,
obligations, and right of
intellectual property.

Art. 461. Les choses
corporelles sont celles qui ont un
corps, soit animé, soit inanimé,
et qu’il est possible de sentir et
toucher.
Les choses incorporelles sont
celles qui n’ont pas de corps,
mais qui se conçoivent par
l’entendement, tels que les droits
d’hérédité, les servitudes, les
obligations et les droits de
propriété intellectuelle.

SECTION 2 - IMMOVABLES

SECTION 2 - DES IMMEUBLES

Art. 462. Tracts of land, with
their component parts, are
immovables.

Art. 462. Sont immeubles les
fonds de terre avec leurs parties
composantes.

Art. 463. Buildings, other
constructions permanently
attached to the ground, standing
timber, and unharvested crops or
ungathered fruits of trees, are
component parts of a tract of
land when they belong to the
owner of the ground.

Art. 463. Sont parties
composantes d’un fonds de terre
lorsqu’elles appartiennent au
propriétaire du sol, les bâtiments
ou autre construction attachée
au sol de manière permanente, le
bois sur pied, et les cultures non
récoltées ou les fruits des arbres
non cueillis.
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Art. 464. Buildings and
standing timber are separate
immovables when they belong to
a person other than the owner of
the ground.
Art. 465. Things incorporated
into a tract of land, a building, or
other construction, so as to
become an integral part of it,
such as building materials, are its
component parts.

Art. 466. Things that are
attached to a building and that,
according to prevailing usages,
serve to complete a building of
the same general type, without
regard to its specific use, are its
component parts. Component
parts of this kind may include
doors, shutters, gutters, and
cabinetry, as well as plumbing,
heating, cooling, electrical, and
similar systems.
Things that are attached to a
construction other than a
building and that serve its
principal use are its component
parts.
Other things are component
parts of a building or other
construction if they are attached
to such a degree that they cannot
be removed without substantial
damage to themselves or to the
building or other construction.
[Acts 2005, No. 301, §1, eff.
June 29, 2005; Acts 2006, No.
765, §1; Acts 2008, No. 632, §1,
eff. July 1, 2008]

Art. 467. The owner of an
immovable may declare that
machinery, appliances, and

Art. 464. Les bâtiments et le
bois sur pied sont des immeubles
distincts lorsqu’ils appartiennent
à une personne autre que le
propriétaire du sol.
Art. 465. Sont parties
composantes d’un fonds de terre,
d’un bâtiment ou d’une autre
construction, les choses qui y
sont incorporées de telle façon
qu’elles en deviennent partie
intégrante, tels les matériaux de
construction.
Art. 466. Sont parties
composantes d’un bâtiment les
choses qui lui sont attachées et
qui, selon l’usage qui prévaut,
servent à compléter un bâtiment
de même catégorie, sans tenir
compte de son utilisation
particulière. De telles parties
composantes comprennent
notamment les portes, les volets,
les gouttières et les rangements,
ainsi que les systèmes
électriques, de plomberie, de
chauffage, de refroidissement, et
autres systèmes similaires.
Les choses qui sont attachées
à une construction autre qu’un
bâtiment et qui servent à son
usage principal sont ses parties
composantes.
Sont également parties
composantes d’un bâtiment ou
autre construction les choses qui
y sont attachées de sorte qu’elles
ne puissent être enlevées sans
subir ou sans y causer de
dommage important. [Loi de
2005, n˚ 301, §1, en vigueur le
29 juin 2005 ; loi de 2006, n˚
765, §1 ; loi de 2008, n˚ 632, §1,
en vigueur le 1er juillet 2008]
Art. 467. Le propriétaire
d’un immeuble ne lui servant pas
de résidence privée peut déclarer
que les machines, appareils et
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equipment owned by him and
placed on the immovable, other
than his private residence, for its
service and improvement are
deemed to be its component
parts. The declaration shall be
filed for registry in the
conveyance records of the parish
in which the immovable is
located.

Art. 468. Component parts of
an immovable so damaged or
deteriorated that they can no
longer serve the use of lands or
buildings are deimmobilized.
The owner may deimmobilize
the component parts of an
immovable by an act translative
of ownership and delivery to
acquirers in good faith.
In the absence of rights of
third persons, the owner may
deimmobilize things by
detachment or removal.
[Amended by Acts 1979, No.
180, §2]
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équipements qui lui
appartiennent, et qu’il y a placés
pour son service et son
exploitation, sont réputés en être
des parties composantes. La
déclaration doit être inscrite au
registre foncier de la paroisse2
où se situe l’immeuble.
Art. 468. Lorsqu’elles sont
endommagées ou détériorées au
point de ne plus pouvoir servir
l’usage des terres ou des
bâtiments, les parties
composantes d’un immeuble
perdent leur qualité de chose
immobilière.
Le propriétaire peut faire
perdre la qualité de chose
immobilière aux parties
composantes d’un immeuble par
acte translatif de propriété et
délivrance aux acquéreurs de
bonne foi.
En l’absence de droits des
tiers, le propriétaire peut faire
perdre aux choses leur qualité
immobilière par détachement ou
enlèvement. [Modifiée par la loi
de 1979, n˚ 180, §2]

Art. 469. The transfer or
encumbrance of an immovable
includes its component parts.
[Amended by Acts 1979, No.
180, §2]

Art. 469. Le transfert de la
propriété d’un immeuble ou les
charges consenties sur celui-ci
comprennent ses parties
composantes. [Modifiée par la
loi de 1979, n˚ 180, §2]

Art. 470. Rights and actions
that apply to immovable things
are incorporeal immovables.
Immovables of this kind are such
as personal servitudes established
on immovables, predial
servitudes, mineral rights, and
petitory or possessory actions.

Art. 470. Les droits et
actions relatifs aux choses
immobilières sont des immeubles
incorporels. Ces immeubles
comprennent les servitudes
personnelles constituées sur des
immeubles, les servitudes réelles,
les droits miniers et les actions
pétitoires ou possessoires.

NdT : La Louisiane a conservé la paroisse comme division territoriale. Celle-ci est l’équivalent du comté dans les
autres états.
2
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SECTION 3 - MOVABLES

SECTION 3 - DES MEUBLES

Art. 471. Corporeal movables
are things, whether animate or
inanimate, that normally move or
can be moved from one place to
another.

Art. 471. Les meubles
corporels sont les choses, soit
animées, soit inanimées, qui
peuvent normalement se
mouvoir, ou que l’on peut
transporter, d’un lieu à un autre.

Art. 472. Materials gathered
for the erection of a new building
or other construction, even
though deriving from the
demolition of an old one, are
movables until their
incorporation into the new
building or after construction.
Materials separated from a
building or other construction for
the purpose of repair, addition, or
alteration to it, with the intention
of putting them back, remain
immovables.

Art. 472. Les matériaux
assemblés pour la construction
d’un nouveau bâtiment ou autre
construction, bien que provenant
de la démolition d’un ancien,
sont meubles jusqu’à leur
incorporation au nouveau
bâtiment ou autre construction.
Les matériaux séparés d’un
bâtiment ou autre construction
pour le réparer, l’augmenter ou
le transformer, avec l’intention
de les y replacer, demeurent des
immeubles.

Art. 473. Rights, obligations,
and actions that apply to a
movable thing are incorporeal
movables. Movables of this kind
are such as bonds, annuities, and
interests or shares in entities
possessing juridical personality.
Interests or shares in a
juridical person that owns
immovables are considered as
movables as long as the entity
exists; upon its dissolution, the
right of each individual to a share
in the immovables is an
immovable.

Art. 473. Les droits, créances
et actions relatifs à une chose
mobilière sont des meubles
incorporels. De tels meubles
comprennent les obligations,
rentes, intérêts ou parts sociales
d’entités ayant la personnalité
juridique.
Les intérêts ou parts sociales
d’une personne morale
propriétaire d’immeubles sont
réputés meubles tant que
l’entité existe; à sa dissolution, le
droit de chaque individu à une
quote-part des immeubles est un
droit immobilier.

Art. 474. Unharvested crops
and ungathered fruits of trees are
movables by anticipation when
they belong to a person other
than the landowner. When
encumbered with security rights
of third persons, they are
movables by anticipation insofar
as the creditor is concerned.
The landowner may, by act

Art. 474. Les cultures non
récoltées et les fruits des arbres
non cueillis sont des meubles par
anticipation lorsqu’ils
appartiennent à une personne
autre que le propriétaire foncier.
Lorsqu’ils sont grevés de sûretés
appartenant à des tiers, ce sont
des meubles par anticipation
dans la mesure où le créancier
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translative of ownership or by
pledge, mobilize by anticipation
unharvested crops and
ungathered fruits of trees that
belong to him.

est concerné.
Le propriétaire foncier peut,
par acte translatif de propriété
ou par sûreté réelle, rendre
meubles par anticipation les
cultures non récoltées et les
fruits des arbres non cueillis qui
lui appartiennent.

Art. 475. All things, corporeal
or incorporeal, that the law does
not consider as immovables, are
movables.

Art. 475. Sont meubles toutes
les choses corporelles ou
incorporelles qui, par
détermination de la loi, ne sont
pas immeubles.

CHAPTER 2 - RIGHTS IN
THINGS

CHAPITRE 2 - DES DROITS
SUR LES CHOSES

Art. 476. One may have
various rights in things:
1. Ownership;
2. Personal and predial
servitudes; and
3. Such other real rights as the
law allows.

Art. 476. On peut avoir sur
les biens différentes espèces de
droits :
1. La propriété ;
2. Les servitudes réelles et
personnelles ; et
3. Tout autre droit réel que
la loi autorise.

TITLE II. OWNERSHIP
[Acts 1979, No. 180, §1]

TITRE II. DU DROIT DE
PROPRIÉTÉ
[Loi de 1979, n˚ 180, §1]

CHAPTER 1 - GENERAL
PRINCIPLES

CHAPITRE 1 - PRINCIPES
GÉNÉRAUX

Art. 477. A. Ownership is the
right that confers on a person
direct, immediate, and exclusive
authority over a thing. The owner
of a thing may use, enjoy, and
dispose of it within the limits and
under the conditions established
by law.
B. A buyer and occupant of a
residence under a bond for deed
contract is the owner of the thing
for purposes of the homestead
exemption granted to other
property owners pursuant to
Article VII, Section 20(A) of the
Constitution of Louisiana. The

Art. 477. A. La propriété est
le droit qui confère à une
personne l’autorité directe,
immédiate et exclusive sur une
chose. Le propriétaire d’une
chose peut en user, jouir et
disposer dans les limites et
conditions établies par la loi.
B. Celui qui occupe un
logement qu’il a acheté sous
contrat stipulant des paiements
échelonnés au vendeur est
considéré comme propriétaire de
la chose aux fins de l’exemption
relative aux propriétés familiales
accordée aux propriétaires par
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buyer under a bond for deed
contract shall apply for the
homestead exemption each year.
[Acts 1995, No. 640, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1996; HR 17, 1998 1st Ex.
Sess.; HCR 13, 1998 R.S.]

l’Article VII, Section 20(A) de la
Constitution de la Louisiane. En
ce cas, l’acheteur doit demander
chaque année l’exemption. [Loi
de 1995, n˚ 640, §1, en vigueur
le 1er janvier 1996]

Art. 478. The right of
ownership may be subject to a
resolutory condition, and it may
be burdened with a real right in
favor of another person as
allowed by law. The ownership
of a thing burdened with a
usufruct is designated as naked
ownership.

Art. 478. Le droit de
propriété peut être acquis sous
condition résolutoire et peut être
grevé d’un droit réel en faveur
d’un tiers dans les limites de ce
que la loi autorise. La propriété
de la chose grevée par un
usufruit est qualifiée de nuepropriété.

Art. 479. The right of
ownership may exist only in
favor of a natural person or a
juridical person.

Art. 479. Le droit de
propriété ne peut exister qu’en
faveur d’une personne physique
ou d’une personne morale.

Art. 480. Two or more
persons may own the same thing
in indivision, each having an
undivided share.

Art. 480. Deux ou plusieurs
personnes peuvent être
propriétaires de la même chose
en indivision, chacune ayant une
part indivise.

Art. 481. The ownership and
the possession of a thing are
distinct.
Ownership exists
independently of any exercise of
it and may not be lost by nonuse.
Ownership is lost when
acquisitive prescription accrues
in favor of an adverse possessor.

Art. 481. La propriété et la
possession d’une chose sont deux
notions distinctes.
La propriété existe
indépendamment de son exercice
et ne se perd pas par non-usage.
La propriété se perd lorsqu’un
tiers possesseur l’acquiert par
prescription acquisitive.

Art. 482. The ownership of a
thing includes by accession the
ownership of everything that it
produces or is united with it,
either naturally or artificially, in
accordance with the following
provisions.

Art. 482. La propriété d’une
chose comprend par accession la
propriété de tout ce qu’elle
produit et de tout ce qui s’y unit,
soit naturellement, soit
artificiellement, en application
des dispositions suivantes.
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CHAPTER 2 - RIGHT OF
ACCESSION

CHAPITRE 2 - DU DROIT
D’ACCESSION

SECTION 1 - OWNERSHIP OF
FRUITS

SECTION 1 - DE LA
PROPRIÉTÉ DES FRUITS

Art. 483. In the absence of
rights of other persons, the owner
of a thing acquires the ownership
of its natural and civil fruits.

Art. 483. En l’absence de
droits de tiers, le propriétaire
d'une chose acquiert la propriété
de ses fruits naturels et civils.

Art. 484. The young of
animals belong to the owner of
the mother of them.

Art. 484. Les petits des
animaux appartiennent au
propriétaire de la mère.

Art. 485. When fruits that
belong to the owner of a thing by
accession are produced by the
work of another person, or from
seeds sown by him, the owner
may retain them on reimbursing
such person his expenses.

Art. 485. Lorsque les fruits
qui appartiennent par accession
au propriétaire d’une chose sont
produits par les travaux ou les
semis faits par un tiers, le
propriétaire peut les retenir en
lui remboursant les frais.

Art. 486. A possessor in good
faith acquires the ownership of
fruits he has gathered. If he is
evicted by the owner, he is
entitled to reimbursement of
expenses for fruits he was unable
to gather.
A possessor in bad faith is
bound to restore to the owner the
fruits he has gathered, or their
value, subject to his claim for
reimbursement of expenses.

Art. 486. Le possesseur de
bonne foi acquiert la propriété
des fruits qu’il a recueillis. S’il
est évincé par le propriétaire, il a
droit au remboursement des
impenses pour les fruits qu’il n’a
pas été capable de recueillir.
Le possesseur de mauvaise
foi est tenu de rendre au
propriétaire les fruits qu’il a
recueillis, ou leur valeur, sous
réserve de son droit au
remboursement des impenses.

Art. 487. For purposes of
accession, a possessor is in good
faith when he possesses by virtue
of an act translative of ownership
and does not know of any defects
in his ownership. He ceases to be
in good faith when these defects
are made known to him or an
action is instituted against him by
the owner for the recovery of the
thing.

Art. 487. Aux fins
d’accession, le possesseur de
bonne foi est celui qui a possédé
en vertu d’un titre translatif de
propriété dont il ignore les vices.
Il cesse d’être de bonne foi, du
moment où ces vices lui sont
connus ou lorsqu’une action en
revendication est exercée contre
lui par le propriétaire de la
chose.  CC 1825, art. 495.
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Art. 488. Products derived
from a thing as a result of
diminution of its substance
belong to the owner of that thing.
When they are reclaimed by the
owner, a possessor in good faith
has the right to reimbursement of
his expenses. A possessor in bad
faith does not have this right.

Art. 488. Les produits
dérivés d’une chose résultant de
la diminution de sa substance
appartiennent au propriétaire de
la chose. Lorsqu’ils sont
réclamés par le propriétaire, le
possesseur de bonne foi a droit
au remboursement de ses
impenses. Le possesseur de
mauvaise foi n’a pas ce droit.

Art. 489. In the absence of
other provisions, one who is
entitled to the fruits of a thing
from a certain time or up to a
certain time acquires the
ownership of natural fruits
gathered during the existence of
his right, and a part of the civil
fruits proportionate to the
duration of his right.

Art. 489. En l’absence
d’autres dispositions, celui qui a
droit aux fruits d’une chose
depuis un certain temps ou
jusqu’à un certain temps
acquiert la propriété des fruits
naturels recueillis durant
l’existence de ce droit et une
partie des fruits civils
proportionnellement à la durée
de ce droit.

SECTION 2 - ACCESSION IN
RELATION TO
IMMOVABLES

SECTION 2 - DE L’ACCESSION
RELATIVEMENT AUX BIENS
IMMEUBLES

Art. 490. Unless otherwise
provided by law, the ownership
of a tract of land carries with it
the ownership of everything that
is directly above or under it.
The owner may make works
on, above, or below the land as
he pleases, and draw all the
advantages that accrue from
them, unless he is restrained by
law or by rights of others.

Art. 490. À moins que la loi
n’en dispose autrement, la
propriété d’un fonds de terre
emporte la propriété du dessus et
du dessous.
Le propriétaire peut faire des
travaux sur, au-dessus ou audessous du fonds comme bon lui
semble et en tirer tous les
avantages, à moins qu’il ne soit
restreint par la loi ou les droits
des tiers.

Art. 491. Buildings, other
constructions permanently
attached to the ground, standing
timber, and unharvested crops or
ungathered fruits of trees may
belong to a person other than the
owner of the ground.
Nevertheless, they are presumed

Art. 491. Les bâtiments, les
autres constructions attachées au
sol de manière permanente, le
bois sur pied, et les cultures non
récoltées ou les fruits des arbres
non cueillis peuvent appartenir à
une personne autre que le
propriétaire du sol. Néanmoins,
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to belong to the owner of the
ground, unless separate
ownership is evidenced by an
instrument filed for registry in
the conveyance records of the
parish in which the immovable is
located.

ils sont présumés appartenir au
propriétaire du sol, à moins que
l’existence de droits de propriété
distincts ne soit prouvée par un
document inscrit au registre
foncier de la paroisse3 où se
situe l'immeuble.
→ CC 1825, art. 498.

Art. 492. Separate ownership
of a part of a building, such as a
floor, an apartment, or a room,
may be established only by a
juridical act of the owner of the
entire building when and in the
manner expressly authorized by
law.

Art. 492. Un droit de
propriété distinct sur une partie
d’un bâtiment, telle qu’un étage,
un appartement ou une chambre,
ne peut être établi que par un
acte juridique émanant du
propriétaire de la totalité du
bâtiment selon les dispositions
expresses de la loi et les formes
qu’elle prévoit.

Art. 493. Buildings, other
constructions permanently
attached to the ground, and
plantings made on the land of
another with his consent belong
to him who made them. They
belong to the owner of the
ground when they are made
without his consent.
When the owner of buildings,
other constructions permanently
attached to the ground, or
plantings no longer has the right
to keep them on the land of
another, he may remove them
subject to his obligation to
restore the property to its former
condition. If he does not remove
them within ninety days after
written demand, the owner of the
land may, after the ninetieth day
from the date of mailing the
written demand, appropriate
ownership of the improvements
by providing an additional
written notice by certified mail,
and upon receipt of the certified
mail by the owner of the

Art. 493. Les bâtiments, les
autres constructions attachées au
sol de manière permanente et les
plantations faits sur le fonds
d’autrui avec son consentement
appartiennent à leur auteur. Ils
appartiennent au propriétaire du
sol lorsqu’ils sont faits sans son
consentement.
Lorsque le propriétaire de
ceux-ci n’a plus le droit de les
retenir sur le fonds d’autrui, il
peut les enlever, sous réserve de
son obligation de remettre le
fonds en l’état. S’il ne les enlève
pas dans les quatre-vingt-dix
jours suivant la demande écrite,
le propriétaire du fonds peut,
après le quatre-vingt-dixième
jour à compter de la date d’envoi
de la demande écrite,
s’approprier les améliorations en
fournissant un avis écrit
supplémentaire par lettre
recommandée. Après réception
de la lettre recommandée par le
propriétaire des améliorations,
le propriétaire du fonds acquiert
la propriété des améliorations et

Voir supra note 2.
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improvements, the owner of the
land obtains ownership of the
improvements and owes nothing
to the owner of the
improvements. Until such time as
the owner of the land
appropriates the improvements,
the improvements shall remain
the property of he who made
them and he shall be solely
responsible for any harm caused
by the improvements.
When buildings, other
constructions permanently
attached to the ground, or
plantings are made on the
separate property of a spouse
with community assets or with
separate assets of the other
spouse and when such
improvements are made on
community property with the
separate assets of a spouse, this
Article does not apply. The rights
of the spouses are governed by
Articles 2366, 2367, and 2367.1.
[Acts 1984, No. 933, §1; Acts
2003, No. 715, §1] NOTE: See
HCR No 306, 2004 R.S., relative
to retroactive effects.
Art. 493.1. Things
incorporated in or attached to an
immovable so as to become its
component parts under Articles
465 and 466 belong to the owner
of the immovable. [Acts 1984,
No. 933, §1]

Art. 493.2. One who has lost
the ownership of a thing to the
owner of an immovable may
have a claim against him or
against a third person in
accordance with the following
provisions. [Acts 1984, No. 933,
§1]

ne doit rien à leur ancien
propriétaire. Tant que le
propriétaire du fonds ne s’est pas
approprié les améliorations,
elles demeurent la propriété de
celui qui les a faites et ce dernier
est seul responsable de tout
dommage qu’elles ont causé.
Cet article n’est pas
applicable lorsque les bâtiments,
les autres constructions
attachées au sol de manière
permanente ou les plantations
sont faits sur les biens propres
d’un époux avec des actifs
communs ou des actifs propres à
l’autre époux, et lorsque de telles
améliorations sont faites sur les
biens communs avec les éléments
d’actif propres d’un époux. Les
droits des époux sont régis par
les articles 2366, 2367 et 2367.1.
[Loi de 1984, n˚ 933, §1 ; loi de
2003, n˚ 715, §1]  CC 1825,
art. 498.

Art. 493.1. Les choses
incorporées ou attachées à un
immeuble de telle façon qu’elles
en deviennent des parties
composantes conformément aux
articles 465 et 466 appartiennent
au propriétaire de l’immeuble.
[Loi de 1984, n˚ 933, §1]
Art. 493.2. Celui qui a perdu
la propriété d’une chose au
profit du propriétaire d’un
immeuble peut agir contre celuici ou contre un tiers
conformément aux dispositions
suivantes. [Loi de 1984, n˚ 933,
§1]
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Art. 494. When the owner of
an immovable makes on it
constructions, plantings, or
works with materials of another,
he may retain them, regardless of
his good or bad faith, on
reimbursing the owner of the
materials their current value and
repairing the injury that he may
have caused to him.

Art. 494. Lorsque le
propriétaire d’un immeuble y fait
des constructions, plantations ou
ouvrages avec des matériaux
d’autrui, il peut les retenir, qu’il
soit de bonne ou mauvaise foi, à
condition d’en rembourser la
valeur actuelle au propriétaire et
de réparer le dommage qu’il peut
lui avoir causé.

Art. 495. One who
incorporates in, or attaches to,
the immovable of another, with
his consent, things that become
component parts of the
immovable under Articles 465
and 466, may, in the absence of
other provisions of law or
juridical acts, remove them
subject to his obligation of
restoring the property to its
former condition.
If he does not remove them
after demand, the owner of the
immovable may have them
removed at the expense of the
person who made them or elect
to keep them and pay, at his
option, the current value of the
materials and of the
workmanship or the enhanced
value of the immovable.

Art. 495. Celui qui incorpore
ou attache à l’immeuble d’autrui,
avec son consentement, des
choses qui en deviennent des
parties composantes
conformément aux articles 465 et
466, peut, en l’absence d’autres
dispositions de la loi ou d’actes
juridiques, les enlever, sous
réserve de son obligation de
remettre le bien en l’état.
S’il ne les enlève pas après
demande, le propriétaire de
l’immeuble peut les faire enlever
aux frais de la personne qui les a
faites ou choisir de les retenir et
payer, selon son choix, une
somme égale à la valeur actuelle
des matériaux et de la main
d’œuvre ou à l’augmentation de
valeur de l’immeuble.

Art. 496. When constructions,
plantings, or works are made by
a possessor in good faith, the
owner of the immovable may not
demand their demolition and
removal. He is bound to keep
them and at his option to pay to
the possessor either the cost of
the materials and of the
workmanship, or their current
value, or the enhanced value of
the immovable.

Art. 496. Lorsque les
constructions, plantations ou
ouvrages ont été faits par un
possesseur de bonne foi, le
propriétaire de l’immeuble ne
peut demander ni leur démolition
ni leur retrait. Il est tenu de les
retenir et de payer au
possesseur, au choix, soit le coût
des matériaux et de la main
d’œuvre, soit leur valeur
actuelle, soit une somme égale à
l’augmentation de valeur de
l’immeuble.

Art. 497. When constructions,
plantings, or works are made by
a bad faith possessor, the owner

Art. 497. Lorsque les
constructions, plantations et
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of the immovable may keep them
or he may demand their
demolition and removal at the
expense of the possessor, and, in
addition, damages for the injury
that he may have sustained. If he
does not demand demolition and
removal, he is bound to pay at
his option either the current value
of the materials and of the
workmanship of the separable
improvements that he has kept or
the enhanced value of the
immovable.

ouvrages ont été faits par un
possesseur de mauvaise foi, le
propriétaire de l’immeuble peut
les retenir ou demander leur
démolition et retrait aux frais du
possesseur. Il peut en outre
demander des dommages-intérêts
pour le dommage subi. S’il ne
demande pas la démolition et le
retrait, il est tenu de payer, selon
son choix, soit la valeur actuelle
des matériaux et de la main
d’œuvre des améliorations
dissociables qu’il a retenues, soit
une somme égale à
l’augmentation de valeur de
l’immeuble.

Art. 498. One who has lost
the ownership of a thing to the
owner of an immovable may
assert against third persons his
rights under Articles 493, 493.1,
494, 495, 496, or 497 when they
are evidenced by an instrument
filed for registry in the
appropriate conveyance or
mortgage records of the parish in
which the immovable is located.
[Acts 1984, No. 933, §1]

Art. 498. Celui qui a perdu
la propriété d’une chose au
profit du propriétaire d’un
immeuble peut opposer ses droits
aux tiers, conformément aux
articles 493, 493.1, 494, 495,
496, ou 497, lorsque leur
existence est prouvée par un
document inscrit au registre
foncier ou au registre des
hypothèques de la paroisse4 où
se situe l'immeuble. [Loi de
1984, n˚ 933, §1]

Art. 499. Accretion formed
successively and imperceptibly
on the bank of a river or stream,
whether navigable or not, is
called alluvion. The alluvion
belongs to the owner of the bank,
who is bound to leave public that
portion of the bank which is
required for the public use.
The same rule applies to
dereliction formed by water
receding imperceptibly from a
bank of a river or stream. The
owner of the land situated at the
edge of the bank left dry owns
the dereliction.

Art. 499. L’accroissement
formé successivement et
imperceptiblement sur la rive
d’un fleuve ou d’une rivière,
navigable ou non, s’appelle
alluvion. L’alluvion appartient
au propriétaire de la rive, qui est
tenu de laisser publique la
portion de la rive requise pour
l’usage public.
Il en est de même du relais
formé par l’eau courante qui se
retire insensiblement d’une rive
d’un fleuve ou d’une rivière. Le
relais appartient au propriétaire
du fonds situé au bord de la rive

Voir supra note 2.
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découverte.
Art. 500. There is no right to
alluvion or dereliction on the
shore of the sea or of lakes.

Art. 500. Il n’y a pas de droit
d’alluvion ou de relais sur le
rivage de la mer ou sur les rives
des lacs.

Art. 501. Alluvion formed in
front of the property of several
owners is divided equitably,
taking into account the extent of
the front of each property prior to
the formation of the alluvion in
issue. Each owner is entitled to a
fair proportion of the area of the
alluvion and a fair proportion of
the new frontage on the river,
depending on the relative values
of the frontage and the acreage.

Art. 501. L’alluvion formée
en face de plusieurs propriétés
riveraines est partagée
équitablement entre les
propriétaires, suivant l’étendue
de la bordure de chaque héritage
avant la formation de l’alluvion.
Chaque propriétaire a droit à
une juste part de la superficie de
l’alluvion et à une juste part du
nouveau rivage, en fonction de la
valeur relative de la bordure et
de la superficie.

Art. 502. If a sudden action of
the waters of a river or stream
carries away an identifiable piece
of ground and unites it with other
lands on the same or on the
opposite bank, the ownership of
the piece of ground so carried
away is not lost. The owner may
claim it within a year, or even
later, if the owner of the bank
with which it is united has not
taken possession.

Art. 502. Si un fleuve ou une
rivière emporte par une force
subite un morceau identifiable
d’un fonds et l’unit à d’autres
fonds de la même rive ou de la
rive opposée, la propriété du
fonds ainsi emporté n’est pas
perdue. Le propriétaire peut la
réclamer dans l’année, ou même
plus tard, si le propriétaire de la
rive à laquelle son fonds a été
uni n’en a pas encore pris
possession.

Art. 503. When a river or
stream, whether navigable or not,
opens a new channel and
surrounds riparian land making it
an island, the ownership of that
land is not affected.

Art. 503. Lorsqu’un fleuve
ou une rivière, navigable ou non,
forme un nouveau bras et
embrasse le fonds riverain en en
faisant une île, la propriété sur
ce fonds n’est pas affectée.

Art. 504. When a navigable
river or stream abandons its bed
and opens a new one, the owners
of the land on which the new bed
is located shall take by way of
indemnification the abandoned
bed, each in proportion to the
quantity of land that he lost.

Art. 504. Lorsqu’un fleuve
ou une rivière navigable
abandonne son lit et en forme un
nouveau, les propriétaires des
fonds nouvellement occupés
prennent à titre d’indemnité, le
lit abandonné, chacun dans la
proportion du terrain qu’il a
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If the river returns to the old
bed, each shall take his former
land.

perdu.
Si le cours d’eau reprend son
lit d’origine, chacun reprend son
ancien terrain.

Art. 505. Islands, and
sandbars that are not attached to
a bank, formed in the beds of
navigable rivers or streams,
belong to the state.

Art. 505. Lorsqu’ils se
forment dans les lits des fleuves
ou rivières navigables, les îles et
les atterrissements non rattachés
à la rive appartiennent à l’état.

Art. 506. In the absence of
title or prescription, the beds of
nonnavigable rivers or streams
belong to the riparian owners
along a line drawn in the middle
of the bed.

Art. 506. En l’absence de
titre ou de prescription, les lits
des fleuves et rivières non
navigables appartiennent aux
propriétaires riverains, en deçà
d’une ligne tracée au milieu du
lit.

SECTION 3 - ACCESSION IN
RELATION TO MOVABLES

SECTION 3 - DE L’ACCESSION
RELATIVEMENT AUX BIENS
MEUBLES

Art. 507. In the absence of
other provisions of law or
contract, the consequences of
accession as between movables
are determined according to the
following rules.

Art. 507. En l’absence
d'autres dispositions légales ou
contractuelles, les effets de
l’accession mobilière sont
déterminés selon les règles
suivantes.

Art. 508. Things are divided
into principal and accessory. For
purposes of accession as between
movables, an accessory is a
corporeal movable that serves the
use, ornament, or complement of
the principal thing.
In the case of a principal thing
consisting of a movable
construction permanently
attached to the ground, its
accessories include things that
would constitute its component
parts under Article 466 if the
construction were immovable.
[Acts 2008, No. 632, §1, eff. July
1, 2008]

Art. 508. Les choses sont
principales ou accessoires. Aux
fins de l’accession mobilière, un
accessoire est un bien meuble
corporel qui sert à l'usage,
l’ornement ou le complément de
la chose principale.
Lorsqu’une chose principale
consiste en une construction
mobilière attachée au sol de
manière permanente, ses
accessoires comprennent les
choses qui en auraient été les
parties composantes en vertu de
l'article 466 si la construction
avait été immobilière. [Loi de
2008, n˚ 632, §1, en vigueur le
1er juillet 2008]

Art. 509. In case of doubt as

Art. 509. En cas de doute sur
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to which is a principal thing and
which is an accessory, the most
valuable, or the most bulky if
value is nearly equal, shall be
deemed to be principal.

la qualité principale ou
accessoire de la chose, est
réputée principale, la plus
considérable en valeur, ou en
volume, si les valeurs sont à peu
près égales.

Art. 510. When two corporeal
movables are united to form a
whole, and one of them is an
accessory of the other, the whole
belongs to the owner of the
principal thing. The owner of the
principal thing is bound to
reimburse the owner of the
accessory its value. The owner of
the accessory may demand that it
be separated and returned to him,
although the separation may
cause some injury to the
principal thing, if the accessory
is more valuable than the
principal and has been used
without his knowledge.

Art. 510. Lorsque deux biens
meubles corporels sont unis de
manière à former un tout et que
l'un d'entre eux est l'accessoire
de l'autre, le tout appartient au
propriétaire de la chose
principale. Le propriétaire de la
chose principale est tenu de
rembourser au propriétaire de
l'accessoire la valeur de ce
dernier. Le propriétaire de
l'accessoire peut demander à ce
que ce dernier soit séparé et lui
soit rendu, même lorsqu'il
pourrait en résulter quelque
dégradation de la chose
principale, lorsque l'accessoire
est plus considérable en valeur
que le principal et a été utilisé à
son insu.

Art. 511. When one uses
materials of another to make a
new thing, the thing belongs to
the owner of the materials,
regardless of whether they may
be given their earlier form. The
owner is bound to reimburse the
value of the workmanship.
Nevertheless, when the value
of the workmanship substantially
exceeds that of the materials, the
thing belongs to him who made
it. In this case, he is bound to
reimburse the owner of the
materials their value.

Art. 511. Lorsqu'une
personne emploie des matériaux
d'autrui, à former une nouvelle
chose, cette chose appartient au
propriétaire des matériaux,
qu‘ils puissent ou non reprendre
leur première forme. Le
propriétaire est tenu de
rembourser la valeur de la maind'œuvre.
Néanmoins, lorsque la valeur
de la main-d'œuvre surpasse de
beaucoup celle des matériaux
employés, la chose appartient à
celui qui l'a formée. Dans ce cas,
ce dernier est tenu de
rembourser la valeur des
matériaux à leur propriétaire.

Art. 512. If the person who
made the new thing was in bad
faith, the court may award its

Art. 512. Lorsque la
personne qui a formé la nouvelle
chose était de mauvaise foi, le
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ownership to the owner of the
materials.

juge peut octroyer la propriété
de la chose au propriétaire des
matériaux.

Art. 513. When one used
partly his own materials and
partly the materials of another to
make a new thing, unless the
materials can be conveniently
separated, the thing belongs to
the owners of the materials in
indivision. The share of one is
determined in proportion to the
value of his materials and of the
other in proportion to the value
of his materials and
workmanship.

Art. 513. Lorsqu'une
personne a employé en partie ses
propres matériaux et en partie
ceux d'autrui pour former une
nouvelle chose, à moins que les
matériaux puissent être
commodément séparés, la chose
appartient aux propriétaires des
matériaux en indivision. La part
de l'un est déterminée en raison
de la valeur de ses matériaux et
celle de l'autre, en raison de la
valeur de ses matériaux et de sa
main-d'œuvre.  CC 1825, art.
519.

Art. 514. When a new thing is
formed by the mixture of
materials of different owners,
and none of them may be
considered as principal, an owner
who has not consented to the
mixture may demand separation
if it can be conveniently made.
If separation cannot be
conveniently made, the thing
resulting from the mixture
belongs to the owners of the
materials in indivision. The share
of each is determined in
proportion to the value of his
materials.
One whose materials are far
superior in value in comparison
with those of any one of the
others, may claim the thing
resulting from the mixture. He is
then bound to reimburse the
others the value of their
materials.

Art. 514. Lorsqu'une
nouvelle chose est formée par le
mélange de matériaux
appartenant à différents
propriétaires, et qu'aucun de ces
matériaux ne peut être considéré
comme principal, celui qui n'a
pas consenti au mélange peut
demander la séparation
lorsqu'elle peut être faite
commodément.
Si la séparation ne peut être
faite commodément, la chose
résultant du mélange appartient
en indivision aux propriétaires
des matériaux. La part de chacun
est déterminée dans la
proportion de la valeur des
matériaux appartenant à chacun
d'eux.
Celui dont les matériaux sont
de beaucoup supérieurs en
valeur à ceux des autres, peut
prétendre à la chose résultant du
mélange. Il est ensuite tenu de
rembourser aux autres la valeur
de leurs matériaux.

Art. 515. When an owner of
materials that have been used

Art. 515. Lorsque le
propriétaire dont les matériaux
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without his knowledge for the
making of a new thing acquires
the ownership of that thing, he
may demand that, in lieu of the
ownership of the new thing,
materials of the same species,
quantity, weight, measure and
quality or their value be
delivered to him.

ont été employés à son insu pour
former une nouvelle chose en
acquiert la propriété, il peut
réclamer la restitution de
matériaux de même nature,
quantité, poids, mesure et qualité
ou leur valeur, au lieu de la
propriété de la nouvelle chose.

Art. 516. One who uses a
movable of another, without his
knowledge, for the making of a
new thing may be liable for the
payment of damages.

Art. 516. Celui qui emploie
le meuble d'autrui, à son insu,
pour former une nouvelle chose
peut être condamné à des
dommages-intérêts.

CHAPTER 3 - TRANSFER OF
OWNERSHIP BY
AGREEMENT

CHAPITRE 3 - DU TRANSFERT
DU DROIT DE PROPRIÉTÉ
PAR CONTRAT

Art. 517. The ownership of an
immovable is voluntarily
transferred by a contract between
the owner and the transferee that
purports to transfer the
ownership of the immovable.
The transfer of ownership takes
place between the parties by the
effect of the agreement and is not
effective against third persons
until the contract is filed for
registry in the conveyance
records of the parish in which the
immovable is located. [Acts
2005, No. 169, §2, eff. July 1,
2006; Acts 2005, 1st Ex. Sess.,
No. 13, §1, eff. Nov. 29, 2005]

Art. 517. La propriété d’un
immeuble est volontairement
transférée par contrat entre le
propriétaire et le cessionnaire
aux fins du transfert de la
propriété de l’immeuble. Le
transfert de propriété a lieu entre
les parties par l’effet de l’accord
et n’est pas opposable aux tiers
tant que le contrat n’est pas
inscrit au registre foncier de la
paroisse5 où se situe l’immeuble.
[Loi de 2005, n˚ 169, §2, entrée
en vigueur le 1er juillet 2006 ;
Loi de 2005, 1ère Sess. ext. n˚
13, §1, entrée en vigueur le 29
novembre 2005]

Art. 518. The ownership of a
movable is voluntarily
transferred by a contract between
the owner and the transferee that
purports to transfer the
ownership of the movable.
Unless otherwise provided, the
transfer of ownership takes place
as between the parties by the
effect of the agreement and

Art. 518. La propriété d'un
meuble est volontairement
transférée par contrat entre le
propriétaire et le cessionnaire
aux fins du transfert de la
propriété du meuble. Sauf
disposition contraire, le transfert
de propriété a lieu entre les
parties par l'effet de l'accord et
est opposable aux tiers lorsque le

Voir supra note 2.
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against third persons when the
possession of the movable is
delivered to the transferee.
When possession has not been
delivered, a subsequent
transferee to whom possession is
delivered acquires ownership
provided he is in good faith.
Creditors of the transferor may
seize the movable while it is still
in his possession. [Acts 1984,
No. 331, §2, eff. Jan. 1, 1985]

cessionnaire est mis en
possession du meuble.
Lorsqu'il n'y a pas eu mise en
possession, un nouveau
cessionnaire qui a été mis en
possession devient propriétaire
pourvu qu'il soit de bonne foi.
Les créanciers du cédant peuvent
saisir le meuble lorsqu'il est
toujours en sa possession. [Loi
de 1984, n˚ 331, §2, entrée en
vigueur le 1er janvier 1985]

Art. 519. When a movable is
in the possession of a third
person, the assignment of the
action for the recovery of that
movable suffices for the transfer
of its ownership.

Art. 519. Quand le meuble
est en possession d'un tiers, la
cession de l'action en répétition
du meuble suffit au transfert de
propriété.

Art. 520. Repealed by Acts
1981, No. 125, §1.

Art. 520. [Abrogé par la loi
de 1981, n˚ 125, §1]

Art. 521. One who has
possession of a lost or stolen
thing may not transfer its
ownership to another. For
purposes of this Chapter, a thing
is stolen when one has taken
possession of it without the
consent of its owner. A thing is
not stolen when the owner
delivers it or transfers its
ownership to another as a result
of fraud.

Art. 521. Celui qui a en sa
possession une chose perdue ou
volée ne peut en transférer la
propriété à autrui. Aux fins du
présent chapitre, une chose est
volée lorsqu'une personne en a
pris possession sans le
consentement de son
propriétaire. Une chose n'est pas
volée lorsque sa délivrance ou le
transfert de sa propriété à autrui
par le propriétaire résulte d'une
fraude.

Art. 522. A transferee of a
corporeal movable in good faith
and for fair value retains the
ownership of the thing even
though the title of the transferor
is annulled on account of a vice
of consent.
Art. 523. An acquirer of a
corporeal movable is in good
faith for purposes of this Chapter
unless he knows, or should have
known, that the transferor was
not the owner.

Art. 522. Le cessionnaire de
bonne foi d'un meuble corporel
cédé à sa juste valeur conserve
la propriété de la chose même si
le titre du cédant est annulé pour
vice du consentement.
Art. 523. L'acquéreur d'un
meuble corporel est de bonne foi
aux fins du présent chapitre sauf
s'il savait ou aurait dû savoir que
le cédant n'était pas le
propriétaire.
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Art. 524. The owner of a lost
or stolen movable may recover it
from a possessor who bought it
in good faith at a public auction
or from a merchant customarily
selling similar things on
reimbursing the purchase price.
The former owner of a lost,
stolen, or abandoned movable
that has been sold by authority of
law may not recover it from the
purchaser.

Art. 524. Le propriétaire
d'un meuble perdu ou volé peut
le recouvrer du possesseur qui
l'a acheté de bonne foi dans une
vente publique ou auprès d'un
commerçant vendant
habituellement des choses
pareilles, en lui remboursant le
prix qu'il lui a coûté.
L'ancien propriétaire d'un
meuble perdu, volé ou
abandonné qui a été vendu par
autorité de justice ne peut le
recouvrer de l'acheteur.

Art. 525. The provisions of
this Chapter do not apply to
movables that are required by
law to be registered in public
records.

Art. 525. Les dispositions du
présent chapitre ne s'appliquent
pas aux meubles dont la loi exige
qu'ils soient inscrits aux registres
publics.

CHAPTER 4 - PROTECTION
OF OWNERSHIP

CHAPITRE 4 - DE LA
PROTECTION DU DROIT DE
PROPRIÉTÉ

Art. 526. The owner of a
thing is entitled to recover it
from anyone who possesses or
detains it without right and to
obtain judgment recognizing his
ownership and ordering delivery
of the thing to him.

Art. 526. Le propriétaire
d'une chose a le droit de la
recouvrer de quiconque la
possède ou la détient sans droit
et d'obtenir un jugement
reconnaissant sa propriété et
ordonnant que la chose lui soit
délivrée.

Art. 527. The evicted
possessor, whether in good or in
bad faith, is entitled to recover
from the owner compensation for
necessary expenses incurred for
the preservation of the thing and
for the discharge of private or
public burdens. He is not entitled
to recover expenses for ordinary
maintenance or repairs.

Art. 527. Le possesseur
évincé, qu'il soit de bonne ou de
mauvaise foi, a le droit de
recouvrer du propriétaire une
compensation pour les dépenses
nécessaires à la préservation de
la chose et au règlement des
charges privées ou publiques. Il
n'a pas le droit de recouvrer les
dépenses d'entretien ou de
réparations ordinaires.

Art. 528. An evicted
possessor in good faith is entitled
to recover from the owner his
useful expenses to the extent that

Art. 528. Un possesseur de
bonne foi évincé a le droit de
recouvrer du propriétaire ses
dépenses utiles dans la mesure
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they have enhanced the value of
the thing.

où celles-ci ont amélioré la
valeur de la chose.

Art. 529. The possessor,
whether in good or in bad faith,
may retain possession of the
thing until he is reimbursed for
expenses and improvements
which he is entitled to claim.

Art. 529. Le possesseur, qu'il
soit de bonne ou de mauvaise foi,
peut rester en possession de la
chose jusqu'au remboursement
des dépenses et des
améliorations qu'il est en droit
de réclamer.

Art. 530. The possessor of a
corporeal movable is presumed
to be its owner. The previous
possessor of a corporeal movable
is presumed to have been its
owner during the period of his
possession.
These presumptions do not
avail against a previous
possessor who was dispossessed
as a result of loss or theft.

Art. 530. Le possesseur d'un
meuble corporel est présumé en
être le propriétaire. L'ancien
possesseur d'un meuble corporel
est présumé en être le
propriétaire pendant sa
possession.
Ces présomptions ne valent
pas à l'encontre d'un ancien
possesseur qui a été dépossédé
par perte ou par vol.

Art. 531. One who claims the
ownership of an immovable
against another in possession
must prove that he has acquired
ownership from a previous
owner or by acquisitive
prescription. If neither party is in
possession, he need only prove a
better title.

Art. 531. Celui qui
revendique la propriété d'un
immeuble en possession d'un
tiers doit apporter la preuve qu'il
a acquis la propriété d'un
propriétaire antérieur ou par
prescription acquisitive.
Lorsqu'aucune des parties n'est
en possession, il lui suffit de
prouver un meilleur titre.

Art. 532. When the titles of
the parties are traced to a
common author, he is presumed
to be the previous owner.

Art. 532. Lorsque les titres
des parties sont attribuables à un
auteur commun, celui-ci est
présumé être le propriétaire
antérieur.

TITLE III. PERSONAL
SERVITUDES
[Acts 1976, No. 103, §1]

TITRE III. DES SERVITUDES
PERSONNELLES
[Loi de 1976, n° 103, §1]

CHAPTER 1 - KINDS OF
SERVITUDES

CHAPITRE 1 – DES
CATÉGORIES DE
SERVITUDES

Art. 533. There are two kinds
of servitudes: personal servitudes

Art. 533. Les servitudes sont
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and predial servitudes.
Art. 534. A personal servitude
is a charge on a thing for the
benefit of a person. There are
three sorts of personal servitudes:
usufruct, habitation, and rights of
use.

réelles ou personnelles.
Art. 534. La servitude
personnelle est une charge
grevant une chose au bénéfice
d'une personne. Il y a trois sortes
de servitudes personnelles :
l'usufruit, l'habitation et les
droits de jouissance.

CHAPTER 2 - USUFRUCT

CHAPITRE 2 - DE
L’USUFRUIT

SECTION 1 - GENERAL
PRINCIPLES

SECTION 1 - PRINCIPES
GÉNÉRAUX

Art. 535. Usufruct is a real
right of limited duration on the
property of another. The features
of the right vary with the nature
of the things subject to it as
consumables or nonconsumables.

Art. 535. L'usufruit est un
droit réel, à durée limitée,
portant sur les biens d'autrui.
Les caractéristiques de ce droit
varient en fonction de la nature
consomptible ou non de la chose
qui y est sujette.

Art. 536. Consumable things
are those that cannot be used
without being expended or
consumed, or without their
substance being changed, such as
money, harvested agricultural
products, stocks of merchandise,
foodstuffs, and beverages.

Art. 536. Les choses
consomptibles sont celles dont on
ne peut faire usage sans les
dépenser ou consommer, ou sans
que leur substance soit modifiée,
comme l'argent, les récoltes, les
stocks de marchandises, les
denrées alimentaires et les
boissons.

Art. 537. Nonconsumable
things are those that may be
enjoyed without alteration of
their substance, although their
substance may be diminished or
deteriorated naturally by time or
by the use to which they are
applied, such as lands, houses,
shares of stock, animals,
furniture, and vehicles.

Art. 537. Les choses non
consomptibles sont celles dont on
peut jouir sans en altérer la
substance, quoiqu'elle puisse être
diminuée ou détériorée
naturellement par le temps ou
l'usage qu'on en fait, comme les
terrains, les maisons, les actions,
les animaux, les meubles
meublants et les véhicules.

Art. 538. If the things subject
to the usufruct are consumables,
the usufructuary becomes owner
of them. He may consume,
alienate, or encumber them as he

Art. 538. Lorsque les choses
sujettes à l'usufruit sont
consomptibles, l'usufruitier en
devient le propriétaire. Il peut les
consommer, aliéner ou grever à
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sees fit. At the termination of the
usufruct he is bound either to pay
to the naked owner the value that
the things had at the
commencement of the usufruct
or to deliver to him things of the
same quantity and quality. [Acts
2010, No. 881, §1, eff. Jul. 2,
2010]

son gré. À la fin de l'usufruit, il
doit payer au nu-propriétaire la
valeur qu'avaient les choses à
l'ouverture de l'usufruit ou lui
délivrer des choses de même
quantité et qualité. [Loi de 2010,
n° 881, §1, en vigueur le 2 juillet
2010]

Art. 539. If the things subject
to the usufruct are
nonconsumables, the
usufructuary has the right to
possess them and to derive the
utility, profits, and advantages
that they may produce, under the
obligation of preserving their
substance.
He is bound to use them as a
prudent administrator and to
deliver them to the naked owner
at the termination of the usufruct.

Art. 539. Lorsque les choses
sujettes à l'usufruit ne sont pas
consomptibles, l'usufruitier a le
droit de les posséder et d'en tirer
l'utilité, le profit et la commodité
qu'elles peuvent produire, à la
charge de celui-ci d'en préserver
la substance.
Il doit en jouir en bon père de
famille et les délivrer au nupropriétaire à la fin de l'usufruit.

Art. 540. Usufruct is an
incorporeal thing. It is movable
or immovable according to the
nature of the thing upon which
the right exists.

Art. 540. L'usufruit est un
bien incorporel. Il est meuble ou
immeuble selon la nature de la
chose sur laquelle il porte.

Art. 541. Usufruct is
susceptible to division, because
its purpose is the enjoyment of
advantages that are themselves
divisible. It may be conferred on
several persons in divided or
undivided shares, and it may be
partitioned among the
usufructuaries.

Art. 541. L'usufruit est
divisible car il a pour objet la
jouissance d'avantages euxmêmes divisibles. Il peut être
accordé à plusieurs personnes
par portions divisées ou
indivisées, et peut être partagé
entre les usufruitiers.

Art. 542. The naked
ownership may be partitioned
subject to the rights of the
usufructuary.

Art. 542. La nue-propriété
peut être partagée sous réserve
des droits de l'usufruitier.

Art. 543. When property is
held in indivision, a person
having a share in full ownership
may demand partition of the
property in kind or by licitation,

Art. 543. Lorsqu'un bien est
en indivision, la personne ayant
une quote-part en pleine
propriété peut demander le
partage du bien en nature ou par
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even though there may be other
shares in naked ownership and
usufruct.
A person having a share in
naked ownership only or in
usufruct only does not have this
right, unless a naked owner of an
undivided share and a
usufructuary of that share jointly
demand partition in kind or by
licitation, in which event their
combined shares shall be deemed
to constitute a share in full
ownership. [Acts 1983, No. 535,
§1]

licitation, même s'il y a d'autres
quotes-parts en nue-propriété ou
en usufruit.
Une personne ayant
uniquement une quote-part en
nue-propriété ou en usufruit n'a
pas ce droit, à moins que le nupropriétaire et l'usufruitier de
cette quote-part indivise
demandent conjointement le
partage en nature ou par
licitation, auquel cas leurs
quotes-parts combinées sont
réputées être une quote-part en
pleine propriété. [Loi de 1983,
n° 535, §1]

Art. 544. Usufruct may be
established by a juridical act
either inter vivos or mortis causa,
or by operation of law. The
usufruct created by juridical act
is called conventional; the
usufruct created by operation of
law is called legal.
Usufruct may be established
on all kinds of things, movable or
immovable, corporeal or
incorporeal.

Art. 544. L'usufruit peut être
établi par acte juridique entre
vifs ou à cause de mort, ou par la
loi. L'usufruit est conventionnel
lorsqu'il est créé par acte
juridique ; il est légal lorsqu'il
est créé par la loi.
L'usufruit peut être établi sur
toute espèce de biens meubles ou
immeubles, corporels ou
incorporels.

Art. 545. Usufruct may be
established for a term or under a
condition, and subject to any
modification consistent with the
nature of usufruct.
The rights and obligations of
the usufructuary and of the naked
owner may be modified by
agreement unless modification is
prohibited by law or by the
grantor in the act establishing the
usufruct.

Art. 545. L'usufruit peut être
établi à terme ou sous condition,
et peut faire l'objet de toute
modification compatible avec la
nature de l'usufruit.
Les droits et obligations de
l'usufruitier et du nu-propriétaire
peuvent être modifiés par
convention, à moins que les
modifications ne soient interdites
par la loi ou l'acte constitutif
d'usufruit.

Art. 546. Usufruct may be
established in favor of successive
usufructuaries.

Art. 546. L'usufruit peut être
établi en faveur d'usufruitiers
successifs.

Art. 547. When the usufruct is
established in favor of several
usufructuaries, the termination of
the interest of one usufructuary

Art. 547. Lorsque l'usufruit
est établi en faveur de plusieurs
usufruitiers, la fin des droits d'un
usufruitier profite à ceux qui
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inures to the benefit of those
remaining, unless the grantor has
expressly provided otherwise.

restent, à moins que le
constituant n'en ait expressément
disposé autrement.

Art. 548. When the usufruct is
established by an act inter vivos,
the usufructuary must exist or be
conceived at the time of the
execution of the instrument.
When the usufruct is established
by an act mortis causa, the
usufructuary must exist or be
conceived at the time of the
death of the testator.

Art. 548. Lorsque l'usufruit
est établi par acte entre vifs,
l'usufruitier doit exister ou être
conçu au moment de la
conclusion de l'acte. Lorsque
l'usufruit est établi par testament,
l'usufruitier doit exister ou être
conçu au jour du décès du
testateur.

Art. 549. Usufruct may be
established in favor of a natural
person or a juridical person.
[Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff. Jul.
2, 2010]

Art. 549. L'usufruit peut être
établi en faveur d'une personne
physique ou morale. [Loi de
2010, n° 881, §1, en vigueur le 2
juillet 2010]

SECTION 2 - RIGHTS OF THE
USUFRUCTUARY

SECTION 2 - DES DROITS DE
L’USUFRUITIER

Art. 550. The usufructuary is
entitled to the fruits of the thing
subject to usufruct according to
the following articles.

Art. 550. L'usufruitier a droit
aux fruits de la chose sujette à
l'usufruit conformément aux
articles suivants.

Art. 551. Fruits are things that
are produced by or derived from
another thing without diminution
of its substance.
There are two kinds of fruits;
natural fruits and civil fruits.
Natural fruits are products of
the earth or of animals.
Civil fruits are revenues
derived from a thing by operation
of law or by reason of a juridical
act, such as rentals, interest, and
certain corporate distributions.

Art. 551. Les fruits sont des
choses produites par une autre
chose ou en provenant sans en
diminuer la substance.
Les fruits sont naturels ou
civils.
Les fruits naturels sont le
produit de la terre ou le produit
et le croît des animaux.
Les fruits civils sont les
revenus provenant d'un bien, par
l'effet de la loi ou d'un acte
juridique, tels que les loyers,
intérêts et certains revenus
distribués par les sociétés.

Art. 552. A cash dividend
declared during the existence of
the usufruct belongs to the
usufructuary. A liquidation
dividend or a stock redemption

Art. 552. Les dividendes en
espèces, déclarés pendant la
durée de l'usufruit, appartiennent
à l'usufruitier. Sous réserve de
l'usufruit, le dividende de
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payment belongs to the naked
owner subject to the usufruct.
Stock dividends and stock
splits declared during the
existence of the usufruct belong
to the naked owner subject to the
usufruct.
A stock warrant and a
subscription right declared
during the existence of the
usufruct belong to the naked
owner free of the usufruct.

liquidation ou le paiement de
rachat d'actions appartient au
nu-propriétaire.
Sous réserve de l'usufruit, les
dividendes en actions et la
division des actions déclarés
pendant la durée de l'usufruit
appartiennent au nupropriétaire.
Une option de souscription
d'action et un droit de
souscription déclarés pendant la
durée de l'usufruit appartiennent
en pleine propriété au nupropriétaire.

Art. 553. The usufructuary
has the right to vote shares of
stock in corporations and to vote
or exercise similar rights with
respect to interests in other
juridical persons, unless
otherwise provided. [Acts 2010,
No. 881, §1, eff. Jul. 2, 2010]

Art. 553. Sauf disposition
contraire, l'usufruitier a le droit
de vote au sein d'une société par
actions ; de même, il a le droit de
voter ou d'exercer des droits
similaires au sein d'autres
personnes morales. [Loi de 2010,
n° 881, §1, en vigueur le 2 juillet
2010]

Art. 554. The usufructuary’s
right to fruits commences on the
effective date of the usufruct.

Art. 554. Le droit de
l'usufruitier aux fruits naît avec
l'usufruit.

Art. 555. The usufructuary
acquires the ownership of natural
fruits severed during the
existence of the usufruct. Natural
fruits not severed at the end of
the usufruct belong to the naked
owner.

Art. 555. L'usufruitier
acquiert la propriété des fruits
naturels détachés pendant la
durée de l'usufruit. Les fruits
naturels non détachés à la fin de
l'usufruit appartiennent au nupropriétaire.

Art. 556. The usufructuary
acquires the ownership of civil
fruits accruing during the
existence of the usufruct.
Civil fruits accrue day by day
and the usufructuary is entitled to
them regardless of when they are
received.

Art. 556. L'usufruitier
acquiert la propriété des fruits
civils qui s'accumulent pendant
la durée de l'usufruit.
Les fruits civils s'accumulent
jour après jour et l'usufruitier y a
droit indépendamment du
moment où ils sont reçus.

Art. 557. The usufructuary
takes the things in the state in
which they are at the

Art. 557. L'usufruitier prend
les choses dans l'état dans lequel
elles se trouvent à l'ouverture de
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commencement of the usufruct.

l'usufruit.

Art. 558. The usufructuary
may make improvements and
alterations on the property
subject to the usufruct at his cost
and with the written consent of
the naked owner. If the naked
owner fails or refuses to give his
consent, the usufructuary may,
after notice to the naked owner
and with the approval of the
court, make at his cost those
improvements and alterations
that a prudent administrator
would make. [Acts 2010, No.
881, §1, eff. Jul. 2, 2010]

Art. 558. L'usufruitier peut
faire des améliorations ou des
modifications sur les biens sujets
à l'usufruit, à ses frais et avec le
consentement écrit du nupropriétaire. Si le nupropriétaire ne parvient pas à
donner son consentement ou
refuse de le faire, l'usufruitier
peut, à ses frais, après
notification au nu-propriétaire et
accord du tribunal, améliorer ou
modifier les biens en bon père de
famille. [Loi de 2010, n° 881, §1,
en vigueur le 2 juillet 2010]

Art. 559. The right of usufruct
extends to the accessories of the
thing at the commencement of
the usufruct.

Art. 559. Le droit d'usufruit
s'étend aux accessoires de la
chose dès l'ouverture de
l'usufruit.

Art. 560. The usufructuary
may cut trees growing on the
land of which he has the usufruct
and take stones, sand, and other
materials from it, but only for his
use or for the improvement or
cultivation of the land.

Art. 560. L'usufruitier peut
faire des coupes de bois sur le
fonds dont il a l'usufruit, en tirer
des pierres, du sable, et autres
matériaux, mais pour son usage
seulement ou pour l'amélioration
et l'exploitation de ce fonds.

Art. 561. The rights of the
usufructuary and of the naked
owner in mines and quarries are
governed by the Mineral Code.

Art. 561. Les droits de
l'usufruitier et du nu-propriétaire
quant aux mines et carrières sont
régis par le Code minier.

Art. 562. When the usufruct
includes timberlands, the
usufructuary is bound to manage
them as a prudent administrator.
The proceeds of timber
operations that are derived from
proper management of
timberlands belong to the
usufructuary.

Art. 562. Lorsque l'usufruit
inclut des exploitations
forestières, l'usufruitier est tenu
de les gérer en bon père de
famille. Les recettes des
opérations liées à l'exploitation
du bois provenant de la bonne
gestion des exploitations
forestières appartiennent à
l'usufruitier.

Art. 563. The usufruct
extends to the increase to the
land caused by alluvion or

Art. 563. L'usufruit s'étend à
l'augmentation survenue au
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dereliction.

fonds par alluvion ou relais.

Art. 564. The usufructuary
has no right to the enjoyment of a
treasure found in the property of
which he has the usufruct. If the
usufructuary has found the
treasure, he is entitled to keep
one-half of it as finder.

Art. 564. L'usufruitier n'a
aucun droit de jouissance sur les
trésors inventés sur le fonds dont
il a l'usufruit. Lorsque
l'usufruitier invente un trésor, il
a le droit d'en garder la moitié
en tant qu'inventeur.

Art. 565. The usufructuary
has a right to the enjoyment of
predial servitudes due to the
estate of which he has the
usufruct. When the estate is
enclosed within other lands
belonging to the grantor of the
usufruct, the usufructuary is
entitled to a gratuitous right of
passage.

Art. 565. L'usufruitier peut
jouir des servitudes réelles dues
à l'héritage dont il a l'usufruit.
Lorsque cet héritage se trouve
enclavé dans d'autres
possessions de celui qui a établi
l'usufruit, le passage doit être
fourni gratuitement à
l'usufruitier.

Art. 566. The usufructuary
may institute against the naked
owner or third persons all actions
that are necessary to insure the
possession, enjoyment, and
preservation of his right.

Art. 566. L'usufruitier peut,
pour entrer en possession de son
droit, en jouir et le conserver,
exercer toutes les actions
nécessaires, tant contre le nupropriétaire que contre les tiers.

Art. 567. The usufructuary
may lease, alienate, or encumber
his right. All such contracts cease
of right at the end of the usufruct.
If the usufructuary leases,
alienates, or encumbers his right,
he is responsible to the naked
owner for the abuse that the
person with whom he has
contracted makes of the property.
[Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff. Jul.
2, 2010]

Art. 567. L'usufruitier peut
louer, aliéner ou grever son
droit. Tous ces contrats prennent
fin de plein droit à l'extinction de
l'usufruit.
Lorsque l'usufruitier loue,
aliène ou grève son droit, il est
responsable envers le nupropriétaire de l'abus que celui à
qui il a transmis ses droits, ferait
des biens. [Loi de 2010, n° 881,
§1, en vigueur le 2 juillet 2010]

Art. 568. The usufructuary
may not dispose of
nonconsumable things unless the
right to do so has been expressly
granted to him. Nevertheless, he
may dispose of corporeal
movables that are gradually and
substantially impaired by use,

Art. 568. L'usufruitier ne
peut disposer de choses non
consomptibles à moins que ce
droit ne lui ait été accordé de
manière expresse. Néanmoins, il
peut disposer de meubles
corporels qui se détériorent peu
à peu et substantiellement par
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wear, or decay, such as
equipment, appliances, and
vehicles, provided that he acts as
a prudent administrator.
The right to dispose of a
nonconsumable thing includes
the rights to lease, alienate, and
encumber the thing. It does not
include the right to alienate by
donation inter vivos, unless that
right is expressly granted. [Acts
1986, No. 203, §1; Acts 2010,
No. 881, §1, eff. Jul. 2, 2010]

l'usage, comme des équipements,
des appareils et des véhicules,
pourvu qu'il agisse en bon père
de famille.
Le droit de disposer d'une
chose non consomptible inclut le
droit de la louer, l'aliéner et la
grever. À moins qu'il ne soit
expressément accordé, le droit
d'aliéner par donation entre vifs
n'est pas inclu. [Loi de 1986, n°
203, §1 ; Loi de 2010, n° 881,
§1, en vigueur le 2 juillet 2010]

Art. 568.1 If a thing subject to
the usufruct is donated inter
vivos by the usufructuary, he is
obligated to pay to the naked
owner at the termination of the
usufruct the value of the thing as
of the time of the donation. If a
thing subject to the usufruct is
otherwise alienated by the
usufructuary, the usufruct
attaches to any money or other
property received by the
usufructuary. The property
received shall be classified as
consumable or nonconsumable in
accordance with the provisions
of this Title, and the usufruct
shall be governed by those
provisions subject to the terms of
the act establishing the original
usufruct. If, at the time of the
alienation, the value of the
property received by the
usufructuary is less than the
value of the thing alienated, the
usufructuary is bound to pay the
difference to the naked owner at
the termination of the usufruct.
[Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff. Jul.
2, 2010]

Art. 568.1 Lorsqu'une chose
sujette à l'usufruit fait l'objet
d'une donation entre vifs par
l'usufruitier, celui-ci est obligé
de payer au nu-propriétaire, à la
fin de l'usufruit, la valeur
qu'avait la chose au moment de
la donation. Lorsque la chose
sujette à l'usufruit est aliénée
d'une autre manière par
l'usufruitier, l'usufruit porte sur
toutes les sommes d'argent ou
autres biens reçus par
l'usufruitier. Les biens reçus sont
qualifiés de consomptibles ou de
non consomptibles conformément
aux dispositions du présent titre,
et l'usufruit est régi par celles-ci
sous réserve des termes de l'acte
constitutif de l'usufruit.
Lorsqu'au moment de
l'aliénation, la valeur du bien
reçu par l'usufruitier est moins
élevée que celle de la chose
aliénée, l'usufruitier est tenu de
payer la différence au nupropriétaire à la fin de l'usufruit.
[Loi de 2010, n° 881, §1, en
vigueur le 2 juillet 2010]

Art. 568.2 The right to
dispose of a nonconsumable
thing includes the right to lease
the thing for a term that extends
beyond the termination of the
usufruct. If, at the termination of

Art. 568.2 Le droit de
disposer d'une chose non
consomptible inclut le droit de la
louer pour une durée pouvant
excéder la fin de l'usufruit.
Lorsqu'à la fin de l'usufruit, la
chose est encore louée,
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the usufruct, the thing remains
subject to the lease, the
usufructuary is accountable to
the naked owner for any
diminution in the value of the
thing at that time attributable to
the lease. [Acts 2010, No. 881,
§1, eff. Jul. 2, 2010]

l'usufruitier est tenu envers le nupropriétaire de toute diminution
de la valeur de la chose causée
par l'exécution du bail. [Loi de
2010, n° 881, §1, en vigueur le 2
juillet 2010]

Art. 568.3 If, at the
termination of the usufruct, the
thing subject to the usufruct is
burdened by an encumbrance
established by the usufructuary
to secure an obligation, the
usufructuary is bound to remove
the encumbrance. [Acts 2010,
No. 881, §1, eff. Jul. 2, 2010]

Art. 568.3 Lorsqu'à la fin de
l'usufruit, la chose qui y est
sujette est grevée d'une charge
établie par l'usufruitier aux fins
de garantir une obligation,
l'usufruitier est tenu de mettre fin
à cette charge. [Loi de 2010, n°
881, §1, en vigueur le 2 juillet
2010]

Art. 569. If the usufructuary
has not disposed of corporeal
movables that are by their nature
impaired by use, wear, or decay,
he is bound to deliver them to the
owner in the state in which they
may be at the end of the usufruct.
The usufructuary is relieved
of this obligation if the things are
entirely worn out by normal use,
wear, or decay. [Acts 2010, No.
881, §1, eff. Jul. 2, 2010]

Art. 569. Lorsque
l'usufruitier n'a pas disposé de
meubles corporels qui se
détériorent par l'usage du fait de
leur nature, il est tenu de les
rendre au propriétaire dans l'état
où ils se trouvent à la fin de
l'usufruit.
L'usufruitier est déchargé de
cette obligation lorsque les
choses se trouvent entièrement
détériorées par l'usage normal.
[Loi de 2010, n° 881, §1, en
vigueur le 2 juillet 2010]

SECTION 3 - OBLIGATIONS
OF THE USUFRUCTUARY

SECTION 3 - DES
OBLIGATIONS DE
L’USUFRUITIER

Art. 570. The usufructuary
shall cause an inventory to be
made of the property subject to
the usufruct. In the absence of an
inventory the naked owner may
prevent the usufructuary's entry
into possession of the property.
The inventory shall be made
in accordance with the rules
established in Articles 3131
through 3137 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.

Art. 570. L'usufruitier doit
faire dresser un inventaire des
biens sujets à l'usufruit. À défaut,
le nu-propriétaire peut empêcher
l'usufruitier d'entrer en
possession des biens.
L'inventaire doit être dressé
conformément aux articles 3131
à 3137 du Code de procédure
civile.
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Art. 571. The usufructuary
shall give security that he will
use the property subject to the
usufruct as a prudent
administrator and that he will
faithfully fulfill all the
obligations imposed on him by
law or by the act that established
the usufruct unless security is
dispensed with. If security is
required, the court may order that
it be provided in accordance with
law. [Acts 2004, No. 158, §1]
Art. 572. The security shall be
in the amount of the total value
of the property subject to the
usufruct.
The court may increase or
reduce the amount of the
security, on proper showing, but
the amount shall not be less than
the value of the movables subject
to the usufruct.

Art. 571. S’il n’en est
dispensé, l'usufruitier doit
donner caution qu'il jouira en
bon père de famille des biens
sujets à l'usufruit, et qu'il
remplira fidèlement toutes les
obligations qui lui sont imposées
par la loi ou par l'acte constitutif
de l'usufruit. Si la caution est
requise, le tribunal peut
ordonner qu'elle soit donnée,
conformément à la loi. [Loi de
2004, n° 158, §1]
Art. 572. Le montant de la
caution sera de la valeur totale
des biens sujets à l'usufruit.
Le tribunal peut, sur la base
de preuves suffisantes,
augmenter ou réduire le montant
de la caution, mais ce montant ne
peut être inférieur à la valeur des
meubles sujets à l'usufruit.

Art. 573. A. Est dispensé de
donner
caution dans un des cas
Art. 573. A. Security is
suivants
:
dispensed with when any of the
(1) Une personne qui a un
following occur:
usufruit légal en vertu des
(1) A person has a legal
usufruct under Civil Code Article articles 223 ou 3252 du présent
Code.
223 or 3252.
(2) Le conjoint survivant qui
(2) A surviving spouse has a
a
un
usufruit légal en vertu de
legal usufruct under Civil Code
l'article 890 du présent Code ;
Article 890 unless the naked
cependant, lorsque le nuowner is not a child of the
propriétaire n'est pas un enfant
usufructuary or if the naked
de l'usufruitier ou lorsqu'il est un
owner is a child of the
usufructuary and is also a forced enfant de l'usufruitier et
également un héritier
heir of the decedent, the naked
réservataire du défunt, il peut
owner may obtain security but
only to the extent of his legitime. obtenir une caution, mais
seulement dans la mesure de sa
(3) A parent has a legal
usufruct under Civil Code Article réserve.
(3) Un parent qui a un
891 unless the naked owner is
usufruit
légal en vertu de l'article
not a child of the usufructuary.
891 du présent Code sauf si le
(4) A surviving spouse has a
nu-propriétaire n'est pas un
legal usufruct under Civil Code
enfant de l'usufruitier.
Article 2434 unless the naked
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owner is a child of the decedent
but not a child of the
usufructuary.
B. A seller or donor of
property under reservation of
usufruct are not required to give
security. [Acts 2004, No. 158,
§1; Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff.
Jul. 2, 2010]

(4) Le conjoint survivant qui
a un usufruit légal en vertu de
l'article 2434 du présent Code
sauf si le nu-propriétaire est un
enfant du défunt mais non de
l'usufruitier.
B. Le vendeur ou donateur
sous réserve de l'usufruit n'est
point tenu de donner caution.
[Loi de 2004, n° 158, §1 ; Loi de
2010, n° 881, §1, en vigueur le 2
juillet 2010]

Art. 574. A delay in giving
security does not deprive the
usufructuary of the fruits derived
from the property since the
commencement of the usufruct.
[Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff. Jul.
2, 2010]]

Art. 574. Le retard de donner
caution ne prive pas l'usufruitier
des fruits provenant des biens
dès l'ouverture de l'usufruit. [Loi
de 2010, n° 881, §1, en vigueur
le 2 juillet 2010]

Art. 575. If the usufructuary
does not give security, the court
may order that the property be
delivered to an administrator
appointed in accordance with
Articles 3111 through 3113 of
the Code of Civil Procedure for
administration on behalf of the
usufructuary. The administration
terminates if the usufructuary
gives security. [Acts 2010, No.
881, §1, eff. Jul. 2, 2010]

Art. 575. Si l'usufruitier ne
donne pas caution, le tribunal
peut ordonner que les biens
soient remis à un administrateur
nommé conformément aux
articles 3111 à 3113 du Code de
procédure civile afin qu'ils soient
administrés pour le compte de
l'usufruitier. L'administration
prend fin lorsque l'usufruitier
donne caution. [Loi de 2010,
n° 881, §1, en vigueur le 2 juillet
2010]

Art. 576. The usufructuary is
answerable for losses resulting
from his fraud, default, or
neglect.

Art. 576. L'usufruitier est
responsable des détériorations
qui proviennent de son dol, de sa
faute ou de sa négligence.

Art. 577. The usufructuary is
responsible for ordinary
maintenance and repairs for
keeping the property subject to
the usufruct in good order,
whether the need for these
repairs arises from accident or
force majeure, the normal use of
things, or his fault or neglect.
The naked owner is
responsible for extraordinary

Art. 577. L'usufruitier est
tenu à l'entretien et aux
réparations des biens sujets à
l'usufruit, que ce soit à la suite
d'un accident ou de la force
majeure, de l'usage normal de la
chose ou de sa propre faute ou
négligence.
Les grosses réparations
demeurent à la charge du nupropriétaire, à moins qu'elles
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repairs, unless they have become
necessary as a result of the
usufructuary's fault or neglect in
which case the usufructuary is
bound to make them at his cost.
[Acts 1976, No. 103, §1.
Amended by Acts 1979, No. 157,
§1; Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff.
Jul. 2, 201]

n'aient été occasionnées par la
faute ou négligence de
l'usufruitier, auquel cas il en est
aussi tenu. [Amendé par la Loi
de 1979, n° 157, §1 ; Loi de
2010, n° 881, §1, en vigueur le 2
juillet 2010]

Art. 578. Extraordinary
repairs are those for the
reconstruction of the whole or of
a substantial part of the property
subject to the usufruct. All others
are ordinary repairs.

Art. 578. Les grosses
réparations sont celles visant à
la reconstruction de tout ou
d'une partie substantielle du bien
sujet à l'usufruit. Toutes les
autres sont des réparations
d'entretien.

Art. 579. During the existence
of the usufruct, the naked owner
may compel the usufructuary to
make the repairs for which the
usufructuary is responsible.
The usufructuary may not
compel the naked owner to make
the extraordinary repairs for
which the owner is responsible.
If the naked owner refuses to
make them, the usufructuary may
do so, and he shall be reimbursed
without interest by the naked
owner at the end of the usufruct.

Art. 579. Pendant la durée
de l'usufruit, le nu-propriétaire
peut contraindre l'usufruitier à
faire les réparations dont il est
tenu.
L'usufruitier ne peut
contraindre le nu-propriétaire à
faire les grosses réparations dont
le propriétaire est tenu. En cas
de refus du nu-propriétaire,
l'usufruitier peut faire les
réparations et sera remboursé
sans intérêts par le nupropriétaire à la fin de l'usufruit.

Art. 580. If, after the usufruct
commences and before the
usufructuary is put in possession,
the naked owner incurs necessary
expenses or makes repairs for
which the usufructuary is
responsible, the naked owner has
the right to claim the cost from
the usufructuary and may retain
the possession of the things
subject to the usufruct until he is
paid. [Acts 2010, No. 881, §1,
eff. Jul. 2, 2010]

Art. 580. Si, entre l'ouverture
de l'usufruit et la mise en
possession de l'usufruitier, le nupropriétaire a engagé des
dépenses nécessaires et fait des
réparations incombant à
l'usufruitier, il a le droit d'en
réclamer le prix, et même de
retenir la possession des choses
sujettes à l'usufruit, jusqu'à ce
qu'il en soit remboursé. [Loi de
2010, n° 881, §1, en vigueur le 2
juillet 2010]

Art. 581. The usufructuary is
answerable for all expenses that
become necessary for the

Art. 581. L'usufruitier
répond de tous les frais qui
tiennent à la conservation et à
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preservation and use of the
property after the
commencement of the usufruct.
[Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff. Jul.
2, 2010]
Art. 582. The usufructuary
may release himself from the
obligation to make repairs by
abandoning the usufruct or, with
the approval of the court, a
portion thereof, even if the owner
has instituted suit to compel him
to make repairs or bear the
expenses of them, and even if the
usufructuary has been cast in
judgment.
He may not release himself
from the charges of the
enjoyment during the period of
his possession, nor from
accountability for the damages
that he, or persons for whom he
is responsible, may have caused.

l'usage des biens après
l'ouverture de l'usufruit. [Loi de
2010, n° 881, §1, en vigueur le 2
juillet 2010]
Art. 582. L'usufruitier est le
maître de se décharger des
réparations dont il est tenu, en
abandonnant l'usufruit, ou, avec
l'accord du tribunal, une portion
de celui-ci, quand bien même le
propriétaire aurait intenté contre
lui une action pour le
contraindre à les faire ou
supporter, et l'usufruitier y aurait
été condamné.
Il ne peut se dégager ni des
charges de la jouissance pendant
la durée de sa possession, ni des
détériorations que lui ou les
personnes dont il doit répondre,
pourraient avoir causées.

Art. 583. Neither the
usufructuary nor the naked
owner is bound to restore
property that has been totally
destroyed through accident, force
majeure, or age.
If the naked owner elects to
restore the property or to make
extraordinary repairs, he shall do
so within a reasonable time and
in the manner least inconvenient
and onerous for the usufructuary.
[Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff. Jul.
2, 2010]

Art. 583. Ni l'usufruitier, ni
le nu-propriétaire ne sont tenus
de rétablir les biens qui ont été
entièrement détruits par
accident, force majeure ou
vétusté.
Lorsque le nu-propriétaire
choisit de rétablir les biens ou
faire de grosses réparations, il
doit le faire dans un délai
raisonnable et de la manière la
moins onéreuse et la moins
incommode pour l'usufruitier.
[Loi de 2010, n° 881, §1, en
vigueur le 2 juillet 2010]

Art. 584. The usufructuary is
bound to pay the periodic
charges, such as property taxes,
that may be imposed, during his
enjoyment of the usufruct. [Acts
2010, No. 881, §1, eff. Jul. 2,
2010]

Art. 584. L'usufruitier est
tenu d'acquitter les charges
périodiques, telles que les taxes,
qui peuvent être imposées sur les
biens pendant la jouissance de
l'usufruit. [Loi de 2010, n° 881,
§1, en vigueur le 2 juillet 2010]

Art. 585. The usufructuary is
bound to pay the extraordinary

Art. 585. L'usufruitier est
tenu d'acquitter les charges
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charges that may be imposed,
during the existence of the
usufruct, on the property subject
to it. If these charges are of a
nature to augment the value of
the property subject to the
usufruct, the naked owner shall
reimburse the usufructuary at the
end of the usufruct only for the
capital expended.

extraordinaires qui peuvent être
imposées sur les biens sujets à
l'usufruit, pendant la durée de
celui-ci. Lorsque ces charges
sont de nature à augmenter la
valeur des biens sujets à
l'usufruit, le nu-propriétaire lui
en doit le remboursement à la fin
de l'usufruit, mais en capital
seulement.

Art. 586. When the usufruct is
established inter vivos, the
usufructuary is not liable for
debts of the grantor, but if the
debt is secured by an
encumbrance of the thing subject
to the usufruct, the thing may be
sold for the payment of the debt.
[Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff. Jul.
2, 2010]

Art. 586. Lorsque l'usufruit
est établi entre vifs, l'usufruitier
n'est pas tenu des dettes du
constituant, mais si la dette est
garantie par une charge grevant
la chose sujette à l'usufruit, la
chose peut être vendue pour le
paiement de la dette. [Loi de
2010, n° 881, §1, en vigueur le 2
juillet 2010]

Art. 587. When the usufruct is
established mortis causa, the
usufructuary is not liable for
estate debts, but the property
subject to the usufruct may be
sold for the payment of estate
debts, in accordance with the
rules provided for the payment of
the debt of an estate in Book III
of this Code. [Acts 2010, No.
881, §1, eff. Jul. 2, 2010]

Art. 587. Lorsque l'usufruit
est établi à cause de mort,
l'usufruitier n'est pas tenu des
dettes de la succession, mais le
bien sujet à l'usufruit peut être
vendu pour le paiement de ces
dettes, conformément aux règles
prévues pour le paiement des
dettes de la succession au Livre
III du présent Code. [Loi de
2010, n° 881, §1, en vigueur le 2
juillet 2010]

Art. 588. When property
subject to a usufruct established
inter vivos is encumbered to
secure a debt before the
commencement of the usufruct,
the usufructuary may advance
the funds needed to discharge the
indebtedness. If he does so, the
naked owner shall reimburse the
usufructuary, without interest, at
the termination of the usufruct,
for the principal of the debt the
usufructuary has discharged, and
for any interest the usufructuary
has paid that had accrued on the

Art. 588. Lorsque le bien
sujet à l'usufruit établi entre vifs
est grevé afin de garantir une
dette avant l'ouverture de
l'usufruit, l'usufruitier peut
avancer les fonds nécessaires à
l'acquittement de la dette. Dans
un tel cas, à la fin de l'usufruit, le
nu-propriétaire doit rembourser
à l'usufruitier, sans intérêts, le
capital de la dette que
l'usufruitier a acquittée et tout
intérêt que celui-ci a payé et qui
a couru avant l'ouverture de
l'usufruit. [Loi de 2010, n° 881,
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debt before the commencement
of the usufruct. [Acts 2010, No.
881, §1, eff. Jul. 2, 2010]

§1, en vigueur le 2 juillet 2010]

Art. 589. If the usufructuary
of a usufruct established mortis
causa advances funds to
discharge an estate debt charged
to the property subject to the
usufruct, the naked owner shall
reimburse the usufructuary,
without interest, at the
termination of the usufruct, but
only to the extent of the principal
of the debt he has discharged and
for any interest he has paid that
had accrued on the debt before
the commencement of the
usufruct. [Acts 2010, No. 881,
§1, eff. Jul. 2, 2010]

Art. 589. Si, dans le cas d'un
usufruit à cause de mort,
l'usufruitier avance des fonds
pour acquitter des dettes de la
succession grevant les biens
sujets à l'usufruit, le nupropriétaire doit le rembourser à
la fin de l'usufruit, sans intérêts,
mais seulement dans la mesure
du capital de la dette qu'il a
acquittée et de tout intérêt que
celui-ci a payé et qui a couru
avant l'ouverture de l'usufruit.
[Loi de 2010, n° 881, §1, en
vigueur le 2 juillet 2010]

Art. 590. If the usufructuary
fails or refuses to advance the
funds needed to discharge a debt
secured by property subject to
the usufruct, or an estate debt
that is charged to the property
subject to the usufruct, the naked
owner may advance the funds
needed. If he does so, the naked
owner may demand that the
usufructuary pay him interest
during the period of the usufruct.
If the naked owner does not
advance the funds, he may
demand that all or part of the
property be sold as needed to
discharge the debt. [Acts 2010,
No. 881, §1, eff. Jul. 2, 2010]

Art. 590. Si l'usufruitier ne
parvient pas ou refuse d'avancer
les fonds nécessaires pour
acquitter une dette garantie par
des biens sujets à l'usufruit, ou
une dette de la succession
grevant un bien sujet à l'usufruit,
le nu-propriétaire peut avancer
ces fonds. Dans ce cas, le nupropriétaire peut demander que
l'usufruitier lui paie les intérêts
pendant la durée de l'usufruit.
Lorsque le nu-propriétaire
n'avance pas les fonds, il peut
demander que tout ou partie des
biens soit vendu pour
l'acquittement de la dette. [Loi
de 2010, n° 881, §1, en vigueur
le 2 juillet 2010]

Art. 591. If property subject
to the usufruct is sold to pay an
estate debt, or a debt of the
grantor, the usufruct attaches to
any proceeds of the sale of the
property that remain after
payment of the debt. [Acts 2010,
No. 881, §1, eff. Jul. 2, 2010]

Art. 591. Lorsque les biens
sujets à l'usufruit sont vendus
pour payer une dette de la
succession, ou une dette du
constituant, l'usufruit porte sur
les recettes de la vente qui
restent après le paiement de la
dette. [Loi de 2010, n° 881, §1,
en vigueur le 2 juillet 2010]
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Art. 592. If there is more than
one usufructuary of the same
property, each contributes to the
payment of estate debts that are
charged to the property in
proportion to his enjoyment of
the property. If one or more of
the usufructuaries fails to
advance his share, those of them
who advance the funds shall have
the right to recover the funds
they advance from those who do
not advance their shares. [Acts
2010, No. 881, §1, eff. Jul. 2,
2010]

Art. 592. Lorsqu'il y a plus
d'un usufruitier pour un même
bien, chacun contribue au
paiement des dettes de la
succession qui grèvent le bien en
proportion de sa jouissance du
bien. Lorsqu'un ou plusieurs des
usufruitiers ne peut avancer sa
part, ceux qui ont avancé les
fonds ont le droit d'en demander
restitution. [Loi de 2010, n° 881,
§1, en vigueur le 2 juillet 2010]

Art. 593. Unless there is a
governing testamentary
disposition, the legacy of an
annuity that is chargeable to
property subject to a usufruct is
payable first from the fruits and
products of the property subject
to the usufruct and then from the
property itself. [Acts 1990, No.
706, §1; Acts 2010, No. 881, §1,
eff. Jul. 2, 2010]

Art. 593. Sauf disposition
testamentaire, le legs d'une rente
garantie par des biens sujets à
l'usufruit est payable dans un
premier temps sur les fruits et
produits de ces biens et, dans un
deuxième temps, sur les biens
eux-mêmes. [Loi de 1990, n°
706, §1 ; Loi de 2010, n° 881,
§1, en vigueur le 2 juillet 2010]

Art. 594. Court costs in
actions concerning the property
subject to the usufruct are taxed
in accordance with the rules of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
Expenses of litigation other than
court costs are apportioned
between usufructuaries and
naked owners in accordance with
the following Articles. [Acts
2010, No. 881, §1, eff. Jul. 2,
2010]

Art. 594. Les frais de justice
dans le cadre d'actions
concernant les biens sujets à
l'usufruit sont imposés
conformément aux règles du
Code de procédure civile. Les
frais de contentieux autres que
les frais de justice sont répartis
entre les usufruitiers et les nuspropriétaires conformément aux
articles suivants. [Loi de 2010,
n° 881, §1, en vigueur le 2 juillet
2010]

Art. 595. Parents who have a
legal usufruct of the property of
their children are bound for
expenses of litigation concerning
that property, in the same manner
as if they were owners of it; but
reimbursement may be ordered

Art. 595. Les parents ayant
un usufruit légal sur les biens de
leurs enfants sont tenus des frais
de contentieux concernant ces
biens, comme s'ils en étaient
propriétaires. Cependant, le
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by the court at the termination of
the usufruct in cases in which
inequity might otherwise result.
Art. 596. Conventional
usufructuaries are bound for
expenses of litigation with third
persons concerning the
enjoyment of the property.
Expenses of litigation with third
persons concerning both the
enjoyment and the ownership are
divided equitably between the
usufructuary and the naked
owner. Expenses of litigation
between the usufructuary and the
naked owner are borne by the
person who has incurred them.

remboursement peut être
ordonné par le tribunal à la fin
de l'usufruit en cas de
conséquence inéquitable.
Art. 596. Les usufruitiers
conventionnels sont tenus des
frais de contentieux contre des
tiers en ce qui concerne la
jouissance des biens. Les frais de
contentieux contre des tiers,
concernant à la fois la jouissance
et la propriété, sont
équitablement divisés entre
l'usufruitier et le nu-propriétaire.
Les frais de contentieux opposant
l'usufruitier au nu-propriétaire
sont supportés par la personne
qui les a engagés.

Art. 597. The usufructuary
who loses a predial servitude by
nonuse or who permits a
servitude to be acquired on the
property by prescription is
responsible to the naked owner.

Art. 597. L'usufruitier, qui
perd une servitude réelle par
non-usage ou qui en laisse
acquérir une sur les biens par
prescription, en est responsable
envers le nu-propriétaire.

Art. 598. If, during the
existence of the usufruct, a third
person encroaches on the
immovable property or violates
in any other way the rights of the
naked owner, the usufructuary
must inform the naked owner.
When he fails to do so, he shall
be answerable for the damages
that the naked owner may suffer.

Art. 598. Si, pendant la
durée de l'usufruit, un tiers
commet quelqu’usurpation sur
l'immeuble, ou attente autrement
aux droits du nu-propriétaire,
l'usufruitier est tenu d'en donner
avis à celui-ci. Faute de ce, il
sera responsable de tout le
dommage qui en peut résulter
pour le nu-propriétaire.

Art. 599. When the usufruct
includes a herd of animals, the
usufructuary is bound to use it as
a prudent administrator and, from
the increase of the herd, replace
animals that die. If the entire
herd perishes without the fault of
the usufructuary, the loss is
borne by the naked owner.

Art. 599. Lorsque l'usufruit
inclut un troupeau d'animaux,
l'usufruitier est tenu d'en user en
bon père de famille et de
remplacer jusqu'à concurrence
du croît, les animaux qui ont
péri. Lorsque le troupeau périt
entièrement sans faute de
l'usufruitier, la perte est
supportée par le nu-propriétaire.

Art. 600. The usufructuary

Art. 600. L'usufruitier peut
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may dispose of individual
animals of the herd, subject to
the obligation to deliver to the
naked owner at the end of the
usufruct the value that the
animals had at the time of
disposition.
The usufructuary may also
dispose of the herd or of a
substantial part thereof, provided
that he acts as a prudent
administrator. In such a case, the
proceeds are subject to the
provisions of Article 618.

disposer d'animaux du troupeau
sous réserve de compenser le nupropriétaire, à la fin de
l'usufruit, de la valeur qu'avaient
ceux-ci lors de l'acte de
disposition.
L'usufruitier peut aussi
disposer du troupeau ou d'une
partie substantielle de celui-ci,
pourvu qu'il agisse en bon père
de famille. Dans un tel cas, les
recettes sont soumises aux
dispositions de l'article 618.

Art. 601. The usufructuary
may remove all improvements he
has made, subject to the
obligation of restoring the
property to its former condition.
He may not claim reimbursement
from the owner for
improvements that he does not
remove or that cannot be
removed. [Acts 2010, No. 881,
§1, eff. Jul. 2, 2010]

Art. 601. L'usufruitier peut
enlever toute amélioration qu'il a
faite, sous réserve de l'obligation
de remettre le bien en l'état. Il ne
peut demander au propriétaire le
remboursement des
améliorations qu'il n'enlève pas
ou ne peut enlever. [Loi de 2010,
n° 881, §1, en vigueur le 2 juillet
2010]

Art. 602. The usufructuary
may set off against damages due
to the owner for the destruction
or deterioration of the property
subject to the usufruct the value
of improvements that cannot be
removed, provided they were
made in accordance with Article
558.

Art. 602. L'usufruitier peut
compenser les dommagesintérêts dus au propriétaire pour
destruction ou détérioration du
bien sujet à l'usufruit avec la
valeur des améliorations qui ne
peuvent être enlevées, lorsque
faites en conformité avec l'article
558.

SECTION 4 - RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS OF THE
NAKED OWNER

SECTION 4 - DES DROITS ET
OBLIGATIONS DU NUPROPRIÉTAIRE

Art. 603. The naked owner
may dispose of the naked
ownership, but he cannot thereby
affect the usufruct [Acts 2010,
No. 881, §1, eff. Jul. 2, 2010]

Art. 603. Le nu-propriétaire
peut disposer de la nuepropriété, sans toutefois porter
atteinte à l'usufruit. [Loi de
2010, n° 881, §1, en vigueur le 2
juillet 2010]

Art. 604. The naked owner
may establish real rights on the

Art. 604. Le nu-propriétaire
peut créer des droits réels sur les
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property subject to the usufruct,
provided that they may be
exercised without impairing the
usufructuary’s rights. [Acts 2010,
No. 881, §1, eff. Jul. 2, 2010]

biens sujets à l'usufruit, pourvu
qu'ils puissent être exercés sans
nuire aux droits de l'usufruitier.
[Loi de 2010, n° 881, §1, en
vigueur le 2 juillet 2010]
 CC 1825, art. 595

Art. 605. The naked owner
must not interfere with the rights
of the usufructuary.

Art. 605. Le nu-propriétaire
ne doit pas interférer avec les
droits de l'usufruitier. [Loi de
1976, n° 103, §1]

Art. 606. The naked owner
may not make alterations or
improvements on the property
subject to the usufruct.

Art. 606. Le nu-propriétaire
ne peut effectuer de changements
ou d'améliorations sur les biens
sujets à l'usufruit.

SECTION 5 - TERMINATION
OF USUFRUCT

SECTION 5 - DE LA FIN DE
L’USUFRUIT

Art. 607. The right of usufruct
expires upon the death of the
usufructuary.

Art. 607. Le droit de
l'usufruit finit par la mort de
l'usufruitier.
 CC 1825, art. 601

Art. 608. A usufruct
established in favor of a juridical
person terminates if the juridical
person is dissolved or liquidated,
but not if the juridical person is
converted, merged or
consolidated into a successor
juridical person. In any event, a
usufruct in favor of a juridical
person shall terminate upon the
lapse of thirty years from the
date of the commencement of the
usufruct. This Article shall not
apply to a juridical person in its
capacity as the trustee of a trust.
[Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff. Jul.
2, 2010]

Art. 608. L’usufruit établi en
faveur d'une personne morale
prend fin à la dissolution ou à la
liquidation de celle-ci, mais pas
en cas de transformation, de
fusion ou de regroupement en
une nouvelle personne morale
qui lui succède. Dans tous les
cas, un usufruit en faveur d'une
personne morale prend fin trente
ans après l'ouverture de
l'usufruit. Le présent article ne
s'applique pas à la personne
morale ayant qualité de
fiduciaire d'une fiducie. [Loi de
2010, n° 881, §1, en vigueur le 2
juillet 2010]

Art. 609. A legacy of
revenues from specified property
is a kind of usufruct and
terminates upon death of the
legatee unless a shorter period
has been expressly stipulated.

Art. 609. Le legs des revenus
d'un bien déterminé est une
espèce d'usufruit qui s’éteint au
décès du donataire à moins
qu’un délai plus court n'ait été
expressément stipulé.
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Art. 610. A usufruct
established for a term or subject
to a condition terminates upon
the expiration of the term or the
happening of the condition.

Art. 610. L’usufruit assorti
d’un terme ou d’une condition
prend fin à l'expiration du terme
ou à l’accomplissement de la
condition.

Art. 611. When the
usufructuary is charged to restore
or transfer the usufruct to another
person, his right terminates when
the time for restitution or
delivery arrives.

Art. 611. Lorsque
l'usufruitier est chargé de
restituer ou de transférer
l'usufruit à une autre personne,
son droit prend fin au moment de
la restitution ou de la délivrance.

Art. 612. A usufruct granted
until a third person reaches a
certain age is a usufruct for a
term. If the third person dies, the
usufruct continues until the date
the deceased would have reached
the designated age.

Art. 612. L’usufruit accordé
jusqu'à ce qu'un tiers ait atteint
un âge fixé est un usufruit à
terme. En cas de décès du tiers,
l'usufruit dure jusqu'à la date à
laquelle le défunt aurait atteint
l'âge fixé.

Art. 613. The usufruct of
nonconsumables terminates by
the permanent and total loss,
extinction, or destruction through
accident, force majeure or decay
of the property subject to the
usufruct. [Acts 2010, No. 881,
§1, eff. Jul. 2, 2010]

Art. 613. L'usufruit portant
sur des biens non consomptibles
prend fin par la perte
permanente et totale, l'extinction
ou la destruction par accident,
force majeure ou vétusté des
biens sujets à l'usufruit. [Loi de
2010, n° 881, §1, en vigueur le 2
juillet 2010]

Art. 614. When any loss,
extinction, or destruction of
property subject to usufruct is
attributable to the fault of a third
person, the usufruct does not
terminate but attaches to any
claim for damages and the
proceeds therefrom.

Art. 614. Lorsque la perte,
l’extinction ou la destruction des
biens sujets à l'usufruit est
attribuable à la faute d'un tiers,
l'usufruit ne prend pas fin mais
porte sur les créances en
dommages et intérêts et les
produits qui en découlent.

Art. 615. When property
subject to usufruct changes form
without an act of the
usufructuary, the usufruct does
not terminate even though the
property may no longer serve the
use for which it was originally
destined.
When property subject to
usufruct is converted into money

Art. 615. Lorsque le bien
sujet à l'usufruit change de forme
indépendamment du fait de
l'usufruitier, l'usufruit ne prend
pas fin alors même que le bien ne
peut plus servir à l'usage auquel
il était originairement destiné.
Lorsque le bien sujet à
l'usufruit est transformé en
argent ou en un autre bien

[Vol. 8

2015]

BILINGUAL LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
or other property without an act
of the usufructuary, as in a case
of expropriation of an
immovable or liquidation of a
corporation, the usufruct
terminates as to the property
converted and attaches to the
money or other property received
by the usufructuary. [Acts 2010,
No. 881, §1, eff. Jul. 2, 2010]

indépendamment du fait de
l'usufruitier, comme en cas
d’expropriation immobilière ou
de liquidation d'une société,
l'usufruit prend fin sur le bien
transformé pour s’exercer sur
l'argent ou tout autre bien reçu
par l'usufruitier. [Loi de 2010,
n° 881, §1, en vigueur le 2 juillet
2010]

Art. 616. When property
subject to usufruct is sold or
exchanged, whether in an action
for partition or by agreement
between the usufructuary and the
naked owner or by a usufructuary
who has the power to dispose of
nonconsumable property, the
usufruct terminates as to the
nonconsumable property sold or
exchanged, but as provided in
Article 568.1, the usufruct
attaches to the money or other
property received by the
usufructuary, unless the parties
agree otherwise.
Any tax or expense incurred
as the result of the sale or
exchange of property subject to
usufruct shall be paid from the
proceeds of the sale or exchange,
and shall be deducted from the
amount due by the usufructuary
to the naked owner at the
termination of the usufruct. [Acts
1983, No. 525, §1; Acts 2010,
No. 881, §1, eff. Jul. 2, 2010]

Art. 616. Lorsque le bien
sujet à l'usufruit est vendu ou
échangé, que ce soit dans le
cadre d'une action en partage ou
par convention entre l'usufruitier
et le nu-propriétaire ou par un
usufruitier ayant le pouvoir de
disposer d'un bien non
consomptible, l'usufruit prend fin
quant au bien non consomptible
vendu ou échangé. Toutefois, en
vertu de l'article 568.1, l’usufruit
s’exerce sur l'argent ou tout
autre bien reçu par l'usufruitier,
sauf si les parties en conviennent
autrement.
Toute imposition ou dépense
résultant de la vente ou de
l'échange du bien sujet à
l'usufruit est payée sur le produit
de la vente ou de l'échange, et est
déduite du montant dû par
l'usufruitier au nu-propriétaire à
la fin de l'usufruit. [Loi de 1983,
n° 525, §1 ; Loi de 2010, n° 881,
§1, en vigueur le2 juillet 2010]

Art. 617. When proceeds of
insurance are due on account of
loss, extinction, or destruction of
property subject to usufruct, the
usufruct attaches to the proceeds.
If the usufructuary or the naked
owner has separately insured his
interest only, the proceeds belong
to the insured party.

Art. 617. Lorsqu’une
indemnité d'assurance est due en
raison de la perte, de l’extinction
ou de la destruction du bien sujet
à l'usufruit, ce dernier porte sur
l’indemnité. Lorsque l'usufruitier
ou le nu-propriétaire a assuré
séparément son seul intérêt,
l’indemnité appartient à la partie
assurée.

Art. 618. In cases governed

Art. 618. Dans les cas régis
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by Articles 614, 615, 616, and
the first sentence of Article 617,
the naked owner may demand,
within one year from receipt of
the proceeds by the usufructuary
that the usufructuary give
security for the proceeds. If such
a demand is made, and the
parties cannot agree, the nature
of the security shall be
determined by the court.
This Article does not apply to
corporeal movables referred to in
the second sentence of Article
568, or to property disposed of
by the usufructuary pursuant to
the power to dispose of
nonconsumables if the grantor of
the usufruct has dispensed with
the security. [Acts 2010, No.
881, §1, eff. Jul. 2, 2010]

par les articles 614, 615, 616 et
par la première phrase de
l'article 617, le nu-propriétaire
peut demander, dans le délai
d'un an à compter de la
réception du produit par
l'usufruitier, que ce dernier
donne des garanties. Lorsqu'une
telle demande est faite, et que les
parties ne peuvent s'accorder, la
sûreté est déterminée par le juge.
Le présent article ne
s'applique pas aux meubles
corporels visés à la deuxième
phrase de l'article 568, ni aux
biens dont l'usufruitier a disposé
en vertu de son pouvoir de
disposer de biens non
consomptibles lorsque le
constituant de l'usufruit l'a
dispensé de caution. [Loi de
2010, n° 881, §1, en vigueur le 2
juillet 2010]

Art. 619. A usufruct by
donation mortis causa is not
considered revoked merely
because the testator has made
changes in the property after the
date of his testament. The effect
of the legacy is determined by
application of the rules contained
in the title: Of donations inter
vivos and mortis causa. [Acts
2010, No. 881, §1, eff. Jul. 2,
2010]

Art. 619. L’usufruit par
donation à cause de mort n'est
pas réputé révoqué du seul fait
de changements opérés par le
testateur sur le bien après la date
du testament. Les effets du legs
sont régis par le titre : Des
donations6. Loi de 2010, n° 881,
§1, en vigueur le 2 juillet 2010]

Art. 620. Usufruct terminates
by the enforcement of an
encumbrance established upon
the property prior to the creation
of the usufruct to secure a debt.
The usufructuary may have an
action against the grantor of the
usufruct or against the naked
owner under the provisions
established in Section 3 of this
Chapter.
The judicial sale of the

Art. 620. L'usufruit prend fin
par la mise à exécution d'une
sûreté établie sur le bien avant la
création de l'usufruit.
L'usufruitier peut agir contre le
constituant ou le nu-propriétaire
conformément à la section 3 du
présent chapitre.
La vente judicaire de
l'usufruit par les créanciers de
l'usufruitier le prive de la
jouissance du bien mais ne met

NdT. L’intitulé du titre, modifié par la loi de 2008, no 204, n’a pas été rectifié à l’article 619.
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usufruct by creditors of the
usufructuary deprives the
usufructuary of his enjoyment of
the property but does not
terminate the usufruct. [Acts
2010, No. 881, §1, eff. Jul. 2,
2010]

pas fin à l'usufruit. [Loi de 2010,
n° 881, §1, en vigueur le 2 juillet
2010]

Art. 621. A usufruct
terminates by the prescription of
nonuse if neither the
usufructuary nor any other
person acting in his name
exercises the right during a
period of ten years. This applies
whether the usufruct has been
constituted on an entire estate or
on a divided or undivided part of
an estate.

Art. 621. L'usufruit se perd
par le défaut de jouissance de ce
droit de la part de l’usufruitier,
ou d’aucune personne en son
nom pendant dix ans, soit que cet
usufruit soit constitué sur un
fonds entier, ou qu’il le soit
seulement sur une partie divisée
ou indivisée d'un fonds7.
 CC 1825, art. 613

Art. 622. A usufruct
terminates by confusion when
the usufruct and the naked
ownership are united in the same
person. The usufruct does not
terminate if the title by which the
usufruct and the naked
ownership were united is
annulled for some previously
existing defect or some vice
inherent in the act.

Art. 622. L'usufruit s’éteint
par consolidation lorsque
l'usufruit et la nue-propriété sont
réunis en une même personne. Il
ne s’éteint pas lorsque le titre
par lequel l'usufruit et la nuepropriété étaient unis est annulé
par une cause ancienne ou en
raison d’un vice inhérent à
l'acte.  CC 1825, art. 615

Art. 623. The usufruct may be
terminated by the naked owner if
the usufructuary commits waste,
alienates things without
authority, neglects to make
ordinary repairs, or abuses his
enjoyment in any other manner.
[Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff. Jul.
2, 2010]

Art. 623. Le nu-propriétaire
peut mettre fin à l'usufruit
lorsque l'usufruitier commet des
dégradations, aliène des choses
sans y être autorisé, néglige
d'effectuer des réparations
ordinaires, ou abuse de sa
jouissance de toute autre
manière. [Loi de 2010, n° 881,
§1, en vigueur le 2 juillet 2010]

Art. 624. In the cases covered
by the preceding Article, the
court may decree termination of
the usufruct or decree that the

Art. 624. Dans les cas
couverts par l'article précédent,
le juge peut prononcer la fin de
l'usufruit ou décider que le bien
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property be delivered to the
naked owner on the condition
that he shall pay to the
usufructuary a reasonable
annuity until the end of the
usufruct. The amount of the
annuity shall be based on the
value of the usufruct.
The usufructuary may prevent
termination of the usufruct or
delivery of the property to the
naked owner by giving security
to insure that he will take
appropriate corrective measures
within a period fixed by the
court. [Acts 2010, No. 881, §1,
eff. Jul. 2, 2010]
Art. 625. A creditor of the
usufructuary may intervene and
may prevent termination of the
usufruct and delivery of the
property to the naked owner by
offering to repair the damages
caused by the usufructuary and
by giving security for the future.
[Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff. Jul.
2, 2010]
Art. 626. A usufruct
terminates by an express written
renunciation. A creditor of the
usufructuary may cause to be
annulled a renunciation made to
his prejudice.

soit délivré au nu-propriétaire à
la condition qu'il paie à
l'usufruitier une rente
raisonnable jusqu’à la fin de
l’usufruit. Le montant de la rente
est fondé sur la valeur de
l'usufruit.
L’usufruitier peut éviter
l’extinction de l'usufruit ou la
délivrance du bien au nupropriétaire en donnant sûreté
afin d'assurer qu'il prendra les
mesures nécessaires dans le
délai fixé par le juge. [Loi de
2010, n° 881, §1, en vigueur le 2
juillet 2010]
Art. 625. Les créanciers de
l'usufruitier peuvent intervenir et
empêcher la fin de l'usufruit et la
délivrance du bien au nupropriétaire en offrant la
réparation des dégradations
commises par l'usufruitier, et des
garanties pour l'avenir. [Loi de
2010, n° 881, §1, en vigueur le 2
juillet 2010]
 CC 1825, art. 618
Art. 626. L'usufruit s’éteint
par renonciation écrite expresse.
Un créancier de l'usufruitier peut
faire annuler une renonciation
qui lui porte préjudice.

Art. 627. Upon termination of
the usufruct, the usufructuary or
his heirs have the right to retain
possession of the property until
reimbursed for all expenses and
advances for which they have
recourse against the owner or his
heirs.

Art. 627. À la fin de
l'usufruit, l'usufruitier ou ses
héritiers ont le droit de retenir la
possession du bien jusqu'à ce
qu'ils soient remboursés de
toutes les dépenses ou avances
dont ils ont la répétition contre le
propriétaire ou ses héritiers.
 CC 1825, art. 620

Art. 628. Upon termination of
a usufruct of nonconsumables for
a cause other than total and
permanent destruction of the
property, full ownership is

Art. 628. La pleine propriété
est restituée lorsqu'un usufruit
portant sur des biens non
consomptibles prend fin pour une
cause autre que la destruction
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restored. The usufructuary or his
heirs are bound to deliver the
property to the owner with its
accessories and fruits produced
since the termination of the
usufruct.
If property has been lost or
deteriorated through the fault of
the usufructuary, the owner is
entitled to the value the property
otherwise would have had at the
termination of the usufruct.

totale et permanente du bien.
L'usufruitier ou ses héritiers sont
tenus de délivrer le bien au
propriétaire avec ses accessoires
et ses fruits accrus depuis la fin
de l'usufruit.
Lorsque le bien a été perdu
ou détérioré par la faute de
l'usufruitier, le propriétaire a
droit à la valeur que le bien
aurait eu à la fin de l'usufruit.

Art. 629. At the termination
of a usufruct of consumables, the
usufructuary is bound to deliver
to the owner things of the same
quantity and quality or the value
they had at the commencement
of the usufruct.

Art. 629. À la fin d'un
usufruit portant sur des biens
consomptibles, l'usufruitier est
tenu de remettre au propriétaire,
ou bien des choses de même
quantité et qualité, ou bien leur
valeur à l'ouverture de l'usufruit.

CHAPTER 3 - HABITATION

CHAPITRE 3 - DU DROIT
D’HABITATION

Art. 630. Habitation is the
nontransferable real right of a
natural person to dwell in the
house of another.

Art. 630. L’habitation est le
droit réel intransmissible d’une
personne physique d’habiter
dans la maison d’autrui.
 CC 1825 Art. 622

Art. 631. The right of
habitation is established and
extinguished in the same manner
as the right of usufruct.

Art. 631. Le droit
d’habitation s’établit et se perd
de la même manière que
l’usufruit.  CC 1825 Art. 623

Art. 632. The right of
habitation is regulated by the title
that establishes it. If the title is
silent as to the extent of
habitation, the right is regulated
in accordance with Articles 633
through 635.

Art. 632. Le droit
d’habitation se règle par le titre
qui l’a établi. Si le titre ne
s’explique pas sur l’étendue de
ce droit, il se règle
conformément aux articles 633 à
635.  CC 1825 Art. 626, 627

Art. 633. A person having the
right of habitation may reside in
the house with his family,
although not married at the time
the right was granted to him.

Art. 633. Celui qui a un droit
d’habitation dans une maison,
peut y demeurer avec sa famille,
quand même il n’aurait pas été
marié à l’époque où ce droit lui a
été accordé.  CC 1825 Art. 636
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Art. 634. A person having the
right of habitation is entitled to
the exclusive use of the house or
of the part assigned to him, and,
provided that he resides therein,
he may receive friends, guests,
and boarders.

Art. 634. Celui à qui le droit
d’habitation a été accordé peut
jouir de la maison ou de la partie
qui lui a été assignée de manière
exclusive et, pourvu qu’il y
demeure, peut recevoir des amis,
des hôtes et des pensionnaires.
 CC 1825 Art. 637

Art. 635. A person having the
right of habitation is bound to
use the property as a prudent
administrator and at the
expiration of his right to deliver
it to the owner in the condition in
which he received it, ordinary
wear and tear excepted.

Art. 635. Celui qui a le droit
d’habitation doit jouir de la
chose en bon père de famille, et
la remettre au propriétaire à
l’expiration de la durée de son
droit, dans l’état où il l’a reçue,
à l’exception de l’usure normale.

Art. 636. When the person
having the right of habitation
occupies the entire house, he is
liable for ordinary repairs, for the
payment of taxes, and for other
annual charges in the same
manner as the usufructuary.
When the person having the
right of habitation occupies only
a part of the house, he is liable
for ordinary repairs to the part he
occupies and for all other
expenses and charges in
proportion to his enjoyment.

Art. 636. Lorsque la
personne qui a le droit
d’habitation occupe la totalité de
la maison, elle est assujettie aux
réparations d’entretien, au
paiement des contributions et
aux autres charges annuelles,
comme l’est l’usufruitier.
Lorsqu’elle n’en occupe
qu’une partie, elle n’est
assujettie qu’au prorata de ce
dont elle jouit.
 CC 1825 Art. 641.

Art. 637. The right of
habitation is neither transferable
nor heritable. It may not be
alienated, let, or encumbered.

Art 637. Le droit
d’habitation n’est ni cessible ni
transmissible à cause de mort. Il
ne peut être ni aliéné, ni loué, ni
grevé.  CC 1825 Art. 639 omet
‘loué’ que l’on trouve dans
Digeste 1808, l. 2, t. 3, art. 79 et
C.civ.fr. art. 634

Art. 638. The right of
habitation terminates at the death
of the person having it unless a
shorter period is stipulated.

Art. 638. Le droit
d’habitation s’éteint au décès de
son titulaire, sauf si une durée
plus courte a été stipulée.
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CHAPTER 4 - RIGHTS OF USE

CHAPITRE 4 - DU DROIT
D’USAGE

Art. 639. The personal
servitude of right of use confers
in favor of a person a specified
use of an estate less than full
enjoyment.

Art. 639. La servitude
personnelle de droit d’usage
confère à son titulaire le droit
d’user de la chose de manière
spécifique sans qu’il en ait la
pleine jouissance.

Art. 640. The right of use may
confer only an advantage that
may be established by a predial
servitude.

Art. 640. Le droit d’usage ne
peut conférer de bénéfice
excédant celui d’une servitude
réelle.

Art. 641. A right of use may
be established in favor of a
natural person or a legal entity.

Art. 641. Un droit d’usage
peut être établi en faveur d’une
personne physique ou morale.

Art. 642. A right of use
includes the rights contemplated
or necessary to enjoyment at the
time of its creation as well as
rights that may later become
necessary, provided that a greater
burden is not imposed on the
property unless otherwise
stipulated in the title.

Art. 642. Le droit d’usage
comprend les droits envisagés
lors de sa création et ceux
nécessaires à la jouissance à ce
moment ou par la suite, sans que
la charge ne grève le bien audelà des stipulations de l’acte
constitutif.

Art. 643. The right of use is
transferable unless prohibited by
law or contract.

Art. 643. Sauf prohibition
légale ou conventionnelle, le
droit d’usage est transmissible.

Art. 644. A right of use is not
extinguished at the death of the
natural person or at the
dissolution of any other entity
having the right unless the
contrary is provided by law or
contract.

Art. 644. Sauf disposition ou
stipulation contraire, le droit
d’usage ne s’éteint pas au décès
ou à la dissolution de son
titulaire.

Art. 645. A right of use is
regulated by application of the
rules governing usufruct and
predial servitudes to the extent
that their application is
compatible with the rules
governing a right of use
servitude.

Art. 645. Le droit d’usage est
soumis aux mêmes règles que
l’usufruit et les servitudes
réelles, dans la mesure où elles
sont compatibles.
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TITLE IV. PREDIAL
SERVITUDES
[Acts 1977, No. 514, §1]

TITRE IV. DES SERVITUDES
RÉELLES
[Loi de 1977, n° 514, §1]

CHAPTER 1 - GENERAL
PRINCIPLES

CHAPITRE 1 - PRINCIPES
GÉNÉRAUX

Art. 646. A predial servitude
is a charge on a servient estate
for the benefit of a dominant
estate.
The two estates must belong
to different owners.

Art. 646. La servitude réelle
est une charge imposée sur un
fonds servant en faveur d’un
fonds dominant. Les deux fonds
doivent appartenir à des
propriétaires différents.

Art. 647. There must be a
benefit to the dominant estate.
The benefit need not exist at the
time the servitude is created; a
possible convenience or a future
advantage suffices to support a
servitude.
There is no predial servitude
if the charge imposed cannot be
reasonably expected to benefit
the dominant estate.

Art. 647. Le fonds dominant
doit en retirer une utilité, sans
qu’il soit nécessaire qu’elle
existe au moment de la création
de la servitude ; le seul agrément
ou avantage futur suffisent pour
la validité de celle-ci. Il n’y a pas
de servitude réelle lorsqu’aucune
utilité en faveur du fonds
dominant ne peut être
raisonnablement attendue de la
charge imposée.
 CC 1825, art. 646

Art. 648. Neither contiguity
nor proximity of the two estates
is necessary for the existence of a
predial servitude. It suffices that
the two estates be so located as to
allow one to derive some benefit
from the charge on the other.

Art. 648. Ni la contiguïté ni
le voisinage des deux fonds ne
sont nécessaires à l’existence de
la servitude. Il suffit qu’ils soient
situés de façon à ce que l’un
puisse retirer utilité de la charge
imposée à l’autre.

Art. 649. A predial servitude
is an incorporeal immovable.

Art. 649. La servitude réelle
est un immeuble incorporel.

Art. 650. A predial servitude
is inseparable from the dominant
estate and passes with it. The
right of using the servitude
cannot be alienated, leased, or
encumbered separately from the
dominant estate.
B. The predial servitude
continues as a charge on the

Art. 650. A. La servitude
réelle est inséparable du fonds
dominant et se transmet avec lui.
Le droit d’user de la servitude ne
peut être aliéné, loué ou grevé
indépendamment du fonds
dominant.
B. La servitude réelle suit le
fonds servant en quelques mains
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servient estate when ownership
changes. [Acts 2004, No. 821,
§2, eff. Jan. 1, 2005]

qu’il passe. [Loi de 2004, n° 821,
§2, en vigueur le 1er janvier
2005]

Art. 651. The owner of the
servient estate is not required to
do anything. His obligation is to
abstain from doing something on
his estate or to permit something
to be done on it. He may be
required by convention or by law
to keep his estate in suitable
condition for the exercise of the
servitude due to the dominant
estate. A servitude may not
impose upon the owner of the
servient estate or his successors
the obligation to pay a fee or
other charge on the occasion of
an alienation, lease, or
encumbrance of the servient
estate. [Acts 2010, No. 938, §2,
eff. Jul. 2, 2010]

Art. 651. Le propriétaire du
fonds servant n’a pas
d’obligation de faire, mais de ne
pas faire ou de souffrir qu’une
chose soit faite sur son fonds. Il
peut se voir imposer par la loi ou
par convention de conserver son
bien afin que la servitude puisse
être exercée au profit du fonds
dominant. Aucuns frais ni
charges ne peuvent être exigés
du propriétaire du fonds servant
ni de ses successeurs à
l’occasion de l’aliénation, du
louage ou de la constitution de
sûreté sur le fonds servant. [Loi
de 2010, n° 938, §2, en vigueur
le 2 juillet 2010]

Art. 652. A predial servitude
is indivisible. An estate cannot
have upon another estate part of
a right of way, or of view, or of
any other servitude, nor can an
estate be charged with a part of a
servitude.
The use of a servitude may be
limited to certain days or hours;
when limited, it is still an entire
right. A servitude is due to the
whole of the dominant estate and
to all parts of it; if this estate is
divided, every acquirer of a part
has the right of using the
servitude in its entirety.

Art. 652. La servitude réelle
est indivisible. Un fonds ne peut
avoir pour partie, sur un autre
fonds, un droit de passage, un
droit de vue ou quelque autre
droit de servitude ni en être
chargé pour partie. L’usage de
la servitude peut être limité à
certains jours ou à certaines
heures ; malgré cette limite, la
servitude est un droit entier.
La servitude est due à
l’intégralité du fonds dominant et
à chacune de ses parties. Si le
fonds est vendu par portion,
chaque acquéreur pourra
exercer son droit de servitude en
son entier.  CC 1825, art. 652

Art. 653. The advantages
resulting from a predial servitude
may be divided, if they are
susceptible of division.

Art. 653. L’utilité résultant
de la servitude réelle peut être
divisée si elle est susceptible de
partage.  CC 1825, art. 653

Art. 654. Predial servitudes
may be natural, legal, and
voluntary or conventional.

Art. 654. La servitude réelle
peut être naturelle, légale, ou
volontaire ou conventionnelle.
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Natural servitudes arise from the
natural situation of estates; legal
servitudes are imposed by law;
and voluntary or conventional
servitudes are established by
juridical act, prescription, or
destination of the owner.

La servitude naturelle dérive de
la situation naturelle des lieux.
La servitude légale est imposée
par la loi et la servitude
volontaire ou conventionnelle est
établie par acte juridique,
prescription ou destination du
père de famille.  CC 1825, art.
655.

CHAPTER 2 - NATURAL
SERVITUDES

CHAPITRE 2 - DES
SERVITUDES NATURELLES

Art. 655. An estate situated
below is bound to receive the
surface waters that flow naturally
from an estate situated above
unless an act of man has created
the flow.

Art. 655. Les fonds inférieurs
sont assujettis envers ceux qui
sont plus élevés, à recevoir les
eaux qui en découlent
naturellement, sans que la main
de l’homme y ait contribué.
 CC 1825, art. 656.

Art. 656. The owner of the
servient estate may not do
anything to prevent the flow of
the water. The owner of the
dominant estate may not do
anything to render the servitude
more burdensome.

Art. 656. Le propriétaire du
fonds servant ne peut rien faire
qui empêche l’écoulement des
eaux. Le propriétaire du fonds
dominant ne peut rien faire qui
aggrave la servitude du fonds
servant.  CC 1825, art. 656

Art. 657. The owner of an
estate bordering on running
water may use it as it runs for the
purpose of watering his estate or
for other purposes.

Art. 657. Celui dont la
propriété borde une eau
courante, peut s’en servir à son
passage pour l’irrigation de sa
propriété, ou pour d’autres
usages.  CC 1825, art. 657

Art. 658. The owner of an
estate through which water runs,
whether it originates there or
passes from lands above, may
make use of it while it runs over
his lands. He cannot stop it or
give it another direction and is
bound to return it to its ordinary
channel where it leaves his
estate.

Art. 658. Celui dont l’eau
traverse l’héritage, soit qu’elle y
prenne sa source, soit qu’elle
vienne de fonds supérieurs, peut
en user dans l’intervalle qu’elle y
parcourt. Il ne peut la supprimer
ou la détourner, et il est tenu de
la rendre, à la sortie de son
fonds, à son cours ordinaire.
 CC 1825, art. 657
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CHAPTER 3 - LEGAL
SERVITUDES

CHAPITRE 3 - DES
SERVITUDES LÉGALES

SECTION 1 - LIMITATIONS
ON OWNERSHIP

SECTION 1 - DES
LIMITATIONS AU DROIT DE
PROPRIÉTÉ

Art. 659. Legal servitudes are
limitations on ownership
established by law for the benefit
of the general public or for the
benefit of particular persons.

Art. 659. Les servitudes
établies par la loi, sont des
limitations à la propriété ayant
pour objet l’utilité publique ou
celle des particuliers.
 CC 1825, art. 660

Art. 660. The owner is bound
to keep his buildings in repair so
that neither their fall nor that of
any part of their materials may
cause damage to a neighbor or to
a passerby. However, he is
answerable for damages only
upon a showing that he knew or,
in the exercise of reasonable
care, should have known of the
vice or defect which caused the
damage, that the damage could
have been prevented by the
exercise of reasonable care, and
that he failed to exercise such
reasonable care. Nothing in this
Article shall preclude the court
from the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an
appropriate case. [Acts 1996, 1st
Ex. Sess., No. 1, §1, eff. April
16, 1996]

Art. 660. Le propriétaire doit
entretenir ses bâtiments de
manière que leur chute, ou les
matériaux qui s’en détachent, ne
puissent causer un dommage aux
voisins ou aux passants. Il n’est
responsable des dommages
causés que s’il est prouvé qu’il
connaissait ou, en agissant avec
une diligence raisonnable, qu’il
aurait dû avoir connaissance du
vice ou du défaut ayant causé le
dommage, que celui-ci aurait pu
être évité en agissant avec une
diligence raisonnable et qu’il a
failli à ce devoir. Le cas échéant,
rien dans le présent article
n’interdit au juge d’appliquer la
règle res ipsa loquitur. [Loi de
1996, 1ère Sess. Ex., no 1, §1, en
vigueur le 16 avril 1996]
 CC 1825, art. 666

Art. 661. When a building or
other construction is in danger of
falling a neighbor has a right of
action to compel the owner to
have it properly supported or
demolished. When the danger is
imminent the court may
authorize the neighbor to do the
necessary work for which he
shall be reimbursed by the
owner.

Art. 661. Lorsqu’un bâtiment
ou toute autre construction
menace ruine, le voisin a une
action pour obliger le
propriétaire à le faire étayer ou
démolir. En cas de danger
imminent, le juge peut autoriser
le voisin à effectuer les travaux
nécessaires dont il aura
remboursement par le
propriétaire.
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 CC 1825, art. 667
Art. 662. One who builds near
a wall, whether common or not,
is bound to take all necessary
precautions to protect his
neighbor against injury.

Art. 662. Celui qui édifie
près d’un mur, mitoyen ou non,
doit prendre toutes les
précautions nécessaires pour
protéger son voisin d’un
quelconque préjudice.

Art. 663. A landowner may
not build projections beyond the
boundary of his estate.

Art. 663. Le propriétaire ne
peut construire de saillie au-delà
des limites de sa propriété.

Art. 664. A landowner is
bound to fix his roof so that
rainwater does not fall on the
ground of his neighbor.

Art. 664. Tout propriétaire
doit établir ses toits de manière
que les eaux pluviales ne
s’écoulent pas sur le fonds de
son voisin.  CC 1825, art. 694

Art. 665. Servitudes imposed
for the public or common utility
relate to the space which is to be
left for the public use by the
adjacent proprietors on the
shores of navigable rivers and for
the making and repairing of
levees, roads, and other public or
common works. Such servitudes
also exist on property necessary
for the building of levees and
other water control structures on
the alignment approved by the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as
provided by law, including the
repairing of hurricane protection
levees.
All that relates to this kind of
servitude is determined by laws
or particular regulations. [Acts
2006, No. 776, §1]

Art. 665. Les servitudes
établies pour l’utilité publique ou
communale, ont pour objet
l’espace qui doit être laissé par
les riverains, pour l’usage
public, sur le bord des rivières
navigables, et la construction et
réparation des levées, chemins et
autres ouvrages publics ou
communaux. De telles servitudes
existent également sur les
terrains nécessaires à la
construction de levées et autres
structures de contrôle des eaux
sur la base de l’alignement
approuvé par le Corps des
ingénieurs de l’armée des ÉtatsUnis tel que prévu par la loi, y
compris la réparation des levées
anti-ouragan.
Tout ce qui concerne cette
espèce de servitude, est l’objet de
lois ou de règlements
particuliers. [Loi de 2006,
n° 776, §1]  CC 1825, art. 661

Art. 666. He who from his
title as owner is bound to give a
public road on the border of a
river or stream, must furnish
another without any

Art. 666. Celui qui, d’après
son titre de propriété, doit un
chemin public sur le bord d’un
fleuve ou d’un cours d’eau, est
obligé d’en fournir un autre,
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compensation, if the first be
destroyed or carried away.
And if the road be so injured
or inundated by the water,
without being carried away, that
it becomes impassable, the owner
is obliged to give the public a
passage on his lands, as near as
possible to the public road,
without recompense therefor.

sans indemnité si celui qu’il avait
déjà fourni vient à être détruit ou
emporté.
S’il arrive que ce chemin,
sans être emporté, soit tellement
gâté ou inondé par le cours
d’eau qu’on ne puisse plus y
passer, le propriétaire est tenu
de donner au public un passage
sur ses terres, le plus près
possible du chemin inondé, sans
pouvoir exiger aucune indemnité
à cet égard.

Art. 667. Although a
proprietor may do with his estate
whatever he pleases, still he
cannot make any work on it,
which may deprive his neighbor
of the liberty of enjoying his
own, or which may be the cause
of any damage to him. However,
if the work he makes on his
estate deprives his neighbor of
enjoyment or causes damage to
him, he is answerable for
damages only upon a showing
that he knew or, in the exercise
of reasonable care, should have
known that his works would
cause damage, that the damage
could have been prevented by the
exercise of reasonable care, and
that he failed to exercise such
reasonable care. Nothing in this
Article shall preclude the court
from the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an
appropriate case. Nonetheless,
the proprietor is answerable for
damages without regard to his
knowledge or his exercise of
reasonable care, if the damage is
caused by an ultrahazardous
activity. An ultrahazardous
activity as used in this Article is
strictly limited to pile driving or
blasting with explosives. [Acts
1996, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 1, §1,
eff. April 16, 1996]

Art. 667. Quoiqu’un
propriétaire puisse faire dans
son fonds tout ce que bon lui
semble, il ne peut cependant y
faire d’ouvrage qui ôte à son
voisin la liberté de jouir du sien,
ou qui lui cause quelque
dommage. Toutefois, si l’ouvrage
réalisé sur son fonds cause au
voisin une perte de jouissance ou
un dommage, il n’est responsable
que s’il est prouvé qu’il
connaissait ou, qu’en agissant
avec une diligence raisonnable,
il aurait dû savoir que son
ouvrage causerait un dommage,
qui aurait pu être évité en
agissant avec une diligence
raisonnable, et qu’il a failli à ce
devoir. Le cas échéant, rien dans
le présent article n’interdit au
juge d’appliquer la règle res ipsa
loquitur. Néanmoins, le
propriétaire est responsable
indépendamment de sa
connaissance ou de sa diligence
raisonnable, si le dommage est
causé par une activité
extrêmement dangereuse. Au
sens de cet article, le terme
d’activité extrêmement
dangereuse est strictement limité
au battage des pieux ou à la
destruction par explosifs. [Loi de
1996, 1ère Sess., Ex. n° 1, §1, en
vigueur le 16 avril 1996]
 CC 1825, art. 663
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Art. 668. Although one be not
at liberty to make any work by
which his neighbor's buildings
may be damaged, yet every one
has the liberty of doing on his
own ground whatsoever he
pleases, although it should
occasion some inconvenience to
his neighbor.
Thus he who is not subject to
any servitude originating from a
particular agreement in that
respect, may raise his house as
high as he pleases, although by
such elevation he should darken
the lights of his neighbors's
[neighbor's] house, because this
act occasions only an
inconvenience, but not a real
damage.

Art. 668. Quoiqu’on ne
puisse faire d’ouvrages dont le
bâtiment voisin soit endommagé,
chacun a la liberté de faire dans
son fonds, ce que bon lui semble,
même s’il devait en résulter
quelque incommodité pour le
voisin.
Ainsi celui qui n’est assujetti
à aucune servitude
conventionnelle à cet égard, peut
élever sa maison aussi haut que
bon lui semble, quoique par cette
élévation, il ôte les jours de celle
de son voisin, parce qu’il ne
résulte de ce fait qu’une
incommodité et non un dommage
réel.  CC 1825, art. 664

Art. 669. If the works or
materials for any manufactory or
other operation, cause an
inconvenience to those in the
same or in the neighboring
houses, by diffusing smoke or
nauseous smell, and there be no
servitude established by which
they are regulated, their
sufferance must be determined
by the rules of the police, or the
customs of the place.

Art. 669. Lorsqu’en
l’absence de servitude à cet effet,
les ouvrages ou matériaux
destinés à la manufacture ou
toute autre opération causent un
inconvénient aux habitants de la
maison ou des maisons voisines,
en répandant de la fumée ou des
odeurs incommodes,
l’incommodité est régie par les
règlements de police ou les
usages locaux.

Art. 670. When a landowner
constructs in good faith a
building that encroaches on an
adjacent estate and the owner of
that estate does not complain
within a reasonable time after he
knew or should have known of
the encroachment, or in any
event complains only after the
construction is substantially
completed the court may allow
the building to remain. The
owner of the building acquires a
predial servitude on the land
occupied by the building upon

Art. 670. Quand le
propriétaire construit de bonne
foi un bâtiment empiétant sur le
fonds voisin et que son
propriétaire n’adresse aucune
plainte dans un délai raisonnable
à compter du moment où il a eu
connaissance ou aurait dû avoir
connaissance de l’empiètement,
ou ne le fait qu’après son
achèvement substantiel, le juge
pourra en autoriser la
conservation. Le propriétaire du
bâtiment acquiert de ce fait une
servitude réelle sur le fonds
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payment of compensation for the
value of the servitude taken and
for any other damage that the
neighbor has suffered.

occupé par le bâtiment
moyennant une compensation
équivalente à la valeur de la
servitude acquise et à tout autre
dommage que le voisin a dû
supporter.

Art. 671. Governing bodies of
parishes and municipalities are
authorized to adopt regulations
determining the mode of
proceeding to prevent the spread
of fire by the destruction of
buildings.
When private property is so
destroyed in order to combat a
conflagration, the owner shall be
indemnified by the political
subdivision for his actual loss.

Art. 671. Les autorités
paroissiales et municipales
pourront adopter des règlements
permettant de prévenir la
propagation d’un incendie par la
destruction de bâtiments.
Les propriétaires dont les
biens auront été ainsi détruits
auront droit à une indemnisation
de la collectivité locale pour la
perte occasionnée.
 CC 1825, art. 668

Art. 672. Other legal
servitudes relate to common
enclosures, such as common
walls, fences and ditches, and to
the right of passage for the
benefit of enclosed estates.

Art. 672. Les autres
servitudes légales sont relatives
aux clôtures mitoyennes, telles
que les murs, les palissades et les
fossés mitoyens, et au droit de
passage en faveur des fonds
enclavés.

SECTION 2 - COMMON
ENCLOSURES

SECTION 2 - DES CLÔTURES
MITOYENNES

Art. 673. A landowner who
builds first may rest one-half of a
partition wall on the land of his
neighbor, provided that he uses
solid masonry at least as high as
the first story and that the width
of the wall does not exceed
eighteen inches, not including the
plastering which may not be
more than three inches in
thickness.

Art. 673. Le propriétaire qui
bâtit le premier peut faire porter
la moitié de son mur sur la terre
de son voisin, pourvu qu’il utilise
des maçonneries solides au
moins jusqu’à la hauteur du
premier étage et que l’épaisseur
entière de ce mur n’excède pas
dix-huit pouces, sans y
comprendre le revêtement qui ne
doit pas avoir plus de trois
pouces d’épaisseur.
 CC 1825, art. 671

Art. 674. The wall thus raised
becomes common if the neighbor
is willing to contribute one-half
of its cost. If the neighbor refuses
to contribute, he preserves the

Art. 674. Si le voisin veut
contribuer pour moitié au coût
de construction du mur ainsi
édifié, celui-ci devient alors
mitoyen. Le voisin qui refuse d’y
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right to make the wall common
in whole or in part, at any time,
by paying to the owner one-half
of the current value of the wall,
or of the part that he wishes to
make common.

contribuer, conserve, le droit de
rendre le mur mitoyen en tout ou
en partie, à tout moment, en
payant au propriétaire la moitié
de sa valeur actuelle ou la moitié
de la portion qu’il veut rendre
mitoyenne.  CC 1825, art. 680

Art. 675. A wall that
separates adjoining buildings and
is partly on one estate and partly
on another is presumed to be
common up to the highest part of
the lower building unless there is
proof to the contrary.

Art. 675. Sauf preuve
contraire, tout mur de séparation
entre bâtiments contigus et situé
en partie sur un fonds et en
partie sur l’autre, est présumé
mitoyen jusqu’à la partie la plus
élevée du bâtiment inférieur.

Art. 676. When a solid
masonry wall adjoins another
estate, the neighbor has a right to
make it a common wall, in whole
or in part, by paying to its owner
one-half of the current value of
the wall, or of the part that he
wishes to make common, and
one-half of the value of the soil
on which the wall is built.

Art. 676. Lorsqu’un mur de
solide maçonnerie est attenant à
un autre fonds, le voisin a le
droit de le rendre mitoyen, en
tout ou en partie, en payant au
propriétaire la moitié de la
valeur actuelle du mur ou de la
portion qu’il veut rendre
mitoyenne, et la moitié de la
valeur du sol sur lequel le mur
est bâti.  CC 1825, art. 680

Art. 677. In the absence of a
written agreement or controlling
local ordinance the rights and
obligations of the co-owners of a
common wall, fence, or ditch are
determined in accordance with
the following provisions.

Art. 677. En l’absence
d’accord écrit ou de règlement
local, les droits et obligations
des copropriétaires d’un mur,
d’une palissade ou d’un fossé
mitoyens sont réglementés par
les dispositions suivantes.

Art. 678. Necessary repairs to
a common wall, including partial
rebuilding, are to be made at the
expense of those who own it in
proportion to their interests.

Art. 678. Les réparations
nécessaires du mur mitoyen, y
compris sa reconstruction
partielle, sont à la charge de
ceux à qui il appartient, à
proportion des intérêts de
chacun.

Art. 679. The co-owner of a
common wall may be relieved of
the obligation to contribute to the
cost of repairs by abandoning in
writing his right to use it, if no
construction of his is actually

Art. 679. Le copropriétaire
d’un mur mitoyen peut être
dispensé de l’obligation de
contribuer au coût des
réparations en abandonnant par
écrit le droit de mitoyenneté,
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supported by the common wall.

pourvu que le mur mitoyen ne
soutienne pas un bâtiment qui lui
appartienne.
 CC 1825, art. 675

Art. 680. The co-owner of a
common wall may use it as he
sees fit, provided that he does not
impair its structural integrity or
infringe on the rights of his
neighbor.

Art. 680. Le copropriétaire
d’un mur mitoyen peut en faire
usage à sa convenance, pourvu
qu’il n’en altère pas l’intégrité
structurelle ou ne porte pas
atteinte aux droits de son voisin.

Art 681. The co-owner of a
common wall may not make any
opening in the wall without the
consent of his neighbor.

Art. 681. Le copropriétaire
d’un mur mitoyen n’est pas
autorisé à pratiquer des
ouvertures dans le mur sans le
consentement de son voisin.

Art. 682. A co-owner may
raise the height of a common
wall at his expense provided the
wall can support the additional
weight. In such a case, he alone
is responsible for the
maintenance and repair of the
raised part.

Art. 682. Le copropriétaire
peut faire exhausser le mur
mitoyen, à ses frais, pourvu que
le mur soit en mesure de
supporter l’exhaussement. Dans
ce cas, il sera seul responsable
des travaux d’entretien et des
réparations de la partie
surélevée.

Art. 683. The neighbor who
does not contribute to the raising
of the common wall may at any
time cause the raised part to
become common by paying to its
owner one-half of its current
value.

Art. 683. Le voisin qui ne
contribue pas à l’exhaussement
peut à tout moment en acquérir
la mitoyenneté en payant la
moitié de sa valeur actuelle.

Art. 684. A landowner has the
right to enclose his land.

Art. 684. Tout propriétaire a
le droit de clore sa propriété.

Art. 685. A fence on a
boundary is presumed to be
common unless there is proof to
the contrary.
When adjoining lands are
enclosed, a landowner may
compel his neighbors to
contribute to the expense of
making and repairing common
fences by which the respective
lands are separated.

Art. 685. Sauf preuve
contraire, toute clôture située à
la limite d’une propriété est
réputée mitoyenne. Lorsque deux
fonds contigus sont clôturés, le
propriétaire peut contraindre ses
voisins à contribuer aux
dépenses de construction et de
réparation des clôtures
mitoyennes séparant leurs fonds
respectifs. Lorsqu’ils ne le sont

553

554

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES
When adjoining lands are not
enclosed, a landowner may
compel his neighbors to
contribute to the expense of
making and repairing common
fences only as prescribed by
local ordinances.

pas, le propriétaire peut
contraindre ses voisins à
contribuer aux dépenses de
construction et de réparation des
clôtures mitoyennes
conformément aux dispositions
règlementaires locales.

Art. 686. A ditch between two
estates is presumed to be
common unless there be proof to
the contrary.
Adjoining owners are
responsible for the maintenance
of a common ditch.

Art. 686. Sauf preuve
contraire, tout fossé entre deux
héritages est réputé mitoyen.
L’entretien du fossé mitoyen
est à la charge des propriétaires
voisins.

Art. 687. Trees, bushes, and
plants on the boundary are
presumed to be common unless
there be proof to the contrary.
An adjoining owner has the
right to demand the removal of
trees, bushes, or plants on the
boundary that interfere with the
enjoyment of his estate, but he
must bear the expense of
removal.

Art. 687. Sauf preuve
contraire, les arbres, buissons et
plantes situés à la limite de deux
fonds sont réputés mitoyens.
Le voisin a le droit d’exiger
l’enlèvement des arbres,
buissons et plantes situés à la
limite de son fonds qui nuisent à
la jouissance de son bien, à
charge pour lui d’en supporter la
dépense.

Art. 688. A landowner has the
right to demand that the branches
or roots of a neighbor's trees,
bushes, or plants, that extend
over or into his property be
trimmed at the expense of the
neighbor.
A landowner does not have
this right if the roots or branches
do not interfere with the
enjoyment of his property.

Art. 688. Tout propriétaire a
le droit d’exiger que les branches
ou racines des arbres, des
buissons ou des plantes du
voisin, qui s’étendent sur sa
propriété soient coupées, aux
frais du voisin.
Ce droit n’existe que dans la
limite où les racines ou les
branches portent atteinte à la
jouissance du bien.

SECTION 3 - RIGHT OF
PASSAGE

SECTION 3 - DU DROIT DE
PASSAGE

Art. 689. The owner of an
estate that has no access to a
public road or utility may claim a
right of passage over neighboring
property to the nearest public
road or utility. He is bound to
compensate his neighbor for the

Art. 689. Le propriétaire
d’un fonds qui n’a aucune issue
sur la voie publique ou les
réseaux publics peut réclamer un
droit de passage sur le fonds
voisin situé le plus près de la
voie ou du réseau. Il doit
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right of passage acquired and to
indemnify his neighbor for the
damage he may occasion.
New or additional
maintenance burdens imposed
upon the servient estate or
intervening lands resulting from
the utility servitude shall be the
responsibility of the owner of the
dominant estate. [Acts 2012, No.
739, §1, eff. Aug. 1, 2012]

compenser son voisin pour le
droit de passage acquis et
l’indemniser pour le dommage
qu’il peut occasionner.
Lorsqu’elles résultent de la
servitude d’utilité publique, les
charges d’entretien nouvelles ou
additionnelles imposées au fonds
servant ou aux fonds
intermédiaires sont à la charge
du propriétaire du fonds
dominant. [Loi de 2012, n° 739,
§1, en vigueur le 1er Août 2012]

Art. 690. The right of passage
for the benefit of an enclosed
estate shall be suitable for the
kind of traffic or utility that is
reasonably necessary for the use
of that estate. [Acts 2012, No.
739, §1, eff. Aug. 1, 2012]

Art. 690. Le droit de passage
en faveur d’un fonds enclavé doit
être adapté au type de
circulation ou de réseau public
raisonnablement nécessaire à
l’usage du fonds. [Loi de 2012,
n° 739, §1, en vigueur le 1er Août
2012]

Art. 691. The owner of the
enclosed estate may construct on
the right-of-way the type of road,
utility, or railroad reasonably
necessary for the exercise of the
servitude.
The utility crossing shall be
constructed in compliance with
all appropriate and applicable
federal and state standards so as
to mitigate all hazards posed by
the passage and the particular
conditions of the servient estate
and intervening lands. [Acts
2012, No. 739, §1, eff. Aug. 1,
2012]

Art. 691. Le propriétaire du
fonds enclavé peut construire sur
le droit de passage le type de
route, réseau ou chemin de fer
raisonnablement nécessaire à
l’exercice de la servitude.
Les réseaux traversant le
fonds doivent être construits
conformément aux normes
fédérales et étatiques pertinentes
et applicables afin de réduire
tout danger résultant du passage
et de la condition particulière du
fonds servant et des fonds
intermédiaires. [Loi de 2012, n°
739, §1, en vigueur le 1er Août
2012]

Art. 692. The owner of the
enclosed estate may not demand
the right of passage or the rightof-way for the utility anywhere
he chooses. The passage
generally shall be taken along the
shortest route from the enclosed
estate to the public road or utility
at the location least injurious to

Art. 692. Le propriétaire du
fonds enclavé ne peut exiger le
passage ou la desserte en
quelqu’endroit qu’il veut. Le
passage doit être ordinairement
pris du côté où le trajet est le
plus court, du fonds enclavé à la
voie publique ou au réseau
public, dans l’endroit le moins
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the intervening lands.
The location of the utility
right-of-way shall coincide with
the location of the servitude of
passage unless an alternate
location providing access to the
nearest utility is least injurious to
the servient estate and
intervening lands.
The court shall evaluate and
determine that the location of the
servitude of passage or utility
shall not affect the safety of the
operations or significantly
interfere with the operations of
the owner of the servient estate
or intervening lands prior to the
granting of the servitude of
passage or utility. [Acts 2012,
No. 739, §1, eff. Aug. 1, 2012]

dommageable pour les fonds
intermédiaires.
L’emplacement des réseaux
publics doit coïncider avec celui
de la servitude de passage, à
moins qu’il n’existe un autre
accès vers le réseau le plus
proche moins dommageable pour
le fonds servant et les fonds
intermédiaires.
Avant d’accorder la
servitude, le juge devra s’assurer
que son emplacement n’affecte
pas la sécurité des activités ou ne
nuit pas de manière significative
aux activités du propriétaire du
fonds servant ou des fonds
intermédiaires. [Loi de 2012,
n° 739, §1, en vigueur le 1er Août
2012]

Art. 693. If an estate becomes
enclosed as a result of a
voluntary act or omission of its
owner, the neighbors are not
bound to furnish a passage to
him or his successors.

Art. 693. Lorsqu’un fonds
devient enclavé en raison d’un
acte ou d’une omission
volontaire de son propriétaire,
les voisins ne sont pas tenus de
fournir un passage, à celui-ci ou
à ses successeurs.

Art. 694. When in the case of
partition, or a voluntary
alienation of an estate or of a part
thereof, property alienated or
partitioned becomes enclosed,
passage shall be furnished
gratuitously by the owner of the
land on which the passage was
previously exercised, even if it is
not the shortest route to the
public road or utility, and even if
the act of alienation or partition
does not mention a servitude of
passage. [Acts 2012; No. 739,
§1, eff. Aug. 1, 2012]

Art. 694. Quand suite à un
partage ou à une aliénation
volontaire du fonds ou d’une
partie de celui-ci, le bien partagé
ou aliéné devient enclavé, un
passage doit être fourni à titre
gratuit par le propriétaire du
fonds sur lequel le droit de
passage était auparavant exercé,
et ce même si ce n’est pas le
trajet le plus court menant à la
voie publique ou au réseau
public, et même si l’acte
d’aliénation ou de partage ne fait
aucune mention d’une servitude
de passage. [Loi de 2012, n°
739, §1, en vigueur le 1er Août
2012]

Art. 695. The owner of the
enclosed estate has no right to
the relocation of this servitude

Art. 695. Une fois
l’emplacement de la servitude de
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after it is fixed. The owner of the
servient estate has the right to
demand relocation of the
servitude to a more convenient
place at his own expense,
provided that it affords the same
facility to the owner of the
enclosed estate.

passage établi, le propriétaire du
fonds enclavé ne peut plus en
changer la situation. Le
propriétaire du fonds servant a le
droit de demander le
déplacement de la servitude de
passage dans un lieu plus
commode, à ses frais, pourvu que
le propriétaire du fonds enclavé
y trouve la même facilité.
 CC 1825, art. 699

Art. 696. The right for
indemnity against the owner of
the enclosed estate may be lost
by prescription. The accrual of
this prescription has no effect on
the right of passage.

Art. 696. L’action en
indemnité contre le propriétaire
du fonds enclavé est
prescriptible. L’écoulement de
cette prescription n’affecte pas le
droit de passage.

Art. 696.1. As used in this
Section, a utility is a service such
as electricity, water, sewer, gas,
telephone, cable television, and
other commonly used power and
communication networks
required for the operation of an
ordinary household or business.
[Acts 2012; No. 739, §1, eff.
Aug. 1, 2012]

Art. 696.1. Le terme de
réseau public, tel qu’utilisé dans
la présente section, s’entend de
tout service requis pour le
fonctionnement d’une activité
ménagère ou professionnelle
ordinaire, comme l’électricité,
l’eau, les égouts, le gaz, le
téléphone, la télévision câblée et
les autres réseaux électriques et
de communications
habituellement utilisés. [Loi de
2012, n° 739, §1, en vigueur le
1er Août 2012]

CHAPTER 4 CONVENTIONAL OR
VOLUNTARY SERVITUDES

CHAPITRE 4 - DES
SERVITUDES
CONVENTIONNELLES OU
VOLONTAIRES

SECTION 1 - KINDS OF
CONVENTIONAL
SERVITUDES

SECTION 1 - DES
CATÉGORIES DE
SERVITUDES
CONVENTIONNELLES

Art. 697. Predial servitudes
may be established by an owner
on his estate or acquired for its
benefit.
The use and extent of such
servitudes are regulated by the

Art. 697. Il est permis aux
propriétaires d’établir sur leurs
propriétés, ou d’acquérir en
faveur de celles-ci des servitudes
réelles.
Leur usage et leur étendue se
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title by which they are created,
and, in the absence of such
regulation, by the following
rules.

règlent par le titre qui les
constitue, et à défaut de titre, par
les règles ci-après.
 CC 1825, art. 705

Art. 698. Predial servitudes
are established on, or for the
benefit of, distinct corporeal
immovables.

Art. 698. Les servitudes
réelles sont établies à la charge
ou au profit de biens corporels
immobiliers distincts.

Art. 699. The following are
examples of predial servitudes:
Rights of support, projection,
drip, drain, or of preventing
drain, those of view, of light, or
of preventing view or light from
being obstructed, of raising
buildings or walls, or of
preventing them from being
raised, of passage, of drawing
water, of aqueduct, of watering
animals, and of pasturage.

Art. 699. Constituent des
servitudes réelles :
Les droits d’appui, de
saillies, d’égout, d’écoulement
ou d’empêcher cet écoulement,
de vues ou de jours, ou
d’empêcher qu’on n’y nuise,
d’élever ou d’empêcher
l’élévation des bâtiments ou des
murs, de passage, de puisage,
d’aqueduc, d’abreuvement des
bestiaux, ainsi que de pâturage.
 CC 1825, art. 707

Art. 700. The servitude of
support is the right by which
buildings or other constructions
of the dominant estate are
permitted to rest on a wall of the
servient estate.
Unless the title provides
otherwise, the owner of the
servient estate is bound to keep
the wall fit for the exercise of the
servitude, but he may be relieved
of this charge by abandoning the
wall.

Art. 700. Le droit d’appui est
une servitude d’après laquelle
les bâtiments ou toute autre
construction édifiée sur le fonds
dominant peuvent reposer sur un
mur du fonds servant.
C'est au propriétaire du
bâtiment asservi à tenir le mur
en état de supporter la servitude,
s'il n'en a été autrement convenu
; mais il peut se délivrer de cette
charge en abandonnant le mur.
 CC 1825, art. 708

Art. 701. The servitude of
view is the right by which the
owner of the dominant estate
enjoys a view; this includes the
right to prevent the raising of
constructions on the servient
estate that would obstruct the
view.

Art. 701. La servitude de vue
est le droit en vertu duquel le
propriétaire du fonds dominant
jouit d’une vue libre, ce qui
implique le droit d’empêcher
l’édification sur le fonds servant
de constructions susceptibles de
l’obstruer.

Art. 702. The servitude of
prohibition of view is the right of
the owner of the dominant estate

Art.702. La servitude de
prohibition de vue est le droit du
propriétaire du fonds dominant
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to prevent or limit openings of
view on the servient estate.

d’empêcher ou de restreindre les
ouvertures avec vue sur le fonds
servant.

Art. 703. The servitude of
light is the right by which the
owner of the dominant estate is
entitled to make openings in a
common wall for the admission
of light; this includes the right to
prevent the neighbor from
making an obstruction.

Art.703. La servitude de jour
confère au propriétaire du fonds
dominant le droit de pratiquer
des ouvertures dans un mur
mitoyen afin d’assurer le
passage de la lumière, ce qui
inclut le droit d’en empêcher
l’obstruction par le voisin.

Art. 704. The servitude of
prohibition of light is the right of
the owner of the dominant estate
to prevent his neighbor from
making an opening in his own
wall for the admission of light or
that limits him to certain lights
only.

Art. 704. La servitude de
prohibition de jours donne au
propriétaire du fonds dominant
le droit d’empêcher le voisin
d’ouvrir son propre mur pour
prendre un jour, ou qui borne la
liberté de prendre de certains
jours.  CC 1825, art. 713

Art. 705. The servitude of
passage is the right for the
benefit of the dominant estate
whereby persons, animals,
utilities, or vehicles are permitted
to pass through the servient
estate. Unless the title provides
otherwise, the extent of the right
and the mode of its exercise shall
be suitable for the kind of traffic
or utility necessary for the
reasonable use of the dominant
estate. [Acts 2012, No. 739, §1,
eff. Aug. 1, 2012]

Art.705. La servitude de
passage est le droit au profit du
fonds dominant par lequel les
personnes, les animaux, les
réseaux d’utilité publique ou les
véhicules sont autorisés à passer
par le fonds servant. S'il n'en a
été autrement convenu, l’étendue
du droit ainsi que ses modalités
d’exercice doivent correspondre
au type de circulation ou de
réseau d’utilité publique
nécessaire à l’usage raisonnable
du fonds dominant. [Loi de 2012,
n° 739, §1, en vigueur le 1er août
2012]

Art. 706. Predial servitudes
are either affirmative or negative.
Affirmative servitudes are
those that give the right to the
owner of the dominant estate to
do a certain thing on the servient
estate. Such are the servitudes of
right of way, drain, and support.
Negative servitudes are those
that impose on the owner of the
servient estate the duty to abstain

Art.706. Les servitudes
réelles sont affirmatives ou
négatives.
Les servitudes affirmatives
sont celles qui confèrent au
propriétaire du fonds dominant
le droit de faire certaines choses
sur le fonds servant. Il en va
ainsi des servitudes de passage,
d’écoulement et d’appui.
Les servitudes négatives sont
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from doing something on his
estate. Such are the servitudes of
prohibition of building and of the
use of an estate as a commercial
or industrial establishment.

celles qui imposent au
propriétaire du fonds servant une
obligation de ne pas faire
certaines choses sur son fonds. Il
en va ainsi des servitudes
interdisant de bâtir et des
servitudes de non-usage du fonds
à des fins commerciales ou
industrielles.

Art. 707. Predial servitudes
are either apparent or
nonapparent. Apparent servitudes
are those that are perceivable by
exterior signs, works, or
constructions; such as a roadway,
a window in a common wall, or
an aqueduct.
Nonapparent servitudes are
those that have no exterior sign
of their existence; such as the
prohibition of building on an
estate or of building above a
particular height.

Art. 707. Les servitudes
réelles sont apparentes ou non
apparentes.
Les servitudes apparentes
sont celles qui s'annoncent par
des signes extérieurs, des
ouvrages ou des constructions,
comme une chaussée, une fenêtre
dans un mur mitoyen ou un
aqueduc.
Les servitudes non
apparentes sont celles qui n’ont
pas de signes extérieurs de leur
existence, comme la prohibition
de bâtir sur un fonds, ou de ne
bâtir qu’à une hauteur
déterminée.  CC 1825, art. 724

SECTION 2 ESTABLISHMENT OF
PREDIAL SERVITUDES BY
TITLE

SECTION 2 - DE
L’ÉTABLISSEMENT DES
SERVITUDES RÉELLES PAR
TITRE

Art. 708. The establishment
of a predial servitude by title is
an alienation of a part of the
property to which the laws
governing alienation of
immovables apply.

Art. 708. L’établissement
d’une servitude réelle par titre
est un acte de disposition d’une
partie d’un bien, régi par les
règles relatives à la disposition
des biens immobiliers.

Art. 709. A mandatary may
establish a predial servitude if he
has an express and special power
to do so.

Art. 709. Un mandataire
peut établir une servitude réelle
s’il a le pouvoir exprès et spécial
de le faire.

Art. 710. The naked owner
may establish a predial servitude
that does not infringe on the
rights of the usufructuary or that
is to take effect at the termination

Art. 710. Le nu-propriétaire
peut établir une servitude réelle
qui ne porte aucune atteinte aux
droits de l’usufruitier, ou
commence à la fin de l’usufruit.
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of the usufruct.
The consent of the
usufructuary is required for the
establishment of any other
predial servitude.

Le consentement de
l’usufruitier doit être obtenu
pour l’établissement de toute
autre servitude réelle.

Art. 711. The usufructuary
may not establish on the estate of
which he has the usufruct any
charges in the nature of predial
servitudes.

Art. 711. L'usufruitier ne
peut accorder sur le fonds dont il
a l'usufruit aucun droit qui
puisse être qualifié de servitude
réelle.  CC 1825, art. 733

Art. 712. A person having
ownership subject to a term or
the happening of a condition may
establish a predial servitude, but
it ceases with his right.

Art. 712. La personne dont le
droit de propriété est assorti
d’un terme ou dépend de
l’accomplissement d’une
condition peut établir une
servitude réelle, mais elle
s'évanouit avec son droit.
 CC 1825, art. 732

Art. 713. A purchaser under a
reserved right of redemption may
establish a predial servitude on
the property, but it ceases if the
seller exercises his right of
redemption.

Art. 713. L’acquéreur sous
faculté de rachat ou de réméré
peut établir une servitude réelle
sur le bien, mais elle cesse si le
vendeur exerce son droit de
rachat.  CC 1825, art. 731

Art. 714. A predial servitude
on an estate owned in indivision
may be established only with the
consent of all the co-owners.
When a co-owner purports to
establish a servitude on the entire
estate, the contract is not null;
but, its execution is suspended
until the consent of all co-owners
is obtained.

Art. 714. Une servitude
réelle sur un fonds indivis ne
peut être établie qu’avec le
consentement de tous les
copropriétaires.
Lorsqu’un copropriétaire
établit une servitude sur
l’ensemble du fonds, le contrat
n’est pas nul, mais l’exécution
est suspendue jusqu’à ce que
tous les copropriétaires y aient
consenti.  CC 1825, art. 734

Art. 715. A co-owner who has
consented to the establishment of
a predial servitude on the entire
estate owned in indivision may
not prevent its exercise on the
ground that the consent of his coowner has not been obtained.
If he becomes owner of the
whole estate by any means which

Art. 715. Le copropriétaire
qui a consenti à l'établissement
d'une servitude sur l’ensemble du
fonds commun, ne peut pas, pour
en empêcher l'exercice, opposer
le défaut de consentement de ses
copropriétaires.
S’il devient seul propriétaire
du fonds, par quelque moyen que
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terminates the indivision, the
predial servitude to which he has
consented burdens his property.

ce soit causant l’extinction de
l’indivision, il est obligé de
laisser exercer la servitude qu’il
avait seul établie auparavant.
 CC 1825, art. 735

Art. 716. When a co-owner
has consented to the
establishment of a predial
servitude on his undivided part
only, the consent of the other coowners is not required, but the
exercise of the servitude is
suspended until his divided part
is determined at the termination
of the state of indivision.

Art. 716. Lorsque le
copropriétaire n'a établi la
servitude que sur sa part
indivise, le consentement des
autres copropriétaires n'est pas
nécessaire, mais l'exercice de la
servitude demeure suspendu,
jusqu’à ce que la portion de celui
qui l’a accordée, soit reconnue
par un partage.
 CC 1825, art. 736

Art. 717. If the estate owned
in indivision is partitioned in
kind, the servitude established by
a co-owner on his undivided part
burdens only the part allotted to
him.

Art. 717. Si le fonds indivis
est partagé en nature, la
servitude établie par un
copropriétaire sur sa part
indivise ne grève que la part qui
lui est assignée.

Art. 718. If the estate is
partitioned by licitation and the
co-owner who consented to the
establishment of the predial
servitude acquires the ownership
of the whole, the servitude
burdens the entire estate as if the
co-owner had always been sole
owner. If the entire estate is
adjudicated to any other person
the right granted by the co-owner
is extinguished.

Art. 718. Lorsque le fonds est
partagé par licitation et que le
copropriétaire qui a accordé la
servitude réelle acquiert la
propriété de l’ensemble, alors la
servitude aura lieu pour le tout,
comme s'il en eût toujours été
seul propriétaire. Si le fonds est
adjugé à toute autre personne, le
droit ainsi accordé par le
copropriétaire s’éteint.
 CC 1825, art. 737

Art. 719. Except as provided
in Article 718, the successor of
the co-owner who has consented
to the establishment of a predial
servitude, whether on the entire
estate owned in indivision or on
his undivided part only, occupies
the same position as his ancestor.
If he becomes owner of a divided
part of the estate the servitude
burdens that part, and if he
becomes owner of the whole the

Art. 719. Sous réserve des
dispositions de l’article 718, le
successeur du copropriétaire
ayant consenti à l’établissement
d’une servitude réelle, sur
l’ensemble du bien indivis ou sur
sa seule part indivise, se trouve
dans la même situation que son
auteur. S’il devient propriétaire
d’une part indivise du bien, la
servitude grève ladite part. S’il
devient propriétaire de
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servitude burdens the entire
estate.

l’ensemble, la servitude porte sur
l’intégralité du fonds.

Art. 720. The owner of the
servient estate may establish
thereon additional servitudes,
provided they do not affect
adversely the rights of the owner
of the dominant estate.

Art. 720. Le propriétaire du
fonds servant peut y établir des
servitudes supplémentaires,
pourvu qu’elles ne préjudicient
pas aux droits du propriétaire du
fonds dominant.
 CC 1825, art. 745

Art. 721. A predial servitude
may be established on mortgaged
property. If the servitude
diminishes the value of the estate
to the substantial detriment of the
mortgagee, he may demand
immediate payment of the debt.
If there is a sale for the
enforcement of the mortgage the
property is sold free of all
servitudes established after the
mortgage. In such a case, the
acquirer of the servitude has an
action for the restitution of its
value against the owner who
established it.

Art. 721. Une servitude
réelle peut être établie sur un
bien hypothéqué. Si la servitude
déprécie la valeur du fonds au
détriment substantiel du
créancier hypothécaire, celui-ci
peut prétendre au recouvrement
immédiat de sa créance.
Dans le cas d’une vente pour
la purge de l’hypothèque, le bien
est vendu libre de toute servitude
établie après l’hypothèque. Dans
une telle hypothèse, l’acquéreur
de la servitude dispose d’une
action en indemnité contre le
propriétaire qui lui a accordé la
servitude.  CC 1825, art. 746

Art. 722. Predial servitudes
are established by all acts by
which immovables may be
transferred. Delivery of the act of
transfer or use of the right by the
owner of the dominant estate
constitutes tradition.

Art. 722. Les servitudes
réelles se constituent par toute
espèce d’actes translatifs de
propriété immobilière. La
délivrance de l’acte ou l’usage
que le propriétaire du fonds
dominant fait de ce droit tient
lieu de tradition.

Art. 723. Predial servitudes
may be established on public
things, including property of the
state, its agencies and political
subdivisions.

Art. 723. Les servitudes
réelles peuvent être établies sur
des choses publiques, lesquelles
incluent les biens de l’état, ses
démembrements et collectivités
publiques.

Art. 724. A predial servitude
may be established on several
estates for the benefit of one
estate. One estate may be
subjected to a servitude for the

Art. 724. Une servitude
réelle peut être établie sur
plusieurs fonds différents au
profit d’un seul. Un fonds peut
être assujetti à une servitude
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benefit of several estates.

envers divers fonds.
 CC 1825, art. 741

Art. 725. The title that
establishes a servitude for the
benefit of the dominant estate
may also establish a servitude on
the dominant estate for the
benefit of the servient estate.

Art. 725. Le titre établissant
une servitude au profit du fonds
dominant peut également établir
une servitude sur le fonds
dominant au profit du fonds
servant.

Art. 726. Parties may agree to
establish a predial servitude on,
or for the benefit of, an estate of
which one is not then the owner.
If the ownership is acquired, the
servitude is established.
Parties may agree that a
building not yet built will be
subjected to a servitude or that it
will have the benefit of a
servitude when it is built.

Art. 726. On peut établir une
servitude réelle sur ou pour un
fonds dont on n’est pas encore
propriétaire. Si la propriété est
acquise, la servitude est établie.
On peut même stipuler qu'un
édifice qui n'est pas encore bâti,
supportera une servitude, ou en
jouira quand il sera construit.
 CC 1825, art. 743

Art. 727. A predial servitude
may be established on a certain
part of an estate, if that part is
sufficiently described.

Art. 727 On peut établir une
servitude sur une certaine partie
d'un fonds, pourvu que cette
partie fasse l’objet d’une
description suffisante.
 CC 1825, art. 744

Art. 728. The use of a predial
servitude may be limited to
certain times. Thus, the rights of
drawing water and of passage
may be confined to designated
hours.

Art. 728. L’exercice de la
servitude réelle peut être limité à
certains temps. Ainsi, on peut
dire des droits de puisage et de
passage, qu’ils ne seront exercés
qu’à certaines heures.
 CC 1825, art. 747

Art. 729. Legal and natural
servitudes may be altered by
agreement of the parties if the
public interest is not affected
adversely.

Art. 729. On peut déroger
par convention aux servitudes
légales et naturelles, pourvu
qu'on ne lèse point l’intérêt
public.  CC 1825, art. 748

Art. 730. Doubt as to the
existence, extent, or manner of
exercise of a predial servitude
shall be resolved in favor of the
servient estate.

Art. 730. Le doute sur
l’existence, l’étendue ou les
modalités d’exercice de la
servitude réelle doit être résolu
en faveur du fonds servant.
 CC 1825, art. 749
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Art. 731. A charge established
on an estate expressly for the
benefit of another estate is a
predial servitude although it is
not so designated.

Art. 731. La charge grevant
un fonds expressément en faveur
d’un autre est une servitude
réelle, quand bien même ce droit
ne serait pas qualifié de
servitude.  CC 1825, art. 750

Art. 732. When the act does
not declare expressly that the
right granted is for the benefit of
an estate or for the benefit of a
particular person, the nature of
the right is determined in
accordance with the following
rules.

Art. 732. Lorsque l’acte
n'énonce pas expressément que
le droit est accordé en faveur
d’un fonds ou d’une personne
particulière, la nature du droit
est déterminée conformément aux
règles suivantes.

Art. 733. When the right
granted be of a nature to confer
an advantage on an estate, it is
presumed to be a predial
servitude.

Art. 733. Lorsque le droit
concédé est de nature à procurer
une utilité réelle au fonds, il est
présumé être une servitude
réelle.  CC 1825, art. 752

Art. 734. When the right
granted is merely for the
convenience of a person, it is not
considered to be a predial
servitude, unless it is acquired by
a person as owner of an estate for
himself, his heirs and assigns.

Art. 734. Lorsque le droit
concédé ne procure qu’un
agrément personnel à l'individu,
il ne peut être considéré comme
une servitude réelle, sauf s’il est
acquis par une personne en
qualité de propriétaire d’un
fonds, et tant pour lui que pour
ses successeurs ou ayant-cause.
 CC 1825, art. 753

SECTION 3 - ACQUISITION
OF CONVENTIONAL
SERVITUDES FOR THE
DOMINANT ESTATE

SECTION 3 - DE
L’ACQUISITION DES
SERVITUDES
CONVENTIONNELLES POUR
LE FONDS DOMINANT

Art. 735. A predial servitude
may be acquired for the benefit
of the dominant estate by the
owner of that estate or by any
other person acting in his name
or in his behalf.

Art. 735. La servitude réelle
peut être acquise en faveur du
fonds dominant par le
propriétaire dudit fonds ou par
toute autre personne agissant en
son nom ou pour son compte.

Art. 736. An incompetent
may acquire a predial servitude
for the benefit of his estate
without the assistance of the

Art.736. Une personne
incapable peut acquérir une
servitude réelle en faveur de son
fonds sans l’assistance de
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administrator of his patrimony or
of his tutor or curator.

l’administrateur de son
patrimoine ou de son tuteur ou
curateur.

Art. 737. The owner of the
dominant estate may renounce
the contract by which a predial
servitude was acquired for the
benefit of his estate, if he finds
the contract onerous, and if the
contract was made without his
authority or while he was
incompetent.

Art. 737. Le propriétaire du
fonds dominant peut renoncer à
la convention par laquelle la
servitude réelle a été acquise en
faveur de son fonds, s’il trouve la
convention onéreuse et si elle a
été conclue sans son mandat ou
lorsqu’il était incapable.
 CC 1825, art. 757

Art. 738. The grantor may not
revoke the servitude on the
ground that the person who
acquired it for the benefit of the
dominant estate was not the
owner, that he was incompetent,
or that he lacked authority.

Art. 738. Le cédant ne peut
révoquer la servitude au motif
que la personne l’ayant acquise
en faveur du fonds dominant n’en
était pas propriétaire, était
incapable ou n’avait pas mandat
pour ce faire.

Art. 739. Nonapparent
servitudes may be acquired by
title only, including a declaration
of destination under Article 741.
[Amended by Acts 1978, No.
479, §1]

Art. 739. Les servitudes non
apparentes ne s’acquièrent que
par titre, y compris une
déclaration de destination du
père de famille conformément à
l’article 741. [Modifié par la Loi
de 1978, n° 479, §1]

Art. 740. Apparent servitudes
may be acquired by title, by
destination of the owner, or by
acquisitive prescription.

Art. 740. Les servitudes
apparentes s’acquièrent par
titre, par destination du père de
famille ou par prescription
acquisitive.

Art. 741. Destination of the
owner is a relationship
established between two estates
owned by the same owner that
would be a predial servitude if
the estates belonged to different
owners.
When the two estates cease to
belong to the same owner, unless
there is express provision to the
contrary, an apparent servitude
comes into existence of right and
a nonapparent servitude comes
into existence if the owner has

Art. 741. On appelle
destination du père de famille la
relation établie entre deux fonds
appartenant au même
propriétaire, laquelle
constituerait une servitude réelle
si lesdits fonds appartenaient à
des propriétaires distincts.
Sauf clause contraire,
lorsque les deux fonds cessent
d’appartenir au même
propriétaire, la servitude
apparente est créée de plein droit
; la servitude non apparente
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previously filed for registry in
the conveyance records of the
parish in which the immovable is
located a formal declaration
establishing the destination.
[Amended by Acts 1978, No.
479, §1]

n’est créée que si le propriétaire
a préalablement déposé une
demande d’enregistrement de la
déclaration formelle établissant
la destination du père de famille,
au registre de transferts de
propriété de la paroisse8 du lieu
de situation de l’immeuble.
[Modifié par la Loi de 1978,
n° 479, §1]

Art. 742. The laws governing
acquisitive prescription of
immovable property apply to
apparent servitudes. An apparent
servitude may be acquired by
peaceable and uninterrupted
possession of the right for ten
years in good faith and by just
title; it may also be acquired by
uninterrupted possession for
thirty years without title or good
faith.

Art. 742. Les lois régissant la
prescription acquisitive des biens
immeubles s’appliquent aux
servitudes apparentes. La
servitude apparente s’acquiert
par la possession paisible et
ininterrompue, de bonne foi et
par juste titre, pendant une
période de dix ans. Elle
s’acquiert également par la
possession ininterrompue de
trente ans sans titre ou de
mauvaise foi.

Art. 743. Rights that are
necessary for the use of a
servitude are acquired at the time
the servitude is established. They
are to be exercised in a way least
inconvenient for the servient
estate.

Art. 743. Les droits
nécessaires à l’usage de la
servitude s’acquièrent au
moment de son établissement. Ils
doivent être exercés de la
manière la moins incommode
pour le fonds servant.

SECTION 4 - RIGHTS OF THE
OWNER OF THE DOMINANT
ESTATE

SECTION 4 - DES DROITS DU
PROPRIÉTAIRE DU FONDS
DOMINANT

Art. 744. The owner of the
dominant estate has the right to
make at his expense all the works
that are necessary for the use and
preservation of the servitude.

Art. 744. Le propriétaire du
fonds dominant a le droit de faire
à ses frais tous les ouvrages
nécessaires pour l’usage et la
conservation de la servitude.
 CC FR, art. 699

Art. 745. The owner of the
dominant estate has the right to
enter with his workmen and
equipment into the part of the

Art. 745. Le propriétaire du
fonds dominant a le droit d’aller
avec ses ouvriers et équipements
à l’endroit du fonds servant où il

Voir supra note 2.
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servient estate that is needed for
the construction or repair of
works required for the use and
preservation of the servitude. He
may deposit materials to be used
for the works and the debris that
may result, under the obligation
of causing the least possible
damage and of removing them as
soon as possible.

a besoin de construire ou réparer
les ouvrages qui sont nécessaires
à l'exercice de la servitude. Il
peut y déposer les matériaux
qu’il veut employer à ces
ouvrages et les décombres qu’il
peut en retirer, à la charge par
lui de causer le moins de
dommage qu'il pourra et de
débarrasser les lieux le plus tôt
possible.
 CC 1825, art. 698, 770

Art. 746. If the act
establishing the servitude binds
the owner of the servient estate
to make the necessary works at
his own expense, he may
exonerate himself by abandoning
the servient estate or the part of it
on which the servitude is granted
to the owner of the dominant
estate.

Art. 746. Si le titre
établissant la servitude contraint
le propriétaire du fonds servant à
réaliser à ses frais les ouvrages
nécessaires, il peut s’en
affranchir en abandonnant le
fonds servant ou la portion de
celui-ci grevée de la servitude au
propriétaire du fonds dominant.
 CC 1825, art. 771

Art. 747. If the dominant
estate is divided, the servitude
remains due to each part,
provided that no additional
burden is imposed on the servient
estate. Thus, in case of a right of
passage, all the owners are bound
to exercise that right through the
same place.

Art. 748. The owner of the
servient estate may do nothing
tending to diminish or make
more inconvenient the use of the
servitude.
If the original location has
become more burdensome for the
owner of the servient estate, or if
it prevents him from making
useful improvements on his
estate, he may provide another
equally convenient location for
the exercise of the servitude

Art. 747. Si le fonds
dominant pour lequel la
servitude a été établie, vient à
être divisé, la servitude reste due
pour chaque portion, sans
néanmoins que la condition du
fonds servant soit aggravée.
Ainsi par exemple, s’il s’agit
d’un droit de passage, tous les
copropriétaires sont obligés de
l’exercer par le même endroit.
 CC 1825, art. 772
Art. 748. Le propriétaire du
fonds servant ne peut rien faire
qui tende à en diminuer l’usage
ou à le rendre plus incommode.
Si la situation d’origine est
devenue plus onéreuse au
propriétaire du fonds servant, ou
si elle l’empêche d’y faire des
réparations avantageuses, il peut
offrir au propriétaire de l’autre
fonds un endroit aussi commode
pour l’exercice de ses droits, et
celui-ci ne peut pas le refuser.
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which the owner of the dominant
estate is bound to accept. All
expenses of relocation are borne
by the owner of the servient
estate.

Tous les frais de déplacement de
l’assiette de la servitude sont
supportés par le propriétaire du
fonds servant.
 CC 1825, art. 773

Art. 749. If the title is silent
as to the extent and manner of
use of the servitude, the intention
of the parties is to be determined
in the light of its purpose.

Art. 749. En cas de silence
du titre établissant la servitude
quant à son étendue et à ses
modalités d’exercice, l’intention
des parties doit être déterminée
au regard de sa finalité.

Art. 750. If the title does not
specify the location of the
servitude, the owner of the
servient estate shall designate the
location.

Art. 750. Si l’emplacement
de la servitude n’est pas réglé
par le titre, le propriétaire du
fonds servant doit le désigner.
 CC 1825, art. 775

SECTION 5 - EXTINCTION OF
PREDIAL SERVITUDES

SECTION 5 - DE
L’EXTINCTION DES
SERVITUDES RÉELLES

Art. 751. A predial servitude
is extinguished by the permanent
and total destruction of the
dominant estate or of the part of
the servient estate burdened with
the servitude.

Art. 751. La servitude réelle
s’éteint par la ruine permanente
et totale du fonds dominant ou de
la portion du fonds servant
grevée de la servitude.

Art. 752. If the exercise of the
servitude becomes impossible
because the things necessary for
its exercise have undergone such
a change that the servitude can
no longer be used, the servitude
is not extinguished; it resumes its
effect when things are
reestablished so that they may
again be used, unless prescription
has accrued.

Art. 752. Si les choses
nécessaires à l'exercice de la
servitude ont subi un changement
tel que son usage devienne
impossible, elle n'est pas éteinte
pour autant. Elle reprend son
effet si les choses sont rétablies
de manière à ce qu’on puisse en
user de nouveau, à moins que la
servitude ne soit prescrite.
 CC 1825, art. 779 & 781

Art. 753. A predial servitude
is extinguished by nonuse for ten
years.

Art. 753. La servitude réelle
s’éteint par le non usage pendant
dix ans.  CC 1825, art. 785

Art. 754. Prescription of
nonuse begins to run for
affirmative servitudes from the
date of their last use, and for

Art. 754. La prescription
résultant du non-usage
commence à courir du jour de
leur dernier usage, pour les

569

570

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES
negative servitudes from the date
of the occurrence of an event
contrary to the servitude.
An event contrary to the
servitude is such as the
destruction of works necessary
for its exercise or the
construction of works that
prevent its exercise.

servitudes affirmatives, et du jour
où il a été fait un acte contraire à
la servitude, pour les servitudes
négatives.
Sont contraires à la servitude
les actes tels que la destruction
des ouvrages nécessaires à son
exercice, ou la construction
d’ouvrages empêchant son
exercice.

Art. 755. If the owner of the
dominant estate is prevented
from using the servitude by an
obstacle that he can neither
prevent nor remove, the
prescription of nonuse is
suspended on that account for a
period of up to ten years.

Art. 755. Si le propriétaire
du fonds dominant est empêché
d'user de la servitude par un
obstacle qu’il n'a pu ni prévenir
ni faire cesser, la prescription de
non-usage est suspendue de ce
fait pour une période maximale
de dix ans.  CC 1825, art. 788

Art. 756. If the servitude
cannot be exercised on account
of the destruction of a building or
other construction that belongs to
the owner of the dominant estate,
prescription is not suspended. If
the building or other construction
belongs to the owner of the
servient estate, the preceding
article applies.

Art. 756. Si la servitude ne
peut être exercée en raison de la
destruction d’un bâtiment ou de
toute autre construction
appartenant au propriétaire du
fonds dominant, la prescription
n’est pas suspendue. Si le
bâtiment ou toute autre
construction appartient au
propriétaire du fonds servant, il
est fait application de l’article
précédent.

Art. 757. A predial servitude
is preserved by the use made of it
by anyone, even a stranger, if it
is used as appertaining to the
dominant estate.

Art. 757. La servitude réelle
est conservée par l'usage qu’en
fait une personne, même
étrangère, pourvu qu'elle le fasse
à l’occasion du fonds dominant.
 CC 1825, art. 790

Art. 758. The prescription of
nonuse does not run against
natural servitudes.

Art. 758. La prescription par
le non-usage ne court pas contre
les servitudes naturelles.

Art. 759. A partial use of the
servitude constitutes use of the
whole.

Art. 759. L’usage partiel de
la servitude vaut usage du tout.

Art. 760. A more extensive
use of the servitude than that

Art. 760. Un usage plus
étendu de la servitude que celui
accordé par le titre ne résulte
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granted by the title does not
result in the acquisition of
additional rights for the dominant
estate unless it be by acquisitive
prescription.

pas en l’octroi de droits
supplémentaires pour le fonds
dominant, à moins qu’il ne
s’agisse de prescription
acquisitive.  CC 1825, art. 793

Art. 761. The use of a right
that is only accessory to the
servitude is not use of the
servitude.

Art. 761. Si le propriétaire
n'a joui que de l’accessoire qui
était nécessaire à l’exercice de la
servitude, il ne sera pas censé
avoir usé de son droit.
 CC 1825, art. 795

Art. 762. If the dominant
estate is owned in indivision, the
use that a co-owner makes of the
servitude prevents the running of
prescription as to all.
If the dominant estate is
partitioned, the use of the
servitude by each owner
preserves it for his estate only.

Art. 762. Lorsque le fonds
dominant est indivis, l’usage de
la servitude par un
copropriétaire empêche la
prescription à l’égard de tous.
Lorsque le fonds dominant
cesse d'être indivis par un
partage, chacun de ceux qui en
étaient copropriétaires, ne
conserve la servitude que pour
lui, par l'usage qu'il en fait.
 CC 1825, art. 797 & 799

Art. 763. The prescription of
nonuse is not suspended by the
minority or other disability of the
owner of the dominant estate.

Art. 763. La prescription par
le non-usage n’est pas suspendue
par la minorité ou autre
incapacité du propriétaire du
fonds dominant.

Art. 764. When the
prescription of nonuse is pleaded,
the owner of the dominant estate
has the burden of proving that he
or some other person has made
use of the servitude as
appertaining to his estate during
the period of time required for
the accrual of the prescription.
[Acts 1977, No. 514, §1]

Art. 764. Lorsque la
prescription par non-usage est
invoquée, il incombe au
propriétaire du fonds dominant
de prouver que lui ou qu’une
autre personne a fait usage de
cette servitude à l’occasion de
son fonds pendant le temps utile
pour la prescription.

Art. 765. A predial servitude
is extinguished when the
dominant and the servient estates
are acquired in their entirety by
the same person.

Art. 765. La servitude réelle
est éteinte lorsque les fonds
dominant et servant sont
entièrement réunis dans la même
main.  CC 1825, art. 801
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Art. 766. When the union of
the two estates is made under
resolutory condition, or if it
cease by legal eviction, the
servitude is suspended and not
extinguished.

Art. 766. Lorsque la réunion
des deux fonds est faite sous
condition résolutoire, ou si elle
cesse par éviction légale, la
servitude est suspendue et non
éteinte.  CC 1825, art. 802

Art. 767. Until a successor
has formally or informally
accepted a succession, confusion
does not take place. If the
successor renounces the
succession, the servitudes
continue to exist. [Acts 2001,
No. 572, §1]

Art. 767. La confusion
n’opère pas tant que la
succession n’a pas été acceptée
expressément ou tacitement. Si le
successeur renonce à la
succession, la servitude continue
d’exister. [Loi de 2001, n° 514,
§1]  CC 1825, art. 803

Art. 768. Confusion does not
take place between separate
property and community
property of the spouses. Thus, if
the servient estate belongs to one
of the spouses and the dominant
estate is acquired as a community
asset, the servitude continues to
exist.

Art. 768. La confusion
n’opère pas entre les biens
propres et les biens communs des
époux. Ainsi, lorsque le fonds
servant appartient à l’un des
époux et que le fonds dominant
est acquis comme bien de la
communauté, la servitude
continue d’exister.

Art. 769. A servitude that has
been extinguished by confusion
may be reestablished only in the
manner by which a servitude
may be created.

Art. 769. La servitude éteinte
par confusion ne peut revivre que
par une nouvelle constitution.
 CC 1825, art. 808

Art. 770. A predial servitude
is extinguished by the
abandonment of the servient
estate, or of the part on which the
servitude is exercised. It must be
evidenced by a written act. The
owner of the dominant estate is
bound to accept it and confusion
takes place.

Art. 770. La servitude réelle
est éteinte par l’abandon du
fonds servant, ou de la portion
sur laquelle elle est exercée. La
preuve écrite doit en être
rapportée. Le propriétaire du
fonds dominant est tenu de
l’accepter et la confusion opère.
 CC 1825, art. 809

Art. 771. A predial servitude
is extinguished by an express and
written renunciation by the
owner of the dominant estate.

Art. 771. La servitude réelle
s’éteint par renonciation
expresse et écrite du propriétaire
du fonds dominant.

Art. 772. A renunciation of a
servitude by a co-owner of the
dominant estate does not

Art. 772. La renonciation à
une servitude par un
copropriétaire du fonds
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discharge the servient estate, but
deprives him of the right to use
the servitude.

dominant ne décharge pas le
fonds servant, mais le prive de
son droit d’user de la servitude.

Art. 773. A predial servitude
established for a term or under a
resolutory condition is
extinguished upon the expiration
of the term or the happening of
the condition.

Art. 773. La servitude réelle
assortie d’un terme ou établie
sous condition résolutoire
s’éteint par l’échéance du terme
ou par l’accomplissement de la
condition.

Art. 774. A predial servitude
is extinguished by the dissolution
of the right of the person who
established it.

Art. 774. La servitude réelle
s’éteint par la résolution du droit
de celui qui l’a constituée.
 CC 1825, art. 818

TITLE V. BUILDING
RESTRICTIONS
[Acts 1977, No. 170, §1]

TITRE V. DES RESTRICTIONS
AU DROIT DE CONSTRUIRE
[Loi de 1977, n° 170, § 1]

Art. 775. Building restrictions
are charges imposed by the
owner of an immovable in
pursuance of a general plan
governing building standards,
specified uses, and
improvements. The plan must be
feasible and capable of being
preserved.

Art. 775. Les restrictions au
droit de construire sont des
charges imposées par le
propriétaire d’un immeuble en
vue d’un projet général régissant
des standards de construction,
des usages spécifiques et des
améliorations. Le projet doit être
réalisable et durable.

Art. 776. Building restrictions
may be established only by
juridical act executed by the
owner of an immovable or by all
the owners of the affected
immovables. Once established,
building restrictions may be
amended or terminated as
provided in this Title. [Acts
1999, No. 309, §1, eff. June 16,
1999]

Art. 776. Les restrictions au
droit de construire ne peuvent
être établies que par acte
juridique passé par le
propriétaire de l’immeuble ou
par tous les propriétaires des
immeubles concernés. Une fois
établies, elles peuvent être
modifiées ou éteintes
conformément au présent titre.
[Loi de 1999, n° 309, §1, en
vigueur le 16 juin 1999]

Art. 777. Building restrictions
are incorporeal immovables and
real rights likened to predial
servitudes.
They are regulated by
application of the rules
governing predial servitudes to

Art. 777. Les restrictions au
droit de construire sont des
immeubles incorporels et des
droits réels semblables aux
servitudes réelles. Elles sont
régies par les règles applicables
aux servitudes réelles dans la
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the extent that their application is
compatible with the nature of
building restrictions.

mesure où leur application est
compatible avec la nature
desdites restrictions.

Art. 778. Building restrictions
may impose on owners of
immovables affirmative duties
that are reasonable and necessary
for the maintenance of the
general plan. Building
restrictions may not impose upon
the owner of an immovable or
his successors the obligation to
pay a fee or other charge on the
occasion of an alienation, lease
or encumbrance of the
immovable. [Acts 2010, No. 938,
§2, eff. Jul. 2, 2010]

Art. 778. Les restrictions au
droit de construire peuvent
imposer au propriétaire de
l’immeuble des obligations
positives dans la mesure où elles
sont raisonnables et nécessaires
à la préservation du projet
général. Les restrictions ne
sauraient imposer au
propriétaire de l’immeuble ou à
ses héritiers l’obligation de
payer des frais ou toute autre
charge à l’occasion de la vente,
du louage ou de l’hypothèque de
l’immeuble. [Loi de 2010, n°
938, §2, en vigueur le 2 juillet
2010]

Art. 779. Building restrictions
may be enforced by mandatory
and prohibitory injunctions
without regard to the limitations
of Article 3601 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.

Art. 779. Les restrictions au
droit de construire sont mises en
œuvre par injonctions de faire ou
de ne pas faire sans égard aux
restrictions prévues à l’article
3601 du Code de procédure
civile.

Art. 780. Building restrictions
may be amended, whether such
amendment lessens or increases a
restriction, or may terminate or
be terminated, as provided in the
act that establishes them. In the
absence of such provision,
building restrictions may be
amended or terminated for the
whole or a part of the restricted
area by agreement of owners
representing more than one-half
of the land area affected by the
restrictions, excluding streets and
street rights-of-way, if the
restrictions have been in effect
for at least fifteen years, or by
agreement of both owners
representing two-thirds of the
land area affected and two-thirds

Art. 780. Conformément aux
dispositions de l’acte qui les
établit, les restrictions au droit
de construire peuvent s’éteindre
ou être éteintes ; elles peuvent
être modifiées, que la
modification en amoindrisse ou
en accroisse l’étendue. À défaut
de telles dispositions, elles
peuvent être éteintes ou
modifiées sur la totalité ou une
partie de la zone faisant l’objet
des restrictions, par l’accord des
propriétaires représentant plus
de la moitié de la surface de cette
zone, à l’exclusion des rues et
des voies où s’exercent les droits
de passage, lorsque les
restrictions sont effectives depuis
au moins quinze ans, ou par
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of the owners of the land affected
by the restrictions, excluding
streets and street rights-of-way, if
the restrictions have been in
effect for more than ten years.
[Acts 1977, No. 170, §1.
Amended by Acts 1980, No. 310,
§1. Acts 1983, No. 129, §1; Acts
1999, No. 309, §1, eff. June 16,
1999]

l’accord des deux tiers des
propriétaires, pourvu qu’ils
représentent aussi les deux tiers
de la surface de la zone, à
l’exclusion des rues et des voies
où s’exercent les droits de
passage, lorsque les restrictions
sont effectives depuis plus de dix
ans. [Modifié par la loi de 1980,
n° 310, §1 ; loi de 1983, n° 129,
§1 ; loi de 1999, n° 309, §1, en
vigueur le 16 juin 1999]

Art. 781. No action for
injunction or for damages on
account of the violation of a
building restriction may be
brought after two years from the
commencement of a noticeable
violation. After the lapse of this
period, the immovable on which
the violation occurred is freed of
the restriction that has been
violated. [Acts 1977, No.170, §1]

Art. 781. Aucune demande
d’injonction ou de dommages et
intérêts pour violation d’une
restriction au droit de construire
ne peut être introduite plus de
deux ans après le début d’une
violation patente. Après
l’écoulement de ce délai,
l’immeuble est libéré de la
restriction objet de la violation.

Art. 782. Building restrictions
terminate by abandonment of the
whole plan or by a general
abandonment of a particular
restriction. When the entire plan
is abandoned the affected area is
freed of all restrictions; when a
particular restriction is
abandoned, the affected area is
freed of that restriction only.

Art. 782. Les restrictions au
droit de construire s’éteignent
par l’abandon de l’ensemble du
projet ou par l’abandon général
d’une restriction particulière.
Lorsque la totalité du projet est
abandonné, la zone concernée
est libérée de toute restriction;
lorsqu’une restriction
particulière est abandonnée, la
zone concernée est libérée de
cette seule restriction.

Art. 783. Doubt as to the
existence, validity, or extent of
building restrictions is resolved
in favor of the unrestricted use of
the immovable. The provisions
of the Louisiana Condominium
Act, the Louisiana Timesharing
Act, and the Louisiana
Homeowners Association Act
shall supersede any and all
provisions of this Title in the
event of a conflict. [Acts 1999,
No. 309, §1, eff. Jun. 16, 1999]

Art. 783. Le doute sur
l’existence, la validité ou
l’étendue des restrictions au
droit de construire, est interprété
en faveur de la libre utilisation
de l’immeuble. En cas de conflit,
les dispositions des lois
louisianaises sur la copropriété
(Louisiana Condominium Act), la
jouissance à temps partagé
(Louisiana Timesharing Act) et
les associations de propriétaires
(Louisiana Homeowners
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Association Act) prévalent sur
celles du présent titre. [Loi de
1999, n° 309, §1, en vigueur le
16 juin 1999]
TITLE VI. BOUNDARIES
[Acts 1977, No. 169, §1]

TITRE VI. DU BORNAGE
[Loi de 1977, n° 169, §1]

CHAPTER I - GENERAL
PRINCIPLES

CHAPITRE I - PRINCIPES
GÉNÉRAUX

Art. 784. A boundary is the
line of separation between
contiguous lands. A boundary
marker is a natural or artificial
object that marks on the ground
the line of separation of
contiguous lands.

Art. 784. La limite commune
est la ligne de séparation entre
des fonds contigus. La borne est
un objet naturel ou artificiel qui
marque sur le terrain la ligne
séparative de fonds contigus.
 CC 1825, art. 819

Art. 785. The fixing of the
boundary may involve
determination of the line of
separation between contiguous
lands, if it is uncertain or
disputed; it may also involve the
placement of markers on the
ground, if markers were never
placed, were wrongly placed, or
are no longer to be seen.
The boundary is fixed in
accordance with the following
rules.

Art. 785. Le bornage peut
impliquer la détermination de la
ligne séparant les fonds contigus
si elle est incertaine ou contestée
; elle peut également impliquer
la mise en place de bornes sur le
terrain, si celles-ci n'ont jamais
été placées, ont été mal placées,
ou ne paraissent plus. Le
bornage se fait conformément
aux règles énoncées ci-après.

Art. 786. The boundary may
be fixed upon the demand of an
owner or of one who possesses
as owner. It may also be fixed
upon the demand of a
usufructuary but it is not binding
upon the naked owner unless he
has been made a party to the
proceeding.

Art. 786. Le bornage peut se
faire sur demande d’un
propriétaire ou d’une personne
qui possède comme propriétaire.
Il peut également se faire sur
demande d’un usufruitier mais
ne lie le nu-propriétaire que s'il
a été mis en cause.
 CC 1825, art. 823, 825 & 826

Art. 787. When necessary to
protect his interest, a lessee may
compel the lessor to fix the
boundary of the land subject to
the lease.

Art. 787. Lorsque son intérêt
le commande, le preneur peut
contraindre le bailleur au
bornage du terrain objet du bail.
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Art. 788. The right to compel
the fixing of the boundary
between contiguous lands is
imprescriptible.

Art. 788. L’action en
bornage est imprescriptible.
 CC 1825, art. 821

Art. 789. The boundary may
be fixed judicially or
extrajudicially. It is fixed
extrajudicially when the parties,
by written agreement, determine
the line of separation between
their lands with or without
reference to markers on the
ground.

Art. 789. Le bornage peut
être judiciaire ou amiable. Il est
amiable lorsque, par accord
écrit, les parties déterminent la
ligne séparative entre leurs fonds
en faisant ou non référence aux
bornes.

Art. 790. When the boundary
is fixed extrajudicially costs are
divided equally between the
adjoining owners in the absence
of contrary agreement. When the
boundary is fixed judicially court
costs are taxed in accordance
with the rules of the Code of
Civil Procedure. Expenses of
litigation not taxed as court costs
are borne by the person who has
incurred them.

Art. 790. Sauf convention
contraire, lorsque le bornage est
amiable, il se fait à frais
communs. Lorsqu’il est
judiciaire, les frais sont calculés
conformément aux règles du
Code de procédure civile. Les
frais de justice autres que ceux
imposés par le juge sont à la
charge de celui qui les a
encourus.

Art. 791. When the boundary
has been marked judicially or
extrajudicially, one who removes
boundary markers without court
authority is liable for damages.
He may also be compelled to
restore the markers to their
previous location.

Art. 791. Lorsqu’il y a eu
bornage judiciaire ou amiable,
celui qui enlève des bornes sans
autorisation du juge, est sujet à
une action en dommagesintérêts. Il peut en outre être
contraint à rétablir les bornes
telles qu’elles étaient
auparavant.
 CC 1825, art. 851

CHAPTER 2 - EFFECT OF
TITLES, PRESCRIPTION, OR
POSSESSION

CHAPITRE 2 - DE L'EFFET
DES TITRES, DE LA
PRESCRIPTION OU DE LA
POSSESSION

Art. 792. The court shall fix
the boundary according to the
ownership of the parties; if
neither party proves ownership,
the boundary shall be fixed
according to limits established by
possession.

Art. 792. Le bornage
judiciaire doit se faire d’après le
droit de propriété des parties ; à
défaut de preuve de propriété, la
seule possession doit servir de
règle.  CC 1825, art. 841
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Art. 793. When both parties
rely on titles only, the boundary
shall be fixed according to titles.
When the parties trace their titles
to a common author preference
shall be given to the more
ancient title.

Art. 793. Lorsque les deux
parties ne se fondent que sur des
titres, le bornage se fait d’après
ceux-ci. Lorsque leurs titres
remontent à un auteur commun,
la préférence sera due au titre le
plus ancien.
 CC 1825, art. 843

Art. 794. When a party proves
acquisitive prescription, the
boundary shall be fixed
according to limits established by
prescription rather than titles. If a
party and his ancestors in title
possessed for thirty years without
interruption, within visible
bounds, more land than their title
called for, the boundary shall be
fixed along these bounds.

Art. 794. Lorsqu'une partie
prouve la prescription
acquisitive, le bornage suit la
prescription plutôt que les titres.
Lorsqu'une partie et ses auteurs
en vertu d’un titre, ont possédé,
sans interruption pendant trente
ans, dans des limites visibles,
plus de terrain qu’énoncé par le
titre, le bornage suit ces limites.

Art. 795. When the boundary
is fixed extrajudicially, the
agreement of the parties has the
effect of a compromise.

Art. 795. Lorsque le bornage
est amiable, l'accord des parties
vaut compromis.

Art. 796. When visible
markers have been erroneously
placed by one of the contiguous
owners alone, or not in
accordance with a written
agreement fixing the boundary,
the error may be rectified by the
court unless a contiguous owner
has acquired ownership up to the
visible bounds by thirty years
possession.

Art. 796. Lorsque des bornes
visibles ont été erronément
placées par l'un seulement des
propriétaires contigus, ou de
façon non conforme à l'accord
écrit fixant la ligne séparative,
l'erreur peut être réformée par le
juge, sauf si un propriétaire a
acquis la propriété contiguë
jusqu’aux limites visibles par une
possession de trente ans.

TITLE VII. OWNERSHIP IN
INDIVISION
[Acts 1990, No. 990, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1991]

TITRE VII. DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ
EN INDIVISION
[Loi de 1990, n° 990, §1, en
vigueur le 1er Janvier 1991]

Art. 797. Ownership of the
same thing by two or more
persons is ownership in
indivision. In the absence of
other provisions of law or
juridical act, the shares of all coowners are presumed to be equal.

Art. 797. La propriété en
indivision est la propriété que
deux ou plusieurs personnes ont
ensemble sur un même bien. À
défaut de disposition contraire
de la loi ou d’un acte juridique,
les parts de tous les
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copropriétaires sont présumées
égales.
Art. 798. Co-owners share the
fruits and products of the thing
held in indivision in proportion
to their ownership.
When fruits or products are
produced by a co-owner, other
co-owners are entitled to their
shares of the fruits or products
after deduction of the costs of
production.

Art. 798. Les copropriétaires
partagent les fruits et produits du
bien indivis à hauteur de leurs
parts respectives.
Lorsque les fruits et produits
sont générés par l’un des
copropriétaires, les autres ont
droit à leur part après déduction
des coûts de production.

Art. 799. A co-owner is liable
to his co-owner for any damage
to the thing held in indivision
caused by his fault.

Art. 799. Tout copropriétaire
est responsable envers son
copropriétaire de tout dommage
causé par sa faute au bien
indivis.

Art. 800. A co-owner may
without the concurrence of any
other co-owner take necessary
steps for the preservation of the
thing that is held in indivision.

Art. 800. Tout copropriétaire
peut, sans l’accord d’aucun
autre copropriétaire, prendre les
mesures nécessaires à la
conservation du bien indivis.

Art. 801. The use and
management of the thing held in
indivision is determined by
agreement of all the co-owners.

Art. 801. L'usage et la
gestion du bien indivis sont
déterminés par convention entre
tous les copropriétaires.

Art. 802. Except as otherwise
provided in Article 801, a coowner is entitled to use the thing
held in indivision according to its
destination, but he cannot
prevent another co-owner from
making such use of it. As against
third persons, a co-owner has the
right to use and enjoy the thing
as if he were the sole owner.

Art. 802. Sous réserve de
l'article 801, un copropriétaire
peut user du bien indivis
conformément à sa destination,
mais ne peut empêcher un autre
copropriétaire d’en faire de
même. Vis-à-vis des tiers, tout
copropriétaire peut user et jouir
du bien comme s’il en était seul
propriétaire.

Art. 803. When the mode of
use and management of the thing
held in indivision is not
determined by an agreement of
all the co-owners and partition is
not available, a court, upon
petition by a co-owner, may
determine the use and
management.

Art. 803. Lorsque l'usage et
la gestion du bien indivis ne sont
pas déterminés par convention
entre tous les copropriétaires et
que le partage ne peut avoir lieu,
le juge, à la demande de l'un des
copropriétaires, peut en
déterminer l'usage et la gestion.
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Art. 804. Substantial
alterations or substantial
improvements to the thing held
in indivision may be undertaken
only with the consent of all the
co-owners.
When a co-owner makes
substantial alterations or
substantial improvements
consistent with the use of the
property, though without the
express or implied consent of his
co-owners, the rights of the
parties shall be determined by
Article 496. When a co-owner
makes substantial alterations or
substantial improvements
inconsistent with the use of the
property or in spite of the
objections of his co-owners, the
rights of the parties shall be
determined by Article 497.

Art. 804. Les modifications
ou améliorations substantielles
du bien indivis nécessitent
l'accord de tous les
copropriétaires.
Lorsqu’un copropriétaire fait
des modifications ou
améliorations substantielles
conformes à l'usage du bien,
sans le consentement exprès ou
tacite des autres, les droits des
parties sont définis à l'article
496. Lorsqu’un copropriétaire
fait des modifications ou
améliorations substantielles non
conformes à l'usage du bien ou
en dépit des objections des autres
copropriétaires, les droits des
parties sont définis à l'article
497.

Art. 805. A co-owner may
freely lease, alienate, or
encumber his share of the thing
held in indivision.
The consent of all the coowners is required for the lease,
alienation, or encumbrance of the
entire thing held in indivision.

Art. 805. Tout copropriétaire
est libre de louer, aliéner ou
grever sa part du bien indivis.
L’acte d’aliénation, de louage ou
de constitution de sûreté portant
sur l’ensemble du bien indivis
requiert l'accord de tous les
copropriétaires.

Art. 806. A co-owner who on
account of the thing held in
indivision has incurred necessary
expenses, expenses for ordinary
maintenance and repairs, or
necessary management expenses
paid to a third person, is entitled
to reimbursement from the other
co-owners in proportion to their
shares.
If the co-owner who incurred
the expenses had the enjoyment
of the thing held in indivision,
his reimbursement shall be
reduced in proportion to the
value of the enjoyment.

Art. 806. Le copropriétaire
qui a engagé sur le bien indivis
des dépenses nécessaires, des
frais d’entretien et de
réparations ordinaires, ou des
frais de gestion courante payés à
un tiers, peut en demander le
remboursement aux autres
copropriétaires à hauteur de
leurs parts.
Le remboursement est réduit
à proportion de la jouissance
qu’il a pu tirer du bien.
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Art. 807. No one may be
compelled to hold a thing in
indivision with another unless
the contrary has been provided
by law or juridical act.
Any co-owner has a right to
demand partition of a thing held
in indivision. Partition may be
excluded by agreement for up to
fifteen years, or for such other
period as provided in R.S. 9:1702
or other specific law. [Acts 1991,
No. 349, §1]

Art. 807. Nul ne peut être
contraint à demeurer dans
l’indivision, à moins que la loi ou
un acte juridique n’en dispose
autrement.
Tout copropriétaire a le droit
de demander le partage du bien
indivis. Le partage peut être
exclu par convention pour quinze
ans maximum ou pour toute
autre durée prévue à l’article
R.S. 9:1702 des Revised Statutes9
ou toute autre loi spéciale. [Loi
de 1991, n° 349, §1]
 CC FR, art. 815

Art. 808. Partition of a thing
held in indivision is excluded
when its use is indispensable for
the enjoyment of another thing
owned by one or more of the coowners.

Art. 808. Le partage d'un
bien indivis est exclu lorsque son
usage est indispensable à la
jouissance d'un autre bien
appartenant à un ou plusieurs
des copropriétaires.

Art. 809. The mode of
partition may be determined by
agreement of all the co-owners.
In the absence of such an
agreement, a co-owner may
demand judicial partition.

Art. 809. Les modalités du
partage peuvent être établies par
l’accord de tous les
copropriétaires. À défaut
d’accord, un copropriétaire peut
demander le partage judiciaire.

Art. 810. The court shall
decree partition in kind when the
thing held in indivision is
susceptible to division into as
many lots of nearly equal value
as there are shares and the
aggregate value of all lots is not
significantly lower than the value
of the property in the state of
indivision.

Art. 810. Le juge ordonne le
partage en nature lorsque le bien
indivis est susceptible de division
en autant de lots de valeur
sensiblement égale qu'il y a de
parts dans l'indivision et lorsque
la valeur cumulée de l'ensemble
des lots n'est pas sérieusement
inférieure à la valeur du bien en
état d'indivision.

Art. 811. When the thing held
in indivision is not susceptible to
partition in kind, the court shall
decree a partition by licitation or
by private sale and the proceeds

Art. 811. Lorsque le bien
indivis n'est pas susceptible de
partage en nature, le juge
ordonne le partage par licitation
ou par vente privée et le
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shall be distributed to the coowners in proportion to their
shares.

versement du produit à chaque
copropriétaire à hauteur de sa
part.

Art. 812. When a thing held
in indivision is partitioned in
kind or by licitation, a real right
burdening the thing is not
affected.

Art. 812. Le partage en
nature ou par licitation d’un bien
indivis n'affecte pas le droit réel
grevant ce bien.

Art. 813. When a thing is
partitioned in kind, a real right
that burdens the share of a coowner attaches to the part of the
thing allotted to him.

Art. 813. En cas de partage
en nature, le droit réel grevant la
part d’un copropriétaire se
reporte sur la portion du bien qui
lui est allouée.

Art. 814. An extrajudicial
partition may be rescinded on
account of lesion if the value of
the part received by a co-owner
is less by more than one-fourth
of the fair market value of the
portion he should have received.

Art. 814. Le partage amiable
peut être rescindé pour lésion
lorsque la valeur de la part reçue
par un copropriétaire est
inférieure de plus d'un quart à la
juste valeur marchande de la
portion qu'il aurait dû recevoir.

Art. 815. When a thing is
partitioned by licitation, a
mortgage, lien, or privilege that
burdens the share of a co-owner
attaches to his share of the
proceeds of the sale.

Art. 815. Lorsqu'un bien fait
l'objet d'un partage par
licitation, l'hypothèque, le droit
de rétention ou le privilège
grevant la part du copropriétaire
se reporte sur sa part du produit
de la vente.

Art. 816. When a thing is
partitioned in kind, each coowner incurs the warranty of a
vendor toward his co-owners to
the extent of his share.

Art. 816. Lorsqu'un bien fait
l'objet d'un partage en nature,
chaque copropriétaire est tenu à
la garantie du vendeur envers les
autres copropriétaires à hauteur
de sa part.

Art. 817. The action for
partition is imprescriptible.

Art. 817. L'action en partage
est imprescriptible.

Art. 818. The provisions
governing co-ownership apply to
other rights held in indivision to
the extent compatible with the
nature of those rights.

Art. 818. Les dispositions
régissant la propriété en
indivision sont applicables aux
autres droits indivis dans la
mesure où elles sont compatibles
avec la nature de ces droits.
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Arts. 819-822. [Repealed.
Acts 1977, No. 514, §1]

Arts. 819-822. [Abrogés par
la Loi de 1977, n° 514, §1]

Arts. 823-855. [Repealed.
Acts 1977, No. 170, §1]

Arts. 823-855. [Abrogés par
la Loi de 1977, n° 170, §1]

Arts. 856-869. [Repealed.
Acts 1977, No. 169, §1]

Arts. 856-869. [Abrogés par
la Loi de 1977, n° 169, §1]
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ABSTRACT
The American Constitution has been the subject of heated
debate since its formation. This article simply introduces a new
argument. It suggests that there exists a “form”1 of an
Enlightenment era code, which is met by the Constitution, and that
the requirements of this form can be derived from inspection of the
three great codes of the time: the Prussian, the Austrian, and the
French. It further notes that these requirements are (1) Roman law
influence; (2) natural law influence; and (3) that they perform the
same functions—they abrogate the prior laws on their respective
subjects and they are “complete” in themselves, covering the
whole aspect of a legal field. In the process of doing so, the essay
shows that the common law was not the only source of inspiration
for the framers of the Constitution; it also shows heavy civil law
influences. The article opens with a “preliminary title”, which
introduces the subject, its sources, and instructs the readers as to
1. This notion of form comes from Aristotle instead of Plato. Instead of the
form existing outside and entirely separate from the thing under discussion, I
find that the form may exist within and be discoverable in, the things under
discussion.
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how to read the article itself. The whole closes by laying forth a
few broad possible consequences of accepting this view, while
leaving a full discussion on the consequences of this understanding
to a later article.
I. PRELIMINARY TITLE2
A. Introduction
The Age of Enlightenment (commonly “the Enlightenment”)
lasted throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and the nineteenth
centuries. This era observed some of our world’s most pivotal
moments: the Renaissance came to an end; a global economic
climate was just starting to appear; slavery was being banned in the
western world; the divine right of kings was—at last—being
challenged; Napoléon was gaining ground in his conquest of
Europe, only to meet defeat at Waterloo; the British Empire rose to
prominence; the once-prestigious Holy Roman Empire fell into
oblivion; and a new republic was born across the sea, destined to
grow into a super power in its own right.
But not all important events of the Enlightenment were
geopolitical. Philosophy was having yet another reformation.
During this age of man, humanity was given the minds and
thoughts of brilliant political theorists and jurists such as Locke,
Rousseau, Hobbes, Montesquieu, Martini, Voltaire, Puffendorf,
Domat, and Grotius, to name only a few. These people laid the
foundation of our modern society. They gave us the separation of

2. The term “preliminary title” was chosen for this section instead of
“introduction” as it does far more than merely introduce the subject. Indeed, the
first subsection under this heading is “introduction.” This term is in reference to
that portion of modern codes which lays out what the sources of law are and
how the document is to be interpreted. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1-14. I have
organized this first section of the paper in much the same fashion. I give the
sources of my criteria, and describe how this essay is to be understood. Even the
introduction names sources, for those events and minds described therein played
vital roles in setting the stage for the Codes and the Constitution.
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powers, limited self-government, the French Encyclopédisme,3 and
codification of law in new form.
This humanist movement saw one of the few instances where
high thought would be brought down and put into practical
application.4 Many saw that the law of nature (natural law) could
be a source of the positive law, or instruction on what that should
be. The robust spirit of the age described gave hope that law could
be eternal and that principles of the same could be written down
for all humanity, not just Europe, not just the Western hemisphere,
but for all of the world. To achieve this end, civilians developed
codes.5 But natural law was not the sole source of these
documents. It is indisputable that the drafters looked to Roman
law6 and customary law7 to forge these great codes.
I do not mean “code” in the contemporary sense.8 For example,
I do not mean a publication in which statutes are kept and
constantly updated, as one would describe the U.S. Code. Nor do I
mean a book into which one collects pre-existing rules of law
without, inter alia, usurping the prior law, which is more properly
3. This compilation of work was intending to put all of human knowledge
in one place. It dealt heavily with philosophy and law. Some have even noted
the larger movement around this document, calling it “French Encyclopédisme”.
See generally Mitchell Franklin, The Encyclopédiste Origin and Meaning of
Fifth Amendment, 15 LAW. GUILD REV. 41 (1955-1956) [hereinafter The
Encyclopédiste].
4. Julio C. Cueto-Rua, The Future of The Civil Law, 37:3 LA. L. REV. 645,
647 (1976-1977) (Explaination, logic and reason were never divorced, however,
from social reality; the civil law absorbed these higher law elements “without
detriment to the practical needs of society”).
5. Roscoe Pound, The Influence of the Civil Law in America, 1:1 LA. L.
REV. 1, 4 (1938) (explaining universal validity of the codes); see also H. Patrick
Glenn, The Grounding of Codification, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 765, 766 (19971998) (explaining the codes’ capability to extend beyond Europe).
6. PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 111-23 (Cambridge
Press, New York 2007) (explaining Roman law influences in the three great
codes) [hereinafter ROMAN LAW]; see also Pan. J. Zepos, The Legacy of the
Civil Law, 34:5 LA. L. REV. 895, 902 (1974) (stating “The Roman law, together
with customary law . . . formed the chief sources of inspiration for the great
codifications.”).
7. Id.
8. I must digress briefly and say that I am not the first, nor shall I be the
last, to point out features of codification. See JACQUES VANDERLINDEN, LE
CONCEPT DE CODE EN EUROPE OCCIDENTALE DU XIIIe AU XIXe SIECLE (1967).
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called a Digest. A code, in the understanding of this essay is an
Enlightenment code; or, as has been described by previous
scholarship, a natural law code.9 These are documents created from
the above-mentioned sources that serve a distinct function and
require a distinct form of interpretation.
The function is both of completeness and abrogation. These
two concepts will be reviewed more thoroughly below but deserve
mention here. Codes in the understanding of the Enlightenment,
were to be all-encompassing.10 This doctrine meant that all
possible situations dealing with the type of law covered by the
codes were to have their decisions based on the same—the codes
covered everything and were meant to extend for centuries.11 To
realize this end, two methods were used; discussion on which will
wait for the appropriate article. Abrogation, on the other hand, is a
more simple function to discuss.12 Put briefly, these codes,
although drawn from prior law, dispensed with the control of the
prior law.13 Lawyers were not permitted to cite to the former rules,
as the codes were the sole source of law.14
9. See generally Horst Klaus Lucke, The European Natural Law Codes:
The Age of Reason and the Powers of Government, 31 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 7
(2012). By this I mean that these codes were heavily influenced by the
eighteenth century and medieval understandings of a “higher law” based on
human reason.
10. Glenn, supra note 5, at 766.
11. Id. See also Jean Louis Bergel, Principal Features and Methods of
Codification, 48:5 LA. L. REV. 1073, 1079 (1988) (stating, “Codes last much
longer than ordinary statutes, some lasting centuries; they are subject to
(usually) very minor and very rare changes.”).
12. I must make an aside and note that the new drafting of the Louisiana
Civil Code lacks an abrogation article.
13. Olivier Moréteau, De Revolutionibus: The Place of the Civil Code in
Louisiana and in the Legal Universe, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 31, 37 (2012) (showing
the need for an abrogation clause and the necessity of breaking from the prior
law); see also Bergel, supra note 11, at 1074 (“[the codes] repeal [] the old legal
system (laws, ordinances or customs) that were dealt with specifically in the
new civil code.”).
14. From an earlier draft of the Prussian Civil Code, THE FREDERICIAN
CODE: OR, A BODY OF LAW FOR THE DOMINIONS OF THE KING OF PRUSSIA:
FOUNDED ON REASON, AND THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRY at Pt. I, Bk. I,
T. II, § 5 (Jean-Henri-Samuel Formey & Alexandre-Auguste de Campagne
trans., Edinburgh 1761): “. . . we discharge the advocates from quoting hereafter
the authority of the Roman Law or that of any doctor whomsoever.” [hereinafter
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There is now almost no dispute that three codes in particular
are considered great among their peers.15 It is from these three
codes that the author has drawn his understanding of the
Enlightenment codes. They are, the Allgemeines Landrecht für die
Preußischen Staaten (ALR), drafted under King Frederick of
Prussia (hereinafter called the Prussian Civil Code); the Austrian
Civil Code, drafted largely by Martini, under Emperor Joseph of
the Holy Roman Empire; and the Code Napoléon (hereinafter
Code civil), drafted under the guidance of Portalis and passed
under the eyes of Napoléon Bonaparte.16 Moreover, reference from
time to time may be made to the Louisiana Civil Code, which has
been described as “the most perfect child of the Civil Law.”17
Even though all these events were taking place in Europe, one
should not ignore what was happening “across the pond.” As one
may tell by the title of this essay, there was yet another document
in the same vein as the three great codes. It, too, as will be shown
below, meets all three requirements for being an Enlightenment
code. It has Roman law and Natural Law sources, and can be
characterized by its “completeness”18 and has lasted over centuries

THE FREDERICIAN CODE]. See also ALAN WATSON, THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL
LAW 131 (Harvard Univ. Press 1981) (stating, “the preexisting law ceases to
have even subsidiary force.” “The Code itself becomes the historical starting
point.”).
15. Lucke, supra note 9 (discussing the Prussian, the Austrian and the
French Codes); see also Glenn, supra note 5, at 767 (noting the poetic majesty
of the Code civil); Zepos, supra note 6, at 902 (drawing particular attention to
the French Code civil and the Austrian Civil Code); and Cueto-Rua, supra note
4, at 650 (stating “The Civil Law gave full recognition to this basic philosophy
in the three great codes enacted at the end of the XVIII Century and the
beginning of the XIX Century: the Code Napoleon in France, the Civil Code for
the Kingdom of Prussia, and the Austrian Civil Code.”).
16. Cueto-Rua, supra note 4, at 651 (discussing the Code Napoléon, the
Prussian Civil Code, and the Austrian Civil Code); see generally Lucke, supra
note 9 (discussing the Prussian Civil Code, the Austrian Civil Code and the
Code civil).
17. John T. Hood, Jr., The History and Development of the Louisiana Civil
Code, 19 LA. L. REV. 18 (1956).
18. The broad provisions let generally applicable rules stretch forward
continuously and to unseen situations. Moreover, since the Federal government
is one of the enumerated powers, the specific listing of those powers (and those
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with comparatively little revision.19 Therefore, what Field said
more than a century ago shall be proven true on a different basis:
the United States Constitution is “a great code in a small
compass.”20 Thus, the thesis of my paper is this: The American
Constitution may be properly understood as an Enlightenment
code, regardless of the specific intent of the framers, because it
meets three criteria discovered by reference to the three great
codes: it has heavy Roman law influences, natural law influences,
and serves the two primary functions of the codes—(1) it abrogates
control of the Articles of Confederation and the English common
law on the subject of foundational national law, and (2) it is
“complete in itself,” as it, by use of broad generalities and specific
enumeration, covers the whole arena of fundamental law for the
nation and is capable of extending eternally forward with little
revision.
B. Answers to Two Objections
Throughout the crafting of the arguments in this essay, I was
confronted by several objections raised by classmates. Instead of

necessary and proper to the same) means that the Constitution is literally
complete as to all the basic rules of our government. This rule will be dealt with
more fully in Article III of this essay.
19. There are several other similarities between the documents, which are
not discussed fully in this paper. The documents all arose out of much
controversy, political upheaval, and philosophical change. The controversies and
turmoil surrounding Civil Codes has been noted before. (Bergel, supra note 11,
at 1077). They are held in almost the same reverence. Of the Civil Codes it was
said, they “are Constitutions for civil society.” (Glenn, supra note 5, at 769).
They are drafted in much the same way, as Professor Moréteau has noted,
“reforming a civil code is like amending a constitution. One may imagine a
process comparable to a Constitutional convention.” (Moréteau, De
Revolutionibus, supra note 13, at 64). Moreover, as an explanation of the title
below will lay out, they are both oriented toward the citizens and are meant to be
understood by the same.
20. MICHAEL KAMMEN, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION at
vii (Penguin Books 1986) (citing 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND
MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 379 (A. P. Sprague ed., New
York 1884)).
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hindering my endeavor, these objections actually helped to sculpt
my writing. As such, I will briefly address them here.
It was argued that since the Constitution deals with public law
matters and not private law matters it could not be considered a
“code” like the civil codes of the Enlightenment. This seemed to be
a troublesome argument. However, upon closer inspection, it fails.
Codes do not have to deal with one specific area of law. They may
cover either private law or public law so long as they conform to
the three requirements above. The Prussian Civil Code has sections
that deal with what today we would call “public law;”21 drafters of
both the Austrian and Prussian Codes wanted to put more public
law into them, which, as noted by another author reaches into what
is commonly considered Constitutional governance.22 Moreover,
even some modern codes that have their basis in the three great
codes have provisions that would seem to deal with public law
matters, such as Louisiana Civil Code article 671, which states, in
pertinent part, “[w]hen private property is so destroyed in order to
combat a conflagration, the owner shall be indemnified by the
political subdivision for the actual loss.”23
It was also argued that the Constitution was drafted prior to the
completion of the three great codes. Therefore, they argued, how
could the framers have taken the ideas of drafting that the
Europeans used? I answer that timing is of no import here. I do not
argue that the framers stole their ideas for drafting broad articles
from the French, or that specific enumeration was stolen from the
Austrians or Prussians. These ideas for drafting pre-date all of
these documents. I argue merely that the same thing occurred.
Thus, the Constitution is the result of a sort of convergence.24
21. For Prussian, see Lucke, supra note 9, at 21 (citing to Pt. II, tit. 11, § 1).
22. Id. at 21-28.
23. This is especially true since, like the Enlightenment codes, the
Louisiana Code is “natural law based.” Moréteau, De Revolutionibus, supra note
13, at 41.
24. Convergent evolution: A process in evolutionary biology where two
unrelated species develop similar traits in response to similar circumstances.
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Certain characteristics were obtained in response to certain
conditions (here, the Enlightenment, Natural Law, and Roman law,
consequent with political and philosophical changes) to achieve a
certain end (a code serving a particular function). This is not to
say, however, that the two had no influences on each other.
C. What this Essay is not Intended to Do
I do not mean, nor should the contents of this essay in any way
be taken, to disrespect either of the two systems of law discussed
herein. I place this disclaimer here due to several experiences I
have had while at law school. Attending a bijural institution has led
to several remarks that gave me pause. Some professors advocated
that Louisiana simply rid itself of the civil law, others remarked,
“the next time a civilian is kind to the common law will be the first
time.” This same animosity has reached to students. Some of who
have uttered phrases such as, “there’s no difference between the
two systems anymore;” or “Louisiana is a common law state with
different words.” One may attribute this not infrequent hostility to
civilian professors “feeling like a minority and [developing] an
inferiority complex”25 or to common law advancement in
Louisiana. After all, LSU is the only law school in the state that
requires civilian training.26 In the end, both the civil law system
and the common law system have positives and negatives. There
are strong similarities between the systems; but this may be due to
the near homogeny of European civilization for centuries.
Moreover, although it was the civilian thinkers who sought to
protect “natural rights” for all humankind (they abolished, inter
alia, slavery and torture),27 it was the common law nations that
were initially successful in putting this higher law into a practical

25. Moréteau, De Revolutionibus, supra note 13, at 33.
26. Id. at 51.
27. Lucke, supra note 9, at 17.
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form.28 Indeed, the monarchy was still quite strong in both Austria
and Prussia at the time of the drafting of the codes, but the
common law was invoked to limit the monarchy in England.29
Moreover, I do not intend to prove specific civilian/continental
influence on the Constitution or the American legal system as a
whole. Such a job has already been done. Much has already been
written on the subject of civilian theory and the framing
generation.30 Some have noted that, at times, the framers appealed
to civilian theory more often than to common law thinkers—even
Blackstone!31 Others have shown, through extensive research, that
the civil law was appealed to on private law matters that the
common law already covered,32 and in American law generally.33
Indeed, some of the most famous cases in common law property
were actually civil law based decisions.34 The use of civilian
theory was even stronger in the area of Constitutional
adjudication.35 Further still, others have inadvertently noted
statements by the framers which show vivid knowledge of the civil

28. Id. at 37, (explaining that the American Declaration of Independence
was recording these ideas while the Europeans were trying to put them into their
codes); common law courts also acted early in protecting certain rights against
one’s neighbors; Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of
American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 170 (1928-1929).
29. Corwin, supra note 28, at 183-85.
30. Some have set forth that the method of adjudication that was used in the
founding documents appears more civilian than common law-based—i.e.
looking for fundamental principles first, then applying them to the facts, rather
than deriving fundamental principles from the facts. See Jacques Vanderlinden,
Is the Pre-20th Century American Legal System a Common Law System? An
Exercise in Legal Taxonomy, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 1 (2011).
31. Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late
Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought, 78 AM. POLIT. SCI. REV. 195
(1984).
32. R.H. Helmholz, Use of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary American
Jurisprudence in Symposium: Relationships Among Roman Law, Common Law,
and Modern Civil Law, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1649, 1679 (1992).
33. Id. at 1653.
34. Id. at 1664 (citing Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)).
35. Id. at 1671, 1676 (stating “The Constitution of the United States and
those of the several states were understood in the light of these civilian
statements of principle.”).
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law, even going so far as to state that writing the Constitution
down would give it “a usufruct” over the next generation.36
Finally, I do not mean to deny any and all common law
influence on the Constitution. However, it is highly important to
note that the common law was not as sacrosanct to the framing
generation as the modern Supreme Court opinions would have us
believe. At times, many were openly hostile to the adoption of the
common law, and made sure that individuals knew they did not
adopt it simply by being under English control—and this was two
years before the colonies declared independence.37 Moreover,
others were concerned about the political structure that having
common law courts would bring, to wit it was noted, “To bring the
common law wholesale would bring ‘a thousand anti-republican
theories.’”38 Perhaps these hostilities were more directed at the
source of the common law rather than at the common law itself.
After all, we declared independence from, and fought a war
against, the English Monarchy. Is it any surprise that the people
would be somewhat put off by adopting a legal regime created by
Crown-appointed judges? In the generation following the framing,
it was succinctly put. “[W]e are not so strict as [England] in our
attachment to everything in the Common Law.”39 Finally, one
should take note that the drafters of the Constitution were not the
ones who actually gave it power. The people of the United States
gave it power. As a result, it was not Englishmen alone who

36. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 11 (Harvard Univ. Press 1980) (citing, 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 116, 121 (P. Ford ed., 1895) (emphasis omitted from original).
37. Pound, supra note 5, at 6 (stating, “already in Novaglus (1774) John
Adams argued against the proposition that the colonists, of legal necessity, had
brought over English law with them and were bound by it . . .”).
38. KAMMEN, supra note 20, at 54 (citing letter from George Washington to
Alexander Hamilton, July 10, 1787).
39. Thomas H. Lee, The Civil Law Tradition in American Constitutionalism
(citing letter to Sir William Scott (Lord Stowell), Sep. 22, 1828, in 1 LIFE AND
LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 559 (William Story ed., 1851)), available at
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Lee%20Civil%20
Law%20Tradition%20NYU%20Final%20Draft.pdf.
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ratified it,40 but a people consisting of mainly Continental
Europeans.41 This idea is reflected through Thomas Paine, who
once stated, “Europe, and not England, is the parent country of
America. Not one third of the inhabitants, even of this province
[Pennsylvania], are of English descent. Wherefore, I reprobate the
phrase of parent or mother country applied to England only as
being false, selfish, narrow and ungenerous.”42
However, one should also note that the framers adored the
common law when it protected individual rights, hence they often
invoked the “rights of Englishmen.”43 Moreover, to deny common
law influence entirely would be an absurd thing to do, as the
Seventh Amendment clearly cites the “common law.”44
D. Note on the Title
In searching for a title to this essay, I knew it must be (1) in
Latin to reflect the classical legal aspect of this paper, and (2) it
must reference both systems of law: common and civil. Eventually,
I came to realize that the selected title, Secundum Civilis, achieved
this end and also reiterated themes present throughout this writing.
Taken together the words may mean “through the civilians,”
“second city,” or “second civilian.” An astute observer would
realize that it also references two works of law that are
fundamentally important. The first part denotes what has become
known as the Corpus Juris Secundum, which is the total body of
40. As the Preamble of the United States Constitution states, “We the
people . . .”.
41. This achieved what Benjamin Franklin wanted, i.e., having a
Constitution which would be attractive to Continental Europeans. See Mitchell
Franklin, Concerning the Influence of Roman Law on the Formulation of the
Constitution of the United States, 38 TUL. L. REV. 621, 631 [hereinafter
Concerning the Influence].
42. Id. (citing Paine, Common Sense (1776) in 2 LIFE & WORKS OF THOMAS
PAINE 93, 127 (William Van der Weyde ed., 1925)).
43. Calvin Massey, The Natural Law Component of the Ninth Amendment,
61 U. CIN. L. REV. 49, 56 (Giving examples of the early American invoking the
“rights of Englishmen”).
44. “In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved….”
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law for the United States—a massive compilation of rules of law
and court decisions.45 The second part denotes the Corpus Juris
Civilis—the work of, inter alia, Tribonian at the order of Emperor
Justinian. The CJC, which will be discussed in detail below, served
as a source of Roman law for centuries.46 One would do well to
study it.
Lastly, the interpretation understood as “through the civilian”
represents a universal theory: law is meant to be understood by the
citizens.47 This need for citizen understanding of the law, I believe,
inevitably leads to the position that the citizenry ought to be at the
center of the law.48 Even those principles of law arising from
universal reason were understood as needing to be morphed in
such a way as to be usable by the average person.49 All four
Enlightenment era codes share such a belief. Thus, the title drives
home the very heart of this essay—the Constitution is, in all
essential respects, an Enlightenment code and ought to be
understood as one.
II. ARTICLE I: THE ROMAN LAW
A. The Roman Law and Europe
What is meant by the term “Roman law” is not a single set of
statutes or juristic writers, but rather a broad spectrum of law
ranging from the sixth century B.C. through Cicero, Theodosius,
45. It is in the context of the CJS, the term “Secundum” denotes the second
edition. Kendall F. Svengalis, Legal Encyclopedias in LEGAL INFORMATION
BUYER'S GUIDE & REFERENCE MANUAL 89-90 (Rhode Island Law Press 2010).
46. Zepos, supra note 6, at 897 (stating, “the root of that common European
Spirit lies in the Roman world-empire, the final phase of which is represented by
the Justinian legislation in the form it took in the sixth century.”).
47. The Constitution is meant to be understood by the voters, District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576; 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2008); Others
have noted that the Civil Codes are meant to be understood by the citizens.
WATSON, supra note 14, at 142.
48. Professor Moréteau also believes that citizens should be the center of
the “legal universe,” Moréteau, De Revolutionibus, supra note 13, at 34.
49. Cueto-Rua, supra note 4, at 655 (discussing how the drafters morphed
the theoretical into the practical).
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and the classical Roman age, then deposited, for the most part,
within the confines of the Corpus Juris Civilis and protected by the
Holy Church for a millennium. It is this body of law that has been
picked apart throughout multiple eras of human kind and
transplanted into the existing social order. Due to its significance
in our discussion, a brief history of the Roman law follows, along
with an explanation of how it entered the great codes and
ultimately the United States Constitution.
Out of historical necessity, we begin with the Law of the
Twelve Tables; indeed, no discussion of legal antiquity could be
complete without it.50 After the monarchy was eliminated and
Rome became a fledgling republic, two classes of people existed—
patricians (noble-born) and plebeians (essentially, commoners).
When a dispute arose between citizens, and the law was not clearly
on one side or the other, resort was made to the pontiffs, who were
all patricians. Needless to say, the plebeians did not always receive
a fair hearing. To resolve the deep mistrust of the plebeians, a
group of ten citizens, decemviri, were assigned to draft the Twelve
Tables, which were to extend over all areas of possible contention
among citizens. Ostensibly, this allowed the plebeians to know
their rights before they entered court.51 One can see in this concept
the shaping of the theory that law is meant for the citizens.
As Rome expanded, the need for new legal devices also grew.
To alleviate this growing need, pontiffs were able to creatively
interpret the Twelve Tables via analogy to other provisions therein
to cover situations not historically provided for. One such event
concerned emancipation.52 The Twelve Tables had the father as
head of the household, who held control over his family until
death. Another provision allowed a father to sell his son into
50. Id. at 645, n. 1&2 (noting that the history of Roman law is said to have
started with the law of the Twelve Tables) (citing Reginald Parker, The Criteria
of the Civil Law, 7 JURIST 140 (1947) and FRITZ SCHULZ, HISTORY OF ROMAN
LEGAL SCIENCE 5 (1946)).
51. STEIN, ROMAN LAW, supra note 6, at 3-4.
52. Id. 7-9.
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servitude, but if he sold him three times, then the son became
liberated and was no longer under his father’s control. This gave us
emancipation, for a father could “sell” his son into servitude three
times, each time having a friend “return” his son. Thus, the son
would be freed from his father’s house. Eventually, this concept of
emancipation was expanded to female children as well. One can
see in this that the origins of text are only interpretation.
When the republic expanded well beyond Italy, it began having
more contact with non-Roman citizens than it ever had before. As
such, a new, separate law was created for them—ius gentium,
meaning the law common to all civilizations.53 That which covered
Roman citizens was called the ius civil. This need to have separate
laws—and separate praetors for each—would come to an end
during the classical Roman period, when essentially all residents of
the empire were made citizens.54
Finally, we reach the Christian era. During the first two
centuries of Christianity, the Roman republic saw its most
prominent legal age yet. Four members of this class deserve
special attention, as their work and ideas will constantly arise in
our discussion, and constantly arise in any discussion on Roman
law. The first is the great teacher of Roman law, Gaius. He was the
one who divided the civil law in his textbook, The Institutes, into
three concepts: persons, things, and actions.55 Then there is Ulpian
and Paul, both of whom are still highly regarded today for their
ability to synthesize jurisprudence. And finally, there is Papinian,
who is beloved for his case analysis.

53. Id. 12-13; see also Anton-Hermann Chroust, Ius Gentium in the
Philosophy of Law of St. Thomas Aquinas, 12 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 22, 26
(1941) (stating that ius genitum is “that law which natural reason alone has set
up among men” or “that law which all peoples make use of.”).
54. STEIN, ROMAN LAW, supra note 6, at 20 (noting that the Constitutio
Antoniana stretched Roman citizenship far beyond its former bounds).
55. For a more thorough discussion of Roman legal history, and on Gaius in
particular, see ANDREW STEPHENSON, A HISTORY OF THE ROMAN LAW WITH A
COMMENTARY ON THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS & JUSTINIAN (1912).
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The next phase of Roman legal history came with the Codex
Theodosius, which was said to be a compilation of all laws created
by the Christian Emperors since Constantine’s religious conversion
of the empire. However grand this work may be on its own, it pales
in comparison to that of a later emperor, Justinian.
Justinian, Emperor of the Eastern Empire in Constantinople,
looked at the desolation of the West after the German invaders
conquered the once great civilization. While at the same time
attempting to wrestle authority away from the Roman Papacy, he
wanted to restore the magnificence of a unified Empire.56 His
conquests eventually let him hold Italy for a brief period. But his
conquests on land would not be his lasting legacy. Like Napoléon
after him, Justinian’s memory would be preserved more by his
legal writing than by his military conduct. In the sixth century,
Justinian appointed a council to combine all the laws of the Empire
into one massive volume. Headed by Tribonian, the council made
quick work of their task. In the end, the work was divided into
three parts: the first is the Institutes, modeled after that of Gaius;
the second is the Digest, a compilation of writings by great jurists
such as Paul, Ulpian, and Papinian; the third is the Code, modeled
after that of Theodosius. Justinian eventually had to add a fourth
part, called the Novels, a compilation of his own enactments.
Massive in size and importance, the document is one and a half
times the size of the Bible, and lasted as the basis of law for
Romans in Byzantium until the Muslim conquest in 1453.57
But in the west, the CJC was lost in the sixth century. It would
not be rediscovered until more than four hundred years later. This
does not mean that Roman law was entirely lost for that lengthy
period. The conquerors adopted some provisions of Roman law
and traces of it can be seen in the Visigoth Code. Moreover, the
56. Stein, ROMAN LAW, supra note 6, at 32-35 (noting his desire to restore
the glory of the old Roman Empire).
57. Id. (noting the massive size and complexity); see also Zepos, supra note
6, at 899 (noting that the Muslim conquerors allowed Roman law to continue as
a basis for enslaved Christians).
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Catholic Church, being the only Roman institution left in the West
after the fall, helped to preserve many Roman legal customs, most
notably by the use of its ecclesiastical courts.
After its rediscovery in Italy, the CJC gave rebirth to the study
of Roman law. Students from throughout the continent came to
study it. During this frenzy a number of different groups developed
inter alia, the commentators and glossators—who sought to
explain the text. Eventually the glosses were given their own
books. In time, some sought to defend Roman law on the basis of a
higher law; others used it as a supplement to their own laws; and it
became a corner stone in the ecclesiastical courts, which gave it
almost universal application in Europe. It was studied to some
degree in England, until those who tried to teach it were exiled.
Roman law was to have its greatest impact when it filled the void
left by the Catholic Church following the Reformation. After those
unfortunately volatile years, a universal system of law seemed
impossible. But the respect many had for the Roman custom
allowed it to continue crossing international borders, including
those of France, Prussia, Austria, and, eventually, to the United
States.58
B. The Prussian Code
Most people are familiar with the saying, “all roads lead to
Rome.” This section of the essay may be construed as implying,
“all codes lead to Rome.” Indeed, that body of law, as has been
noted above, played a pivotal role in the formation of the civil law,
and it is the adoption of the same that gives the civil law, and the
codes of the Enlightenment, a unique spirit.59 Given the extreme

58. For a more thorough discussion on Roman legal history, see CHARLES
PHINEAS SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD (1917) and PETER
STEIN, THE CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN CIVIL LAW (1988)
[hereinafter CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE].
59. WATSON, supra note 14, at 1-22 (noting that one of the main
characteristics of the civil law and of the Codes is the basis of Roman law;
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importance of each code in laying the criteria for what is an
“Enlightenment code,” it is necessary to show how these codes
came to be, for it is by the similar political and social processes
that created them that one may compare them to the United States
Constitution; this is especially true with Roman law.60
Therefore, we begin with the Prussian Civil Code. In German,
its name is Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten
(ALR), and it was initially begun under the leadership of Frederick
the Great.61 But did not come into force until his son, Frederick II,
came to power in 1794. It is said to have dealt with what we call
today constitutional law,62 civil law, and criminal law.
When Frederick William I first sought to adopt a code for his
scattered kingdom in 1714, he looked to the faculty of law at the
University of Halle, led by Christian Thomasius. His goals were
not reached. But a little more than two decades later, he arranged
for Samuel von Cocceji to draft a new law. It is said that unlike
Thomasius, Cocceji was “a keen Romanist [who] tried to maintain
the primacy of Roman law.”63 The kingdom was against him,
though, on this point.
Part of the reason why the code took so long to be drafted was
due to Roman law. Initially, the King wanted to remove the
“Roman law which [was] written in Latin and compiled without
any order or system.”64 This dream, however, was not realized, as
the bulk of the draft simply rearranged what had become the ius

Roman law is essentially the intellectual basis of the civil law and of the Civil
Codes).
60. Others have given blanket statements as to the effect of Roman law on
the great codes. See Zepos, supra note 6, at 903 (noting particular characteristics
of the great codes showing Roman law influences).
61. STEIN, ROMAN LAW, supra note 6, at 112; Lucke, supra note 9, at 1324.
62. Pt. II, tit. 13, giving legislative authority, power to lay taxes, and power
to levy war; Pt. II, tit. 17, § 18 dispenses judicial power; § 44 gives sovereign
immunity, abrogated only by consent.
63. STEIN, ROMAN LAW, supra note 6, at 112.
64. Lucke, supra note 9, at 18.
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commune—Roman law changed to fit into each nation. Indeed, by
the time the whole matter was settled, Roman law was to be
included where it fit in with everything else.
One needs not look to the subtext of the code to find Roman
influences. In Section 30 of the introduction to an earlier draft of
the code it is stated that the King has not abolished Roman law, but
has taken out the confusion so that, “consequently, the Roman law
is reduced into an art and system; that is to say, it is proposed in
the most natural and proper order….” Moreover, Part I, Book I,
Title I, Section 10 of that same draft states, “We have indeed taken
the Roman law for a foundation, in so far as its general principles
appear to be drawn from natural reason.” The specific intuitions of
Roman law taken up in the code may be seen in those provisions
on property.65 Though highly specific, this code managed to last
until the Code of the German Empire of 1900.
C. The Austrian Code
Much like the other Codes discussed within this essay, the
Austrian Code had a tumultuous gestation period. Holy Roman
Emperor Charles VI wanted a comprehensive law of intestate
succession based upon Justinian’s laws (in force from 1727 to
1747).66 His successor to the empire, Maria Teresa, issued an order
in 1753 to draft a code, which was to cover all of private law (as
opposed to the Prussian code, which wanted to also cover public
law). This Codex Theresianus was finished in 1766, and was a
compromise of Roman law and customary law. Although written
in the vernacular, the code spanned 8,367 articles and was grouped
based on Roman law categories. This code was met with fierce
public opposition as it removed too much power from the nobles,
and was viewed by reformers as not being drastic enough.
65. STEIN, ROMAN LAW, supra note 6, at 112. Such a fact is not surprising,
since Roman law has been called “a prolific parent of codes.” Edgar S.
Shumway, Justinian’s Redaction, 49 AM. L. REG. 195, 197 (1901).
66. STEIN, ROMAN LAW, supra note 6, at 112.
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A student of the great natural law thinker Martini, a man by the
name of Johann Bernhard Horten, was hired to draft a new, shorter
code. The code under the new emperor, Joseph II, went into force
in 1787. The work of the previous commission was then thrown
out and a new commission was ordered. This time, Martini was
placed at its head (as he had been for the first draft of the Codex
Theresianus). The code was eventually given actual force in 1811,
some sixty years after the Codex was begun.
But Martini’s effect upon the Code is felt in both Natural law
and Roman law. For it is by his natural law work that the Roman
law was allowed into both his code and the later final drafts.67 He
argued that Roman law was not bad, but was indeed reasonable:
“Roman civil law consists to the greatest extent of natural laws. It
is impossible to avoid all error if its shortcomings are complements
according to the precepts of natural law and its dark passages
illuminated.”68 One may see the primary effect of Roman law in
this code in the notion that the private civil law made no distinction
of social or economic status between freemen. One may also see
the Roman law influence on the notion of suretyship.69
In the end, Franz von Zeiller replaced Martini as head of the
commission on drafting. His work is said to be a practical
compromise between Roman law and the contemporary law. This
shortened draft (1,502 articles) has remained in force to the present
day, with some amendments occurring in 1914, 1915, and 1916
and was given the name of Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch—
ABGB).70 One may view the document as a testament to the
longevity and universality of both the Roman law and of the codes.

67. Id. at 113 (stating, “Thus, although Roman law as such was rejected,
certain ideas of Roman law could be brought back under guise of natural law.”).
68. Id.
69. Philip K. Jones, Jr., Roman Law Bases of Suretyship in Some Modern
Civil Codes, 52 TUL. L. REV. 129, 148 (1977-1978) (noting that the Roman
conception of suretyship was adopted into the Austrian Civil Code).
70. Id. at 114 (noting its longevity).
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D. The Code Civil
Aside from the United States Constitution, few legal
documents have ever had the global impact of the Napoleonic
Code. Its theories and order were followed by codifiers in
Louisiana,71 Italy, Latin America, and Canada (to name only a
few)—not to mention throughout central Europe as a consequence
of Napoleon’s wars.
Codification as such was nothing new in France. Indeed,
centuries prior to the Revolution, King Charles VII had ordered
that the customs of France be written down, which resulted in a
codified and uncodified system. After the Revolution, however, the
need for a comprehensive code on private law was more than
obvious. The Revolutionary government had continuously
promised such, but it had always failed to deliver it. In fact, the
first three drafts of the code, written by Jean-Jacques Régis de
Cambacérès, were all rejected for one reason or another.
However, when Napoléon became first consul, he envisioned a
code covering all private law, and wanted it completed quickly and
perfectly. To achieve this end, he appointed Jean Étienne Portalis
and three jurists to head the Commission of 1800. To be sure, the
prior attempts at codification were very useful to their endeavors.
Moreover, the Commission was able to look to eighteenth century
writers such as Domat and Pothier, and quoted them frequently.
In this manner Roman law was able to influence the French
code. Both Domat and Pothier summarized the law that was in
force in France at that time, which was itself heavily Roman. Even
more importantly, Pothier had already done much of the primary
work needed to draft a code. He had collected and organized the
Roman law into a “rational and usable order,”72 and then divided
the generally applicable laws gleaned from there into five
71. The Digest of 1808 was the first in a long list of civil codes inspired by
the French model.
72. STEIN, ROMAN LAW, supra note 6, at 114.
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categories: general rules, persons, things, actions, and public law.
The rules on public law were left out of the Code civil. But Pothier
was not solely a Roman scholar. He was also very familiar with
French customary law, and was able to weave Roman law and
custom together.
It is said that the Roman rules of law predominate the Code
civil,73 which is still in force (with some amendments) today. One
example of Roman private law can be seen in the notion of lesion:
in article 1118, lesion vitiates certain kinds of contracts; then
article 1674 allows parties with full legal capacity to gain
rescission of a contract where he has been injured by selling his
property for less than seven-twelfths of the value of his immovable
property. Moreover, the concept of good faith, which can be seen
in all three of the great codes, stems from the Roman law of bona
fides.74 So, too, is the concept of favoring the debtor over the
creditor derived from the Roman rule of wanting to protect the
weak from the strong. Lastly, the distinctions between ownership
and possession in the codes were, and continue to be in all civilian
states, the Roman rule.75

73. Others have noted the massive influence of Roman Law on the Code
civil. See J.L. HALPERIN, THE CIVIL CODE 69 (David Gruning trans., 2001)
(stating, “Roman law was also invoked as the source for the Code’s rules on
successions and property.”). See also Olivier Moréteau, Recodification in
Louisiana and Latin America, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1103, 1146 (2008-2009) (noting
the “radical unity of the European law that found its grounding in Roman law.”).
74. See WATSON, supra note 14, at 166 (noting the Roman lesion concept in
the codes). See Zepos, supra note 6, at 904 (noting that it is from this notion that
the concept of abuse of right is derived. This rule of law is present in all civilian
jurisdictions even where no provision for it exists.).
75. To be fair, several provisions of the codes do not derive from the
Roman rules directly and are, in fact, responses to the Roman understanding.
See Zepos, supra note 6, at 903-904.
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E. The Roman Law and the United States Constitution76
The framing generation had a wealth of sources pertaining to
the Roman law.77 This included, inter alia, numerous copies of
Justinian’s legal temple, the Corpus Juris Civilis—both translated
into English and retained in Latin. They were taught in the
classical style, and knew a great deal about Roman public law and
its history.78 It is indisputable that the same people who declared
independence and drafted the American Constitution at
Philadelphia both admired, to the point of nearly worshiping, the
ancient republic, and wished to learn from its mistakes.79 Their
professors were civilians, their friends across the pond were
civilians; and these civilians were all trained in the Roman law.80
With this brief interlude in mind, we continue forth with
ascertaining just how the late republic touched out national code.
1. Article I, Sections 1 & 3
What may at first seem to be a superficial connection to
antiquity, may also be the most profound Roman influence on the
76. This section of the essay owes a substantial debt to Professor Mitchel
Franklin of Tulane. Without his early study in the area of Roman law influences
on the Constitution, I doubt I would have been able to have completed this
essay.
77. It has also been noted that there was a “propaganda campaign” to
establish the civil law in America. Peter Stein, The Attraction of the Civil Law in
Post-Revolutionary America, 52 VA. L. REV. 403 (1966) (cited in STEIN,
CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE, supra note 58, at 413). Others have also noted this
general civil law influence in the early United States. See Pound, supra note 5.
78. Richard M. Gummere, The Classical Ancestry of the United States
Constitution, 14 AM. Q. 4-6 (1962) (noting that Jefferson was busy shipping
ancient Roman law sources and contemporary Romanist writings by Mably to
the delegates, also noting that Adams was said to have “thought in Latin;” and
“Cicero’s ideas on [some subjects] run like a stream underground through our
colonial writings.” See also David J. Bederman, The Classical Constitution:
Roman Republic Origins of The Habeas Suspension Clause, 17 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 405, 407 (2007-2008).
79. R.H. Helmholz, supra note 32. See also DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE,
JUSTINIAN IN BRAINTREE: JOHN ADAMS, CIVILIAN LEARNING, AND LEGAL
ELITISM, 1758-1775 (Colonial Soc. of Mass. 1984) (noting that Cicero has been
called “a role model for early American lawyers” and calling John Adams a
“barnyard Justinian.”).
80. Stein, supra note 77.
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Constitution. It is well established that the framers looked to the
Roman notion of public power as a guide as to how the same
power ought to be handled.81 Indeed, perhaps one of the most
famous comments to come from Rome seems to be reflected in our
triune federal structure. In discussing the separation of
governmental power into three parts, Polybius writes:
For when one part having grown out of proportion to the
others aims at supremacy and tends to become too
predominate, it is evident that, as for the reasons above
given none of the three is absolute, but the purpose of the
one can be counterworked and thwarted by the others, none
of them will excessively outgrow the others or treat them
with contempt. 82
Besides this separation of powers there is yet another structural
connection to the ancient regime. It is this structural feature that
bears a more pronounced Roman influence than the three-part
separation of power. That feature is, of course, the Senate. Article
I, Section 1 creates the Senate: “All legislative powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which
shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.” Section 3
further delineates the powers and functions of the body. Of
particular note are a higher age requirement, a longer term, and a
larger constituency than the House.
As any student of history should know this separation of
legislative power was the result of the Great Compromise. Some
delegates wished to have Congressional representation based upon
statehood, and thus a set number of representatives per state.
Others wanted Congressional representation to be based upon
population. The solution to this crisis: split the difference. Thus,
the bicameral legislature was born in the United States.
81. See generally Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Federalist Lessons of Rome, 75
MISS. L.J. 431 (2005-2006) (The author outlines Roman law influences on
multiple provisions of the federalist papers. Due to the constraints of this essay,
I have been unable to address the full influence here. Thus I refer the reader to
this most excellent work on the subject).
82. Cited in Bederman, supra note 78, at 416.
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The body, as it exists in this nation, is undoubtedly based on
the Roman constitutional scheme. The term “Senate” derives from
the Latin Senatus, which means “council of elders.” If the framing
generation had not wanted to base its conception upon the Roman
system, it could have named the body anything else. Examples of
such are “upper house” or “chamber.” Moreover, the type of
reverence for this body, as opposed to other contemporary
legislatures, is almost identical. The Romans looked to their
council as a higher office; its members were allowed to wear
purple sashes and make binding legislation. The same body has
been charged with being “made up of the wisest, the best educated,
the most respected, most experienced, most vigilant, most patriotic
men of substance in the Roman republic.”83 In much the same way,
it is well known that the American Senate was designed to be more
prestigious and deliberative than the House of Representatives.
2. Article I, Section 9, Clause 2
The Constitution provides in this section, “The privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it.”84
In reviewing ancient influences on the American Constitution, it
has been explained that, “[a] Roman citizen’s right of provocatio,
coupled with the tribunitial power of auxilium, was an ancient
analogue of habeas corpus. Additionally, the exigent circumstances
for the suspension of habeas corpus closely mirror those for the
derogation of provocatio and auxilium.”85 Although one may see
correlation to the British model of habeas corpus, one should also
realize that there exists a concept of habeas corpus that is not the
sole concept of the clause at issue. Rather, it also provides under
what circumstances the writ may be suspended. This method is in
83. ROBERT C. BYRD, THE SENATE OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC ON THE
HISTORY OF ROMAN CONSTITUTIONALISM at ix, xi (1995).
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
85. Bederman, supra note 78, at 439.
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stark contrast to the way the writ was suspended by the English.
On that point, it has been noted, “[i]t is important to realize,
however, that British law was rather less helpful to the Framing
Generation in explaining the specific conditions or timing for the
suspensions of habeas corpus.”86 The English version was “less
helpful” because the Parliament suspended habeas corpus only
against a “limited class of persons declared to be treasonous or in
rebellion against the Crown and were essentially bills of attainder,
a form of legislation proscribed by the United States
Constitution.”87
If the item known as the “suspension clause” were to be
thought of as referring to the British model of habeas corpus, then
it would simply mean “bills of attainder.” But if the term
contemplates bills of attainder, then we would be forced into a
terrible position—the Constitution would have superfluity. For if
the habeas corpus clause means “bills of attainder,” then the clause
that follows the suspension clause is superfluous. For that clause
states, “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed.”88 The only way to avoid this superfluity is to suggest that
the second clause overrules the first, but seeing that they were
passed at the same time, this seems highly unlikely.
Lastly, it should be mentioned that throughout the ratifying era,
in the State conventions, and in the Philadelphia convention,
extensive attention was paid to the Roman republican use of
temporary dictators in times of emergency.89 When these dictators
were declared, periods of time were set for the suspension of the
aforementioned provocatio and auxilium.90 Thus, the ratifying
states certainly contemplated the clause as referring to the Roman
legal concept. But one must be aware that both clauses are in the
portion of the Constitution placing limits on Congressional power.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
Bederman, supra note 78, at 439-40.
Id. at 436.
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Thus, the Roman influence is not only one of giving an example of
a necessary power, but in giving a lesson of what ought not be
done. A student of history would recall that the last Roman dictator
never gave up power.
3. Article IV, Section 4
The Constitution states, “The United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and
shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of
the Legislature, or if the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be
convened) against domestic violence.”91 Few scholars have
expounded on this text and courts have essentially overlooked it.
And the American people have forgotten its meaning over time.
But this section suggests something rather amazing. If it had been
understood in a Roman law light, then: (1) The fourteenth
amendment could have been accomplished by legislation, and (2)
much of what was accomplished by an expanded commerce power
could have been achieved by a Romanist-construed Guarantee
clause. But those specific results are beyond the scope of this
section of my essay. They will, however, be alluded to in what
follows.
There was, in Roman public law, a concept of intercessio,
whereby the plebeian tribunes could agree or veto acts passed by
the patricians, when those actions had effect upon the plebeians.92
The main historical connection to the Roman doctrine can be found
91. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
92. The history of this power is much more complicated than I have made it
here. A full discussion of Roman intercession is left for another time. However,
one may note that the power of intercession is not confined to acts by the
Congress; judicial review of State actions also bears a striking burden to the
concept. Moreover, Professor Franklin has been able to connect the same
principle discussed herein, intercession, and apply it to the veto power implicit
within the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mitchell Franklin, Problems Relating to
the Influence of the Roman Idea of the Veto Power in the History of Law, 22
TUL. L. REV. 443 (1947-1948). Since this paper primarily concerns the
Philadelphia Constitution and the original ten amendments, I have refrained
from discussing that point.
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in writings between the French Romanist, Abbé de Mably, who
was a very dear friend of both Adams and Jefferson, and whose
works were read by Benjamin Franklin. On the issue of
intercession against the States, Mably wrote to Adams:
With you, the authority of the Congress must supply the
place of triunes, provided you give to this assembly the
form and credit which it ought to hold. The rich, when they
perceived a body empowered to sit in judgment upon their
actions, would prove guarded in their enterprises; and the
people would, certainly, feel less disquiet and suspicious….
[E]ither the hope of fear of a juridical decision would calm
the raging of sedition in America.93
Thus, it is said that Mably “gave the Continental Congress the
power
of
interposition
against
anti-democratic
state
94
governments.” Madison apparently took up this idea and, in
Federalist Paper 43, described it as creating the power of
“interposition of the general government.” That this intercessio
was taken from Mably and ordered upon the United States
Constitution is further shown by Madison’ writings to Jefferson.
There Madison reveals his worries about state power in saying, “a
check on the States appears to me necessary . . . . Without such a
check in the whole over the parts, our system involves the evil of
imperia in imperio.”95
In discovering this connection, Professor Franklin noted:
In suggesting that the national government was capable of
objective judgment concerning the genuineness of the
republicanism of the states, Madison was following Mably.
As has been shown [Mably] had proposed to John Adams
that the Romanist interpositional or tribunitional power [as
was named above as intercession] be given exclusively to
the Continental Congress, because it would exercise its
authority in accordance with legal method.96

93.
94.
95.
96.

Franklin, Concerning the Influence, supra note 41, at 628.
Id.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 633-34.
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To further drive home the Roman law influence on this portion
of the Constitution, it is interesting to note that the Guarantee
clause may have no English origin.97
It is a sad gloss on history that the Southern States used
“interposition” to protect their racist proclivities for decades, while
the true power of interposition actually rested in the hands of the
federal Congress.
4. The Fifth Amendment and Infamy
The Constitution provides that “No person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crimes . . . nor be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”98
The understanding of that clause, today, is that a person cannot be
forced to testify against himself on any matter that may eventually
lead him to criminal liability. However, when this clause is
understood in light of its Roman origin, it actually means that a
person cannot be forced to testify at all in a criminal trial, when
doing so may “infame” him.
Infamy stems from Roman feudal infamy.99 This concept
essentially causes a person to be ostracized by the community. The
person, whether or not convicted of a crime or found liable for
some action, could be deemed “civilly unworthy,” dishonored, or
disgraced. The general term for this concept when translated into
English is “infamy.”100 From Rome, the concept was carried over
into feudal Europe, under the guise of religious
infamy/excommunication. John Calvin kept infamy/excommunication after Luther attempted to abolish it. The Puritans carried the
concept with them to the New World, until it was abolished by
popular demand as being “undemocratic.” Montesquieu wrote
97. Id. at 628-29.
98. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
99. See generally Franklin, The Encyclopédiste, supra note 3. The following
is a summary of Professor Franklin’s findings on the subject.
100. Id. at 42 (explaining that there are some thirty-two other ways of stating
infamy).
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about infamy as being one of the most ruinous things that could
happen to a person.101 A French Encyclopédisme idol, Cesare
Beccaria,102 helped to develop and secularize Luther’s attack on
infamy. Jefferson and Edward Livingston are both known to have
studied Beccaria in detail. It is from these men and their roles in
the founding generation that infamy was brought into the Fifth
Amendment.103
Because informing, or testifying against one’s neighbors and
friends, may create just the type of infamy that was present in
feudal Europe and ancient Rome, the Fifth Amendment must
necessarily be understood as a right of any witness to refrain from
testifying, even if it would not incriminate him for the crime
charged or any future charges. Thus, self-incrimination should
properly be understood as “self-infamy.” A dissenting Justice of
the U.S. Supreme Court recognized this point.104
It is important to note that the concept of “infamy” mentioned
in the Constitution, “[never] enjoy[ed] any real important role as
such in [the] history of English Criminal law, perhaps because it
was excluded or held down by Magna Carta.”105 Therefore, the

101. Id. at 43 (quoting Montesquieu as saying, “the hopelessness of infamy
causes torment to a Frenchman condemned to a punishment which would not
deprive a Turk of a quarter of our sleep.”).
102. Beccaria himself was Italian, but his work on the philosophy of crime
became world-famous, was read throughout Europe, and made its way to the
United States. Richard V. Sipe, Cesare Beccaria, 22 IND. L.J. 29, 38 (19461947).
103. Franklin also shows how such an understanding would exclude
“presidential and congressional infamy, such [as had] developed in the United
States since the ending of the Second World War.” Id. at 44.
104. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 450; 76 S. Ct. 497, 513 (1956)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). That the Supreme Court would cite to the Roman law
is of no surprise. After all, there have been literally hundreds of Supreme Court
cases that have made mention of or relied upon Roman law. See Samuel J.
Astorino, Roman Law in American Law: Twentieth Century Cases of the
Supreme Court, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 633 (2001-2002).
105. Franklin, The Encyclopédiste, supra note 3. I would also note that this is
another example of the common law system moving more toward human rights
protection than the civil law system. By this statement, it is shown, that infamy
was excluded from public life much sooner in England than on the continent.
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most potent source of “infamy” is that which stems from the
Roman law and not any that is present in the English law.
5. The Fifth Amendment and Double Jeopardy
On this point the Fifth Amendment declares, “nor shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb.”106 Popularly called the Double Jeopardy clause,
the Roman roots of this clause have long been established. In
Justice Black’s dissent in Bartkus v. Illinois,107 it was stated, “Fear
and abhorrence of governmental power to try people twice for the
same conduct is one of the oldest ideas found in Western
civilization. Its roots run deep into Greek and Roman times.”108 To
prove this point, the Justice makes reference to Justinian’s Digest,
which states, as translated by Scott, “The governor should not
permit the same person to be again accused of a crime of which he
has been acquitted.”109
But Justice Black is not alone in finding the source of double
jeopardy in antiquity. The same connection was made by Professor
Paul Baier of LSU, who upon finding the connection stated,
“[w]ho would have thought that certain of our Constitutional
protections have come down to us from Rome?”110 Indeed, even
other clauses, such as the right of confrontation expressed in the
Sixth Amendment111 have roots in Roman legal practice.112
106. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
107. 359 U.S. 121; 79 S. Ct. 673 (1959).
108. Id. at 151-52.
109. Id. at 152, n. 3 (citing to DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 48.2.7.2).
110. Paul Baier, The Supreme Court, Justinian and Antonin Scalia: Twenty
Years in Retrospect, 67 LA. L. REV. 494 (2007). Professor Baier also noted
several other provisions of the United States Constitution which appear to have
been lifted wholesale from the Roman text, and applied to the practical
situations facing the framers. Among these are: the ex post facto prohibition in
art. I, § 9, cl. 3, and the rule against the impairing the obligation of contracts
found in art. I, § 10. Id.
111. U.S. CONST. amend. VI states, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to…be confronted with the witnesses against him.”
112. THOMAS JAMES NORTON, 1 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:
ITS SOURCES AND ITS APPLICATION 219 (1962).
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6. The Ninth Amendment and the Roman Legal Method
As one will come to know upon completion of this essay, I
believe that the Ninth Amendment ought to be considered the most
robust Amendment of them all.113 Indeed, I believe that it (1)
orders that the Roman method of analogical reasoning be used to
interpret the Constitution, especially the Bill of Rights; (2) houses
the natural law of the Enlightenment; and (3) should bring under
its umbrella almost the entirety of substantive due process, while
incorporating all that against the states, not via the Due Process
clause, but via the Privileges or Immunities clause. However, this
section of the essay aims only to show how the Roman legal
method can be seen in the Ninth Amendment.
To briefly summarize the argument, the Ninth Amendment
declares, “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.”114 The most important fact about this Amendment is that
it says “the Constitution.” It does not say “these last eight
Amendments.” Thus, it refers to every right listed in the
Constitution. Moreover, one must read this clause from the
negative to see its ordering of the Roman method. Because we are
not allowed to use the listing of rights to deny any unwritten rights,
we must use the listing to discover these unwritten rights protected
by the Ninth Amendment.
The Civilian legal method is laid out in detail in the Louisiana
Civil Code.115 Moreover, when there is a problem that is
113. I am not alone in believing that the Ninth was meant to serve multiple
purposes. See Massey, supra note 43, at 50.
114. U. S. CONST. amend. IX.
115. Those articles read as follows:
Article 4: When no rule for a particular situation can be derived from
legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to equity.
To decide equitably, resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing
usages.
. . . Article 9: When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application
does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as
written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the
intent of the legislature.
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“historically novel,”116 the Roman method orders that one make
analogy, not to prior cases to develop the law, but to other
provisions of the law. This method is usually summarized as “audelà du Code civil mais par le Code civil.”117 This is the opposite
of the common law method, which has at its helm the development
of law by analogical reasoning from prior cases. An example of
this can be seen above with the note on Roman emancipation.
Essentially, this method locates multiple provisions of the written
law, discovers their principles, and fashions a new rule implicit
therefrom. I am not the first person to notice that the Ninth
Amendment requires the civilian method be used in interpreting
the Constitution.118 Indeed, the Supreme Court has used it even as
late as the twentieth century.119

Article 10: When the language of the law is susceptible of different
meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best
conforms to the purpose of the law.
Article 11: The words of a law must be given their generally prevailing
meaning.
Words of art and technical terms must be given their technical meaning
when the law involves a technical matter.
Article 12: When the words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning
must be sought by examining the context in which they occur and the
text of the law as a whole.
Article 13: Laws on the same subject matter must be interpreted in
reference to each other.
116. Mitchell Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Method and Its
Implications for Republican Form of Government: Griswold v. Connecticut;
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 40 TUL. L. REV. 487-88 (1965-1966) [hereinafter
The Ninth Amendment].
117. Raymond Saleilles, Preface to FRANÇOIS GENY, SCIENCE ET
TECHNIQUE EN DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF (1913). (“Beyond the Civil Code,
but through the Civil Code.” This is essentially the method that was used by
Justice Goldberg in discussing the Ninth Amendment in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479; 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965)).
118. Franklin, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 116.
119. Id. (Generally discussing this method as used in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479; 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965)).
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III. ARTICLE II: THE NATURAL LAW120
There are few concepts that have caused as much debate and
misunderstanding as natural law.121 It has, as Aristotle suggested,
been appealed to when one had no chance with the law of the
land.122 It has been argued as the basis for adopting the Roman
law,123 and has been supported on the notion of law originating
from the Bible. As such, it has gone by many names: The law of
nature, the law of God, the natural law, the law of reason. Its
existence or non-existence would either mean that positive law was
subordinate to another law, not crafted by human hands; or,
provided it doesn’t exist, would lead human beings to a sort of
legal nihilism known as “positivism.” Grounds for locating its
principles have been argued on both an ontological and
teleological basis—often arriving at the same conclusion. Others
dismiss it as merely looking up into the clouds and discovering an
answer.124
However, by the time it appeared in the American Constitution,
natural law had taken on a whole new model completely separate
from its theological roots, although owing a great deal to the
same.125 The Enlightenment had secularized it and changed the
focus from “natural law” to “natural rights.”126 Although in
Catholic Spain, the idea of natural law still had not yet taken on the
“individualist” approach of the other European states. Moreover,
120. For a more thorough discussion on the natural law, see JOHN FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
121. Massey, supra note 43.
122. Corwin, supra note 28, at 154. This quote is perhaps second in fame
only to “Law is reason, free from passion.”
123. See text accompanying note 60.
124. Or, as some have erroneously put it, “you can invoke natural law to
support anything you want.” ELY, supra note 36, at 50.
125. Kirk A. Kennedy, Reaffirming the Natural Law Jurisprudence of Justice
Clarence Thomas, 9 REGENT U. L. REV. 33, 41 (1997) (discussing natural law in
the context of law of reason and religion); see also Corwin, supra note 28, at
153 (discussing natural law as being from God); see also Lucke, supra note 9, at
10 (noting the transformation of the religious law of nature to the secular
version).
126. Lucke, supra note 9, at 10.
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the concept of natural law as obtained in England by that point was
not the same theory as what was coming of age on the continent.127
In England, the theory of natural law in the common law was not
“universal reason” but “artificial reason.”128 However, in practice,
one could see that these two concepts were ultimately arriving at
similar conclusions. Therefore, we will not take pains to separate
which concepts derived from which place, because ultimately they
are the same thing—a law higher than mere positive legislation.
A. The Natural Law and the Code of Prussia
The Prussian Code may well be called a “constitution for civil
society,”129 whose drafters saw no “insurmountable contradiction
between positive law and natural law.”130 Indeed, they brought
them together under one roof in a way that could scarcely be
imagined today: a world where legal positivism apparently rules
and natural law gets laughed at.131 But at the time of the Prussian
Code’s debate and existence, natural law was considered to be the
one true law, a law that no one dared to laugh at.

127. Pound, supra note 5, at 4-5.
128. Mitchell Franklin, A Study of Interpretation in the Civil Law, 3 VAND.
L. REV. 557 (1949-1950). I do not mean “artificial” as in fake. I mean artificial
in the since that the reason upon which this law is based—although influenced
by the natural law—is largely built up by experience. This is in contrast to what
is thought of in the continental “natural law” theory that law is “universal.” In
that vein, the natural lawyers decipher a rule of law from “reason” and apply it
to the circumstance in which it must do its work. An astute observer would note
that this is very similar to what St. Thomas Aquinas believed as to how the
natural law was to operate—finding a fundamental principle and then apply it to
its particular setting. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Pt. I of the
Second Part, Question XCV, art. 2 (comparing how the natural law is applied to
particular situations in the same manner that the form of a house is applied to a
particular construct of a house).
129. Glenn, supra note 5, at 769.
130. Cueto-Rua, supra note 4, at 655.
131. Although, many have suggested that natural law is making a comeback
and will soon be welcomed with thunderous applause. See Thurston Howard
Reynolds II, Natural Law Jurisprudence of the Sermon of the Law, 31 OHIO
N.U.L. REV. 231 (2005) (stating, “Lately, Natural law seems to be regaining its
rightful place of preeminence . . .”).
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The influence of natural law on the Prussian Code can be seen
in both its effects upon those who controlled its drafting and in the
document itself. For example, the leading force for what ultimately
became the code was Frederick II.132 He, in turn, was a great
student of Voltaire and shared many of the same views: “religious
freedom, the abolition of literary censorship and of slavery, [and]
freedom of trade . . . .”133 Moreover, other forces such as Suarez,
who was to draft the final version of the code, was a great natural
law student of Pufendorf. Indeed, the entire structure of the code is
based on Pufendorf’s understanding of how the law should be.134
Such influences do not even begin to cover the love the King had
for Montesquieu, in fact the only idea of Montesquieu that seems
to have been wholly rejected by the King in the ALR was the
notion of separation of powers.135
When time came to actually write a code, Frederick turned to
Samuel von Cocceji, in 1746, ordering him to “draw up a legal
code based solely upon reason and the constitutions of the
provinces.”136 Owing to wars and aristocratic opposition, work did
not resume on the code until the late 1770’s.137
Finally, we move to the text of the code and its initial draft to
show what influence the natural law may have had. In
Introduction, Section 1 of an earlier draft of the ALR, it is stated,
“Roman law, being founded on natural equity, and the principles of
sound reason, it is not surprising that the Christians have made it
preferable to any other.” Moreover, the code tells us, “Our chief
attention was to lay down the most natural principles”138 and that
132. Lucke, supra note 9, at 13-24 (noting the King’s influence over the
Code).
133. Id. at 13. Moreover, throughout the King’s control, he remained
respectful of other religions. He even stated in 1740 that, “All religions are equal
and good, provided only that the people who profess them are honest.” Id. at 17.
134. Id. at 14.
135. Id. at 16.
136. Id. at 17.
137. Id. at 18.
138. Introduction, § 11 of THE FREDERICIAN CODE, supra note 14.
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the law’s “end is justice which consists in giving everyone his
own.”139
Further, the king began to adopt wholesale central doctrines of
the Enlightenment natural law, most notably equality before the
law.140 In fact, the King brought his former order (that judges must
apply natural equity without regard to person or statute) and
transplanted it into his own introduction to the Code as Section 22,
which states, “The laws of the state bind all its members,
regardless of status, rank or gender.”141 Other Enlightenment
notions, such as neutrality of government towards religion, were
brought into the Code, as Lucke observes:
The beliefs residents of the state hold of God and of things
divine, their faith, and their internal worship, cannot be
made the subject of strict laws. Every resident in the state is
entitled to unqualified freedom of faith and conscience.
Neither churches nor their parishioners are allowed to
persecute or insult other churches or their parishioners.142
Still further, the Enlightenment notion that property is an
inherent right in being human is strongly apparent in the code. For
Introduction, Section 75 orders, “The State is obliged to
compensate a person who is forced to sacrifice his particular rights
and advantages in the interest of the public welfare.” These
property rights are protected further in the code as well: “the state
may force a person to sell his property only if the public welfare
requires it.”143
Finally, there is one portion of the code that reflects a
quintessential Enlightenment natural law theory that would not be
recognized in our own nation’s Constitution144 until the end of the
139. Pt. I, Bk. I, tit. II, § 2 of THE FREDERICIAN CODE, supra note 14.
140. Lucke, supra note 9, at 18.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 21 (internal quotations omitted).
143. Id. at 23 (citing to Pt. I, tit. 11, § 4).
144. There has been blatant comparison between the Prussian Code and other
Constitutional documents which protect “the basic law of freedom” Id. (citing to
H. HATTENHAUER, ALLGEMEINES LANDRECHT FUR DIE PREUßISHEN STAATEN
VON 1794 (Frankfurt & Berlin 1970)).
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Civil War145—slavery is in violation of the natural law. Part II,
Title 5, sections 196 & 197146 prohibit slavery in Prussia and
prohibited anyone under its control form owning slaves. This rule
flows necessarily from what is said in Part I, Title 3, Sections 26 &
27, “No one may force another to act or limit another’s freedom in
some other way without a special legal justification for doing so.
No one may force another to refrain from certain conduct only on
the ground that the conduct would be harmful to the other.”147
B. The Austrian Civil Code
The Austrian Code is without a doubt one of the great natural
law codes of Europe.148 To this end, one may see the natural law
influences, like in all the codes studied in this essay, in both those
people who influence it and in the written words that ultimately
occupied its pages.
The influence on the code, drafted under Joseph II and Leopold
II, began early in both of these ruler’s lives. Co-Empress of the
Holy Roman Empire, Maria Theresa, had her children taught in the
natural law by the most prominent thinker in the kingdom, Anton
von Martini. After Joseph II came to power upon his father’s
death, and received true political power after his mother’s passing,
he openly opposed torture, and reserved the death penalty for only
the most serious offenses.149 He supported what some may call a
due process rule by “defend[ing] the integrity of the ordinary
courts.”150 By 1776, the emperor had banned torture and soon
thereafter ended the death penalty. It is even more important to
145. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1: “Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.”
146. Lucke, supra note 9, at 23-24. However, the author is careful to note
that the institution of serfdom remained.
147. Id. at 23.
148. Cueto-Rua, supra note 4, at 650.
149. Lucke, supra note 9, at 24.
150. Id. at 24 (these actions were taken prior to the adoption of the Great
Code).
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note that based on his understanding of Enlightenment natural law,
the Emperor allowed for a freedom of conscience much like that of
Prussia, and sought to end censorship for the most part.151
The many drafts of the Austrian code shed light on the massive
influence of natural law on the final version. It has been noted that
the commission called to write the Code for Maria Theresa was
instructed to write a code based simply on “the rules of reason and
natural law,” and that the draft resulting from the order provided,
“the state of liberty is given to all men by nature” and “liberty is a
natural faculty to do what one chooses unless restricted by force of
law.”152 After Francis II succeeded his brother Leopold II (who
had succeeded Joseph II), he turned away Martini’s draft of a new
code, and subjected it to more revision, with one of his own
students heading the project.
However, Martini’s ideas did survive as an official code in
other provinces (Eastern and Western Galicia). This code came
into force when the main Austrian Code was still in the drafting
stage. This draft became known as Martini’s “principles of public
order” and are said to have “constitute[d] the philosophy of the
natural lawyers in a nutshell. They also show[ed] their political
timidity when faced with the power of monarchy.”153 Of particular
note for our purposes are the following provisions:
“Law” has two meaning: one is the rule which prescribes
lawful conduct, the other the natural freedom or the
permission to act which everyone has if he fits his conduct
into the framework of the rules (§3). Rights and duties
either flow from human nature in which case they are
called natural or inborn rights and duties, or they are based
on a particular society in which case they are called
positive rights and duties, i.e., those which have arisen by
virtue of the life of the society. (§4) . . . This ultimate goal
is the general welfare of the state, i.e., personal safety,
151. Id. at 25.
152. Id. at 26. Also, it should be noted that the draft was declined not because
of its natural law content but simply because it was too long. Id.
153. Id. at 27.
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property and all the other rights of its members. (§7)154
As noted above, the Austrian Code was not finished until sixty
years after the Empress had begun its creation. The final version of
the code did not contain most of the rules on public order.
However, the final draft does have a provision that, as will be
shown shortly, correlates heavily to the Ninth Amendment. Section
7 of the final version states:
If a case cannot be decided by applying the words or the
natural meaning of a statute, one must take into
consideration similar cases which are dealt with in other
statutes in a definite manner and the reason behind such
statutes, if doubt remains, the case must be decided by
applying natural legal principles, having given mature
consideration to the carefully gathered circumstances.
C. The Code Civil
In his address to the French assembly, Portalis openly
announced his natural law influences for the entire world to
recognize:
154. Id. at 27, n. 166. The same author has arranged these principles in a
different manner. Stating that:
Communities are association of people who have united in accordance
with certain rules in order to achieve a particular purpose (§5). The
State is such a community, united and bound together under a common
ruler to achieve an ultimate goal (§6). Thus ultimate goal, adapted to
the nature of man and therefore unchangeable, is the general welfare of
the state, i.e. the protection of the personal safety, property and of all
the other rights of its members (§§6 & 7). Rights and duties are of two
kinds: (1) those which are natural or inborn, flow from human nature
and are unchangeable, i.e., they cannot be changed by a positive law
and (2) those which are positive in the sense that they flow from the life
of the particular society and are articulated by the rule as prescriptions
and rules, called laws, which are required to attain the ultimate goal of
the State (§§ 4, 7 & 8). Rules which give guidance to people for their
conduct and which prescribed their duties emerge from the whole body
of the law (§2). Positive rules enacted by the ruler may be good or bad.
They are good only when they contain something good according to the
circumstances and consequences and when they contribute to general
wellbeing (§1). The totality of all the laws that determine the mutual
rights and duties of the inhabitant of inter se constitute its private law.
The private law for West Galicia is contained in this law book (§9). Id.
at 28-29.
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Law is universal reason, supreme reason based on the very
nature of things. Legislation is, or ought to only be, law
reduced to positive rules, to specific precepts . . . reason, as
it governs all men for all time, is called natural law . . . that
which is not contrary to the laws is lawful . . . the judiciary,
established to apply laws, needs to be guided in this
application by certain rules. We have outlined them. They
are such that the private reason of no man can prevail over
the law, which embodies public reason.155
Moreover, in his draft of the code, Portalis had written, “There
exists a natural and immutable law, the source of all positive
legislation: it is nothing but natural reason, in so far as it governs
all men.”156
What is even more important for the purposes of this paper is
to whom the code was being addressed. The drafters were likely
not as focused on the outcome of the code as they were with who
was going to be reading it—Napoléon. Like all great leaders of his
time, Napoléon was a natural law thinker, even if there is some
disagreement as to the degree to which he accepted the more
theoretical side of the movement. He is said to have been an
admirer of King Frederick the Great (the ruler responsible for the
Prussian Code) and of Rousseau.157 And he opposed cruel and
unusual punishment in the form of torture. Indeed, the French
Code civil adopted the Revolution’s and the Enlightenment’s rally
cry: liberty, equality and brotherhood.158 It abolished classes and
155. Id. at 31; also a person schooled in the natural law will be able to see the
influence of Domat in these statements. Others have noted the natural law
influence on the Code civil as well. HALPERIN, supra note 73, at 69 (stating
“Despite the silences and even denials of the drafters, the Code cannot be fully
understood without taking into account the contribution of [] the natural law
thinkers….”).
156. PROJET DE CODE CIVIL, PRESENTE PAR LA COMMISSION NOMMEE PAR LE
GOUVERNEMENT, LE 24 THERMIDOR AN VIII (1801), Preliminary Book of Law
and Legislation, tit. I, art. I (Special thank you to Professor John Randall Trahan
for the translation).
It should be noted, however that this provision was ultimately left out of the
Code civil, but did manage to appear in the Louisiana Digest of 1808 and in
Civil Code art. 21, which is now art. 4 in the current Code.
157. Lucke, supra note 9, at 30.
158. Id. at 33.
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privileges pertaining to the private law, and thus achieved
(ostensibly) the foundation of the natural law—equality in the
law.159
Moreover, the Code civil was destined to essentially achieve
the second most profound theory of the natural law era. This theory
that natural law is universal and that such universal principles are
“capable of extension beyond European societies”160 needs only be
adjusted to fit into the society in which they do their work, which
was closely linked to Grotius’ understanding of international law.
Owing to Napoléon’s military and political power, and the sheer
acceptability of the Code civil, a number of other countries have
been greatly affected by the French Code civil.161 Natural law
became a basis for several areas of the code, such as obligations—
being the means by which individuals transferred property and that
whatever harm one causes by his fault, he is required to repair it.162
D. The Natural Law and The Constitution163
The Constitution itself is teeming with the natural law, so much
so that one would be justified in suggesting that not only has it
embraced the natural law, but also that it has become the natural
law. By this I mean to suggest that the saying “an unjust law is no
law at all” has become “an unconstitutional law is no law at all.”164
Such a transformation is not unreasonable. After all, the framing
159. HALPERIN, supra note 73, at 70 (stating that the [code] “is imprinted
with the Revolutionary principle of equality before the law.”).
160. Glenn, supra note 5, at 766.
161. Belgium, Luxemburg, Monaco, Italy, Romania, Portugal, Spain,
Louisiana, Québec, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Japan, China, Turkey,
Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria. Lucke, supra note 9, at 34.
162. HALPERIN, supra note 73, at 69-70.
163. Others have given more thorough discussion of the natural law
influences on the Constitution than is appropriate or possible here. Kennedy,
supra note 125, at 41; Corwin, supra note 28; Robert P. George, The Natural
Law Due Process Philosophy, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301 (2000-2001); Robert
P. George, Natural Law and the Constitution Revisited, 70 FORDHAM L. REV.
273 (2001-2002); Massey, supra note 43.
164. Lucke, supra note 9, at 37, (suggesting that Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1803) brought lex injusta non est lex to the Constitution).
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generation viewed constitutions as statements of general rules of
law that were meant to extend continuously forward165 (just like
the other Enlightenment codes). This is not to mention the fact that
the framers themselves were brought up and educated in the
heyday of the natural law/natural rights movement. This movement
stressed identifying broad generally applicable rules of law. Thus,
this section of the essay must examine exactly how the
Constitution reflects the higher law.
1. The Designation of Rights in the Declaration of
Independence
Perhaps no document better reflects the framer’s understanding
of natural law based rights than the Declaration of Independence.
For in that document, it is clearly laid out that human rights do not
come from governments, whether democratic or tyrannical, but are
inborn in human beings as of their own existence, by God and by
the natural law. This means that even though the framers took
provisions of the English Bill of Rights for inspiration on their
drafting of the Constitution, they certainly did not mean to create
English control over them. That the beliefs announced in
Declaration are natural law based is apparent from its very
opening:
[A]nd to assume among the powers of the earth, the
separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and
of Nature’s God entitle them …We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of
Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers form the

165. Resolutions of the Town Meeting of Concord Massachusetts, October
1776 (stating, “We conceive that a constitution in its Proper Idea intends a
system of Principles Established to secure the subject.”) (quoted in KAMMEN,
supra note 20, at 9).
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consent of the governed . . . .166
The blanket statement of the laws of nature, coupled with the
teleological idea of government, and the overarching equality, and
respect for Life, Liberty, and Property, are all hallmarks of the
natural law. It is important to note that there is no mention of the
“Rights of Englishmen.” Therefore, the understanding of natural
law as announced by the Declaration is not the English common
law notion of “artificial reason” (the notion that the rights of
Englishmen could be built in part on custom), but rather that ALL
people have inborn rights. This gives credit to what was said
above: the framers adored the common law, when it protected
human rights, but not always. It is therefore sad that the framers
did not embrace the ban on slavery right away. The realization of
that fundamental law would only be established by our
Constitution after the Civil War (1861-1865).167
2. The Structure of our Federal Government is Born out of the
Natural Law
The vast majority of Americans can recall that the federal
government has three branches: The Congress, created by Article I
of the Constitution; the Executive, created by Article II, and the
Judiciary, created by Article III. This entire structure was created
to help protect natural law-based rights.168
The framing era had taken the broad “natural law” and turned it
into a sweeping “natural rights” movement. From this
transformation, the idea obtained is that the entire purpose of

166. Numerous others have pointed out the connection between the natural
law of both the Church and of the secular Enlightenment, and the Declaration.
See Kennedy, supra note 125, at 43.
167. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
168. By this statement, I suggest that because Montesquieu, an
Enlightenment thinker, wanted to establish a better regime to protect human
rights, it follows that a three-part separation of powers is intended to protect
natural law-based rights. See BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE
LAWS (1748).
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government was to secure the rights of one’s people,169 as is
evident from the above quoted Declaration. Thus, many theories
were proffered as to how to best protect one’s people from an
overreaching government. To answer this, Montesquieu developed
his three separate, yet equal, branches of government. And instead
of just having three separate departments of government that could
check each other, he theorized that governmental power should be
separate and distinct. Thus, he devised that the Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial powers should be distinct. This separation
was thought to be a way of protecting the natural rights of citizens.
It is now widely accepted that the framers looked to Montesquieu
and borrowed his ideas.170 Thus, the natural law touched our
federal Constitution by inspiring the way it divided power.
3. The Natural Law and the Bill of Rights171
It has been shown that the framing generation believed in a
certain set of natural law principles that became evident in their
writing of the Bill of Rights: (1) The rights revealed by natural
law, including all rights under the rubric of the right to selfpreservation; (2) the right to property (3) freedom of conscience;
(4) freedom of communication; (5) freedom from arbitrary laws;
(6) the rights of assembly and petition; and (7) the right to selfgovernment.172 One may see in these concepts both cognates to
169. See Cueto-Rua, supra note 4, at 650 (noting that the Enlightenment idea
was that the sole justification for the existence of government was the protection
of individual rights).
170. Mitchell Franklin has pointed out that the Constitution as written in
Philadelphia may properly be called, “the Montesquieian constitution, because
its primary conception was the separation of powers.” See Franklin, The
Relation of the Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment to the Third
Constitution, 4 HOWARD L.J. 170 (1958) [hereinafter Relation of the Fifth]; see
also Gummere, supra note 78, at 7.
171. Others have noted the Bill of Rights as having an influence in natural
law. See Mark Hamilton Levison & Charles Sherman Kramer, The Bill of Rights
as Adjunct to Natural Law, 1991 DET. C. L. REV. 1267 (1991).
172. Kennedy, supra note 125, at 46 (The author also points out that on these
points, the Christian based natural law and the secularized natural law of the
Enlightenment are in accord).
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what has been said of the Enlightenment natural law codes and to
what appears in our Constitution. Further, it has been stated that
“[w]hile there is no textual ground on which one can conclude that
the Constitution incorporates the whole of the natural law, certain
passages indisputably attach to object right.”173 Hence they
connect to a natural law. A summarized and systematized
explanation of these connections could be as follows:
(1) That there is a right to preserve one’s self, and that this
right is protected under the Constitution is evident in the Second
Amendment,174 which has been declared to possess at its core a
right to self-defense.175 Moreover, even if one could interpret the
Second Amendment to not protect a right to self-defense, this does
not mean that the Constitution would not. For the Ninth
Amendment tells us that other rights exist which the Constitution
equally protects, one of which may be the right to self-defense.
Others have pointed out the natural law influence on the Second
Amendment.176
(2) That there is a right to own property and that this right is
somehow derived from nature without any intervention by
government is evident in a number of places. But most
importantly, it is evidenced in the Fifth Amendment,177 which

173. David C. Gray, A Prayer for Constitutional Comparativism in Eigth
Amendment Cases, 18 FED. SENT. R. 237 (2005-2006).
174. U.S. CONST. amend. II states, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.”
175. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
176. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Natural Law in the American Tradition, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 1513, 1524 (2011). The same author has even suggested
natural law influences on the Ex Post Facto clause and the Equal Protection
clause. Id. at 1526.
177. U.S. CONST. amend. V stating:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crimes, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
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protects property unless the taking of it would be for the public
use, and then it can only be taken upon compensation. It is also
found explicitly stated in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
clause. For that clause declares that no person shall “be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”
(3) Freedom of conscience is represented in the freedom to
exercise one’s religion.178 One’s religious beliefs are so close to
their existence that a sudden denial of them may have severe
psychological consequences. Moreover, religion, like greed for
land and power, has caused wars and catastrophes throughout
human history. Thus, the First Amendment179 represents a
principle of natural law discovered during the Enlightenment—that
human beings should have the freedom to protect their innermost
beliefs, but should not force those beliefs upon others.180
(4) The Freedom of communication can be found within the
confines of the freedom of speech and of the press in the First
Amendment.181 It can also be found within the limited protection
afforded a free press by the natural law even in the monarchies of
England.

process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
178. Another writer has noted the natural law influence on the First
Amendment. Eugene C. Gerhart, The Doctrine of Natural Law, 26 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 76, 110 (1951) (citing Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 242-44
(1788); THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 302 ff. and 545 ff. (1950)).
179. U.S. CONST. amend. I states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”
180. This rule has a cognate in what was said of the natural law’s freedom of
conscience influence on the Prussian Civil Code. See Lucke, supra note 9, at 21
(noting an absolute right to freedom of faith and conscience).
181. The natural law influence on the First Amendment has been shown
before. Felix Morley, The Natural Law and The Right to Self-Expression, 4 NAT.
L. INST. PROC. 75 (1951); see also Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural
Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 913 (1992-1993) (stating,
“These older ideas about freedom of speech and press—so different from those
which prevail today—illustrate the significance of the eighteenth-century natural
rights analysis for our understanding of modern constitutional rights.”)
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(5) Freedom from arbitrary law can be found in a number of
places. It can be found, most of all, in the Ninth Amendment,182
and can also be found in the Due Process clauses of the
Constitution. Although I believe that the Due Process clauses
ought to be limited to simple process and the Ninth Amendment
should address of non-enumerated rights, persuasive authority has
long decided that the Substantive Due Process of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Fifth Amendment create a host of different
rights, protected under different conditions.183 Moreover, other
scholars have investigated the natural law foundations of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process clause.
(6) The natural rights of assembly and petition may be said to
derive from the notion that the government’s purpose is to protect
its people, and that the government gathers its power from the
consent of those governed and not simply by the fixing of laws.184
This is so because a government concerned with the consent of its
people must listen to their pleas for redress. Their textual home is
the First Amendment proscriptions on prohibiting such rights.
(7) The natural right to self-government has its place in
multiple parts of the Constitution. To show the example of this—
based on text—requires using multiple provisions of the
Constitution. First, it is evident that being able to petition the
government tells us that people have some right to attempt to
change their government. The other provisions that give a
constitutional home to the natural right of self-government are not
in the Bill, but in the original Constitution. Chief among these is
the fact that both chambers of Congress are elected, that the
Executive is elected, and that even the Judiciary must go through
182. U.S. CONST. amend. IX states: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.”
183. See generally Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reining in Abuses of Executive
Power Through Substantive Due Process, 60 FL. L. REV. 519 (2008).
184. See Declaration of Independence (noting that the only just government
is one that derives its powers from “the consent of the governed”) available at
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html.
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an elected body to be approved. Moreover, Article IV, Section 4
tells us that the Federal Government must guarantee to each state a
republican form of government. As we all know, a republican form
of government is self-governing.
(8) There is, moreover, another facet of the natural law that
appears in the Constitution. This can be seen in the Eight
Amendment.185 Another scholar has pointed out that “the Eighth
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment” is an
example of the natural law being connected with the
Constitution.186 According to that scholar, the determination of
what is cruel under the Amendment “is not the same as
determining what the framers and other residents of late-eighteenth
century America thought was cruel.”187 But instead, determining
what is cruel under the Eighth Amendment is to determine what is
now and always has been cruel and unusual punishment. One may
see cognates to cruel and unusual punishments in the European
model of abolishing torture of war prisoners as a result of natural
law theory.188 For there, as in the Eighth Amendment, we are
dealing with government confining people and subjecting them to
a type of punishment for which they have not been convicted and,
likely, do not deserve.
Finally, we arrive at perhaps the most apparent invocation of
the natural law in the Constitution—the Ninth Amendment.189 The
Ninth
Amendment
has
already
been
called
the
190
“natural law’s logical textual home within the Constitution.” It
has further been stated, “the founders intend the Ninth Amendment
185. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII states: “Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
186. Gray, supra note 173.
187. Id.
188. Lucke, supra note 9, at 24 (noting the natural law-based opposition to
torture).
189. The natural law content of the Ninth Amendment has been discussed
many times before. See note 177, and see Thomas E. Towe, Natural Law and
the Ninth Amendment, 2:2 PEPP. L. REV. 270 (1975).
190. Massey, supra note 43.
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to serve multiple purposes, including a role as a judicially
enforceable source of natural law rights.”191
Now, it may be horrifying to some to suggest that a court may
look to the Ninth Amendment and simply create rules based on
natural law. That fear is erroneous for two reasons. First, the
natural law is not simply looking up to the clouds to find an
answer, but is rather “reason, unaffected by desire.”192 By this I
mean that the natural law is supposed to be discovered based upon
rational, axiomatic principles. Second, we may curtail any attempts
by the judiciary to create rules out of whole cloth by adopting the
method by which the civil law has long handled the natural law as
it relates to their written codes. This is the above-mentioned
civilian method.
As spelled-out in detail by Professor Franklin, the natural law
does not have to be formless.193 Rather, we use the civilian method
to control it. Thus, it is the natural law that a judge ought to
compare to the provisions of the document to create new rules. The
natural law and the understanding of the framing era may be used
to “fill up” the broad provisions of the Constitution, but creating
other rights that are not historically provided for should come
through analogical development of the text. The Civilians call this
method “au-delà du Code civil mais par le Code civil” (beyond the
civil code but through the civil code).194 Constitutional scholars,
such as Professor Coenen of LSU Law, have unintentionally
studied this method by calling it the “combination analysis.”195

191. Id. at 50-51.
192. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS at Bk. III, ch. 16.
193. See generally Franklin, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 116
(explaining how the Ninth Amendment reflects the civil law method and how
such a method may curb judicial attempts at simply making up rules).
194. I am leaving a full discussion of the civilian legal method and its effects
on the Constitution to a possible later essay. This serves as a mere introduction
to that topic.
195. See Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PENN.
L. REV. (forthcoming) (stating, “Most familiarly, the Court has indicated that
multiple rights-based provisions of the Constitution might sometimes require the
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Indeed, as stated before, the text of the Ninth Amendment
supports such an interpretation—because we are not supposed to
use the rights listed to deny those not expressly protected, we must
use the enumerated rights to divine those that are not expressly
protected.
4. The Argument from Phraseology
Further still, the very phrasing of all of these rights in the
Constitution denotes a natural law. For all of these rights are not
ones being granted by the Constitution or the government. They
are phrased as “the right.” Meaning they are phrased as preexisting rights.196 They not only pre-date any laws that may apply
to them, but they also pre-date the Constitution. Thus, one must
ask, “where do these rights comes from?” The answer obviously
cannot be the common law; for by declaring independence, the
framers broke with the common law.197 Even if one assumes a
common law basis for these rights, he or she must also assume a
natural law basis, as it is well-established that the common law had
a substantial natural law basis, although generally drawn from the

invalidation of government action that each provision would permit in
isolation.”).
196. My argument is strengthened by the words of Thomas Jefferson, who
stated:
I deride with you the ordinary doctrine, that we brought with us from
England the common law rights. This narrow notion was a favorite in
the first movement of rallying to our rights against Great Britain. But, it
was that of men who felt their rights before they had thought of their
explanation. The truth is, that we brought with us the rights of men; of
expatriated men.
See letter from Jefferson to Tyler, Monticello, 17 June 1812, in 6 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 65 (H.A.Washington ed., 1854) (cited in Franklin,
Concerning the Influence, supra note 41, at 645).
197. It should be noted that:
[I]mmediately after the Revolution, there was a widespread feeling that
efforts should be made to develop a particular American jurisprudence,
which would not be just a slavish imitator of the English common law,
but would be eclectic—selecting the best principles and methods form
whatever system they might be found.
STEIN, CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE, supra note 58, at 415.
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facts of each case or situation. Moreover, they could not have
come from the English crown, otherwise it would have been unjust
for the revolutionaries to have broken away—if the rights were
derived from the crown, then the crown would have had every
authority to take them away. Moreover, the rights could not have
come simply from their having been English subjects. Once they
left the crown, they were no longer English subjects and thus
would not have had these “rights.” Not only that, but as has been
noted above, not everyone living in the United States was
English.198 Nor did they all consider themselves English. Even
among the most politically powerful of the time were some not of
English descent.199 This means that those who ratified the
Constitution (the people) would not have believed their rights
came from being English. All of these reasons, combined with
what was detailed above, conclusively show that the natural law of
the Enlightenment had a profound impact upon the American
Constitution.
Thus, one may say that reasoning from the Constitution’s
text—a strictly positivist notion—leads to a complete refutation of
legal positivism. If we are going to understand the Constitution at
all, or understand it as an Enlightenment code, we must understand
its natural law composition, and be able to apply it to our
interpretation of the document.
Lastly, I must mention that like the civilians and their codes,
the framers had to bow to political pressure. Just as the Prussian
drafters and Martini wanted to limit the intrusion of the monarchy
on human rights, but had to give way to the politically powerful
kings at the time, so too did many framers want to curtail slavery
under the natural law but were forced to yield to the politically

198. See text accompanying note 38.
199. For example, James Wilson, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and
a signatory of the Declaration of Independence, was born and raised in Scotland.
See STEIN, CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE, supra note 58, at 415.
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powerful slave-holding states. In any event, the Constitution is still
influenced by the natural law.200
IV. ARTICLE III: THE FUNCTIONS OF THE CODES AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES
The last two qualities of an Enlightenment era code are these:
completeness and abrogation.201 Abrogation, on one hand, is the
theory that the new code does more than simply compile or restate
the existing law, but rather terminates the existing law from having
any force at all—even subsidiary force. The old law cannot even
be used to fill in the gaps between the new written laws, although it
may be used to help define terms and fill up broadly-written
provisions. Completeness, on the other hand, means that the
document covers the totality of civil society,202 on either the whole
spectrum of law or on a specific era of law and is meant to be such
for a very long period of time.203 Completeness itself has two
primary methods of obtaining this goal: specific enumeration or
broadly written law. One may see that the Constitution uses both of
these methods and fulfills both of these functions.

200. As Lucke stated, “Despite the unavoidable compromises forced upon
the draftsmen by the political realities of their time, the ALR is a true child of
the natural law tradition and of the Enlightenment.” Likewise, the sheer force of
the slave-holding powers ought not be weighed against the natural law
influences of the Constitution. See Lucke, supra note 9, at 24.
201. Professor Moréteau points out that the key difference between Codes
and Digests is the abrogation clause. Moréteau, De Revolutionibus, supra note
13, at 37.
202. Glenn, supra note 5, at 766.
203. Napoléon summarized the theory of the codes lasting for extended
periods by saying: “My true glory is not that I have won forty battles; Waterloo
will blow away the memory of these victories. What nothing can blow away,
what will live eternally, is my Civil Code.” Alain A. Levasseur, Code Napoléon
or Code Portalis?, 43 TUL. L. REV. 764 (1969).
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A. Abrogation204
The notion of abrogation has been used since Justinian’s
Corpus Juris Civilis, when the Emperor released his lawyers from
ever having to cite to the old law again, and that the new body of
law was the sole source, complete in itself.205 This same idea
carried over to each one of the great codes of Europe.206
The Louisiana Supreme Court summarized the need for
abrogation in the now-infamous case of Cottin v. Cottin:207
It must not be lost sight of, that our civil code is a digest of
the civil laws, which were in force in this country, when it
was adopted; that those laws must be considered as
untouched, wherever the alterations and amendments,
introduced in the digest, do not reach them; and that such
parts of those laws only are repealed, as are either contrary
to, or incompatible with the provisions of the code.208
Thus, in order to say that the Constitution is a code, in the vein
of the Enlightenment, it must be shown that it decisively broke
from the prior law. Now, there are many methods by which
abrogation can be done. The most powerful is expressed

204. It may be best to give an overall summary of my “abrogation”
discussion in a footnote: Abrogation essentially means that, for the area of law
covered by the code, any former existing law is no longer controlling. This
makes the code, in the understanding of the Enlightenment, entirely different
from ordinary statutes. For if a code were to be passed dealing with private
contract law, it would be presumed that any existing law on the subject—even
that not in conflict with the code, is now abridged and the sole source of law is
the code. This is distinguished from a statute, whose purpose is to address very
specific situations, because one statute can be passed that touches on private
contract law, which is not repugnant to the former statute on private contract
law, and the former will still have force. Likewise, the American Constitution
abrogated the common law on fundamental rules for government.
205. STEIN, ROMAN LAW, supra note 6, at 35 (noting that Justinian had
forbidden any comments on his work, believing it to cover every possible
situation).
206. WATSON, supra note 14, at 131 (noting that in the Codes of Europe, the
prior law ceases to have even subsidiary force and stating, “What is wanted is
the correct interpretation of the code provision, not its forerunners.”).
207. 5 Mart. (O.S.) 93 (1817).
208. Id. at 94.
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abrogation.209 This is, of course, an article of a code, which states
that all prior laws are abrogated. The second method is tacit repeal,
where something about the new law makes it obvious that all of the
old law was repealed.210 It is the second method by which the
Constitution abrogates all prior public law.
First, I must admit that no rational person would even suggest
that the Constitution did not abrogate the English and European
rules on government. That is to suggest, no one would say when
addressing a possible gap about what the powers of government
are, or what the rights of persons are, by asking what is done in
England or France. That question would only come into play in
defining or filling up the broad provisions of the law. Moreover,
this point is made even clearer by the rule that “all interpretation of
the Constitution must begin with its text.”211 For if the document
did not abrogate all prior law and there were a gap in the type of
law covered by the Constitution, then that gap would have
certainly been discovered by now; and for the answers to that
question, the justices would have appealed to the pre-existing rules
of law without reference to the Constitution.
Further, the Constitution creates a general government of
enumerated powers. All those powers that the national government
has are found in the Constitution, with others only coming in as
necessary and proper to fulfill the government’s other powers.212
Thus, it is clear that the Constitution abrogated any common law
rules on the powers of government. For example, in England the
national government was able to establish a church, which is
anathema to the American Constitution, and is expressly made so
by the Establishment clause of the First Amendment.
209. Moréteau, De Revolutionibus, supra note 13, at 37 (noting that there is
generally a requirement of an abrogation clause).
210. It is by this method that the modern Louisiana Code abrogates the old.
211. Indeed, even those who may be considered “living constitutionalists”
must begin the analysis with the text of the Constitution even if they do not end
there.
212. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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Put simply, abrogation is the reason why, in determining if the
federal government can do some act, we ask (1) does the
Constitution say the government can, and (2) if so, does the
Constitution elsewhere say that the government can’t? If the
Constitution had not abrogated the prior law, the questions would
be (1) does the Constitution say you can, (2) if not, do the other
laws say you can (3) if so, does something else in the Constitution
say you can’t? Thus, the American Constitution is the sole source
of foundational law that, at a minimum, the government must
obey, and the sole source of that general government’s powers.213
There are, however, two clauses in the Constitution that may
seem at first glance to defeat my argument for abrogation. The first
is Article VI,214 which tells us that all debts incurred by the
national government under the Articles of Confederation are to be
held to the same extent against the new government. One may
suggest that if the new government is taking care of the debts of
the old, then the old is not really gone. In response, I argue that
taking on responsibilities of the former regime does not undo
abrogation. In fact, it furthers my argument. For, by officially
announcing that the former is gone and that the new will hold its
debts, the charter is stating that the former is actually gone.
Moreover, taking care of the other’s debts does not mean that the
former regime is not gone. Indeed, the Article is nothing more than
an assurance that the people who created the federal government
would not be defaulting on their promises to foreign nations.
Lastly, the Confederation is long since dead. Any bond it had not
paid back by the time of the Philadelphia convention has most
certainly been paid back by now. Thus, if the Article could once

213. As will be evident below, this aspect of abrogation bleeds into
completeness.
214. U. S. CONST. art. VI states in pertinent part: “All Debts contracted and
Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as
valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the
Confederation . . . .”
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have been read as defeating abrogation, it could not be so now, the
target of clause itself is long resolved.
The second portion of the Constitution which may give
abrogation trouble is the Seventh Amendment, which states that:
In suits at common law, where the value on controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.
One may argue that the mention of the “common law” in the
Amendment signify that the common law has not been abrogated
for constitutional reasons. This argument fails to comprehend the
fact that codes frequently adopt old rules. This clause does nothing
but adopt the term “common law” in the first instance to described
lawsuits, and merely adopts “common law” in the second instance
to denote the procedure by which the jury verdicts may be
reexamined.215 Put another way, the Seventh Amendment merely
reflects that the Constitution received a portion of the common
law.
B. Completeness216
If one understood the Constitution to simply be a super
common law jurisdiction statute, it would have to be understood to
have dealt solely with the problems of the time and to have been
immediately actionable by the people at the time of the framing.
However, if one understands the Constitution as a supreme code,
215. I thank my friend, Brian Strand, for pointing out these two arguments to
me.
216. I believe it best to summarize “completeness” in a footnote for those
unfamiliar with the concept: The Constitution’s arena of law is public law,
setting the foundation of the government’s relationship with the people and vice
versa. In this arena, the Constitution is complete. It covers everything that could
possibly happen. Moreover, like the codes, it is complete in the sense that it is
finished, i.e., it is capable of extending into the future without constant revision.
This makes the Constitution different from regular statutes, whose rules cover
only very small portions of law and are intended to deal with very specific
incidents.
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then it would in fact cover every situation placed before it. We
have, since the beginning of our republic, interpreted the
Constitution in the latter vein. For as the Marbury court noted, the
Constitution is not some static legal code,217 similar to one which
could have seen in England at the time. Rather, it is meant to
extend eternally forward and touch on every debate that may be
presented to it.218
The first method of extending eternally forward to every case is
generality.219 Portalis articulated the general rule that a code ought
not to provide rules that are immediately applicable to every
conceivable concrete case. On the contrary, it must lay down the
rules of law broadly enough to regulate all situations of a certain
type that may arise from human interaction and must not lay down
specific solutions relating to particular circumstances.220 However,
the code must also be practical and not abstract to the point that it
would be worthless.221 In solving this conundrum, Portalis stated:
How does one arrest the passing of time? How can one
oppose the course of events or the imperceptible change of
custom? How can one know and calculate in advance
things which only experience can reveal? Can foresight
ever extend to things our minds cannot grasp? . . . Many
things are therefore necessarily left to the arbitration of
judges. The function of the [Code] is to set down, in broad
terms, the general maxims of law, to establish principles
rich in consequences, and not to deal with particulars of the
questions that may arise on every subject. It is left to the
magistrate and the jurisconsult, fully alive to the overall
spirit of laws, to guide their application.222

217. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803).
218. Id. at 177.
219. See Olivier Moréteau, Codes as Straight-Jackets, Safeguards, and
Alibis: The Experience of the French Civil Code, 20 N.C.J. INT’L & COM. REG.
273, 275 (1994-1995) (discussing the use of broad generalities within the civil
codes) [hereinafter Codes as Straight-Jackets].
220. Bergel, supra note 11, at 1082.
221. Id.
222. See Lucke, supra note 9, at 32.
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The second method of covering every possible situation is
specific enumeration. Simply put, this method held that a code
could set forth the rule for every single possible situation. The
Prussian Code is generally thought of as using this method. This is
the same method that was used by Justinian and his CJS.223
However, both ultimately suffered the same consequences. The
CJS needed frequent updating to the point that a fourth portion was
added.224 Likewise, the Prussian Code needed almost constant
updating, for specific enumeration cannot arrest the passage of
time. That is, until the American Constitution’s theory of the
general government, specific enumeration could not arrest the
passage of time. Thus, specific enumeration is maintainable if the
powers given are specifically limited.
The genius of the Constitution is that it does not disregard
specific enumeration for broad generality, nor does it do away with
broad generality. Thus, it has accomplished the same feat as the
European codes—it found the perfect middle ground between
general and specific, theoretical and practical.225 Indeed, it has
already been stated that, “[The] emancipation from particularism is
characteristic, above all, in the succinct Constitution of the United
States and in terse code of the modern civil law, such as that of
France….”226 The same author noted, “the flexible texts of the
Fourteenth Amendment and elsewhere may be called abstract . . .
universals;” a comparison may thus be made between “due
process” in the Constitution and “good faith” of the codes.227
These abstract universals and the broad generalities in which
the Amendments are written, especially those on individual rights,

223. STEIN, ROMAN LAW, supra note 6, at 35.
224. This portion was called the Novels, which consisted of Justinian’s own
enactments. Id.
225. Gummere, supra note 78 (showing that the framers took general
“principles into the instrument without trying to particularize too explicitly how
they should be put into effect”).
226. Franklin, Relation of the Fifth, supra note 170.
227. Id.
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allow for growth in the law.228 The framers believed that human
rights were essentially innumerable. It follows that they would
have written these provisions broadly to allow them to grow and
morph to meet future situations. Such a connection between the
goals of individual rights being construed broadly and the
understanding of the codes in Europe was unmistakably given by
Justice Story in the 1816 opinion of Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee:229
The words are to be taken in their natural and obvious
sense, and not in a sense unreasonable restricted or
enlarged.230 The constitution unavoidably deals in general
language. It did not suit the purposes of the people in
framing this great charter of our liberties to provide for
minute specifications of its powers, or to declare the means
by which those powers should be carried into execution.231
The instrument was not intended to provide merely for the
exigencies of a few years, but was to endure through a long
lapse of ages the events of which were locked up in the
inscrutable purposes of Providence.232 It could not have
been foreseen what new changes and modifications of
power might be indispensable to effectuate the general
principles of the charter.233
228. It has already been shown that these broad generalities are written for
the purpose of allowing jurisprudence to adapt to changing situations, without
breaking entirely from either the spirit or the letter of the law. This rule of the
legislative drafting in the civil law, as opposed to legislative drafting in the
common law world was summarized by Professor Moréteau, who has written,
“[M]any people in common law jurisdictions tend to regard the law in a codified
system as rigid, because they tend not to appreciate that the civil law legislature
is content with enunciating general principles….” Moréteau, Codes as StraightJackets, supra note 219, at 275.
229. 14 U.S. 304, 327; 1 Wheat 304, 331 (1816).
230. This is a well-known code theory that the whole document was drafted
to be understood by the common man. See Moréteau, De Revolutionibus, supra
note 13, at 62 (discussing that in the context of civil code, the law must be
accessible to the average person).
231. Just as the codes were (1) drafted in general language, (2) not meant to
be immediately actionable or cover to a minute detail, and (3) did not provide
for how their provisions are to be carried out entirely.
232. Just as the codes were meant to arrest the passage of time and provide
the general rules for generations to come.
233. The fact that the Constitution was meant to extend eternally forward and
be relevant for the same period is noted in the preamble, when it states, “And
secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” If the framers had
intended for the Constitution to act like a mere statute, placing the term
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Therefore, the Constitution’s broad general principles of law,
combined with the methods of gap-filling discussed above, bring
unforeseeable, historically unprovided-for situations under the
purview of the Constitution, thereby making it complete.
Specific enumeration is taken up in the context of the
enumerated powers of the Federal government. Aside from these
powers and those procedures that are necessary and proper to
fulfill the enumerated powers, no other authority exists for the
federal government’s actions.234 Not even a strong government
interest235 is enough to generate government power—it must be
specified in the Constitution. This presents a stark contrast to the
problem faced by the Prussian Code and the Corpus Juris’ use of
specific enumeration. In those documents we find that the specific
enumeration, setting forth very restrictive rules, lead to a need for
constant revision and update. Other answers had to be provided for
these minute situations because courts were unable to extend by
analogy the very specific clauses. The Constitution does not face
this problem. For even where it is silent, something that ostensibly
could require the creation of new powers or new rules of law (as to
the power of the federal government), it gives an answer. That
answer is, “no, the federal government cannot not do this.”236
Thus, the Constitution was able to specifically provide for every
possible instance of federal power, by making those (and those
necessary and proper thereto) the only instances of federal power.
Moreover, the Constitution, like the codes of Europe, has
devices that allowed for the document to extend continuously even
“Posterity” in the preamble would have been a terrible way of conveying the
idea.
234. Here is where the two functions bleed into each other.
235. A strong government interest, however, may allow for the government
to exercise its power against the rights of individuals—either by it being a
“legitimate government interest,” “an important government interest,” or a
“compelling government interest.” Or at least that is how the doctrine stands
now. See note 211.
236. Likewise, for issues dealing with the states, the answer is, “yes, unless
the Constitution says the states cannot.”
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in the face of apparent gaps in the law. We have already discussed
the Roman method above. But here, we will discuss it in the
context of completeness. Here, we must steer clear of the full
discussion on the civilian method of looking at the principles of
law, and maintain focus on that clause of the constitution which
declares that the analogical development of text be used—the
Ninth Amendment.
The Ninth Amendment declares that there are other rights
protected by the Constitution, even if they are not written down. It
is sad that this Amendment has not yet shown its full potential. But
by its existence the Ninth actually gives the judges who decide the
case the power to locate and protect these rights. The text of the
Ninth can actually do a great deal of work. As noted above, read to
its negative, the Amendment tells us that a judge ought to use the
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights and elsewhere in the
Constitution to discover previously unnoticed rights. Thus, the
Constitution’s listing of rights would not be confined to those
broad principles of the eighteenth century.
Read in its ordinary meaning, the Amendment may even allow
for reference to natural law in order to discover new rules on
human rights. This would be beyond the context of simply saying
that the natural law requires judges to rely upon the text.
Thus, the Ninth Amendment allows for the Constitution to
cover every possible situation which may arise involving
individual rights that are not covered in the text elsewhere. In so
discovering those rights, a court ought to look to the principles
announced in the other provisions, by reading them together to
create new rules, and by reference to the natural law when the text
of the Constitution fails to provide a solid answer. Thus, in
assuming control of the natural law, the Constitution’s protections
on the issue of individual freedoms are literally universal and
complete, because all possible protections of rights are given effect
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by the Constitution, and only an appropriate government interest237
can abrogate those protections. In so being, the Amendment is
similar to the former Section 7 of the Austrian Civil Code, which
stated:
If a case cannot be decided by applying the words or the
natural meaning of a statute, one must take into
consideration similar cases which are dealt with in other
statutes in a definite manner and the reasons behind such
statutes. If a doubt remains, the case must be decided by
applying natural legal principles, having given mature
consideration to the carefully gathered circumstances.238
Therefore, the Constitution is functionally a code, because the
document abrogates the prior law and is complete over its specific
era of law. The similarities between the framing document and the
codes of Europe can no longer be ignored. The Constitution is an
Enlightenment code.
C. Consequences
Showing that the Constitution functions like an Enlightenment
code and has the requisite other features would be a moot task, if
there were not some consequence that would result from such a
revelation. A full delineation of the consequences is saved for
another essay. However, it feels appropriate to briefly address a
few of such consequences here.

237. Because the entire purpose of the government is to protect its people, I
believe that the only interest that could weigh against a person’s rights is the
rights of others. A similar philosophy, that government’s only purpose is to
protect individual rights can clearly be seen in the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man, Article II, which clearly puts forth the Enlightenment’s thought
on the “goal” of political association, which is the preservation of natural rights.
238. This passage is very similar to current the art. 4 of the Louisiana Civil
Code, which states, “When no rule for a particular situation can be derived from
legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to equity. To
decide equitably, resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing usages,” and to
former article 21 of the Civil Code of 1870, which stated: “In all civil matters,
where there is no express law, the judge is bound to proceed according to equity.
To decide equitably, an appeal is to be made to natural law and reason, or
received usages, where positive law is silent.”
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1. Jurisprudence
First and foremost, it cannot be denied that the Supreme Court
and the lower federal courts have the power to interpret the
Constitution and to declare acts null under its provisions. Such a
power is blatantly obvious with the “arising under the
Constitution” rule in Article III. What sort of suits would “arise
under the Constitution” except for those challenging acts as not
being constitutional? The answer is none. This may, however, be
incompatible with the notion of stare decisis. It has already been
noted by prominent scholarship that the text and form of the
Constitution is anathema to stare decisis.239 The courts have just
not realized that fact yet.
As it stands now, the only way the Supreme Court will
overturn inaccurate precedent is if it is wrong enough.240 Not if it is
wrong, but only if it is wrong enough. This ought to seem absurd
to anyone familiar with the concept that judges are supposed to
interpret and apply the law, not make it. Moreover, even if lower
courts notice massive errors in the Supreme Court’s decisions, they
are bound by those prior cases. The only way a lower court may
get away with not applying the rule developed by the high court is
by somehow distinguishing the cases.
Just imagine, if there had been no binding authority to the
Supreme Court’s erroneous decision in the Slaughter House
Cases,241 then the States would likely not have gotten away with as
many atrocities as they did until the incorporation of substantive
due.

239. Franklin, The Encyclopédiste, supra note 3, at 61 (stating, “stare decisis
is not justified by the content of the Constitution.”).
240. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854
(1992) (showing that a prior decision will not be overruled absent showing that
the court must consider “prudential and pragmatic considerations,” before
overruling erroneous precedent).
241. 83 U.S. 36 (1872) (holding that the Privileges or Immunities clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate all of the Bill of Rights against
the States).
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If we do adopt the idea that the Constitution is a supreme code,
then the decisions of the United States Supreme Court would not
be binding upon the lower courts or the Court itself. Of course,
those decisions would be binding upon the parties who happen to
be in the suit. And, of course, those decisions may help other
courts decide cases, so long as they adopt the appropriate
understanding of jurisprudence.
There are a few theories of jurisprudence in civil law
jurisdictions. The first is that of “probable doctrine,”242 where an
issue has been decided so many times by a higher court that it is
probably the right way to rule. The second is “jurisprudence
constante”243 meaning that precedent only becomes strongly
influential after it has been almost universally agreed to being the
right interpretation of the law. This is the method which is
supposed to be used in Louisiana and is widely used in civilian
jurisdictions. Considering that the majority of jurisdictions have
adopted the third method, and considering it was that method that
was ruling the day in Europe at the time of the Enlightenment, and
that it was to be used by our founders’ greatest ally, France, it
seems appropriate to state that it should be the method used.
I understand the concern about whether such a situation would
be appropriate; after all, would we want lower courts allowing
States to bypass decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education?244
Moreover, one may point out that in civilian jurisdictions, the
Constitutional Courts’ rulings are binding. It may be due to a
pragmatic development.

242. Rett R. Ludwikowski, Latin American Hybrid Constitutionalism: The
United States Presidentialism in the Civil Law, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 29, 47 (2003).
243. Doerr v. Mobile Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 128: “Under the civilian
tradition, while a single decision is not binding on our courts, when a series of
decisions form a constant stream of uniform and homogenous rulings having the
same reasoning, jurisprudence constante applies and operates with considerable
persuasive authority.” (internal quotations omitted).
244. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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2. Implications for Several Current Doctrines
(1) Since this theory focuses heavily on the natural law, and
argues that there may be some sort of general jurisprudence
ordained by the Constitution, this would certainly have an impact
on the Erie245 doctrine, which appears to be based on the notions
that (1) there is no natural law, and (2) there is no general law
discoverable or which may be applied by the federal courts.
(2) This theory asserts that the Constitution adopted the
Enlightenment notion that government has only one purpose—the
protection of human rights. If this is so, then the only legitimate
government interest (as hinted at above) is the protection of
individuals from others and the government. Such a consideration
would have massive implications for weighing government interest
against human rights in the context of equal protection, and
substantive due process.246
(3) Since this theory would require comparison of the text and
discerning fundamental principles embedded in the text, we would
be forced to review the notion of constitutional protections for
juridical persons. By this I mean that in reading the Bill of Rights it
is clear that “persons” within the meaning of the Constitution have
the capacity to enjoy all the rights listed in the document, and are
protected under it, even though they cannot yet exercise those
rights, until they are taken away after due process is given. Thus, it
cannot be that one may start out with enjoyment of some rights and
not others. But this is exactly what the American corporate
personhood doctrine suggests—that there are some constitutional
persons that may have the capacity of enjoyment for some but not
all of these rights initially,247 even before they are taken away with
245. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64; 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938)
(overruling the general federal common law).
246. See generally Dragovich v. U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, 845 F. Supp. 2d
1091 (U.S. N.D. Cal. 2012) (discussing rational basis review and strict scrutiny
review for substantive due process).
247. For example, corporations do not have the right against selfincrimination. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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due process. Therefore, if my theory is adopted, either corporations
have the capacity of enjoyment for every single right, both
enumerated and non-enumerated (as natural persons) or they have
none. But since it has already been agreed that it is logically
impossible for corporations to enjoy some rights (the right against
self-incrimination, since corporations lack an actual “self”), then
that means they cannot be considered “persons” within the
meaning of the Constitution. Thus, they have no constitutionally
protected rights; they have only those created by ordinary statute.
(4) Substantive due process will be a thing of the past under my
theory, because we are to give an average person reading to the
words of a law. But a provision that speaks to “process” means
only that: “process.” The only way to logically get “substance” out
of “process” would be if there were really no difference between
them.248 Moreover, all the work of substantive due process would
already have been done by the Privileges or Immunities clause
incorporating all of the rights held by the federal government
against the states.249 This would also mean, of course, that the
Privileges or Immunities clause would have to incorporate all of
the unwritten rights of the Constitution.250
(5) Because we would likely adopt other code based
theories,251 we would likely adopt the use of foreign law to help fill
up the broad provisions on human rights, so long as that foreign
law had a similar basis in its development as our constitutional
provision. I can think of no better example than the Eighth
248. If that were so, then the Erie doctrine would be wrong for yet another
reason.
249. The Supreme Court has basically “incorporated” all of the Bill of Rights
against the states. The most recent being the right to bear arms of the Second
Amendment. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742; 130 S. Ct. 3020
(2010).
250. In relation to this idea and to what was written about the Slaughter
House Cases above, another writer has shown the influence of civilian theory on
the Fourteenth Amendment. Jared Bianchi, Anything but Common: The Role of
Louisiana’s Civilian Tradition in the Development of Federal Civil Rights
Jurisprudence under the Fourteenth Amendment, 6 J. CIV. L. STUD. 177 (2013).
251. One of which would also be “abuse of rights,” but this is left to another
essay.
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Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.252 However,
because we must relay back and forth between the texts of the
Constitution, I must sadly admit that such use of foreign law could
not abolish the death penalty. However, it could end imprisonment
for drug offenses, as many other nations have begun to abolish
such actions. The more that other nations change their treatment of
drug offenders and users, the more the United States would
become increasingly “unusual” in its treatment of drug offenders.
Such a disparity between the United States and other nations could
inform our understanding of what is cruel and unusual.
(6) Original intent would be dead. The intent of the framers—
by that, I mean their original application of the Constitution—
would only be one part of the puzzle in interpreting the broad
provisions of the Constitution. However, resort should be made to
the original understanding in “defining” what the words mean. For
example, if the Constitution contained the word “fence,” but that
word actually meant what we call today a “dog,” it would be
imperative to know what the framers definition was in order to
help locate the appropriate principle.
With this in mind, I realize that there would be an
insurmountable amount of disinterest in adopting my idea as a
whole. Even though conceptually the Constitution is an
Enlightenment code, many would likely not wish to adopt all of
these consequences.
V. CONCLUSION
Two centuries ago, at the height of the Enlightenment age, our
founders set forth the national charter—a document filled with
natural law influence and lessons from Roman legal history. Its
passages distilled these higher and ancient laws—derived from
religion, reason, and nature—through practical experience into a
252. I am glad to see that this has already been done in part. Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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Constitution that abrogated control of the prior regimes and gave
answers to all questions relevant to the fundamental law of our
nation. All of these facts make the Constitution conceptually
identical to the great codes of Europe, and like those legal titans,
our Constitution has survived war, national poverty, and
unpredictable social changes. But what has been overlooked is this:
the Constitution has not had to undergo the full scale changes of
the Enlightenment codes, it does not have the danger of an
auxiliary code that may draw it out of the center of our national
legal structure, and instead of merely adopting the natural law, it
has become the natural law. Therefore, not only can we say that the
Constitution is a code in a small compass, but we may also be
justified in saying that it is the best code of them all.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The South African trust is best described as an “evolutionary
hybrid”—a product of the coalescence of Roman-Dutch civil law
and English common law in South Africa’s mixed legal system.1
The South African trust, like its Anglo-American counterparts, is
essentially an administrative device through which a trustee
controls property for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries.2
However, the South African trust, unlike its Anglo-American
 University of the Western Cape, Faculty of Law (South Africa); LL.B.,
LL.M., LL.D., University of Stellenbosch (South Africa). I am grateful to Profs.
Marius de Waal (University of Stellenbosch) and Bradley Smith (University of
the Free State) for their valuable commentary on an earlier draft of the article.
1. A description proffered by Tony Honoré, Trust in SOUTHERN CROSS:
CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 849, 850 (R. Zimmermann &
D. Visser eds., 1996).
2. Braun v. Blann and Botha NNO and Another 1984 (2) SA 850 (A)
859H.
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counterparts, is not premised on any dichotomy of ownership. This
is because the law/equity-divide in English law and its incidental
duality of legal and equitable ownership are foreign to South
African law’s adherence, in typical civilian fashion, to singular (or
unitary) ownership.3 Instead, the separation of estates (or
patrimonies)4 is fundamental to the conceptualization of the South
African trust—a trust constitutes a special estate, distinct from but
held contemporaneously with, the trustee’s personal (or general)
estate.5 The South African Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed the
separateness of a trust estate in Land and Agricultural Bank of
South Africa v. Parker and Others6 when it described a trust estate
as an accumulation of assets and liabilities which vests as a
separate entity, devoid of legal personality, in trustees.7 The Court
confirmed, furthermore, that the “core idea” of the South African
trust lies in a functional separation between trustees’ control over
the trust property on the one hand, and trust beneficiaries’
enjoyment of the benefits yielded by that control on the other
hand.8 The Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 is the statute that
regulates aspects of South African trust law. Section 12 of the Act
reinforces the separateness of a trust estate through its directive
that trust property forms no part of a trustee’s personal estate
except in the instance where a trustee is also a trust beneficiary and
has, as such, a claim to the trust property.
The foregoing synopsis explains why, where one of the spouses
in divorce proceedings is the trustee of a trust, the trust assets are,
3. Id. at 859F.
4. The term “estate,” rather than “patrimony,” is generally used in South
African legal parlance.
5. Marius J. de Waal, The Core Elements of the Trust: Aspects of the
English, Scottish and South African Trusts Compared, 117 S. AFRICAN L.J. 548,
559–63 (2000). See also generally George L. Gretton, Trusts without Equity, 49
INT’L. & COMP. L.Q. 599, 608–15 (2000).
6. Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker and Others 2005
(2) SA 77 (SCA). The Supreme Court of Appeal is South Africa’s highest court
in non-constitutional matters.
7. Id. at para. 10.
8. Id. at para. 19.
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in principle, excluded from the determination of the patrimonial
consequences of that divorce. The patrimonial consequences of the
divorce impact on the divorcing spouses’ personal estates, or, in
the case of a marriage in community of property, on the spouses’
joint estate. Where one spouse is the trustee of a trust, such a trust
constitutes a separate estate in that spouse’s hands and,
consequently, the trust property forms no part of the trusteespouse’s personal estate or, in the case of community of property,
the spouses’ joint estate. However, this ostensibly straightforward
legal position has been increasingly challenged before South
African courts since the advent of the twenty-first century. These
challenges occurred particularly in the context of the emergence of
a “newer type of trust”9 in South Africa since the 1990s. The
Supreme Court of Appeal described this newer type of trust in
Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker, its seminal
judgment on point, as one under which the trust’s abovementioned
core idea is debased because the trust form is employed not to
separate trust beneficiaries’ beneficial interest from trustees’
control over trust property, but rather to permit everything to
remain “as before.”10 This occurs typically when a trust’s trustees
are also among the beneficiaries of that trust or, stated differently,
when some of the trust beneficiaries control the selfsame trust as
its trustees. In South Africa this newer type of trust is particularly
prevalent in the family context when, for example, a husband sets
up a trust with himself as trustee; and himself, his wife and their
children as trust beneficiaries. The husband then administers the
trust as if the trust property still formed part of his personal estate,
and does so (by reason of the family dynamics at play)
unchallenged by his family members who are the other
beneficiaries of the trust.

9. A term first used by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Nieuwoudt and
Another NNO v. Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk 2004 (3) SA 486 (SCA) para. 17.
10. Parker, 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA), para. 26.
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A popular appellation in South African legal parlance for this
newer type of trust is the so-called “alter ego trust”11—it portrays
accurately the scenario in which a trustee controls the trust affairs
with self-interest and with an utter disregard for the existence of
the trust as a separate estate in which the trust beneficiaries are
beneficially interested: the trust is nothing but the trustee’s (in the
foregoing example, the husband’s) alter ego. The Supreme Court
of Appeal opined in the Parker case that, in order to remedy
trustees’ abuse of the trust through treating it as their alter ego and,
in so doing, debasing the core idea of the trust, it is, in appropriate
circumstances, permissible to find that “the trust form is a veneer
that in justice should be pierced” in the interests of, for example,
creditors.12 South African trust law has accepted “piercing the trust
veneer” and its synonym “going behind the trust form” 13 as
suitable descriptions for those instances where the courts provide
apposite relief when the trust form has been abused through
trustees’ non-observance of the core idea of the trust. In light of the
foregoing legal development, it was, predictably, only a matter of
time before a trustee’s treatment of a trust as his or her alter ego
through a disregard for the aforementioned control/enjoyment
divide that typifies the South African trust would, when such a
trustee engaged in divorce proceedings, elicit the averment from
his or her spouse that the trust property should be considered
alongside the property in the trustee-spouse’s personal estate, or
the property in the spouses’ joint estate, for the purpose of
determining the patrimonial consequences of the dissolution of
their marriage.

11. Commissioner for Inland Revenue v. Pick ’n Pay Employee Share
Purchase Trust 1992 (4) SA 39 (A) 59F was one of the first reported judgments
in which a court used the expression. Senior v. Senior 1999 (4) SA 955 (W)
964H was one of the first divorce cases in which the term was used.
12. Parker, 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA), para. 37.3.
13. See, e.g., Van Zyl and Another NNO v. Kaye NO and Others 2014 (4)
SA 452 (WCC), para. 22.
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This article analyzes some of the principal South African
judgments on point in order to place in perspective the South
African courts’ engagement with alter ego trusts in divorce cases.
It is shown that, in particular, marriages concluded out of
community of property have given rise to claims that trust assets
should be considered alongside the property in trustee-spouses’
personal estates for the purpose of determining the patrimonial
consequences of the dissolution of such marriages. These claims
have been directed at either the addition of trust asset values to that
of trustee-spouses’ personal estates for the purpose of effecting
redistributions of assets (in terms of Section 7 of the Divorce Act
70 of 1979) on the one hand, and the inclusion of trust asset values
in the calculation of the growth of trustee-spouses’ personal estates
stante matrimonio for the purpose of realizing accrual claims (in
terms of Section 3 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984) on
the other hand. Marriages concluded in community of property
recently entered the fray when the South African Supreme Court of
Appeal had to adjudicate on a prayer that trust assets be considered
alongside the assets in divorcing spouses’ joint estate in order to
effect the division of that estate. Part IV of the article is devoted to
an analysis and evaluation of South African judgments on the
(possible) interplay between trust law and matrimonial property
law toward determining the patrimonial consequences of the
dissolution of marriages through divorce. That investigation is
preceded in Parts II and III of the article by brief contextualizing
descriptions of South African matrimonial property systems and
pertinent aspects of the patrimonial consequences of the
dissolution of marriages, as well as essential aspects of South
African courts’ power to go behind the trust form.
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICAN MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
REGIMES AND ASPECTS OF THE PATRIMONIAL CONSEQUENCES OF
THE DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGES
Universal community of property is South Africa’s primary (or
default) matrimonial property system14—upon conclusion of the
marriage the spouses become tied co-owners in undivided and
indivisible half-shares of all the assets and liabilities they have at
the time of the marriage, as well as all the assets and liabilities they
acquire during the subsistence of their marriage. Upon the
dissolution of the marriage, all liabilities are settled from the joint
estate and the balance of the joint estate is thereafter distributed
equally between the spouses.15
Spouses are (and have always been) free to depart from this
default position by entering into a pre-nuptial contract. They may,
therefore, opt to marry out of community of property with the
exclusion of community of profit and loss—this is essentially a
regime of complete separation of property.16 However, this regime
is potentially prejudicial to the spouse who is in the weaker
financial position—typically the spouse who is not the family’s
primary breadwinner. Such a spouse, despite having contributed
financially and/or otherwise to the growth of the other spouse’s
estate, invariably finds him- or herself in an unfavorable position
upon the dissolution of the marriage by reason of limited or no
growth in his or her own estate during the subsistence of the
marriage. Such a spouse has no entitlement to a share of the other
spouse’s estate and, consequently, often finds him- or herself in a
financial predicament upon the dissolution of the marriage.17 The
Matrimonial Property Act, which commenced on November 1,
1984, introduced measures to address this situation. These will be
discussed in greater detail below. Even before the commencement
14. D.S.P. CRONJÉ & JACQUELINE HEATON, SOUTH AFRICAN FAMILY LAW
65 (3rd ed., LexisNexis, Durban 2010).
15. Du Plessis v. Pienaar NO and Others 2003 (1) SA 671 (SCA), para. 1.
16. CRONJÉ & HEATON, supra note 14, at 65.
17. Id. at 93.
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of the Matrimonial Property Act, spouses could combat the
aforementioned potentially adverse financial consequences of a
marriage subject to a complete separation of property by
concluding a marriage out of community of property with the
retention of community of profit and loss. This regime entailed that
all profits and losses stante matrimonio constituted a joint estate of
which each spouse owned an undivided half-share. However,
spouses hardly exercised this option in the past.18
The Matrimonial Property Act retained both of the
aforementioned formats of the marriage out of community of
property but, in an attempt to address the potential financial
prejudice consequent upon this regime, introduced the accrual
system in 1984. The Act stipulates that the accrual system applies
to all marriages concluded out of community of property and
community of profit and loss after the commencement of the Act,
unless this system is expressly excluded in the spouses’ pre-nuptial
contract.19
The accrual system entails that each spouse controls his or her
own estate during the subsistence of their marriage, but upon
dissolution of the marriage, spouses share in the accrual, or
growth, that their respective estates have shown during the course
of the marriage. Such sharing is effected by entitling the spouse
whose estate showed the smaller (or no) accrual during the
subsistence of the marriage to a claim against the spouse whose
estate showed the greater accrual stante matrimonio. This claim is
for an amount equal to half of the difference between the accruals
of the spouses’ respective estates.20 The accrual of an estate is the
amount by which the net value of a spouse’s estate at the
dissolution of the marriage exceeds the net value of that spouse’s
estate at the commencement of that marriage.21
18. Id. at 92.
19. Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984, § 2.
20. Id. at § 3(1).
21. Id. at § 4(1)(a). If the net final value of a spouse’s estate is lower than
the commencement value, no accrual has occurred in respect of that spouse’s
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The example hereafter illustrates the operation of the accrual
system.
Spouse A commenced the marriage with an estate valued at ZAR 200,000.
Spouse B commenced the marriage with an estate valued at ZAR 20,000.
Spouse A’s estate is valued at ZAR 1 million upon the termination of the marriage
through divorce.
Spouse B’s estate is valued at ZAR 100,000 upon the termination of the marriage through
divorce.
Had the spouses been married subject to a complete separation of property, Spouse A
would exit the marriage with ZAR 1 million and Spouse B would exit the marriage with
ZAR 100,000.
However, if the spouses married out of community of property but subject to the accrual
system, Spouse B (the spouse whose estate accrued the least during the subsistence of the
marriage) will have a claim against Spouse A upon the termination of the marriage
through divorce.
The extent of Spouse B’s claim is calculated as follows:
Accrual of Spouse A’s estate: ZAR 1 million (final value) – ZAR 200,000
(commencement value) = ZAR 800,000.
Accrual of Spouse B’s estate: ZAR 100,000 (final value) – ZAR 20,000 (commencement
value) = ZAR 80,000.
The difference between the respective accruals: ZAR 800,000 (Spouse A’s accrual) –
ZAR 80,000 (Spouse B’s accrual) = ZAR 720,000.
Half of the difference between the respective accruals: ZAR 720,000 ÷ 2 = ZAR 360,000.
Spouse B will, therefore, have a claim against Spouse A for ZAR 360,000.
Consequently, Spouse B will exit the marriage with ZAR 460,000 (ZAR 100,000 (Spouse
B’s estate value) + ZAR 360,000 (Spouse B’s accrual claim)) and Spouse A will exit the
marriage with ZAR 640,000 (ZAR 1 million (Spouse A’s estate value) – ZAR 360,000
(Spouse B’s accrual claim)).

The above example underscores the more equitable financial
dispensation occasioned by the accrual system for the spouse who
finds him- or herself in the financially weaker position upon the
dissolution of the marriage. However, the Matrimonial Property

estate. For the purpose of the final calculation, that spouse’s “accrual” is
regarded as being zero: H.R. HAHLO, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF HUSBAND
AND WIFE 305 (5th ed., Juta & Co., Ltd. 1985).
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Act did not introduce the accrual system retroactively;
consequently, a spouse to a marriage concluded subject to a
complete separation of property that was entered into prior to the
commencement of the Act may still find him- or herself in a
precarious financial position if that marriage was to be dissolved
by divorce today. In order to alleviate such potential prejudice,
Section 7 of the Divorce Act permits one spouse (typically the
spouse in the financially weaker position) to request a so-called
“redistribution of assets” whereby a court, when issuing a decree
of divorce, orders a transfer of the other spouse’s assets or such
part of the other spouse’s assets to the first-mentioned spouse as
the court deems just. Apposite provisions of Section 7 determine
that:
 the redistribution dispensation only applies to marriages
with complete separation of property entered into before
the enactment of the Matrimonial Property Act;22
 a court granting a decree of divorce may, on application of
one of the parties to the marriage and in the absence of an
agreement between the parties regarding a division of their
assets, order an equitable redistribution of assets in favor of
the applying party;23
 the court shall not grant a redistribution order unless it is
satisfied that it is equitable and just to do so by reason of
the fact that the party in whose favor the order is granted
contributed directly or indirectly to the maintenance or
increase of the estate of the other party during the
subsistence of the marriage, either by the rendering of
services, or the saving of expenses which would otherwise
have been incurred, or in any other manner;24 and
 in determining the extent of the redistribution of assets the
court shall take into account inter alia the existing means of
22. Divorce Act 70 of 1979 § 7(3).
23. Id.
24. Id. at § 7(4).
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both parties, any donations made inter partes, as well as
any other factor which the court deems pertinent.25
It is evident from the preceding exposition that equitable
considerations underpin the Divorce Act’s dispensation on the
redistribution of assets; moreover, that a court’s power to issue a
redistribution order is not only discretionary in nature but is also
designed to achieve a just patrimonial settlement between the
divorcing spouses. The Appellate Division26 confirmed this truism
in Beaumont v. Beaumont27 when it said:
[T]he feature of overriding importance in the exercise of
the Court’s discretion as to what proportion of assets is to
be transferred in terms of subsection (3) is the court’s
assessment of what would be “just,” having regard to the
factors mentioned specifically and to “any other factor
which should in the opinion of the Court be taken into
account.
. . . The Legislature has seen fit to confer a wide discretion
upon the courts, and the flexibility in the application of
subsection (3) thus created ought not . . . to be curtailed by
placing judicial glosses on the subsection in the form of
guidelines as to the determination of what would be a just
redistribution order.28
It is important to note at this juncture that South African law,
unlike its Anglo-American counterparts, is not typified by equity
as a body of law. South African courts are not permitted, therefore,
to grant relief exclusively on the ground of equity in instances
where a statute and/or the common law do not afford apposite
remedies.29 However, the South African legislature can incorporate
notions such as reasonableness, fairness, equity and justness into
statutory prescripts, usually in conjunction with other objectively25. Id. at § 7(5).
26. The former appellation of the Supreme Court of Appeal.
27. Beaumont v. Beaumont 1987 (1) SA 967 (A).
28. Id. at 991E–H (emphasis added).
29. In Potgieter and Another v. Potgieter NO and Others 2012 (1) SA 637
(SCA) the Supreme Court of Appeal cautioned strenuously against judicial
invocation of reasonableness and fairness as freestanding norms by reason of the
potential for “intolerable legal uncertainty” and the resultant threat to the rule of
law in South Africa: paras. 34, 36.
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determinable criteria. Section 7 of the Divorce Act serves as a
good example in this regard—a court in divorce proceedings can
order an equitable redistribution of assets in favor of one of the
spouses who was married subject to a complete separation of
property, but the Section also sets out a number of objectivelydeterminable criteria for the court to consider in the exercise of its
discretion.
III. “GOING BEHIND THE TRUST FORM:” A SYNOPSIS
It was shown in the article’s introduction that claims regarding
trust assets in divorce proceedings have arisen with regard to alter
ego trusts in particular. These claims called for courts to consider
trust assets alongside the assets in a spouse’s personal estate or the
assets in the spouses’ joint estate. Claimants in these cases invoked
the power of South African courts to go behind the trust form in
order to provide relief in instances where trustees abused trusts
through a disregard of the South African trust’s core idea. 30 This
phenomenon in divorce cases calls for some elaboration regarding
the judicial power to go behind the trust form. A number of South
African legal scholars have recently canvassed this topic31 and
their endeavors need not be repeated here. It is, nevertheless,
important to note de Waal’s submission that the cases to date
where South African courts raised the possibility of going behind
the trust form concerned instances in which trustees violated the
core idea of the South African trust through their failure to adhere
to the basic principles or core duties of trust administration.32 De
Waal identifies the following as being among those principles or
duties typically disregarded by trustees who treat trusts as their
alter ego: the duty to exercise independence of judgment and
30. See supra Part I.
31. See, e.g., Marius J. de Waal, The Abuse of the Trust (or: “Going Behind
the Trust Form”), 76 RABEL J. COMP. & INT’L. PRIV. L. 1078 (2012); Anton van
der Linde, Debasement of the Core Idea of a Trust and the Need to Protect
Third Parties, 75 J. CONTEMP. ROMAN-DUTCH L. 371 (2012).
32. de Waal, supra note 31, at 1095.
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independent discretion; the duty to give effect to the trust deed,
properly interpreted; and the principle that trustees must act with
care, diligence and skill in the performance of their duties and the
exercise of their powers.33 The joint-action rule, which requires cotrustees to act jointly at all times, can be added to this list.34 In Van
Zyl and Another NNO v. Kaye NO and Others35 the Court
emphasized, furthermore, that South African courts’ power to
remedy, when apposite, the abuse of the trust is founded upon a
need to curb the unconscionable effects of trustees’ non-adherence
to the aforementioned basic principles or core duties of trust
administration. This exercise is, per definition, designed to achieve
an equitable outcome. Binns-Ward J. remarked in Van Zyl:
Going behind the trust form . . . essentially represents the
provision by a court of an equitable remedy . . . . I consider
it appropriate to describe it as an equitable remedy in the
ordinary, rather than technical, sense of the term; one that
lends itself to a flexible approach to fairly and justly
address the consequences of an unconscionable abuse of
the trust form in given circumstances. It is a remedy that
will generally be given when the trust form is used in a
dishonest or unconscionable manner to evade a liability, or
avoid an obligation.36
This dictum reveals that trustees’ abuse of the trust form
frequently comes to light when they attempt, by invoking their
failure to adhere to the basic principles or core duties of trust
administration, to “evade a liability, or avoid an obligation” in a
dishonest or unconscionable manner. South African case law
shows that such attempts on the part of trustees to extricate
themselves from a liability or an obligation is consistently part of a
33. Id.
34. In Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker and Others
2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA), the Court characterized the joint-action rule as
foundational to the development of South African trust law: para. 15. See also
François du Toit, Co-Trusteeship and the Joint-Action Rule in South African
Trust Law, 27 TRUST L. INT’L. 18 (2013).
35. Van Zyl and Another NNO v. Kaye NO and Others 2014 (4) SA 452
(WCC).
36. Id. at para. 22.

2015]

SOUTH AFRICA

667

larger stratagem, namely to conduct trust affairs with an utter
disregard for the existence of the trust by treating the trust property
as their own (in other words, by treating the trust as their alter ego)
but then to invoke the existence of the trust only when it suits
them.37 In Thorpe and Others v. Trittenwein and Another38 the
Supreme Court of Appeal strenuously condemned this practice
when it said that “[t]hose who choose to conduct business through
the medium of trusts . . . cannot enjoy the advantage of a trust
when it suits them and cry foul when it does not.”39
The above exposition shows that South African courts will
generally go behind the trust form to grant relief consequent upon
trustees’ abuse of a trust when the trustees failed to adhere to the
basic principles or core duties of trust administration; when they
dishonestly or unconscionably relied on that very failure,
frequently to extricate themselves from a liability or an obligation
incurred as trustees; and when the trust was nothing more than the
trustees’ alter ego, with its existence invoked only when it suited
the trustees.40 It is important to note at this point that South African
courts have drawn a vitally important distinction between the
aforementioned abused-trust scenario on the one hand, and the
sham-trust scenario on the other hand. In Van Zyl v. Kaye the Court

37. See, e.g., Van der Merwe NO and Others v. Hydraberg Hydraulics CC
and Others; Van der Merwe NO and Others v. Bosman and Others 2010 (5) SA
555 (WC) para. 39.
38. Thorpe and Others v. Trittenwein and Another 2007 (2) SA 172 (SCA).
39. Id. at para. 17.
40. See further Rees and Others v. Harris and Others 2012 (1) SA 583
(GSJ) where the Court said that:
where the trustees of a trust clearly do not treat the trust as a separate
entity, and where special circumstances exist to show that there has
been an abuse of the trust entity by a trustee, the [trust] veneer must be
pierced. It follows that if a legitimately established trust is used
or misused in an improper fashion by its trustees to perpetrate deceit,
and/or fraud, the natural person behind the trust veneer must be held
personally liable (para. 17).
The Supreme Court of Appeal remarked in a similar fashion in WT and Others
v. KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA) that the “unconscionable abuse of the trust form
through fraud, dishonesty or an improper purpose will justify looking behind the
trust form”: para. 31.
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opined, rightly it is submitted, that any finding that a trust is a
sham essentially entails a finding that some or all of the
requirements for the establishment of that trust were not met, or
that the appearance that those requirements were met was in reality
a dissimulation.41 Where, however, trustees abused a trust in the
manner explained earlier in this paragraph, a court may provide
relief by going behind the trust form. The Van Zyl Court pointed
out that going behind the trust form invariably entails an
acceptance of the existence of a trust but necessitates a disregard of
the ordinary consequences of such existence. A court going behind
the trust form may, for example, hold trustees personally liable for
an obligation ostensibly undertaken as trustees, or may hold the
trust bound to transactions ostensibly undertaken by the trustees
acting outside the parameters of their authority or legal capacity.42
It stands to reason, therefore, that the sham-trust scenario leaves no
room whatsoever for going behind the trust form because, in the
words of Binns-Ward J. in Van Zyl, “[w]hen a trust is a sham, it
does not exist and there is nothing to ‘go behind.’”43 The Van Zyl
Court consequently cautioned against an erroneous conflation of,
on the one hand, establishing that a trust is a sham with, on the
other hand, going behind the trust form—the Court distinguished
the two as “fundamentally different undertakings.”44
The synoptic descriptions in Parts II and III of the article on
South African matrimonial property regimes and aspects of the
patrimonial consequences of divorce, along with the judicial
practice of going behind the trust form provide the backdrop
against which South African judgments on claims to trust assets in
divorce proceedings can be considered next.

41.
42.
43.
44.

Van Zyl, 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC), para. 19.
Id. at para. 21.
Id. at para. 16. See also De Waal, supra note 31, at 1084–1086.
Van Zyl, 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC), para. 16.
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IV. SOUTH AFRICAN JUDGMENTS ON CLAIMS REGARDING TRUST
ASSETS IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS
A. Claims for the Redistribution of Assets
Jordaan v. Jordaan45 was one of the first reported judgments in
which a South African High Court46 had an opportunity to consider
whether, in making a redistribution order under Section 7 of the
Divorce Act, the value of trust assets should be included in the
determination of the value of one of the spouses’ estate. The Court
ordered that the asset values of a number of inter vivos trusts
created by the defendant (the husband) had to be included in the
determination of the value of his personal estate because the
evidence showed that he was in full control of these trusts and
administered the trusts as if the trust property was vested in him
personally.47 It is instructive to note that the Court’s consideration
of the trust asset values occurred with express reference to the
equitable underpinnings of the redistribution dispensation of the
Divorce Act.48 The Court, moreover, distinguished redistribution
claims in terms of the Divorce Act from accrual claims in terms of
the Matrimonial Property Act, and intimated that the former
permits greater scope than the latter for a court to take cognizance
of all benefits enjoyed by a spouse in determining the patrimonial
consequences of a divorce.49
In Badenhorst v. Badenhorst50 the Supreme Court of Appeal
subsequently acknowledged the Jordaan judgment and elaborated
on the reasoning upon which an inclusion of the asset value of a
trust in the value of a spouse’s personal estate toward the making
of a redistribution order is founded. The Badenhorst case also
illustrates the typical circumstances in which a trust may be
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Jordaan v. Jordaan 2001 (3) SA 288 (C).
At the time still known as the Supreme Court.
Jordaan, 2001 (3) SA 288 (C), paras. 24–34.
Id. at paras. 21, 34.
Id. at para. 22.
Badenhorst v. Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA).
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considered as the alter ego of one of its trustees. In casu a husband
(the plaintiff in the court of first instance, and the defendant on
appeal) sued his wife (the appellant, and the defendant in the court
of first instance) for a decree of divorce. The appellant
counterclaimed in the court of first instance and, because the
marriage was concluded out of community of property prior to the
commencement of the Matrimonial Property Act, requested a
redistribution of assets in terms of Section 7 of the Divorce Act.
The appellant’s claim included the averment that the Court had to
consider the assets of an inter vivos trust, of which the defendant
was a co-trustee, in addition to the assets in the defendant’s
personal estate. She contended, in support of this averment, that
the trust was no more than the defendant’s alter ego.51 The court of
first instance held that the trust in question constituted a separate
legal entity and, therefore, that its assets had to be disregarded for
the purpose of making a redistribution order.52 The appellant
appealed against this aspect of the court of first instance’s
judgment.
The Supreme Court of Appeal acknowledged the fact that the
trust assets were vested in its trustees and, therefore, did not form
part of the defendant’s personal estate. The Court opined, however,
that this fact did not per se exclude those assets from being
considered for the purpose of making a redistribution order.53 The
Court opined, furthermore, that, for the appellant to succeed in her
claim that the Court should consider the value of the trust assets in
its ruling on redistribution, she had to show that the defendant not
only controlled the trust de jure as trustee, but was indeed in de
facto control thereof in that, but for the trust, the trust assets would
have vested in his personal estate. In order to determine whether
the defendant exercised such de facto control over the trust, the
Court had regard to the provisions of the trust deed as well as the
51. Id. at paras. 1–2.
52. Id. at paras. 5, 7.
53. Id. at para. 9.
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manner in which the trustees conducted trust administration during
the subsistence of the marriage.54 The Court noted, as far as the
provisions of the trust deed were concerned, that, inter alia, the
trust’s two co-trustees could determine the vesting dates of the
trust income and capital benefits; the trust deed conferred on the
defendant the right to discharge his co-trustee and to appoint
another in his stead; the trustees enjoyed an unfettered discretion to
deal with the trust income and capital as they saw fit; and the
defendant received remuneration for the performance of his duties
as trustee.55 As far as the manner of trust administration was
concerned, the Court noted that the defendant blatantly ignored the
joint-action rule because he seldom sought the approval of his cotrustee for actions performed on behalf of the trust; he listed trust
assets as his own in a credit application; he insured a beach
cottage—a trust asset—in his own name; and the trust financed a
fixed property owned by the defendant.56 The Court concluded that
the foregoing had the cumulative effect of placing the defendant
“in full control of the trust,”57 which, in the Court’s opinion,
justified the addition of the trust asset value to that of the
defendant’s personal estate.58 The Court ordered, therefore, that the
defendant had to make a redistribution payment of ZAR 1,25
million to the appellant. The Court arrived at this amount by taking
into account the net asset values of the parties’ respective estates as
well as the trust asset value, and by calculating a percentage that it
considered a just and equitable reflection of the appellant’s
contribution to the defendant’s estate.59
54. Id. In Brunette v. Brunette and Another NO 2009 (5) SA 81 (SE) the
Court concurred when it said that “the manner in which the trusts had been
administered in the past becomes highly relevant in determining whether or
not . . . assets [are] to be taken into account in any distribution order in terms of
§ 7(3) of the Divorce Act”: § 4. See also B v. B [2014] ZAECPEHC 33 (May 29,
2014) para.26.
55. Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA), para. 10.
56. Id. at para. 11.
57. Id.
58. Id. at para. 13.
59. Id. at para. 16.
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It is interesting to note that the defendant’s personal estate in
the Badenhorst case was valued at just under ZAR 1,9 million.60
He could, therefore, make the full redistribution payment from his
personal estate, and there was no need for the Court to find that the
trust assets in fact vested in him personally and could be used
toward satisfaction of the appellant’s successful redistribution
claim. In fact, the appellant in Badenhorst never sought an order
depriving the trust of its assets; this fact also explains why there
was no need to join the trust (or its trustees) in Badenhorst in the
suit.61 In Zazeraj NO v. Jordaan and Others,62 a follow-up
judgment to the aforementioned judgment in Jordaan v. Jordaan,
the Court also confirmed that, in Jordaan v. Jordaan, no finding
was made that the various trusts’ assets in fact vested in the
defendant; moreover, that the Jordaan Court’s finding that the
trusts in question were the alter ego of the defendant did not per se
imply that the Court regarded these trusts’ assets as the defendant’s
personal assets.63
The aforementioned considerations may explain why, in the
subsequent judgment in Van Zyl v. Kaye,64 the Court opined that
the Badenhorst judgment was not a case in which the Court went
behind the trust form because “[i]t was left to Mr Badenhorst [the
defendant] to decide how to make payment in terms of the court
order.”65 The Van Zyl Court ostensibly regarded only the relief that
culminates in a judgment against a trust or, alternatively, an order
that trust assets are exigible at the instance of the party in whose
favor the order is granted, as instances of going behind the trust
60. Id. at para. 4.
61. See also Pringle v. Pringle [2009] ZAWCHC 207 (March 27, 2009), para.
6.
62. Zazeraj NO v. Jordaan and Others [2012] ZAWCHC 120 (March 22,
2012).
63. Id. at para. 19. See also Pringle, [2009] ZAWCHC 207 (March 27, 2009),
para. 6. See further Van Greune NO and Another v. Van Greune, In re: Van
Greune v. Van Greune and Others [2013] ZAGPPHC 291 (October 14, 2013).
64. Van Zyl and Another NNO v. Kaye NO and Others 2014 (4) SA 452
(WCC).
65. Id. at para. 24.
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form.66 However, as pointed out earlier,67 the Van Zyl Court also
emphasized that trustees’ unconscionable abuse of the trust is
foundational to South African courts’ power to grant apposite
relief by going behind the trust form.68 In this light, the Van Zyl
Court conceded that its assessment of the Badenhorst case may be
incorrect, and that the Badenhorst judgment can be construed as
one where the Court granted the relief sought by reason of the
defendant’s opportunistic resort to the existence of the trust as an
unconscionable means to evade the obligations attendant on the
dissolution of his marriage.69
The foregoing begs the question of whether it is within the
competence of a South African court, when it makes a
redistribution order in terms of Section 7(3) of the Divorce Act, to
include therein a directive that the assets of an alter ego trust be
used in satisfaction of the successful redistribution claim. Can a
court, in other words, order that, by reason of a trustee-spouse’s
abuse of a trust, the assets of that alter ego trust in fact vest in the
trustee-spouse personally and can be used to meet the other
spouse’s redistribution claim? The Supreme Court of Appeal’s
initial view on going behind the trust form in Land and
Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker suggests an
affirmative answer to this question. The Court said that trustees’
conduct may invite the inference that “the trust form was a mere
cover for the conduct of business ‘as before’, and that the assets
allegedly vesting in trustees in fact belong to one or more of the
trustees.”70 However, in Van Zyl v. Kaye the Court opined that,
66. Id.
67. See supra Part III.
68. Van Zyl, 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC), para. 22.
69. Id. at para. 24. Also, see generally Eben Nel, An Interpretive Account of
Unconscionability in Trust Law, 35 OBITER 81 (2014).
70. Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker and Others 2005
(2) SA 77 (SCA), para. 37.3. See also, e.g., First Rand Limited trading inter alia
as First National Bank v. Britz and Others [2011] ZAGPPHC 119 (July 20, 2011)
where the Court, in a judgment on alter ego trusts (though not in the context of a
redistribution order under the Divorce Act), ruled that, by virtue of trustees’
excessive and comprehensive control over two trusts, these trusts’ assets indeed
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where a trust was validly created and continued its existence as
such, trustees’ maladministration of the assets vested in such a
properly-constituted trust cannot sustain an averment that the
assets no longer vest in the trust’s trustees officially, but vest in
them personally; such an averment is, according to the Van Zyl
Court, sustainable only upon proof that the trust in question is a
sham.71 It is, in this light, unsurprising that the Supreme Court of
Appeal in WT v. KT72 rendered a judgment, discussed in greater
detail below,73 in which it expressed doubt as to whether even the
wide discretion bestowed on courts by Section 7(3) of the Divorce
Act permits a court, when going behind the trust form in giving a
redistribution order, to rule that trust assets in fact vest in a trusteespouse’s personal estate, rather than merely to include the trust
asset value into that of the trustee-spouse’s personal estate.74 A
ruling that trust assets in fact vest in the personal estate of a
trustee-spouse is, as stated in the Van Zyl case, efficient only upon
a finding that the trust at hand is a sham.
It is, in light of the foregoing, instructive to note that at least
one South African commentator has viewed the Badenhorst
judgment as one in which the Court indeed regarded the trust in
question as a sham.75 However, South African legal scholarship76
and jurisprudence77 subsequently confirmed that a trust such as the
one in the Badenhorst case is not a sham—it is a validlyconstituted trust, but one in respect of which the trustees (or, in
Badenhorst, the defendant as the dominant co-trustee)

vested in the trustees personally. The Court ordered, consequently, that the trust
assets could be attached in satisfaction of a judgment debt against the two
trustees in their personal capacities: para. 69.
71. Van Zyl, 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC), para.18.
72. WT and Others v. KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA).
73. See infra Part IV. C.
74. WT, 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA), para.36.
75. Harry Joffe, “Sham” Trusts, DE REBUS 25, 26 (January/February 2007).
76. de Waal, supra note 31, at 1086.
77. Van Heerden v. Van Heerden and Others [2011] ZAWCHC 209 (May 4,
2011), § 9. See also generally Van Zyl, 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC).
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unconscionably abused the trust through non-adherence to some of
the basic principles or core duties of trust administration. In the
Badenhorst case, the defendant’s failure to adhere to the
fundamentals of trust administration, particularly the joint-action
rule, and, thereby, his treatment of the trust as his alter ego,
justified the Court order regarding the addition of the asset value of
the trust to that of his personal estate for the purpose of making the
redistribution order. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that a trust needs
not be declared a sham in order for its asset value to be included in
a court’s valuation of a party’s estate for the purpose of making a
redistribution order.78
South African cases on point also show that the purpose for
which a trust was created is, although not irrelevant, not
necessarily determinative to a court ruling on the inclusion of the
asset value of such a trust in a spouse’s personal estate for the
purpose of making a redistribution order. In Badenhorst, for
example, the trust at issue was created in order to protect the
spouses against creditors as well as to curb the payment of
inheritance tax79—quite legitimate purposes on its face. In Jordaan
v. Jordaan,80 by contrast, the defendant (the husband) admitted to
create one of the trusts in question shortly after the commencement
of the divorce proceedings as part of a fraudulent scheme to
obscure assets from the plaintiff (his wife).81 The Badenhorst and
Jordaan courts both acceded to the respective prayers to add the
relevant trusts’ asset values to the values of the relevant parties’
personal estates, and did so notwithstanding the fact that, in the
former case, the trust in question was established for legitimate
purposes, whereas, in the latter case, the trust was set up to achieve
a distinctly unlawful purpose. However, in Maritz v. Maritz82 the
78. See also Childs v. Childs and Others NNO 2003 (3) SA 138 (C) 146E.
The sham-trust issue is discussed further and in greater detail in Part IV. B.
79. Badenhorst v. Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA), para. 4.
80. Jordaan v. Jordaan 2001 (3) SA 288 (C).
81. Id. at para. 17.6.
82. Maritz v. Maritz [2006] JOL 16569 (T).
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Court expressly distinguished the Jordaan case from the one at
hand, and did so, inter alia, on the basis that, in Maritz, the
plaintiff (against whom the defendant sought a redistribution order
that encompassed also the asset value of an inter vivos trust of
which the plaintiff and defendant were the co-trustees) did not
exhibit any of the “dishonest and mean attributes” exhibited by the
defendant in the Jordaan case.83 The defendant’s prayer for the
inclusion of the trust asset value in the plaintiff’s personal estate
value for the purpose of making a redistribution order in the Maritz
case proved unsuccessful.84 The Maritz judgment therefore
underscores the fact that the purpose of the trust(s) in question is
not wholly irrelevant to the courts’ adjudication on the
consideration of trust asset values in redistribution claims.
Maritz v. Maritz evinced another feature that distinguishes it
from the earlier judgment in Badenhorst v. Badenhorst. It was
shown above that the Supreme Court of Appeal in Badenhorst paid
particular attention to evidence that indicated how the defendant
treated trust assets as if they were his own when he conducted his
personal business or financial affairs. In Maritz, on the other hand,
the Court was on the alert that the trustees maintained the trust’s
financial records and annual financial statements separate from
those of the plaintiff. Moreover, the trust’s financial statements
were prepared by an auditor and examples of these served before
the Court. The plaintiff’s separate financial statements also served
before the Court. The Court could, therefore, scrutinize both sets of
documents. These documents indicated, inter alia, that the trust
and the plaintiff were assessed separately for income tax
purposes.85 The Court also observed that each instance where the
plaintiff advanced money to the trust and, conversely, where the
trust advanced money to the plaintiff was reflected separately in
the relevant financial statements. Moreover, movements on these
83. Id. at paras. 18–19.
84. Id. at para. 22.
85. Id. at para. 16.
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loan accounts were supported by relevant documents and
explanations. In this light, the Court could not be persuaded that
the manner in which the plaintiff dealt with the trust assets in his
capacity as trustee justified a finding that the trust was his alter ego
and that the value of the trust assets had to be considered toward
determining the value of his personal estate.86 However, a trustee’s
separation of the financial dealings of a trust from his or her
personal financial affairs will not necessarily ensure the exclusion
of the trust asset value from consideration additional to the value
of the trustee’s personal estate for the purpose of making a
redistribution order. In Pienaar v. Pienaar and Another,87 for
example, the plaintiff contended that the asset value of a trust, of
which the defendant was the co-dominant trustee, had to be
included in the value of the defendant’s personal estate for the
purpose of effecting a redistribution of assets. The Court
acknowledged that, despite the fact that a separate bank account
was opened and operated for the trust, the defendant nevertheless
treated the principal trust asset, a farm, as well as the rentals
received in respect thereof, as his own. The Court ruled,
consequently, that the farm’s value had to be added to the value of
the defendant’s personal estate for the purpose of making a
redistribution order.88
The foregoing analysis shows that claims regarding the
consideration of trust assets toward the granting of redistribution
orders in divorce proceedings have posed various challenges to
South African courts in the recent past. South African courts have
responded to these challenges in a fairly principled and consistent
manner. Any divergences between judgments on the matter can be
explained by the factual peculiarities of the cases at hand. Are
similar trends evident from South African courts’ engagement with
86. Id. at para. 17.
87. Pienaar v. Pienaar and Another [2005] ZAWCHC 123 (January 1,
2005).
88. Id. at para. 44.
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claims regarding the consideration of trust assets for the purpose of
realizing accrual claims in divorce proceedings? This question is
addressed in the next Part of the article.
B. Accrual Claims
The first South African judgments regarding the consideration
of trust assets toward the realization of accrual claims were handed
down around the same time that jurisprudence emerged on claims
regarding the consideration of trust assets toward the issuing of
redistribution orders.89 In Pringle v. Pringle,90 for example, the
plaintiff in a matrimonial dispute asked the Court to consider the
assets of an inter vivos trust, of which her husband, the defendant,
was the sole trustee, for the purpose of realizing her accrual claim
against the defendant. She contended that the principles enunciated
and applied in the Jordaan and Badenhorst cases with regard to the
treatment of alter ego trusts under the Divorce Act’s redistribution
dispensation applied mutatis mutandis to the Matrimonial Property
Act’s accrual dispensation.91
The Pringle Court saw no reason in principle why trust assets
may not in appropriate circumstances be taken into account in the
assessment of the accrual of spouses’ estates upon the dissolution
of their marriage.92 The Court emphasized, moreover, that in casu
the plaintiff did not seek an order divesting the trust of its assets;
the plaintiff merely prayed that the trust asset value had to be
considered toward the determination of the accrual of the
defendant’s estate. The Court opined that, consequently, the trust
did not have to be joined in the suit.93 The Court granted the
plaintiff’s prayer, and did so with particular reference to the de
facto control that the defendant exercised over the trust in his
89. Smith v. Smith and Another SECLD case No. 619/2006 was one of the
first unreported judgments on point.
90. Pringle v. Pringle [2009] ZAWCHC 207 (March 27, 2009).
91. Id. at para. 1.
92. Id. at para. 2.
93. Id. at para. 8.
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capacity of trustee.94 It is instructive to note that the Court in
Pringle, like the Court in Jordaan v. Jordaan before it,95
distinguished the Divorce Act’s stipulations on the redistribution of
assets on the one hand, from the Matrimonial Property Act’s
directives regarding accrual claims on the other hand. The Court
said that, whereas Section 7(3) of the Divorce Act endows a court
with a discretion to issue a redistribution order that is just and
equitable, no such discretion is conferred by Section 3(1) of the
Matrimonial Property Act—under the latter provision the extent of
an accrual claim is strictly a mathematical calculation in
accordance with the formula prescribed by the Matrimonial
Property Act.96 The Pringle Court did not, however, view this
difference as a bar to the application of the principles formulated
and applied in the Jordaan and Badenhorst cases to the
Matrimonial Property Act’s accrual dispensation.97
The trend of considering trust assets in accrual claims
continued in BC v. CC and Others.98 However, aspects of this
94. Id. at para. 17.
95. See supra Part IV. A.
96. See supra Part II on the formula applicable to the calculation of accrual.
97. Pringle, [2009] ZAWCHC 207 (March 27, 2009), para. 2. In AM v. JM
[2010] ZAWCHC 226 (December 10, 2010) the Court subsequently
acknowledged the Pringle judgment, particularly its affirmation that the
principles laid down in the Jordaan and Badenhorst cases can be invoked for the
purpose of including a trust’s asset value in the determination of the extent of an
accrual claim upon the dissolution of a marriage. In AM v. JM the Court
followed suit and ordered that the asset value of an inter vivos trust of which the
defendant was the dominant co-trustee had to be taken into account in the
determination of the defendant’s estate accrual. The Court did so by reason of
copious evidence that the defendant did not deal with the trust “at arm’s length”
but was, from the trust’s inception, in sole and absolute control of its affairs:
paras. 17–18. In K v. K [2014] ZAGPPHC 242 (March 7, 2014), on the other
hand, the Court denied the defendant’s counterclaim for the addition of two inter
vivos trusts’ asset values to the plaintiff’s personal estate value for the purpose
of determining the accrual of that estate. The Court did so because the evidence
adduced did not support the defendant’s averment that the trusts in question
were in fact the plaintiff’s alter ego. The Court, in arriving at this conclusion,
distinguished the facts of the Badenhorst case from the facts of the case before it
and, therefore, did not make a finding on the applicability of the Badenhorst
case to the consideration of the asset values of trusts in accrual claims: paras.
34–35.
98. BC v. CC and Others 2012 (5) SA 562 (ECP).
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particular judgment are perplexing. In casu the plaintiff instituted
divorce proceedings against the first defendant to whom she was
married out of community of property but subject to the accrual
system. She sought an order directing, inter alia, that the value of
assets held by an inter vivos trust, of which the first defendant was
both the settlor as well as the dominant co-trustee, be taken into
consideration in determining the accrual of his estate for the
purpose of her accrual claim under the Matrimonial Property Act.
The plaintiff alleged in support of this prayer that the first
defendant was in full control of the trust and of the acquisition,
management and sale of trust assets.99 The first defendant
countered by pleading in limine that the plaintiff’s particulars of
claim were deficient for three reasons: it conflicted with Section 12
of the Trust Property Control Act regarding the separateness of a
trust estate in a trustee’s hands;100 the Matrimonial Property Act
does not vest a court with any discretion to include assets other
than a spouse’s personal assets in the determination of the accrual
of such a spouse’s estate; and the plaintiff failed to plead that the
trust had to be set aside, or that the trust assets were in fact the first
defendant’s property or had to be deemed as such.101 The first
defendant contended that, consequently, the trust assets could not
be considered for the purpose of ascertaining the accrual of his
personal estate. He argued in particular that, given the
aforementioned absence under the Matrimonial Property Act of a
judicial discretion commensurate to that under the Divorce Act’s
redistribution dispensation to ensure that a divorce yields a just and
equitable pecuniary outcome, the court is not permitted to interfere
with the spouses’ contractual rights regarding accrual as
determined by their pre-nuptial contract.102

99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at para. 15.
See supra Part I.
BC, 2012 (5) SA 562 (ECP), para. 3.
Id. at para. 7.
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The Court, in addressing the aforementioned arguments
proffered by the first defendant, acknowledged the directive in
Section 12 of the Trust Property Control Act, but opined that the
said directive is inapplicable where a sham trust is at hand. Where,
therefore, the parties who ostensibly set up a “trust” never intended
the formation of a trust, or never intended for the so-called trustees
to hold the supposed trust assets for the would-be trust
beneficiaries, no trust would come into existence and the assets of
the “trust” would remain the de facto property of either the
supposed settlor or the beneficial owner of the particular assets.
The Court opined that, in such a case, the simulated creation of the
“trust” could be set aside, and the settlor or beneficial owner would
then be identified as the true owner of the assets concerned—if the
settlor or beneficial owner is a spouse to a marriage subject to the
accrual system, the supposed trust assets will indeed constitute
assets in that spouse’s personal estate.103 The Court opined,
furthermore, that the consideration of the asset value of a trust
toward determining the accrual of a spouse’s estate under the
Matrimonial Property Act does not amount to the exercise of a
discretion—it entails a factual inquiry similar to the one conducted
for the purpose of the inclusion of a trust’s asset value toward
determining the extent of a spouse’s redistribution claim under the
Divorce Act. The Court, therefore, disagreed with the defendants’
contention that, unlike redistribution claims, accrual claims do not
warrant consideration of trust assets.104 The Court opined, finally,
that, if the plaintiff’s allegations were shown to be correct, the
plaintiff would succeed in proving that the assets ostensibly owned
by the trust, or some of those assets, were de facto the
first defendant’s property, and, therefore, that their value ought to
be taken into account in determining the extent to which the first
defendant’s estate accrued stante matrimonio. The Court ruled that
the plaintiff’s failure to plead specifically that such assets be
103. Id. at para. 8.
104. Id. at paras. 9–10.
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deemed to be the first defendant’s assets was not fatal to the
plaintiff’s case.105 The Court consequently dismissed the points of
law that the defendants raised in limine.106
Whilst the judgment in BC v. CC provides further affirmation
for the consideration of trust assets in accrual claims, the basis
upon which the Court was willing to do so in casu is not altogether
clear. The Court seems to suggest, on the one hand, that such
consideration is appropriate where the “trust” at hand is a sham
and the supposed trust assets are in fact the property of the party
who actually derives benefit therefrom.107 On the other hand, the
Court considered judgments, including the Jordaan and
Badenhorst cases, which it typified as cases where “[t]he courts
have in the past identified beneficial owners as the true owners of
trust assets in matrimonial cases.”108 A scenario in which the
beneficial owner of trust assets is in fact the true owner of those
assets is certainly evocative of the state of affairs under a sham
trust.109 However, it was pointed out earlier110 that the trusts in the
105. Id. at para. 18.
106. Id. at para. 19.
107. Id. at para. 8.
108. Id. at para. 10.
109. de Waal, supra note 31, observes that, in the sham-trust scenario where
the parties to a simulated creation of a trust lacked the actual intention to
establish a trust but rather intended to benefit the recipient of the “trust assets,”
the supposed trust is disregarded and the recipient acquires the assets in his or
her personal capacity free from any burden to hold it on trust: at 1096–1097.
Similarly, in Van Zyl and Another NNO v. Kaye NO and Others 2014 (4) SA
452 (WCC), the applicants, the provisional trustees in the insolvent estate of
Kaye, applied for an order that an immovable property held in trust was in fact
an asset in Kaye’s insolvent estate. They averred that the trust was Kaye’s alter
ego, and they urged the Court to go behind the trust form by ordering that the
immovable property formed part of Kaye’s insolvent estate. The Court
dismissed the application on the ground that the relief sought by the applicants
was misconceived. Binns-Ward J. said that the applicants’ objective was to have
a mortgage over the particular immovable property set aside, and that that
objective could be achieved only if they could show that the immovable
property was not a trust asset but rather an asset in Kaye’s personal estate.
According to Binns-Ward J. only proof that the trust was a sham would yield
such a result because then the trustees would not have acquired the immovable
property for the trust but rather as Kaye’s agents, which, in turn, would occasion
the property to form part of the principal’s (Kaye’s) personal estate. Binns-Ward
J. was adamant, however, that Kaye’s treatment of the trust as his alter ego did
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Jordaan and Badenhorst cases were not sham trusts—they were
validly-constituted trusts whose trustees abused the trusts through
non-adherence to the fundamentals of trust administration. It was
also pointed out earlier111 that the Jordaan and Badenhorst courts
did not rule that the respective trustees in fact personally owned
the assets of the trusts in question; instead, the two courts regarded
the trusts at hand as genuine trusts (with the respective trustees as
the owners of trust assets qua trustees) but, by reason of the
trustees’ unconscionable treatment of those trusts as their alter ego,
the Jordaan and Badenhorst courts went behind the trust form
through consideration of the trust asset values for purposes of
making redistribution orders.
It is submitted, therefore, that the Court in BC v. CC fell prey
to the very danger against which the Court in Van Zyl v. Kaye
cautioned,112 namely an unwholesome conflation of the law
pertaining to sham trusts on the one hand, and alter ego trusts on
the other hand. This conflation is, arguably, most evident when
Dambuza J., who delivered the BC judgment, stated:
[I]f the plaintiff’s allegations are proved to be correct, the
plaintiff will have succeeded in proving that the assets
ostensibly owned by the trust, or some of them, are de facto
the property of the first defendant . . . .The fact that the
plaintiff has not pleaded specifically that such assets be
deemed to be the assets of the plaintiff113 is not . . . fatal to
the plaintiff’s case in the light of the allegation that such
assets are under de facto ownership of the first defendant
and that the trust is his alter ego.114

not render the trust a sham and, therefore, that going behind the trust form could
not yield the outcome that the applicants desired: paras. 15, 29.
110. See supra Part IV. A.
111. Id.
112. See supra Part III.
113. This is apparently an erroneous reference to the plaintiff—the Court
should have referred to the first defendant.
114. BC v. CC and Others 2012 (5) SA 562 (ECP), para. 18 (emphasis
added).
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It must be reiterated that, when assets are deemed to be the
personal assets of a trustee because that trustee is the de facto
owner of those assets (in the sense that the trustee—and not the
trust beneficiaries—was intended all along as the beneficial owner
of those assets), the “trust” at hand, contrary to the Court in BC v.
CC’s above standpoint, is not an alter ego trust, but may well be a
sham trust. It is clear, therefore, that aspects of the judgment in BC
v. CC are open to criticism by reason of the Court’s ostensible
conflation of the law pertaining to sham trusts with that regarding
alter ego trusts. The judgment nevertheless extended the earlier
series of cases in which South African courts were favorably
disposed toward considering trust assets in the assessment of
accrual claims. The subsequent judgment in MM and Others v.
JM115 questioned the legal foundation upon which this series of
cases rested.
In MM v. JM the plaintiff instituted divorce proceedings
against the first defendant who, in a claim in reconvention, sought
an order for an accrual payment in accordance with their
matrimonial property regime. The principal issue before the Court
was whether the asset value of an inter vivos trust, of which the
plaintiff was the settlor and the dominant co-trustee, could be taken
into account toward establishing the accrual of the plaintiff’s
estate. The defendant pleaded that the trust was the plaintiff’s alter
ego and that, consequently, its assets should be considered
alongside his personal assets for the purpose of determining the
accrual of his estate. She did not, however, aver that the plaintiff
was in fact the beneficial owner of the trust assets, nor did she
maintain that the trust was a sham. Her case was that the trust
assets had to be taken into account toward determining the accrual
of the plaintiff’s estate because he had the power and the ability to
use those assets for his sole benefit.116 The defendant sought

115. MM and Others v. JM 2014 (4) SA 384 (KZP).
116. Id. at paras. 4, 6.
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support for this contention in the judgments, discussed earlier,117 in
which trust assets were considered toward effecting the
redistribution of assets in terms of the Divorce Act.118
The Court in MM, unlike its predecessor in BC, regarded a
redistribution order in terms of the Divorce Act as fundamentally
different from an accrual claim in terms of the Matrimonial
Property Act in that, in the former instance, a court is required to
make a discretionary assessment of what it deems just, whereas no
such assessment is made in the latter instance in terms of the strict
mathematical calculation of accrual prescribed by the Matrimonial
Property Act.119 The Court opined, therefore, that a judgment such
as Badenhorst on the redistribution of assets provides no authority
for the proposition that trust assets can be considered toward
determining the accrual of the estate of one spouse for the purpose
of realizing the other spouse’s accrual claim.120 The Court in MM
questioned, moreover, the BC Court’s view that the determination
of which assets are to be so considered is the same for purposes of
the Divorce Act and the Matrimonial Property Act. The MM Court
evidently viewed the absence of a judicial discretion regarding the
calculation of accrual claims under the latter Act as an absolute bar
to any equation of the two instances.121 The MM Court concluded,
therefore, that the defendant’s claim in reconvention was invalid
because the Matrimonial Property Act reveals no legal basis for an
order that trust assets, which do not form part of one spouse’s
personal estate could, on the ground of justness, be deemed to form
part of it for purposes of determining the accrual of that spouse’s
estate.122
The judgment in MM v. JM, being at odds with its predecessors
in Pringle and BC, certainly complicated the topic under
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See supra Part IV. A.
MM 2014 (4) SA 384 (KZP), paras. 7–11.
Id. at paras. 12, 19.
Id. at para. 13.
Id. at paras. 17, 19.
Id. at paras. 19–20.
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discussion. RP v. DP and Others123 subsequently amplified this
complexity through its affirmation of the correctness of the BC
judgment and, by implication, its opposition to the MM
judgment.124 However, aspects of the RP judgment are as
perplexing as those aspects of the BC judgment highlighted earlier.
RP concerned a matrimonial dispute between the applicant (the
wife) and the first defendant (the husband). The first defendant had
earlier instituted divorce proceedings against the applicant, and the
applicant, in a counterclaim, had prayed an accrual payment from
him in accordance with their matrimonial property regime. The
applicant, in the application proceedings before the Court in RP v.
DP, prayed the joinder of an inter vivos trust’s trustees to the suit
and asked, furthermore, that the asset value of said trust be
considered toward establishing the value of the first defendant’s
estate for the purpose of her accrual claim. She contended that,
from the trust’s inception, the first defendant was, as the dominant
co-trustee, in de facto control of its assets and that he used the trust
as a vehicle to accumulate wealth for his personal benefit. The
applicant averred, therefore, that the trust was the first defendant’s
alter ego and, had the trust not been created, all its assets would
have vested in the first defendant personally.125 The defendants
(the trustees of the trust) opposed the application and argued that,
since the applicant did not seek to divest the trust of ownership of
its assets or to effect transfer of any of the trust assets to herself or
to the first defendant, the trust had no substantial interest in the
relief claimed and, therefore, should not be joined in the suit.126 In
regard to the applicant’s prayer that the value of the trust assets be
considered toward establishing the accrual of the first defendant’s
123. RP v. DP and Others 2014 (6) SA 243 (ECP).
124. It must be noted that the judgment in RP v. DP was handed down in the
same division of the High Court as the earlier judgment in BC v. CC and,
therefore, in accordance with the doctrine of stare decisis (or legal precedent),
the particular High Court was bound by its own previous judgment.
125. RP, 2014 (6) SA 243 (ECP), paras. 6–8.
126. Id. at paras. 10, 12.
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estate, the first defendant contended that, while such a
consideration may be appropriate in the context of the Divorce
Act’s discretionary redistribution dispensation, the Matrimonial
Property Act leaves no room for a commensurate judicial
consideration of the asset value of a trust for the purpose of
establishing the accrual of a spouse’s estate.127
The Court, in addressing the first defendant’s contentions,
acknowledged the separate existence of trust estates in trustees’
hands, but also acknowledged that South African courts have in the
past pierced “the veil which separates the trust assets from the
personal assets of the trustee.”128 Regrettably, the RP Court
followed this apt metaphor with a statement that smacks of the BC
Court’s earlier conflation of the law regarding sham trusts with that
regarding alter ego trusts in the context of the abuse of the trust
form. The RP Court said that “[t]his will happen . . . in cases where
the trust is a sham and for all practical purposes is the alter ego of
the founder or trustee.”129 This statement, it is submitted, again
represents an erroneous equation of sham trusts with alter ego
trusts. The aforementioned conflation is confirmed when the Court
opined that the personal assets of a trustee will include what is
notionally regarded as trust assets only through the lifting or
piercing of the trust veil and, therefore, by a finding that the trust is
indeed the alter ego of the trustee and that the so-called trust assets
are assets in the personal estate of the trustee.130 It must be
reiterated at this juncture that, in light of the unequivocal
pronouncement in Van Zyl v. Kaye referred to earlier,131 a trustee’s
abuse of a trust by treating it as his or her alter ego cannot cause
trust assets to vest in such a trustee’s personal estate, nor can a
court go behind the trust form to order such a result. A trustee’s
personal assets can include what is notionally regarded as trust
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at para. 11.
Id. at para. 21.
Id. at para. 22.
Id. at para. 35.
See supra Part IV. A.
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assets only when a sham trust is at hand, in which case going
behind the trust form is, again according to the view espoused in
Van Zyl v. Kaye,132 not an appropriate remedy.
The Court in RP, ostensibly referring to piercing the trust veil
in the sense of going behind the trust form, opined further, having
had regard to the judgment in Badenhorst v. Badenhorst in
particular, that the power of a court to pierce the trust veil is
derived from the common law—it is, according to the RP Court,
consequent upon the evidence placed before the court and not upon
the exercise of any judicial discretion.133 The Court, therefore,
regarded piercing the veil that separates a trustee’s personal estate
from the trust estate as a function distinct from, for example, the
exercise of discretion in making a redistribution order under
Section 7 of the Divorce Act.134 The Court viewed the making of a
redistribution order as involving two distinct functions: the first is
a factual determination of “which assets are [a spouse’s] personal
assets,” whereas the second concerns the calculation of a just and
equitable redistribution amount. The first function must not,
according to the Court in RP, “be conflated or confused with the
second function;”135 moreover, the first function, being nondiscretionary in nature, can apply equally to redistribution claims
as well as accrual claims. In consequence of this view, the RP
Court was favorably disposed toward the earlier judgment in BC v.
CC, particularly the BC Court’s reliance on the Jordaan and
Badenhorst cases in performing the aforementioned first function,
namely its finding that the asset value of the alter ego trust could
be taken into account in determining the extent of the accrual of
the first defendant’s personal estate in the BC case.
The RP Court—possibly by reason of its dubious conflation of
the law pertaining to sham trusts with that pertinent to alter ego
132.
133.
134.
135.

See supra Part III.
RP, 2014 (6) SA 243 (ECP), paras. 24, 31, 35.
Id. at para. 31.
Id. at para. 57.
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trusts—next opined that, in piercing the trust veil, a court is not
required to set aside the entire trust as a simulated deed; it is only
required to set aside those transactions which are proven to be
simulated.136 In fact, Alkema J., who handed down the judgment in
RP, described the applicant’s claim as follows:
Her claim, essentially, is that by virtue of first respondent’s
[defendant’s] abuse of the trust form, many transactions
resulting in the ostensible acquisition of trust assets held by
first respondent as trustee allegedly on behalf of the trust,
are simulated transactions because in truth and in fact
those assets belong to first respondent and are assets in his
personal estate and not in the estate of the trust. She
effectively seeks the simulation to be set aside and claims
an order that those assets be taken into account as personal
assets of the first respondent in determining her accrual
claim.137
Whilst Alkema J.’s above exposition on the effects of setting
aside simulated transactions is indeed correct, it is arguable that a
challenge to individual trustee transactions on the ground that they
were simulations is not typical of going behind the trust form in
order to curb the abuse of a trust. This much is evident from YB v.
SB and Others NNO.138 In this case the plaintiff instituted divorce
proceedings against the first defendant to whom she was married
out of community of property but subject to the accrual system.
The plaintiff and first defendant were among the co-trustees of an
inter vivos trust created during the subsistence of their marriage.
The plaintiff sought to amend her particulars of claim by including
therein a claim that the trustees simulated the acquisition of trust
assets and that these simulated transactions had to be set aside to
acknowledge the first defendant as the de facto beneficial owner of
the assets. The plaintiff averred that the first defendant and the
trustees intended at all material times for the first defendant to be
the beneficial owner of the assets ostensibly held in trust. The
136. Id. at paras. 47, 48, 53.
137. Id. at para. 47.
138. YB v. SB and Others NNO 2016 (1) SA 47 (WCC).
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plaintiff contended, consequently, that the trust assets had to be
added to the value of the first defendant’s personal estate for the
purpose of calculating the accrual of said estate in terms of the
Matrimonial Property Act.139
Riley A.J., in granting the plaintiff’s application to amend her
particulars of claim, pointed out explicitly that the plaintiff’s
application was not based on the averment that the trust in issue
was the first defendant’s alter ego; instead, she plead expressly
that, from the trust’s inception, the assets ostensibly held in trust
were acquired through simulated transactions and, therefore, were
beneficially owned by the first defendant.140 Riley A.J. evidently
regarded a challenge to individual trustee transactions on the
ground that they were simulations as essentially different from
going behind the trust form to curb the abuse of a trust in the alterego-trust scenario. This assertion is fortified by the Acting Judge’s
opinion that, even though the plaintiff’s case in YB v. SB was on all
fours with Alkema J’s above exposition in RP v. DP on the effects
of setting aside simulated transactions,141 it was, nevertheless, “not
necessary to become involved in the so-called alter ego
controversy, as it . . . does not find application.”142 This statement
supports the contention that the setting aside of individual trustee
transactions on the ground that they were simulations is not typical
of going behind the trust form in order to curb the abuse of the
trust form. The better view, it is submitted, is to address the setting
aside of trustee transactions on the ground that they were
simulations in terms of the common-law rules pertinent to
simulated contracts, particularly the application of the maxim plus
valet quod agitur quam quod simulate concipitur.143 This maxim,
139. Id. at paras. 2, 5.
140. Id. at para. 40.
141. Id. at para. 47.
142. Id. at para. 51.
143. The maxim means that the contracting parties’ real intention carries
more weight than a fraudulent formation or pretence: see Zandberg v. Van Zyl
1910 AD 302 309.
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if invoked successfully, will occasion the discarding of any
simulated transactions for the supposed acquisition of trust assets,
and will ensure that effect is given to the contracting parties’ true
intention, namely that the assets acquired under the guise of
trusteeship actually vest in its beneficial owner’s personal estate. It
follows from the foregoing that the RP Court’s engagement with
going behind the trust form in the context of accrual claims is,
unfortunately, not a model of conceptual clarity.
The Court in RP v. DP ruled in the end that the trustees of the
inter vivos trust in question had a real and substantial interest in the
applicant’s claim, and, accordingly, that they should be joined as
parties to the action. The Court also found that the prayer for the
proposed amendment of the applicant’s particulars of claim to
reflect the joinder as well as the claim that certain trust assets
should be considered as assets in the personal estate of the first
defendant should be granted.144
The foregoing analysis shows that prayers regarding the
consideration of trust assets toward the realization of accrual
claims in divorce proceedings have also posed challenges to South
African courts in the recent past. South African courts’ responses
to these challenges have been more varied than their engagement
with the consideration of trust assets toward the issuing of
redistribution orders in divorce proceedings. The judgment in MM
v. JM in particular threw the proverbial cat amongst the pigeons
insofar as it, unlike other judgments on point, espoused a
fundamentally different view on the legal rules applicable to the
treatment of alter ego trusts under the Divorce Act’s redistribution
dispensation compared to the legal rules apposite to the
Matrimonial Property Act’s accrual dispensation. A prima facie
resolution to this matter has since been provided by the Supreme
Court of Appeal in a judgment on the addition of trust assets to a
144. RP v. DP and Others 2014 (6) SA 243 (ECP), para. 58. See also M v. M
[2015] ZAGPPHC 66 (February 4, 2015) for another judgment that yielded an
outcome similar to that in RP v. DP.
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joint estate where the spouses were married in community of
property. This judgment is considered in the next part of the
article.
C. Trust Assets and Joint Estates
While judgments abound on the addition of trust asset values to
those of trustee-spouses’ personal estates under the Divorce Act’s
redistribution dispensation and the Matrimonial Property Act’s
accrual dispensation, only two South African judgments have, at
the time of writing, been handed down on the consideration of trust
assets with regard to a joint estate where a marriage was concluded
in community of property. Moreover, the two judgments were that
of the court of first instance and, subsequently, that of the Supreme
Court of Appeal in the same case. A comparison between the lower
court’s standpoint on the one hand, and that of the appeal court on
the other hand, in this matter is instructive for two reasons: first, it
ostensibly settled the legal position with regard to the (potential)
consideration of trust assets as part of a joint estate; and, secondly,
it also seemingly answered (albeit indirectly) the question of
whether the BC and RP Courts’ stance, or that of the MM Court, to
the treatment of alter ego trusts under the Matrimonial Property
Act’s accrual dispensation is to be preferred.
In T v. T145 the plaintiff (the husband) and defendant (the wife)
cohabitated for approximately four years prior to marrying, and did
so for the two years preceding their marriage in a home acquired
by a trust of which the plaintiff was a co-trustee. The parties
subsequently married in community of property, which marriage
had broken down irretrievably when the spouses separated
approximately eight years later. The plaintiff thereafter instituted
divorce proceedings against the defendant. The defendant did not
oppose the decree of divorce sought by the plaintiff, but she
instituted a counterclaim relating to the extent of the assets in the
145. T v. T [2014] ZAGPJHC 245 (September 19, 2014).
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spouses’ joint estate. The defendant averred, inter alia, that the
aforementioned trust assets, principally the matrimonial home, had
to be included in the joint estate because the plaintiff de facto
controlled the trust to amass his own wealth; moreover, the
argument was made that but for the trust, he would have acquired
the trust assets in his own name—in other words, she averred that
the trust was no more than her husband’s alter ego.146
The Court commenced its engagement with the defendant’s
averments by stating that, in order to ascertain whether the trust
“fell into the joint estate” it had to determine whether or not the
trust “is in fact the alter ego of the plaintiff and so is an asset which
is his.”147 The Court’s starting point, like that of the Court in RP v.
DP,148 appears to be premised on the supposition that a trustee’s
treatment of a trust as his or her alter ego, and the abuse of the trust
form consequent upon such treatment, occasions the trust assets to
vest in such a trustee personally and, in the instance of a marriage
in community of property, thereby to form part of the spouses’
joint estate. It must again be emphasized at this point that such a
supposition runs contrary to the pronouncement in Van Zyl v.
Kaye, highlighted earlier,149 that a trustee’s abuse of a trust through
his or her non-adherence to the fundamentals of trust
administration is in itself insufficient to sustain an averment that
the trust assets no longer vest in the trustee officially, but that those
assets vest in him or her personally. Accordingly, the Court in T v.
T, as was the case with its predecessors in BC v. CC and RP v. DP,
appears to have erred in its understanding of the consequences that
attach to a trustee’s treatment of a trust as his or her alter ego. The
Court compounded its error when it referred expressly to
Badenhorst v. Badenhorst as an example of those cases in which
“properties owned by entities other than parties to the marriage
146. See the exposition on the pleadings in the Supreme Court of Appeal’s
judgment: WT and Others v. KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA), para. 3.
147. T, ZAGPJHC 245 (September 19, 2014), para. 28.
148. See supra Part IV. B.
149. See supra Part IV. A.
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have been held to form part of an estate.”150 However, it was
shown earlier that the appellant in Badenhorst never sought an
order depriving the trust at issue in that case of its assets, nor
indeed an order that the assets of the trust formed part of her
husband’s personal estate.151 Therefore, the Badenhorst case does
not support the finding that the T Court ascribed to it.
The Court next addressed the submission, ostensibly made by
the plaintiff, that judgments such as Badenhorst dealt with the
Divorce Act’s redistribution dispensation and, therefore, involved
the exercise of a judicial discretion; because the exercise of a
commensurate discretion was not at issue in the present matter, so
the submission proceeded, the principles laid down in Badenhorst
and corresponding judgments were inapplicable to the present
case.152 Of course, this very argument was also addressed in BC v.
CC, MM v. JM, and RP v. DP in the context of the addition of trust
asset values to the values of trustee-spouses’ personal estates under
the Matrimonial Property Act’s accrual dispensation. The Courts in
the first- and last-mentioned judgments were unconvinced by this
submission, whereas the Court in MM agreed fully with it.153
Which view would the Court in T v. T hold?
Lamont J., who handed down the judgment in T v. T, aligned
himself with the BC and RP Courts’ standpoint (although without
express reference to these cases) when he said with regard to the
judgments relied upon in the above-mentioned submission:
The flaw in the argument made to me is that in each case it
was necessary for the court to first determine what the
assets were which belonged to the party against whom the
order was to be made. This involved a decision as to how
big the estate was and what comprised the estate. Once that
investigation had been taken, a discretion was applied as to
what the financial consequences of that decision were.
There was no question of any discretion playing any role in
150.
151.
152.
153.

T, ZAGPJHC 245 (September 19, 2014), para 30.
See supra Part IV. A.
T, ZAGPJHC 245 (September 19, 2014), paras. 31–32.
See supra Part IV. B.
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the formulation of the test to be applied in establishing
whether or not assets belonged to a particular party. The
issue in the present case is identical. The investigation to be
undertaken is whether or not the assets in the trust are the
assets of the plaintiff and hence of the joint estate.154
Lamont J.’s foregoing view certainly corresponds to that
expressed in BC v. CC and RP v. DP, namely that piercing the veil
that separates a trustee’s personal estate from the trust estate is a
function distinct from the exercise of any discretion in making a
redistribution order under Section 7 of the Divorce Act.155 As
indicated earlier,156 this view regards the making of a redistribution
order as involving two distinct functions, the first of which is a
factual determination of “which assets are [a spouse’s] personal
assets.”157 This function, being non-discretionary in nature,
applies, according to the BC and RP judgments, equally to
redistribution claims as well as accrual claims, and, in light of
Lamont J.’s ruling in T v. T, also to the inclusion of trust assets in
the determination of the extent of spouses’ joint estate. In the
result, the Court in T v. T ordered, in light of copious evidence that
the plaintiff’s co-trustee was supine to the plaintiff’s control over
the trust and that the plaintiff manipulated the trust’s affairs to give
himself unfettered access to the trust funds and assets,158 that the
spouses’ joint estate “includes the assets of the . . . Trust.”159 The
plaintiff, evidently dissatisfied with this ruling, appealed against
Lamont J.’s judgment. The appeal was heard by a full bench—five
judges—of the Supreme Court of Appeal; consequently, the appeal
judgment, under the citation WT and Others v. KT,160 constitutes,
along with the Badenhorst judgment, the most authoritative

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

T, ZAGPJHC 245 (September 19, 2014), paras. 33–35.
See supra Part IV. B.
Id.
RP v. DP and Others 2014 (6) SA 243 (ECP), para. 57.
T, ZAGPJHC 245 (September 19, 2014), para. 37.
Id. at para. 47.
WT and Others v. KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA).
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pronouncement to date on the consideration of trust assets toward
the determination of the patrimonial consequences of divorce.
The Supreme Court of Appeal made short work of what it
regarded as Lamont J.’s reliance on the Badenhorst case in the
judgment he handed down in the court of first instance. The
Supreme Court of Appeal regarded this reliance as “misdirected”
because, in the Court’s opinion, Badenhorst was decided in the
context of the discretion bestowed by Section 7(3) of the Divorce
Act toward the making of a redistribution order whereas, in the
present matter, the court, in assessing the patrimonial
consequences of the termination of a marriage in community of
property, is not vested with any commensurate discretion but is
“confined merely to directing that the assets of the joint estate be
divided in equal shares.”161 The Court then stated:
The court concerned with a marriage in community of
property . . . has no comparable discretion as envisaged in
s 7(3) of the Divorce Act to include the assets of a third
party in the joint estate. In any event, s 12 of the [Trust
Property Control] Act specifically recognizes in this
context that trust assets held by a trustee in trust, do not
form part of the personal property of such trustee as a
matter of law.162
The foregoing statement appears to situate the addition of the
asset values of alter ego trusts to the values of trustee-spouses’
personal estates exclusively within the equitable and discretionary
dispensation on the redistribution of assets contained in the
Divorce Act. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Appeal’s statement
directly and pertinently excludes any possibility of adding the
assets of an alter ego trust (or their value) to a joint estate where a
marriage was concluded in community of property; a view that is
founded on the absence of any judicial discretion to such an end in
the legal rules that govern the strictly mathematical division of a
joint estate upon the termination of a marriage in community of
161. Id. at para. 35.
162. Id.
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property. It is submitted that the Supreme Court of Appeal’s
statement also indirectly and by analogy excludes the possibility of
adding the assets (or their value) of an alter ego trust to a trusteespouse’s personal estate for the purpose of realizing an accrual
claim where the spouses married out of community of property
subject to the accrual system. This submission is premised on the
same absence of any judicial discretion to such an end in the legal
rules that govern the strictly mathematical calculation of accrual
upon the termination of a marriage out of community of property
to which the accrual system applies. The directive, mentioned
expressly in the above dictum from WT v. KT, in Section 12 of the
Trust Property Control Act on the separateness of the trust estate in
a trustee’s hands lends further weight to this submission. In this
light, the Supreme Court of Appeal’s stance in the WT judgment
provides firm support to the judgment on accrual in MM v. JM,
and, commensurately, appears to vitiate the judgments on point in
BC v. CC and RP v. DP.
The Supreme Court of Appeal in WT also exposed the
erroneous supposition of the court of first instance regarding the
consequences that attach to a trustee’s treatment of a trust as his or
her alter ego. The Court opined that Lamont J.’s order in the court
of first instance amounted to a “transfer of the trust’s assets to the
joint estate.”163 The Supreme Court of Appeal reasoned—in
consonance with the view expressed earlier in Van Zyl v.
Kaye164—that such a “transfer” in the ownership of trust property
merely by reason of the abuse of the trust form is legally
untenable; in fact, the Court expressed doubt as to whether even
the wide discretion afforded by Section 7(3) of the Divorce Act
enables a court to effect any “transfer” of ownership in trust assets,
rather than to merely order the addition of the value of such assets

163. Id. at para. 36.
164. See supra Part IV. A.
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to that of a trustee-spouse’s personal estate when it goes behind the
trust form in the making of a redistribution order.165
In light of the foregoing considerations, the Supreme Court of
Appeal upheld the appellant’s appeal, and set aside the order of the
court of first instance on the inclusion of the trust assets in the
spouses’ joint estate.166
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The South African experience with trusts and their (possible)
role in the determination of the patrimonial consequences of
divorce bring to light many of the unforeseen challenges
occasioned by the development of a uniquely South African trust
law through the adaptation of the English-law trust to South
African law with its strong civilian legal tradition. One such
challenge relates to the conceptual clarity demanded of judicial
(and scholarly) engagement with the abuse of the trust form. The
apparent absence of such clarity in judgments such as BC v. CC,
RP v. DP and T v. T by reason of these courts’ obfuscation
regarding the difference between sham trusts and alter ego trusts
have wrought a great deal of confusion in South African
jurisprudence on claims to trust assets in divorce proceedings. The
Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment in WT v. KT elucidated this
matter insofar as it exposed the lack of clarity evident from these
three judgments. The Court in WT v. KT also distinguished
pertinently between the Divorce Act’s discretionary redistribution
dispensation with regard to marriages concluded subject to a
complete separation of property on the one hand, and marriages
concluded in community of property on the other hand. In the
former instance, according to the Badenhorst judgment, judicial
consideration of trust asset values to determine the patrimonial
consequences of divorce is possible, whereas in the latter instance,
165. WT, 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA), para. 36.
166. Id. at para. 38.
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according to the WT judgment, considering trust asset values in
determining the patrimonial consequences of divorce is not
possible by reason of the absence of a judicial discretion
comparable to that afforded by the Divorce Act’s redistribution
dispensation. The latter finding extends, by implication, also to
marriages concluded out of community of property subject to the
accrual system because the accrual system is also nondiscretionary in nature.167
It must be noted, however, that the Supreme Court of Appeal
made no definitive pronouncement in WT v. KT on the view
espoused in the BC, RP and T judgments that the Divorce Act’s
redistribution dispensation involves a two-tiered approach insofar
as it comprises both a non-discretionary element (determining the
extent or total value of a spouse’s estate) as well as a discretionary
element (achieving a just patrimonial outcome in the divorce
proceedings at hand); moreover, that the non-discretionary element
is transferable onto other matrimonial property regimes. Should
this view on the redistribution of assets as a segmented process
prevail in future judgments of South Africa’s highest court, it may
well (re-)open the door to the consideration of trust assets—as part
of a factual determination on the extent of a trustee-spouse’s
estate—in divorce proceedings for spouses married out of
community of property subject to the accrual system and, possibly,
even for spouses married in community of property. A close
reading of the Badenhorst judgment appears to support this view in
that the Court first addressed the question of whether the trust at
issue in casu was indeed abused, which, if answered in the
affirmative, would warrant a consideration of the trust asset value
in the determination of the extent of the defendant’s personal estate
value. The Court invoked the “but for”-test to this end. Combrinck
167. Note, however, Riley A.J.’s opinion in YB v. SB and Others NNO 2016
(1) SA 47 (WCC), that the determination of an accrual claim does not involve a
purely arithmetical calculation, but that the Matrimonial Property Act endows a
court with a certain measure of leeway as to how exactly an accrual claim must
be satisfied: paras. 34, 35.
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A.J.A., who handed down the Badenhorst judgment, said: “To
succeed in a claim that trust assets be included in the estate of one
of the parties to a marriage there needs to be evidence that such
party controlled the trust and but for the trust would have acquired
and owned the assets in his own name.”168
The evidence adduced by the appellant in Badenhorst satisfied
the Court that the defendant’s abuse of the trust justified the
addition of the trust asset value to that of his personal estate. Only
thereafter did the Court proceed to determine the redistribution
amount payable by the defendant, and did so with express
reference to the equitable considerations that underpin the Divorce
Act’s redistribution dispensation. Combrinck A.J.A. said:
[I]n my judgment an equitable result will be achieved, and
recognition given to the appellant’s contribution to the
maintenance and increase of the respondent’s estate, by
ordering him to pay to the appellant the sum of R1 250 000.
This amount is arrived at by taking the total of the net asset
value of the parties’ estates and that of the trust,169
calculating a percentage which is considered just and
equitable for appellant’s contribution170 and deducting what
she already stands possessed of.171
It is submitted that this perspective on Badenhorst gives
credence to Riley A.J.’s view in YB v. SB that the consideration of
trust assets (or their values) to determine the patrimonial
consequences of divorce should be viewed broadly rather than
restrictively, or, stated differently, should be capable of application
also to matrimonial property regimes other than a complete
separation of property where the redistribution of assets is at issue.
The Judge said:

168. Badenhorst v. Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA) para. 9.
169. In other words, the outcome of the inquiry under the first tier of the
aforementioned two-tiered approach.
170. In other words, the outcome of the inquiry under the second tier of the
aforementioned two-tiered approach.
171. Badenhorst, 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA), para. 16.
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If I consider . . . the approach adopted by the SCA in
Badenhorst . . . it seems to me that the principles laid out in
Badenhorst as to when trust assets are to be held to form
part of a spouse’s estate are not confined to s 7(3) [of the
Divorce Act on the redistribution of assets] situations.172
The eminent South African legal scholar H. R. Hahlo observed
more than half a century ago that “when it comes to ‘trusts’ in our
law, even the most elementary propositions cannot be regarded as
settled.”173 This observation certainly rings true with regard to
South African courts’ engagement with trusts within the context of
the patrimonial consequences of divorce. Hahlo’s observation
suggests, moreover, that the Supreme Court of Appeal’s
pronouncements on point in Badenhorst v. Badenhorst and WT v.
KT may not necessarily be the final word on the matter.

172. YB, 2016 (1) SA 47 (WCC), para. 49. It must be kept in mind, however,
that Riley A.J. did not consider the Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment in WT
v. KT in his judgment in YB v. SB.
173. H.R. Hahlo, Revocation of Trusts, 69 S. AFRICAN L.J. 348, 349 (1952).
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JOHN A. LOVETT, MARKUS G. PUDER & EVELYN L. WILSON,
LOUISIANA PROPERTY LAW—THE CIVIL CODE, CASES AND
COMMENTARY
(Carolina Academic Press, Durham, North Carolina 2014)
Reviewed by Yaëll Emerich*
Although this interesting work, by John A. Lovett, Markus G.
Puder and Evelyn L. Wilson, styles itself as “a casebook about
Louisiana property law,”1 it nevertheless has some stimulating
comparative insights. The book presents property scholarship from
the United States and beyond, taking into account property texts
from other civilian and mixed jurisdictions such as Québec, South
Africa and Scotland. As underlined by the authors, Louisiana’s
system of property law is a part of the civilian legal heritage
inherited from the French and Spanish colonisation and codified in
its Civil Code: “property law . . . is one of the principal
areas . . . where Louisiana´s civilian legal heritage has been most
carefully preserved and where important substantive differences
between Louisiana civil law and the common law of its sister states
still prevail.”2 While the casebook mainly scrutinizes Louisiana
jurisprudence and its Civil Code in local doctrinal context, it also
situates Louisiana property law against a broader historical, social
and economic background. Rather than concentrating only on the
technicalities of property law, it insists on understanding principles
and practices as reflections of local conditions and cultures. There
is also a clear desire to present and understand some of the recent
controversies within property law.
* Associate Professor, McGill University, Faculty of Law, P.-A. Crépeau
Center for Private and Comparative Law.
1. JOHN A. LOVETT, MARKUS G. PUDER & EVELYN L. WILSON, LOUISIANA
PROPERTY LAW—THE CIVIL CODE, CASES AND COMMENTARY 3 (Carolina
Academic Press, Durham, North Carolina 2014).
2. Id. at xxiii.
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The book is divided into sixteen chapters that follow a
relatively traditional presentation of property law. The first chapter
explains the sources of Louisiana property law and underlines the
role of codification in the civil law tradition in Louisiana, mainly
through two texts that are then annotated and questioned by the
authors. It is a fascinating story, as it explains “how Louisiana,
alone among the fifty states, came to have a civil code modeled on
a European civil code.”3 The book offers some general background
to explain the history of civil law in Europe and codification in
Louisiana and underlines “the complementary and sometimes
competing relationships between judge and legislator.”4 As Peter
G. Stein has shown, the prevailing ideology when Louisiana’s first
Civil Code, sometimes referred to as a Digest, was drafted in 1808
was quite different from the revolutionary spirit that had preceded
the drafting of the French Civil Code; many wanted the “status
quo”5 rather than a fresh beginning. As for “[t]he compilers of the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1825, [they] not only added more detail,
they also included explanatory comment.”6 One of the main
debates here, as David Gruning explains, is the role of the old law,
given that the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that the Great
Repealing Act of 1828 could not affect “principles of law […]
established or settled by the decisions of the courts of justice”
under the old law.7 It is also worth noting that “the 1870 Code,
unlike the 1825 Code or the 1808 Digest, was published in English
only, without the French text.”8 On a final note, the authors
underline that the comments found in the Civil Code are not law

3. Id. at 15.
4. Id. at 3.
5. Peter G. Stein, Judge and Jurist in the Civil Law: A Historical
Interpretation, 46 LA. L. REV. 241, 242–57 (1986), quoted by LOVETT ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 12.
6. LOVETT ET AL., supra note 1, at 13.
7. David Gruning, Mapping Society through Law: Louisiana, Civil Law
Recodified, 19 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1, 1–12, 14–20, 31–34 (2004), quoted by
LOVETT ET AL., supra note 1, at 17.
8. LOVETT ET AL., supra note 1, at 17.
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strictly speaking but are rather of explanatory value.9 While this
chapter is one of the most stimulating of the book it might have
been interesting to have more discussion of the tension between the
civil law and common law as potential models for Louisiana law,
rather than limiting comments to the debate about which civilian
system should prevail.
Chapter 2 deals with ownership, real rights and the right to
exclude. It briefly explains the civilian concept of ownership
versus the common law estate, underlines the role of exclusivity in
ownership, and compares real rights to personal rights. Ownership,
one of the most fundamental concepts in property law, is defined in
article 477 of the Civil Code as: “the right that confers on a person
direct, immediate, and exclusive authority over a thing. The owner
of a thing may use, enjoy, and dispose of it within the limits and
under the conditions established by law.”
As for real right, it is described by the authors as “a right in a
thing that is good against the entire world.”10
To illustrate the importance of this distinction between real and
personal rights, several examples are given, including some taken
from the jurisprudence, and the question of the openness of the list
of real rights is discussed. As the authors underline, the drafters
“appear to conceptualize ownership as that particular real right,
alone among the entire universe of real rights” that confers on a
person “direct . . . immediate . . . [and] exclusive authority over a
thing.”11 Article 477 also refers to the classic triad of ownership in
that it “suggests that ownership comprises at least three particular
elements, which some property scholars conceptualize as options
(or facultés) accruing from ownership.”12

9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 23.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 34.
Id.
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John Merryman’s well-known article “Ownership and Estate”
is added as a reference to distinguish civil law ownership from
common law estate.13
Chapters 3 and 4 deal with “The Division of Things” and
“Classification of Things.” Chapter 3 relates to common, public
and private things. This corresponds to the first classification
scheme detailed in Book II of the Louisiana Civil Code. This
chapter contains important developments related to water and
navigability, notably those that make a distinction between running
water, territorial sea and the seashore. Chapter 4 classifies things
between corporeal movables, corporeal immovables and
incorporeal immovables and movables. It is worth noting that the
1978 revision of the Civil Code suppressed the French tripartite
classification of immovables and simplified the law by adopting
two basic categories of immovables: corporeal immovables and
incorporeal immovables.14 The authors look at how corporeal
movables attached to land (buildings and other constructions)
become component parts of land, and they also scrutinize the
reversed situation of deimmobilization.
Apart from chapter 8, which is related to possession, chapters 5
to 9 deal with acquisition of ownership. Chapter 5 relates to
“Voluntary Transfer of Ownership” and gives an introduction to
the basic principles governing three types of voluntary transfer of
ownership described in the Louisiana Civil Code: donation, sale
and exchange. This chapter notably explains the public records
doctrine and how Louisiana law differs from the French principe
du consensualisme.15 Relating to the voluntary transfer of
ownership of an immovable, a good explanation is given of the
significance of the Louisiana Public Records Doctrine, according
to which such a transfer “has no effect against third parties unless
13. John Henry Merryman, Ownership and Estate (Variations on a Theme
by Lawson), 48 TUL. L. REV. 916, 921–25, 927–29 (1974).
14. LOVETT ET AL., supra note 1, at 158.
15. Id. at 256.
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evidence of the transfer is recorded in the appropriate public
records.”16 As for movables, according to article 518 of the Civil
Code, the transfer of ownership in this case is effective “against
third persons when the possession of the movable is delivered to
the transferee”—so that “the delivery or ‘tradition’ . . . serves the
function of putting third parties on notice.”17 The authors
interestingly discuss what happens in the context of incorporeal
movables.
Accession is discussed in chapter 6, which contains
developments on natural accession, with the example of
acquisition of the ownership of fruits and the impact of good faith;
artificial accession of Immovables; and improvements made by
precarious and adverse possessors. Occupancy is the subject of
chapter 7. As stated by the authors, “Roman law made occupancy
(occupatio) available as a function of natural reasoning (ratione
naturali),” which is not far from the idea of first possession in the
common law.18
Chapter 8 contains interesting developments on possession and
possessory actions, and chapter 9 deals with Acquisition
prescription with respect to immovable.
[If] ownership of a thing cannot be lost by non-use . . . [i]t
can, however, be lost to another person through acquisitive
prescription, [namely as] a mode of acquisition of
ownership which accrues in favor of a person that the Civil
Code calls “an adverse possessor.”19
As expressed by the authors, it is clear that “in addition to the
physical detention or enjoyment of a thing, a person must also have
a particular state of mind in order to qualify as an adverse
possessor.”20 The requirement of giving notice to the true owner is
discussed. Also, the question of the delay, in relation to just title
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 257.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 345.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 366.
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and good faith, is interestingly presented. The authors then discuss
the possessory action that is recognized by Louisiana’s Civil Code
to protect a person’s right to possess immovable property and
stress that such an action may not be cumulated with the petitory
action in the same suit. Moreover, there is a discussion of relevant
developments on quasi-possession of incorporeals and, notably,
servitudes.
The question of vindicating ownership is dealt with in chapter
10 that looks both at immovables and movables. In the context of
immovables, the authors notably discuss the Louisiana Supreme
Court decision in Pure Oil Co. v. Skinner. As for revendicatory
actions for the recovery of movables, they underline the presence
of an innominate real action, grounded in French doctrine.
The remaining chapters of the book deal with co-ownership or
ownership in indivision (chapter 11), usufruct (chapter 12),
servitudes (chapter 13 and 14), habitation and right of use (chapter
15) and finally building restrictions (chapter 16). The book
addresses the general rules for owners in indivision but does not
look at the Louisiana Condominium Act. As stated by the authors
Louisiana law allows a person to take the fundamental
constitutive elements of ownership outlined in Article 477
of the Civil Code—the right to use a thing, to enjoy its
fruits , and to dispose of it (usus, fructus and abusus)—and
reconfigure them in new forms to create real rights other
than ownership.21
Conclusion
While it might have been interesting to have more
developments on the tensions between civil law and common law,
this book makes a useful contribution in many respects. It is
valuable for Louisiana students and its community of jurists. It is
also interesting for lawyers and researchers interested in
comparative law, who will be able to find in this book a very good
21. Id. at 566.
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introduction to Louisiana property law based on its civil code,
doctrine and jurisprudence. Louisiana law has become fruitful for
comparatists, and especially for scholars interested in civil law or
mixed jurisdictions, as well as for scholars attentive to comparative
legal history. Moreover, the book might also be interesting to
jurilinguists or jurist interested in the linguistic of law, because
civil law in English is still underrepresented in the literature. For
this reason, this book has the potential to give a new range of
vocabulary to civil property law that is expressed in English.

GÉRARD CORNU, DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE
(Alain Levasseur & Marie-Eugénie Laporte-Legeais trans.,
LexisNexis 2014)
Reviewed by Jean-Claude Gémar
Law dictionaries are legion, translations of law dictionaries are
few, especially from French into English due to the deep-seated
differences between French Civil Law’s and Common Law’s
concepts and systems. Translating is a high-risk activity, all the
more so when law and its critical consequences are involved. The
phrase traduttore traditore continues to undermine the very idea of
translation in the eyes of so many. If everything can be translated,
many doubt that this translation specialists’ dogma can apply to the
translation of legal texts. Furthermore, translators must not
underestimate how laws are drafted, the style of which can vary,
sometimes considerably, from one language to another. This is the
case, among many other pairs of legal languages, for English and
French: their writing styles differ dramatically, and particularly in
the development of their legal texts. Translators are thus faced with
the problem of conceptual incongruity between languages.
Linguistic scholars believe the congruity of words between
languages is purely by chance.
IS LAW TRANSLATABLE?
Such statements suggest that untranslatability would be
inevitable. In view of the particular constraints of legal translation,
especially when texts of national interest are involved, as in
Canada, the question arises whether legal translation is still
possible. It is true that if one focuses on the concepts covered by
the key terms in the vocabularies of the main legal systems and if
one makes a comparative analysis, term for term, one ends up most
of the time, for lack of perfect equivalence, at the impossibility of
translation. Few specialists—most of them jurists—accept the
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feasibility of translation. They think it does not really produce the
claimed legal equivalence. Many reasons or obstacles are put
forward, among them the uniqueness of legal systems, of their
specific concepts, terms and language. Prejudices, preconceived
ideas, not to mention ignorance, increase their impact.
Therefore, one needs a good amount of courage and
consistency, possibly a touch of madness, to embark on this
odyssey and tread new territory: translating into English Cornu’s
respected Vocabulaire juridique (9th ed., 2011), and, no doubt, the
reigning law dictionary in the French-speaking realm. A
formidable task, if any, when one considers with Cornu1 that “the
language of the law is, to a major extent, a legacy of tradition,”2
and filled with culture-bound terms. Legal notions are sometimes
so abstract and singular, so culturally bound to a local system, its
traditions and customs,3 that many lawyers and linguists alike
question the translatability of law.
However, specialists in comparative law are best placed to deal
not only with the problems posed by the language of law, its
words, terms and phrases, but also with the concepts and notions
they convey when transferred from one legal system to another. It
is not surprising one finds among comparativists able specialists in
legal translation, as are Professors Alain Levasseur and MarieEugénie Laporte-Legeais who, in an international joint venture
conducted by Association Henri Capitant and Poitiers’ Juriscope,
coordinated and supervised the team who translated the
Vocabulaire juridique in order to produce the Dictionary of the
Civil Code under review.
To start with some striking facts and figures, Cornu’s
Vocabulaire juridique (10th ed., 2014) contains over 5,000 entries
1. Professor Gérard Cornu passed away in 2007. He was 81.
2. GÉRARD CORNU, DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE xiii (Alain Levasseur
& Marie-Eugénie Laporte-Lageais trans., LexisNexis 2014) [hereinafter
DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE].
3. Compare droits de l’Homme vs habeas corpus, terms not addressed in
the Dictionary.
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within over 1,000 pages (1,099, to be precise), when the
Dictionary of the Civil Code contains less than 3,000 (c. 2,800)
within 663 pages. The some 2,000-entry difference lies in the
notion-based corpus selected, which is composed of some 1,600
essential notions. Not all terms, notions and entries of the
Vocabulaire juridique were judged relevant and worth being
retained to be translated and incorporated in a dictionary of the
Civil Code. See for example: anomal, concordat, concours,
consulaire, distraction, distrat, éthique, étoc, fourrière, incoterm,
litisconsorts, mission, nouveauté, obligataire, perquisition,
préjudiciel, réfugié, requérir, sécularisation, soumission, staries,
superficie, taille, tontine, usance, ventilation, vétusté, voluptuaire,
and so on, were retained terms bearing a notion, a legal institution
that matter, representing more or less the basic terminology
carrying the essential notions of private law, which amounts to
some 2,000 terms, as the first edition (1985) of Quebec’s
Dictionnaire de droit privé demonstrated.
The Dictionary of the Civil Code’s entries (pp. 1–591), as is the
case with most dictionaries, are presented in alphabetical order.
They are preceded by a short Foreword (p. ix), the authors’
Approach to Translation (pp. xiii–xiv), the Foreword written by
Prof. Philippe Malinvaud for the original edition (pp. xv–xvi) and
by excerpts of the Preface of the original edition (pp. xvii–xx)
written by Gérard Cornu—all translated by Alain A. Levasseur and
J. Randall Trahan—, a list of abbreviations (pp. xxi–xxiii) and by
some Instructions for Use (p. xxv). The Dictionary proper (pp. 1–
589) is followed by an Index of (English-French) Entries4 (pp.
593–657), an Index of Legal Adages (pp. 659–62) and, finally, by
a Louisiana Civil Code Bibliography (p. 663).
Since we are dealing here with a translated book, the authors’
statements on their translation objectives and strategies are of
4. Each entry is introduced by the French term under consideration; the
text of the entry is in English, the equivalent English term(s) follow the
definition. Ex: “Demande (. . .) En. Demand, Claim, Action, Request.”
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prime importance to better grasp what they intended to accomplish,
the purpose toward which their endeavor was directed. In
translation, the German philologist Friedrich Schleiermacher
forged the critical alternative, the old and obvious dualism: the
translator’s task is to move the author to the reader, or move the
reader to the author.
SOURCE TEXT-ORIENTED OR READER-ORIENTED?
In law, the issue of equivalence assumes particularly critical
importance. Thus arises the question of translating law. Translating
a text of a legal nature or significance comes to perform an act of
comparative law, but coupled with a translating process
(l’opération traduisante). In sum, that is the translator’s daunting
task. Translating does not consist in finding matching equivalents
that can be assembled in a chain of words making phrases and
sentences and, eventually, a text. If translation is thought to be a
word-for-word operation, a translator’s search à tout prix for a
lexical equivalent to the source language in the target language,
since linguists claim that no word possesses the exact equivalent
meaning in another language, then one should seriously doubt the
feasibility of translating.
Nonetheless translating has been going on for thousands of
years. Faced with his or her text, the translator has to adopt a
strategy with a view to reaching the goal intended, which will
depend on principles, and one or several methods that are more or
less established and proven. Throughout history, sometimes
translators have opted for a literal form of translation, sometimes
for a freer approach to translating, without neglecting ways to
combine them, including adaptation. Nowadays, in the quest for
equivalence, it is the spirit, not the letter any more, that is being
sought. It reveals a general trend in communication—writing more
concise, plainer and simpler texts—that is reaching out to the legal
world, where form, i.e., language, is increasingly governing law.
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Language-conscious Canada has a long and rich tradition and
experience with translation, that necessary evil which plays such a
decisive part in the smooth running of its institutions. Canada is the
country where “functional equivalence”5—which may be
compared to Nida’s “dynamic equivalence”6—has been the
privileged method for translating Canadian statutes for decades.
The reason?
KEEP LAW AND FORM AND DUE PROPORTION
(Richard II. 3.4.41)
It is therefore somewhat surprising that the Dictionary’s
authors-translators “favored ‘formal equivalence’ [source textoriented] over ‘dynamic equivalence’ [target text-oriented], which
is as much as to say that we have erred on the side of literalism.”7
They could not have put it better! But there are sound reasons
behind this. According to Levasseur and Trahan, “in all of the
writings of Cornu, the meaning of each word and the style of every
sentence, far from being independent of each other, are
inextricably bound up together.”8 This accounts for that. They
were not translating any dictionary, they dealt with a work of legal
doctrine, which is a magnum opus as far as substance is concerned,
and a gem as regards writing and style. You deal with the author of
Linguistique juridique (Legal Linguistics), a work that is the musthave of every student of the language of law and its texts. You do
not translate a great jurist’s words and style the way you do, say, a
5. See Louis-Philippe Pigeon, L’équivalence fonctionnelle in LANGAGE DU
DROIT ET TRADUCTION : ESSAIS DE JURILINGUISTIQUE—THE LANGUAGE OF THE
LAW AND TRANSLATION: ESSAYS ON JURILINGUISTICS 271–81 (Jean-Claude
Gémar ed., Conseil de la langue française 1983).
6. EUGENE A. NIDA & CHARLES R. TABER, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
TRANSLATION at xiv (4th prtg., Brill 2003), (which authored the formal vs
dynamic equivalence principle. In their system of priorities, “dynamic
equivalence has priority over formal correspondence”).
7. CORNU, DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE, supra note 2, at xiv.
8. Id.
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contract, but rather like what Peter Newmark thought of as
“authoritative statements,”9 which is what law dictionaries are all
about, where every word of each definition tells. One example will
demonstrate this. It is a comparison between a definition of
PERSONNE MORALE from the Vocabulaire juridique and its
translation in the Dictionary of the Civil Code:
Groupement doté, sous
certaines conditions, d’une
personnalité juridique plus ou
moins complète ; sujet de droit
fictif qui, sous l’aptitude
commune à être titulaire de
droit et d’obligation, est soumis
à un régime variable, not. selon
qu’il s’agit d’une personne
morale de droit privé ou d’une
personne morale de droit
public.
(50 words)

A group granted, under
certain conditions, a more or
less complete legal personality;
fictitious legal/juridical person
which, by virtue of the common
capacity to have rights and
obligations, is subject to a
variable regime, depending, in
particular, on whether it is a
private law moral/legal/juridical
person or a public law
moral/legal/juridical person.
(52 words)

The “formal equivalence” is obvious. One will also notice the
slight difference in the number of words between the French (50)
and the English (52) versions, which confirms the fine touch of
“literalism” since the translated text is usually longer than the
source one—a gap which can reach 300% between English and
Italian—,10 but not between English and French as far as statutes
are concerned.11 The legal equivalence of “personne morale” and
“legal person” reveals, as in the Quebec Civil Code (article 298),
the priority given to civil law over common law, while in a
9. Peter Newmark, The Translation of Authoritative Statements: a
Discussion, 27 META 375–91 (1982).
10. See Text size in Translation: http://www.w3.org/International/articles/
article-text-size.en, consulted on August 20, 2015.
11. In Canada, owing to methods of co-drafting legislation, articles in the
French version of a statute are often shorter than the English ones.
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common law context it is the term “corporation” that would be
appropriate, as indicated in the dictionary of common law
produced by the Centre de traduction et de terminologie juridiques
(CTTJ) of Moncton university Faculty of Law.12
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW: BACK TO THE FUTURE
But another reason behind the decision to translate Vocabulaire
juridique Cornu, the driving force behind the whole translating
endeavor, “was a matter not only of promoting our Louisiana civil
law tradition in general by anchoring it in the English language and
not just any English language, but an English language different
from the English language of the common law.”13 It is a manner of
going back to the future. After all, the Louisiana civil law has been
expressed for centuries in English (from the Digest of 1808 to the
Louisiana Civil Code of today), and became, nolens volens, “an
instrument for the defense of the civil law”!14 This characteristic
feature is constantly brought out by the authors when dealing with
major terms and notions; among many other examples, to stick to a
few A-terms: Abandon, Abus, Acceptation, Acte sous seing privé,
Action rédhibitoire (and Rédhibitoire), Agrément, Amiable
(compositeur), Antichrèse, Arrhes, Authentique, Ayant cause.
In many entries the team dealt with appears in one or several
articles of the Louisiana Civil Code, the Penal Code or a Louisiana
statute, which clearly reflects the underlying common language
identity and culture of the French civil law and Louisiana’s, at least
since the Code Napoléon and, before that, the reminders of lois
civiles (civil laws) of yesteryear. The cousinage between both civil
laws stands out particularly with a term like FAUTE/FAULT and its
so important notion of obligation. Let us compare what both Codes
say about it.
12. JACQUES VANDERLINDEN, GÉRARD SNOW & DONALD POIRIER, LA
COMMON LAW DE A À Z at 382 (Yvon Blais-Bruylant 2010).
13. CORNU, DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE, supra note 2, at xiv.
14. Id. at xiii.
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Article 2315. A. Every act
whatever of man that causes
damage to another obliges him
by whose fault it happened to
repair it.

[Vol. 8

Code civil, 2015
(enacted on Feb. 19, 1804)
Article 1382 Tout fait
quelconque de l’homme, qui
cause à autrui un dommage,
oblige celui par la faute duquel
il est arrivé à le réparer.

Once more, the original French article (1804) may be found,
translated word for word, in the Louisiana Civil Code, illustrating
the deeply-rooted French civil law culture and tradition perduring
in the only U.S. state still maintaining a civil code.
Each entry of the Dictionary reproduces the rich information
compiled and skillfullly synthesized by Cornu and his expert team
on every term they chose to enter into the Vocabulaire juridique.
Many general entries present subentries constituted of the family
of words comprising the key term, which at times can be
numerous, as is the case with LOI (9 terms) FAMILLE (13 terms), or
DROIT (43 terms!). This is in line with other dictionaries, Black’s
Law Dictionary for example, where the entry SUCCESSION contains
nine subentries devoted to “Civil Law and Louisiana.” Like
Garner’s dictionary,15 but to a lesser degree, Cornu’s Vocabulaire
juridique also gives linguistic information about the term, its
etymology, synonyms, antonyms, semantic relations (See, Comp.,
etc.), and other useful specifications (adages, classical/dominant
interpretation, strict/broad sense, usage), and, sometimes, a
warning : Avoid, as for the controversial common law term “Joint
and several.”16 This information is part of the translated entries.
15. B.A. GARNER, DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE (3rd ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 2011).
16. See CORNU, DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE, supra note 2, at xiv (the
authors’ remark on the civil law term solidarité, when “the only access key
available [to understand the civil law concept of solidarité] is ‘joint and
several’”). See also “Joint and several liability” in BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY.
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The authors of the Dictionary even went to the lengths of dealing
with and translating the definition of older term significations. See,
for instance, héritage (estate), the third signification of which (c.
1228) has been used “to refer to an immovable by nature.”17
Conveying that obsolete signification, this term is still present in
the French Code civil (article 637) and was one of Cornu’s
favorites (much used in the ages of Montaigne and Balzac).
As regards translation, the translators of Vocabulaire juridique
have accomplished a remarkable feat. As said before, translating a
dictionary is no easy task. Some even think it is a useless, if not
impossible, endeavor as far as law is concerned. In the case of the
Dictionary of the Civil Code, this task turned out to be not only
feasible but successfully accomplished, despite the fact definitions
do not follow the same path in English and French general
lexicographical traditions. These traditions are based upon
linguistic theories and principles that vary from time to time in the
manner in which a dictionary will define and inform users. In law,
however, the difference between English and French ways of
defining words and informing readers in law dictionaries is as large
as the gap separating common law and civil law. Where French
lexicographers (Capitant, Cornu) favor semantic definitions based
on Aristotelian logic, English lexicographers (Black, Garner,
Jowitt) lean towards pragmatics (an area of linguistics): they
recognize there is no linguistic meaning outside of usage. Bathing
in a written law, codified system, French jurists, unlike commonlawyers, think the “real meaning” of a word does not, or very
slowly, fluctuate. Lex non scripta, common law was not developed
by legislators but almost daily, case by case, by courts. Therefore,
the meaning of its words and terms is not cast-in-stone law, it does
fluctuate over the course of time.
Comparing Cornu’s and Black’s (Garner’s, in fact) ways of
defining a term will exemplify those differences. Choose a term
17. Id. at 281.
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like DOMICILE, for instance. In Cornu’s Vocabulaire juridique, the
definition will refer you to an article of the Code civil (article 102),
whereas Black’s Law Dictionary, like most English law
dictionaries (see Curzon, PAJLO, Stroud), refers the reader to one
or several cases : “Smith v. Smith, 206 Pa.Super., 310, 213 A.2nd
94,” and other law dictionaries may add statutes to case law
references. It says it all: in civil law, legislation surpasses case law.
And vice versa: in common law, “remedies precede rights”
affirmed René David, the great French comparativist.18 As said
before, the authors of Dictionary of Civil Code opted for a quasilitteral translation of Cornu’s definitions. This is well illustrated in
DOMICILE: “Place where a person has his principal establishment
(Frch. civ. C. a. 102; La. civ. C. a. 38).” Compare with Louisiana
Civil Code (article 38): “The domicile of a natural person is the
place of his habitual residence.” Definition followed by the usual
references: [Acts 2008, No. 801, §1; Acts 2012, No. 713, §2, eff.
Aug 1, 2012]. Two different ways of informing, two different
spirits of laws.
As for translation, a last example from the Dictionary of the
Civil Code will help in understanding the kind of difficulties a
translator might encounter when translating certain terms, as is the
case for VALABLE and VALIDE. Based on what general dictionaries
indicate, many French-speaking persons (and a great number of
others) think these words are synonyms. This might be true, in
certain cases, for the general language, where valide and valable
can both be translated in English by valid, but is not the case with
law, where the latter, not the former, may also be translated by
lawful. This is a source of ambiguity, all the more so as valide, in
reference to a juridical act, may apply to either a negotium “Ex.
marriage clear, in its formation, of any ground of nullity. Syn.
valable (sense 1),”19 or an instrumentum “Ex. passport in the
18. RENÉ DAVID, LES GRANDS SYSTÈMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS 330
(6th ed., Dalloz 1974).
19. CORNU, DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE, supra note 2, at 572.
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process of being validated. Comp. valable (sense 2),”20 therefore
conveying a critical semantic nuance, a difference that might blot
out underlying similarities.
TRADUTTORE TRADITORE?
This and other obstacles on which translators may stumble
along the translating process did not deter nor hamper the bold
translators of Vocabulaire juridique into English. The translated
text is faithful not only to Cornu’s letter but also to his spirit, a feat
in itself considering his high legal expectations and his writing
style. It is in a class all by itself and sets the bar very high for
future candidates envisaging to engage into such a hazardous
endeavor: translating a law dictionary, whatever the language,
without keeping in mind that translation cannot live forever if it is
not assigned extreme, even impossible, challenges. This labor of
Sisyphus that produced an English version of Vocabulaire
juridique should captivate law students and professors, judges and
attorneys, jurilinguists and translators, whether English or Frenchspeaking, in Louisiana and elsewhere in the legal sphere, interested
in one way or another by civil law, its terms and notions, and by its
unique way of expressing them. They will, no doubt, welcome and
appreciate this great piece of inspiring translated doctrinal work,
which, on top of that, is presented in the user-friendly format and
text of Cornu’s Quadrige source text. Last but not least, they might
get Cornu’s embedded message also carried by the translators of
the Dictionary of the Civil Code: “remember the [civil law]
style.”21

20. Id.
21. Boyet: “I am much deceived but I remember the style” (Love’s Labour’s
Lost, 4.1.96).

